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
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SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS
1904

SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS

BY

FRANCIS GALTON, E. WESTERMARCK, P. GEDDES
E. DURKHEIM, HAROLD H. MANN
AND V. V. BRANFORD

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS

BY

JAMES BRYCE

PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIETY



PUBLISHED FOR THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

London

MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED

NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1905

SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
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Printed by
John Lewis & Co., at The Selkirk Press,
5 Bridewell Place, London, E.C.



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PREFACE

The contents of the present volume consist principally of the papers read before the Sociological Society in its first session, during the spring and summer of 1904, together with a report of the discussions which followed some of them. A report of the address given at the opening meeting of the Society by Mr. BRYCE serves—and nothing could serve better—as an Introduction.

The subjects covered by the papers may perhaps be grouped under the following three heads—

1. **The History and Methodology of Sociology**—represented here by the papers of Professor DURKHEIM and Mr. BRANFORD. Professor DURKHEIM's paper dealing with the scope and definition of sociology, was the means of focussing on that vexed question, a large body of authoritative opinion. It elicited communications from many leading sociologists both at home and abroad, which form a veritable international symposium, in which French, German, Italian, Russian, and Dutch sociologists are represented. It was unfortunate that the preparations for the discussion of Professor DURKHEIM's paper were commenced too late to permit of the participation of American sociologists. Many of these have welcomed the

establishment of the Sociological Society, and given it their personal adhesion.

2. **Pioneer Researches in Borderland Problems**—represented by the papers of Dr. WESTERMARCK and Mr. H. H. MANN. The former, apart from its own value, stands here as a type of research which sociologists are forced to undertake—partly because the subject is vital to any adequate theory of social evolution, and partly because it belongs to a field not definitely cultivated by any organised body of specialists. In other words, the sociologist is himself compelled to undertake specialist research into such subjects as Marriage, War, Sport, Class Distinction, etc.; because these have not been brought adequately within any of the existing sub-sciences into which the sociological province is at present partitioned. Mr. MANN's paper—secured through the kind offices of Mr. SEEBOHM ROWNTREE—gives the results of an important investigation into the family budgets of an English village community. As a contribution to general demography, this paper may claim to rank as sociological, though professedly economic in its inception.

3. **Applied Sociology**—represented here by Mr. GALTON's paper on "Eugenics" and Professor GEDDES' on "Civics." These, though brought forward in entire independence, are yet, it will be observed, correlative. The one deals with the citizen, the other with cities. But problems of population and problems of housing, only need to be stated in the more general terms of organism and environment, for their interdependence to become manifest. It is from such points of departure as those adopted in these two papers, that, in the future, must be built up an applied science of sociology. At present the mere conception of an applied sociology is apt to startle by its novelty. Students may therefore be cautioned

against allowing the mere novelty of the general conception to prejudice their judgment of the particular applications recommended respectively by Mr. GALTON and Professor GEDDES.

The Society is doubly indebted to Mr. GALTON, in the first place for the obligation he conferred on the Society by emerging from his retirement to appear on its platform ; and in the second place for permission to include in the present volume his "Index to Achievements of near kinsfolk of some of the Fellows of the Royal Society." This latter paper of Mr. GALTON's very appropriately finds a place alongside his address on "Eugenics," since it is in itself a step towards that "Golden Book of Thriving Families" which Mr. GALTON urges the Sociological Society to initiate.

The thanks of the Editorial Committee* are due to many helpers in the preparation of the volume—and especially for translations, to Miss B. E. MEYER, Mr. J. A. CABLE and Mr. W. MACDONALD ; and for proof revision to Mr. GEORGE LEWIS, J.P.

It will be understood that responsibility for statement of fact and doctrine in the various papers, discussions and communications included in the volume, rests entirely with the respective writers and speakers.

* The Members of this Committee are:—Mr. L. T. HOBHOUSE (Chairman), Professor GEDDES, Mr. G. P. GOOCH, Mr. J. A. HOBSON, Mr. BENJAMIN KIDD, Mr. J. M. ROBERTSON, and Mr. V. V. BRANFORD (Hon. Sec.). In the earlier stages of the work the Committee was assisted by Mr. H. G. WELLS.

INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS*

ON

THE USE AND PURPOSE OF A SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

BY THE RT. HON. JAMES BRYCE.

It has been suggested to me that a few preliminary words are needed with regard to the aims which the Sociological Society sets before itself, and the sort of work it hopes to do. Doubtless, any new society, any organisation added to the large number of associations already existing for promoting various branches of study and inquiry, does need to be justified. We have so many that it may be said no more should be called into existence unless some conclusive reason can be given. There was a rule in some of the republics of antiquity that when a man asked leave to propose a new law, he should come in with a halter round his neck, because there were so many, indeed too many, laws already in force. So it may be thought that any one sets himself a difficult task who undertakes to justify the addition of one more society to the enormous number of organisations already in existence. As we know, a considerable part of every one's working-day would be taken up in attending committees, if he were to render attendance at all whereof he is a member. I trust, however, that it will not be difficult to justify the Sociological Society.

* Delivered at a meeting of the Society in the School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), April 18, 1904.

I shall not attempt to define sociology; and far be it from me to describe the full scope of this society. I will rather venture to suggest a few reasons why a new society may be needed which will add something to the agencies that exist for the purpose of devising and conducting inquiries into the various functions, or, let us say, the various spheres of activity which characterise human society. Man, as a being living in society, presents himself in such an endless variety of aspects, that we have not to-day by any means exhausted these aspects, considered as subjects of scientific study. Even supposing that at any given time students were to draw up an exhaustive list of the recognised branches of social study, yet we may be quite certain that before many years had elapsed, other branches would have suggested themselves. Other lines of inquiry, different from those men had previously thought of conducting, would emerge as needing to be followed out, each in its own way. Here, in this ever-expanding ramification of social investigation, is to be found the first of the reasons why a Sociological Society is required. There does not exist at present any society or association, so far as I know, which surveys with the eye of science the whole field of human activity. Therefore, it does seem proper that when any new department of human knowledge comes into being, there should be a general society under whose fostering tutelage the new science may grow and develop through its own juvenile stages until the time of maturity and integration arrives, when its cultivators are numerous and strong enough to constitute an organisation of their own.

Many incipient branches of social study are beginning to emerge, which a sociological society seems called upon to deal with. I will take one example from a subject which is the topic for a discourse included in the programme of the first series of papers read before the society. The subject is called by Francis Galton, one of the most original and most unwearied of our investigators, "Eugenics"—by which he means the science of the laws which govern the formation of the best types of man. That is a branch of the great subject of heredity—a human subject which has been very imperfectly investigated as yet; for which, so far as I know, there exists no special society, and yet it is a subject in which there are immense possibilities. I had occasion not long ago, in

an examination into the relations of the different races of mankind, to inquire as to the result of intermarriage, and whether the result of the unions of persons belonging to races of different colour really is, as is commonly supposed, to make the product of the union inferior to one or other of the parent stocks, or whether it tends to produce a better race. I found there were extremely few data available on the subject. I was not able to discover—although one would think it must exist in Germany, where we fancy there are books on every conceivable subject—any systematic treatise on this topic. Such a book does not, at any rate so far as I could ascertain, exist in English; and, apparently, there is no work treating the subject with completeness in French or Italian. Neither is there any society which devotes itself specially to that subject. The anthropologists have a society, but they do not seem to have followed up this particular line of inquiry to any great extent. Here, therefore, even in a matter so familiar as the doctrine of heredity in its relation to the various races of mankind, are topics wherein much still remains to be done.

Another ground for the establishment of a Sociological Society is that where various branches of investigation have been studied and developed as special departments of the so-called social sciences, there, notwithstanding, does not between them exist that intimate relation which ought to exist for the common benefit of all. There are many societies and associations which work along parallel lines, but without developing relations of inter-communication. And yet nothing should be more easy than to place these cognate branches in profitable relations with each other. A single society surveying the whole field of human phenomena ought to be able to bring all these diverse and formally unconnected, yet really interlacing branches, into systematic co-operation. Further, it has to be noted as both a cause and an effect of the inadequate correlation of the various departments, that the workers themselves live in too great isolation from one another. It would be a solid gain and help were the specialists in different groups able to meet and compare notes more often. But the facilities for this commingling of diverse specialists in the mental and moral sciences have not been hitherto organised. It is the hope and aim of the Sociological Society to bring into a useful

and helpful relation with one another persons who follow out each one of the several branches of social investigation. And it is thought that by having one society to which the other more specialised societies may send communications that are of general interest for all or many departments of human study, a more rapid advance may be made towards the correlation and unification of all forms and kinds of knowledge bearing on Man.

I may add that in this country we have done less than might have been expected for the development of the theoretical side of systematic inquiry into the sciences connected with human progress. The one conspicuous exception is political economy. In that branch perhaps no nation has, on the whole, done so much as our own. If we look at the eminence of the names of those who have adorned this subject, we have reason to be proud of what the British thinkers and writers have done for the advancement of economic science. But in many branches of social study, our achievements have been, on the theoretical side, less than they might have been. It is true that on the practical side Britain has, since the days of Adam Smith, achieved a great deal. Speaking generally, we have had, and we have still, a large number of practical workers—energetic, enterprising, patient men and women who have laboured at all sorts of social undertakings for the benefit of the people, principally in the line of what we call philanthropic work. We have done a great deal to secure practical progress in matters bearing on poor law, charities, public health, hospitals; upon the use and abuse of endowments, and many other subjects of that kind. But our theoretical treatment of these matters has fallen rather behind the level of our practical work; and there are many departments of social activity in Britain which rest too exclusively upon a merely empirical basis, even where scientific knowledge is available and where it might be brought to bear, were scientific resources adequately organised and made accessible. I need not enlarge to such an audience as this upon the enormous benefit it is to practical men to have the aid of the men of theory.

Another set of reasons which justify the establishment of a Sociological Society will appear when we turn our thoughts to certain immediate and practical objects. One of these is

to advocate, and if possible secure, better provision for the teaching of the theory of all branches of social inquiry than exists in our universities or other educational institutions. We have a marked deficiency of university chairs and lecture-ships devoted to topics of this kind. Any one who doubts that British universities have fallen conspicuously behind in the provision for teaching and research in the social sciences may be readily convinced by a brief study of the lists given in the German annual publication called *Minerva*. In the lists there given of academic teachers in the social sciences in various countries, it will be seen how marked is the superiority of the best Continental and American universities over British ones. Of course, our universities are comparatively poor; but the country is rich, so that we must not allow poverty to stand in the way of a proper effort.

It may be added that another aim which the Society might set before itself is to secure better collections of books bearing on social science. Britain possesses very few libraries which are adequately equipped for sociological research. The library of this School of Economics and Political Science in whose rooms we are met, has been particularly organised with a view to the advancement of research in two, at least, of the social sciences. But the social sciences are many; and a great deal more remains to be done both in London and elsewhere. I am told, for instance, that it is impossible for the sociological student to find in any one library in this country an even fairly complete set of the files of the leading foreign journals of his subject. The Society will have a worthy aim before it in endeavouring to get the public libraries to make their collection of books on this subject more complete. Here then, in advocating the extension of sociological teaching, and in urging the multiplication and organisation of bibliographical resources are two of many ways in which a sociological society may do useful propagandist work.

Finally, let me refer to what in the largest sense may be said to be the general aim of the Society. It has become a commonplace to say that the great change—the greatest of all changes, perhaps—that has passed over the world during the last 150 years has come not only from the material developments

arising out of the progress of the physical sciences, but even more from the effect these sciences have produced upon the minds of men, and upon the investigation of all other subjects. The very idea of science (*i.e.*, the grouping of facts and sequences into ascertained and positive relationships) is an idea which, although existing for many centuries, has now become so immensely potent and so universally disseminated as to mark an important stage in the development of the human mind. It has had its full effect in the domain of physical science, but not yet in the domain of human science. All the human sciences, from history and ethics downwards, have not yet been brought as fully within the grasp of this idea as ought to be the case. Therefore, a sociological society has a great and useful task before it in endeavouring to interpenetrate every department of human investigation with the scientific idea.

The success which the Society can attain will, of course, depend upon the number and character of the persons who join it. If it can induce the leading men who work in the several main departments of social inquiry to come in and give it the benefit of their support and co-operation; and if those who join it are prepared to work assiduously and steadily in promoting its aims—to attend meetings, to assist one another in pushing its work out in new directions, results of permanent and solid worth may be expected. But, be that as it may, we may legitimately feel that the need for bringing these subjects more fully into the domain of science—for establishing between those who work at them due relationship and co-operation—for developing theory so that it may react upon practice—is a need of our time so real and so urgent as to justify the effort now being made for the creation of this Sociological Society.

THE WORD SOCIOLOGY.

ON THE ORIGIN AND USE OF THE WORD SOCIOLOGY,*

AND ON THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGICAL TO OTHER STUDIES AND
TO PRACTICAL PROBLEMS.

By VICTOR V. BRANFORD, M.A.

I. COMTE'S USAGE OF THE WORD.

Only after a severe and protracted struggle has the word Sociology established itself in international usage. It was introduced by Auguste Comte in the series of lecture courses which resulted in the publication of the "Positive Philosophy,"—the final instalment of this appearing in 1842. Comte's intention in introducing the word has been widely misunderstood. It has too often been confused with the suggestions of practical change in polity and in religion which Comte in the latter part of his life advocated. It seems advisable, therefore, to recall the historical circumstances out of which the word Sociology arose.

Comte considered himself to be in succession to a line of thinkers historically beginning with Thales and Pythagoras,

* This paper was, at the instance of a Provisional Committee, printed for private circulation in 1903, to accompany a circular addressed to various representatives of philosophical, scientific and practical interests, asking their opinion as to the advisability of forming a Sociological Society. It was in response to the overwhelming body of affirmative opinion thus secured that the Provisional Committee decided to proceed with the establishment of the Society. The original members of the Provisional Committee were—the Rt. Hon. J. Bryce, M.P., Dr. C. M. Douglas, M.P., Dr. A. C. Haddon, F.R.S., Professor Geddes, Professor C. S. Loch, Dr. R. D. Roberts, Professor Sully, Mr. E. J. Urwick, and Mr. J. Martin White.

continuing with Bacon and Descartes, and (for Comte) culminating in Hume. With the work of Kant, Comte was very imperfectly acquainted, being in all probability familiar only with the "Idea of a Universal History." Of Hegel's work, too, he had only a general and probably vague knowledge, apparently regarding him, at one time, as an elder contemporary, engaged also in the task of constructing a sort of positive philosophy. For Comte, then, Hume's "Treatise of Human Nature" was the highest expression of philosophy endeavouring to unify the total available knowledge of Man. But between the publication of Hume's "Treatise" in 1739 and Comte's attempt at a fresh synthesis, almost exactly a century intervened. It is indeed a coincidence worthy of remark, that the particular volume of the "Philosophie Positive" which introduced the word Sociology was actually published in 1839. In this intervening century the range of verifiable knowledge was enormously extended in all departments of investigation. It was a period of immense activity, analytic and synthetic, in the mathematical and physical sciences—witness the names of Fourier, Lagrange and Laplace, of Carnot, Coulomb and Volta, of Scheele, Lavoisier, Cavendish, Davy, Berthollet and Dalton. But as affecting the genesis of Sociology, the main features of the century were, in the first place, the creation of the Biological Sciences as definite systems of study, and in the second place the growth of the conception of a Science of History. In whole or in part belong to the period 1739-1842, the labours of Linnaeus, Haller and Jussieu, of Buffon and Cuvier; and finally, the attempt of Bichat, of Lamarck and of Treviranus to institute a general science of the phenomena of life, for which both the latter used the title Biology. The idea of a science of Human History, if it belongs to any one individual, belongs to Vico, who held that he had established it by his "New Science" in 1725. This idea, in the interval between Hume's "Treatise" and Comte's "Positive Philosophy," had been notably developed in France by Montesquieu, Turgot, Condorcet and St. Simon, in Germany by Lessing, Herder and Kant, in Scotland by Adam Smith, Ferguson and Miller.

The particular task which Comte proposed to himself

was to survey with the eye of philosophy the scientific and historical labours of this prolific century intervening between Hume and himself. His attempted unification was propounded under the name of the Positive Philosophy, and for that portion of the Positive Philosophy which set forth the bearing of the new scientific and historical knowledge on the conceptions of Human Nature and Society, he proposed the name Sociology. These he understood to be the two perennial problems of Philosophy—to unify the extant body of knowledge and to show its bearing on human life past, present, and future. And in the increase of the mass and definiteness of knowledge, in the growth of the demonstrable and verifiable element in the social synthesis, lay the justification of instituting a new department of study which was to be at once an organ of Science and of Philosophy.

The particular word, Sociology, chosen for the new branch of philosophy was justified philologically on two grounds. In the first place it was urged that the Greek language afforded no word so appropriate in significance as the Latin Socius. In the second place the hybrid character of the word—justified in any case by analogy with mineralogy—was declared to be a convenient memento of the twofold nature (at once material and spiritual) of human society, and the derivation of these two phases of modern western civilisation, the one mainly from Roman and the other mainly from Hellenic sources.

II. J. S. MILL'S ADOPTION OF THE WORD.

Between Vico's "New Science" and Comte's "Sociology" the infiltration of various kindred phrases, such as Social Science, Science of Society (Condorcet), Science of Man (St. Simon) would seem to mark a general tendency towards the expansion of science into the field of humanistic studies. Among Comte's contemporaries J. S. Mill (only eight years younger than Comte) held pronouncedly that the time was ripe for marking off from other studies—both scientific and philo-

sophical—a general social science, and for this he himself proposed a particular designation. In 1836 Mill defined the scope and character of this department of studies, using as titular synonyms, these, among other phrases—Social Philosophy, Social Science, Natural History of Society, Speculative Politics, and Social Economy. This essay of Mill (“On the Definition and Method of Political Economy”) appeared six years before the completion of the “Positive Philosophy.” Lacking the large historical interests of Comte, Mill necessarily conceived of Social Science in a considerably different way from Comte. But after the appearance of the “Positive Philosophy,” Mill very considerably modified his views of Social Science. He abandoned both the phrases he had previously recommended as being the most suitable titles—Social Economy and Speculative Politics. He even denied to the latter any right to exist as a separate department of scientific studies. The word Sociology he sanctioned by frequent use in the final book of his “Logic”—that “On the Logic of the Moral Sciences,”—perhaps the least studied and most valuable of all the parts of the famous treatise. Writing in 1843, Mill said, “if the endeavours now making in all the more cultivated nations, and beginning to be made even in England (usually the last to enter into the general movement of the European mind) for the construction of a Philosophy of History, shall be directed and controlled by those views of the nature of sociological evidence which I have (very briefly and imperfectly) attempted to characterise, they cannot fail to give birth to a sociological system widely removed from the vague and conjectural character of all former attempts, and worthy to take its place, at last, among the sciences. When this time shall come, no important branch of human affairs will be any longer abandoned to empiricism and unscientific surmise.” Anticipating the practical effects of sociological study on statesmanship, Mill said: “By its aid we may hereafter succeed not only in looking far forward into the future history of the human race, but in determining what artificial means may be used, and to what extent, to accelerate the natural progress in so far as it is beneficial; to compensate for whatever may be its inherent inconveniences or disadvan-

tages; and to guard against the dangers or accidents to which our species is exposed from the necessary incidents of its progression. Such practical instructions, founded on the highest branch of speculative Sociology, will form the noblest and more beneficial portion of the Political Art. That of this science and art even the foundations are but beginning to be laid is sufficiently evident. But the superior minds are fairly turning themselves towards the object." Since this plea for Sociology was written by Mill two generations have passed. Is it not humiliating to reflect that, in England, one has still to plead and argue for the very existence of the word, and this, moreover, after its general establishment in international usage?*

For a long time the word Sociology made little headway, and this notwithstanding Mill's sanction and usage of it, and the rapid acquisition and long maintenance by his "Logic," of classic rank throughout the western world; carrying as it did the new term into quarters—notably in Germany and America—where the "Positive Philosophy" did not penetrate. It was not in fact till more than half a century had passed, that the word could be said to be accepted as part of the international vocabulary of the learned world. In this, to be sure, is followed the general tendency of ideas to outstrip words. No one, for instance, to-day denies the legitimacy of general studies in the Natural Sciences; and yet there are universities in which the word Biology is not yet officially recognised. And Biology, it has to be remembered, had more than a generation's start of Sociology, as a piece of technical nomenclature. It is therefore not surprising that what Huxley said of Biology in 1874 should be widely applicable to Sociology still:—"There are I believe some persons who imagine that the term Biology is simply a new-fangled designation, a neologism in short." Incidentally it is worth noting that Huxley in that same address in 1874 spoke of Sociology as a "constituted science." By this he did not of course mean that our knowledge of social phenomena

* "Professor Bain tells that Mill entertained a project of executing a work on Sociology 'as a whole,' but the project collapsed in a singular fashion through Mill's conscious failure to shape to any purpose his notion of 'Ethology,' or science of character, which was to be the foundation of his sociological scheme."—J. M. ROBERTSON, "Buckle and his Critics," p. 460, footnote.

was scientifically organised. He merely meant that to the needed work of organisation a group of trained investigators was pledged to co-operatively contribute—that, in short, a system of organised study was being built up.

III. SPENCER'S INFLUENCE.

An important factor in the ultimate establishment of the word Sociology was, of course, Spencer's adoption of it. His book, "The Study of Sociology," won recognition in almost every civilised country during the two decades between 1870 and 1890. The first volume of the "Principle of Sociology" appeared in 1876 and the last in 1896. Though comparatively neglected by British Universities, the work has been extensively studied in German and still more in American Universities. In France, too, Spencer's influence has tended to the dissemination both of the idea and the word; for he is there considered as the chief continuator of the philosophical and scientific work of Comte—a continuation in some respects the more emphatic and convincing by Spencer's repudiation of discipleship and total rejection of the political and religious deductions made by Comte in his later years from his sociological and philosophical system.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century there was a very considerable development of interests and studies specifically sociological. It was a time of growth characterised by the customary symptoms both of expansion of studies and of co-ordination of them—the establishment of chairs, lectureships, and institutions; the multiplication of literature (much of it, to be sure, calling itself sociological with little justification), and the founding of sociological journals. Outstanding marks in the history of the word during this decade were:—In France, the sociological lectures and writings of Tarde, of Durkheim, and of De Roberty; the establishment of the International Institute of Sociology (1893); the publication of the *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, and the addition (1894) to the *Revue Philosophique* of a section under the title "Sociologie"; and the publication of the *Année Sociologique* (1898). In Italy, the

publication of the *Rivista Italiana Sociologia* (1897), and the growth of sociological courses in the universities. In Italy there are to-day at least five journals devoted mainly or exclusively to sociological publication and research. There is even a sociological review of reviews! In Belgium there has been the foundation of the Université Nouvelle in Brussels, under de Greef, on a specifically sociological basis. In Germany have to be recorded the specifically sociological courses of Simmel in Berlin, of Tönnies in Kiel, and of Barth in Leipzig, and the publication of the latter's "Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie" (1897). In the United States, the wide extension of sociological courses in the Universities, Colleges, and Theological Seminaries, and the publication (in 1895), by the elaborately-equipped sociological department in Chicago University of the *American Journal of Sociology*, at once accepted in Europe as an important addition to the periodical literature of scientific studies.

During the past three or four years the further growth of the word in international usage is marked by the foundation of the Institut de Sociologie in Brussels, by the inclusion of an article under the heading "Sociology" in the supplement to the ninth edition to the "Encyclopædia Britannica" (following in this the recent example of the "Grande Encyclopédie"), and by the addition (in 1902) of the word "Sociology" to its title by the well-known quarterly (*Vierteljahrschrift für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie*) founded by Mach, Avenarius, and Riehl. In Great Britain, almost alone of leading nations, Sociology is to-day unrepresented by any special institution or periodical of scientific studies, and our Universities stand in conspicuous isolation, whether on the implicit assumption that sociological studies are adequately pursued under some other title, or that means and men are needed, we need not for the moment enquire.*

* Since this was written, an excellent beginning of specifically sociological teaching and investigation has been made by the University of London under Mr. Martin White's benefaction. Under this scheme, or in connexion with it, courses have already been given by Professor Geddes, Dr. Haddon, Dr. Westermarck, and Mr. L. T. Hobhouse. And to this has to be added the initiation of research in Eugenics, instituted by Mr. Francis Galton's benefaction to London University.

IV. GROUNDS ON WHICH THE WORD IS REJECTED.

In contending that the word Sociology has established itself in international usage, it is not of course intended to convey the impression that hostility has ceased, indifference been expelled, or misunderstanding corrected. There is, for instance, in many quarters, a prejudice against Sociology on the ground of its supposed antagonism to specialist studies of social phenomena. Sociology is, by these critics, conceived as an exclusive alternative to the group Economics, Politics, Ethics, &c. As well accuse the architect of being inimical to the mason and the carpenter. For this and other reasons, it remains a fact evident to the most superficial observer, that numerous influential groups of philosophers, scientists and critics still reject the word or restrict it either to some specialist application in science (as, for instance, to empirical anthropology), or to the vague purposes of popular usage. Of those who take up this position, some still do so on grounds of genuine though unconscious ignorance of what scientific Sociology stands for. Others, and to be sure they are both numerous and influential, have been at pains to investigate the case. Of these there are two main groups. The first group either denies the possibility of a General Study of social phenomena in terms of causation, or admits it as an intangible contingency of a remote future. The second group, while admitting the present need and opportunity for a General Study of social phenomena, yet denies the relevancy and legitimacy of the work of professed Sociologists. This second group of investigators customarily pursues general social studies under some other title than Sociology. Some of them do so by broadening out their own particular specialism—economics, politics, jurisprudence, psychology, anthropology, etc.—till it yields them a theory of social development, function and organisation, which, however, is almost of necessity coloured by the initial sectional bias. Students of economics, for instance, have been fertile in constructing systems rejected by Economists as theories of Business, but not admissible by Sociologists as theories of Society. From this particular source of error—a

fallacy of which Æsop made a well-known study—other students of social theory free themselves by starting from the more comprehensive standpoint of philosophy or of history, and the resulting study is pursued under the title of Social Philosophy or of Philosophy of History.

Of all these different groups of social investigators working outside the conception of a sociological science, it has to be remarked—in no disparagement of their work, but as matter of observed fact—that they are apt to be deficient in some one or more of the necessary elements of a comprehensive sociological equipment. Those who deny to general social studies a scientific status are usually specialists lacking in philosophical or broad historical training. These are consequently accustomed to narrow their range of vision by a too strict confinement within the rigid yet often arbitrary boundaries marked off for them by the division of scientific labour. Those who make some sectional study or groups of studies a point of departure for the pursuit of a general social theory, are usually men of broad mind, but may be limited in philosophical or historical knowledge; while those who seek a social theory under the title of Social Philosophy or Philosophy of History are apt to be defective in their equipment of exact science. To the last two statements there are, to be sure, notable exceptions in individual cases; but the broad truth of the description will probably pass without challenge. It remains nevertheless a fact that a steady flow of excellent contributions to Sociology comes from each of the foregoing groups, and not the least in either excellence or number from those specialists who repudiate the existence of general studies in social phenomena. In this, in fact, lies the main strength of the sociological position and its fulness of promise for the future—that each one of the sciences that directly deals with the phenomena of Man is gradually organising and orienting itself towards a sociological position. The more that process of re-orientation can be brought within the conscious and educated intention of the specialist investigator, the more rapid will be the growth of the still nascent science of Sociology. On these grounds alone it behoves those interested in the development of sociological studies to organise the alliance and

co-operation of all who, under whatever titular mark, pursue studies that touch upon Man. To disclose these common truths, to advance these common interests by bringing together representatives of the different groups, is one of the main purposes of the Sociological Society.

V. THE SCOPE AND AIM OF SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES.

The accompanying analysis of a year's output of sociological literature, noticed in the *Année Sociologique* for 1902 will serve in the first place to indicate the scope of sociological studies as understood by at least one large group of active sociological workers, and in the second place to exhibit the relative strength and direction of the sociological movement in the different nations.* Here, then, are nearly 500 different publications selected by the editors of the *Année* for summarisation, on the ground of being contributions made to Sociology during the year. These contributions do not of course all come from professed Sociologists. On the contrary, the great majority of them issue from investigators working under other designations—those, *e.g.*, of Philosophy or History, Jurisprudence or Politics, Psychology or Philology, Ethics or Æsthetics, Folklore or Comparative Religion, Anthropology or Demography, Geography or Statistics, &c. Assuming that contributions may be made to Sociology from each and all of these specialist points of

* The views of that veteran sociologist and careful observer, Dr. Lester Ward, on the international position in sociological investigation are given in the following extract from his Report to the U. S. Government, on the Social Economy Section of the Paris Exposition of 1900:—"All the countries of the civilised world are contributing to the sociological movement, but the activity is greater in some than in others. It is perhaps least in England. In Germany, it has a distinctive character, with a tendency to evade the name of sociology. It is very marked in Italy and Belgium, slightly less so in Switzerland and the Netherlands, perceptibly on the increase in Spain and Portugal, and wholly absent from several South American States. In the United States this activity is most intense and very real and earnest. But there can be no doubt that it is in France, which was also the cradle of the science, that sociology has taken the firmest hold upon the thinking classes, and it is there that we find the largest annual output, whether we confine ourselves to the literature or include in our enumeration the practical applications of Sociology in the form of institutions, such as the Musée Social, for carrying on lines of operation calculated to educate and enlighten the people in social matters."—*U. S. Education Report*, 1900.

ANALYSIS* OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE (IN BOOKS AND IN PERIODICALS) SUMMARISED IN THE "ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE" FOR 1902.

	NUMBERS OF PUBLICATIONS IN—						
	France.	Italy.	United States of America.	Germany.	England.	Other Countries	TOTAL.
I. GENERAL SOCIOLOGY	26	10	8	6	5	1	
1. Objects and Methods of Sociology	9	5	2	2	—	—	18
2. Social Philosophy—General Theories	7	2	4	2	—	1	16
3. Mentality of Groups	5	2	—	—	—	—	7
4. Civilisation in General and Types of Civilisation... ..	1	1	1	1	2	—	6
5. Collective Ethology	2	—	—	—	2	—	4
6. The Social Milieu and the Race	2	—	1	1	1	—	5
II. RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY	29	5	12	75	29	11	
1. General Conceptions Methodology	4	1	1	2	—	—	8
2. Elementary Forms of Religious Life	1	1	5	18	11	5	41
3. Magic	1	—	1	5	—	3	10
4. Beliefs and Practices Concerning the Dead	4	—	1	4	2	1	12
5. Ritual	4	1	2	9	5	1	22
6. Religious Representations	12	1	1	27	8	1	50
7. Religious Society	1	1	1	6	1	—	10
8. General Studies on the Great Religions	2	—	—	4	2	—	8
III. JURIDICAL AND MORAL SOCIOLOGY	45	15	5	34	7	10	
1. General Considerations	10	4	—	—	2	—	16
2. Social Organisation in General	2	—	1	5	2	—	10
3. Political Organisation	5	2	1	1	—	4	13
4. Domestic Organisation	11	2	—	14	2	—	29
5. Law of Property	2	1	—	1	—	1	5
6. Law of Contract	4	—	1	—	—	1	6
7. Criminal Law	7	1	—	8	—	4	20
8. Procedure	1	3	—	1	1	—	6
9. Miscellaneous	3	2	—	4	—	—	9
IV. CRIMINAL SOCIOLOGY & MORAL STATISTICS	12	9	1	5	3	5	
1. Statistics of Domestic Life	2	—	—	2	—	—	4
2. General Criminality in the Different Countries	1	2	1	1	—	1	6
3. Factors of General Criminality	4	3	—	1	—	2	10
4. Special Forms of Criminality and Immorality	2	2	—	1	2	1	8
5. Crime-making Milieux. Societies of Male- factors and their Customs	2	2	—	—	—	1	5
6. Functioning of the Repressive System	1	—	—	—	1	—	2
V. ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY	21	4	5	35	5	3	
1. Methodology—General Problems	1	1	1	2	3	—	8
2. Economic Systems	2	—	1	—	1	—	4
3. Regimes of Production	—	2	1	6	—	2	11
4. Forms of Production	1	—	—	7	—	—	8
5. Elements of Distribution	1	—	1	1	—	—	3
6. Economic Classes	2	—	—	2	—	—	4
7. Professional Associations	1	—	—	1	—	1	3
8. Special Economies (Agrarian, Commercial, and Colonial)	4	—	—	8	1	—	13
9. Social Legislation	4	1	—	4	—	—	9
10. Miscellaneous	5	—	1	4	—	—	10
VI. SOCIAL MORPHOLOGY	7	1	1	6	2	4	
1. The Geographical Base of Society	1	—	1	—	1	—	3
2. Population in General	3	—	—	3	1	2	9
3. Urban and Rural Groupings	3	1	—	3	—	2	9
VII. MISCELLANEOUS	6	4	—	4	1	2	
1. Æsthetic Sociology	2	2	—	2	1	1	8
2. Technology	2	1	—	—	—	1	4
3. Language	1	—	—	1	—	—	2
4. War	1	1	—	1	—	—	3
	146	48	30	165	52	36	477

* See Note on next page.

NOTE.—The classification of Sociological literature on preceding page is that of the editors of the *Année*. It may be compared with the following different arrangements to be found explicitly or implicitly in other leading periodicals of Sociology :—

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOCIAL WISSENSCHAFT.	RIVISTA ITALIANA SOCIOLOGIA.	VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE. Outside the strictly philosophical part of the Journal, the classification is as follows—
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political Economy. 2. Social Philosophy and Social Ethics. 3. Social History and Social Jurisprudence. 4. Evolution Theory. 5. Anthropology. 6. Mass and Individual Psychology. 7. Medicine and Hygiene. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Anthropology and Ethnology. 2. Demography. 3. Social Psychology. 4. Social Economy. 5. Social Ethics. 6. Jurisprudence. 7. Politics. 8. Criminal Sociology. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Psychology and Science of Language. 2. Ethics and Philosophy of Law. 3. Æsthetics. 4. Philosophy of Society and of History. 5. Philosophy of Religion. 6. Natural Philosophy. 7. Education.

The diversities disclosed in these different systems of classifications are sometimes urged as evidence that Sociological studies are in too immature a condition to be worth serious organised investigation. But is not that an argument which, if consistently applied, would exclude from the field of organised research almost, if not quite, the whole of the mental and moral sciences, and would also eliminate not a few of the recognised branches of the material sciences—as for instance, meteorology?

view, the question arises—How to distinguish, in the researches of psychologists, anthropologists, or other specialists, what is pertinent to Sociology, and set it apart from what is, as it were, technical and internal to the particular specialism from which it emanates? The answer to that question will depend, of course, on the precise meaning attached to the word Sociology, and the degree to which it is co-ordinated with other studies. A better way, perhaps, to put the question is to ask what is the distinguishing mark of the Sociologist as contrasted with the specialist investigator who studies Man under one or other of the different manifestations called Business, Law, Politics, History, Health, Mentality, Language, Fine Arts, Education, Manners, Morals, Religion, &c.?

Before trying to answer that question, let us make the assumption that Sociology is not another name for Social Psychology or any other sectional study or group of sectional studies. There is indeed at the present moment some tendency that way even among Sociologists themselves, and the logical result is either the fall of Sociology from the rank of a general to that of a merely specialist study, or the rising of as many sociologies as there are sectional approaches to the central problems of social development, function, and organisation. There is a synthetic standpoint which is not to be confused with that search for a unificatory social principle which has been a will-o'-the-wisp to so many Sociologists. Let us assume, then, that the professed Sociologist—whether or not he be a sectional investigator—yet as Sociologist is faithful to the general conception of the science and seeks some higher ultra-sectional standpoint, from which all available knowledge of Man and his action and reaction with environment may be drawn together and focussed for two purposes. The first of these two purposes is a speculative one—the understanding and interpreting of that unfolding process or drama of social evolution, in which we are all interested as spectators and as participants. The second purpose is practical—the utilisation of our knowledge, gathered and unified from its manifold sources, for the directing, as far as may be, and in part controlling, of this evolutionary process. The first task of Sociology—as pure science—is thus the de-

liberate, systematic, and ever-continuing attempt to construct a more and more fully-reasoned social theory—a theory of the origin and growth, of the structures and functions, of the ideals and destiny of human society. The second task of Sociology—as applied science—is the construction of principles applicable to the ordering of social life, in so far as concrete problems can be shown to come within the range of verifiable knowledge.

Regarded from this point of view the closeness of Sociology to Philosophy and to Religion on the one side and to the Arts of Statesmanship and of Education on the other is manifest. And this juxtaposition of the Sociologist to the Philosopher and the Theologian, to the Statesman and to the Educationist, profoundly distinguishes the Sociologist from the specialist investigator who occupies himself exclusively with the study of some particular one of the many recognised approaches to social knowledge. The Sociologist derives his general attitude, his mental tendency and outlook from philosophy, but the positive contents of his study he derives from the sciences, drawing in turn upon the whole circle of the positive sciences—material, mental, and moral. Thus, as Comte, Spencer, and subsequent Sociologists have so fully pointed out, in order to acquire an adequate equipment for Sociology, an investigator must have some command not only of the special social sciences, but also must grasp at least one branch—and that a central one—of each of the three great groups of the preliminary sciences—the mathematical, the physical, and the biological. From these he acquires a training in precise observation and rigorous logic, a familiarity with the sources of accumulated knowledge, a habit of detached and impersonal generalisation, and an instinct for verifying his generalisations by reference to matters of concrete fact. Yet if his education stop here, the Sociologist is not unlikely to miss some of the most indispensable qualities, if not even acquire some of the most ineradicable of defects. The remedy lies in an adequate training in philosophical and in historical studies—which, by old convention, based on use but not on reason, we speak of as outside the sciences. To test the adequacy of studies of the Past, we must ask how they help to build up the student's conception of the Future. From historical

studies (interpreting these words in a broad sense) the student of Sociology acquires most readily and fully the conception—above all necessary to the Statesman and the Educationist—of an evolutionary process in which nature is not necessarily the dominating, but may be the dominated factor. This conception of Man, as conquering nature and determining for himself the conditions of life, throws back the Sociologist on the positive sciences with certain specific inquiries, addressed in turn to the representatives of each one of the scientific specialisms of the day. The particular form and content of each of these inquiries will depend on which of the sciences is appealed to, but the general purpose of the question will be to ask—Under what limits and conditions, here and now, may man become master of his fate? What ideals of action are sanctioned by the sciences? What resources of contemporary science are available towards the realisation of social ideals? How to construct by the aid of the sciences a pathway to a fuller life? Here the student reaches a point of view from which the scheme of the sciences is seen to be no other thing than a convenient, and hence a continuous, indeed ever-extending, device for parcelling out a difficult piece of work amongst squads of labourers. The general aim underlying this division of labour is the directing of cosmic and human energies to the service of certain ideals of life. Each labourer works at his own job, what he conceives to be his specifically appointed task. And so far well; but unless there is some common and correspondingly increasing understanding as to criteria, methods, and desired ends of work, there will be friction and waste of effort amongst the workers, and a struggle of ideals, in which the lower ones too often eliminate the higher. The study of these underlying unities—criteria of the principles of knowledge, a theory of method, and a theory of ideals—has hitherto lain for the most part with Philosophy, under its branches of Epistemology, Logic and Methodology, Teleology (doctrine of ends), or the like. From Philosophy, then, the student of Sociology must borrow the aptitudes and inclinations associated with these studies, leaving, of course, to their special cultivators the internal and technical questions of each.

To philosophical studies also the Sociologist must owe another, and perhaps the very first of his qualities—if we mean by philosophical studies the persistent endeavour to re-think some of the elemental thoughts that have occupied the great philosophers of history. Human personality, its origin and destiny, its relation to humanity and to the world, its degree of freedom and determinism—these elemental questions touch the very bed-rock of Sociology. And the Sociologist claims it as differentiating his subject, both from metaphysical Philosophy and from Theology, that it belongs to him to re-state these questions and the available answers from the point of view and in terms of contemporary science. But in claiming this province, the Sociologist is far from denying legitimacy and justification, either to the dialectic of Metaphysics or to the dogma of Theology, in a field where, beyond shifting limits, the rigid canons of scientific method do not reach.

It is, on the contrary, contended that contact with the living tradition of metaphysics, in the above sense, must be sought, if the student of Sociology is to acquire in full measure that mental attitude which is the special characteristic of the philosopher—his comprehensiveness of view, his insatiable but disciplined curiosity, his tendency to “think things whole.” The Sociologist will inevitably fall short at some stage of his work unless he, too, is possessed by the philosopher’s “universal home-sickness”—the unquenchable desire to feel at home in all the representative departments of thought and action. It is by the cultivation of this tendency that the specialist in any department of social science may hope to pass from the abstractions of his special studies to an approximate unification of available sociological knowledge, and from this concrete unity may, and indeed must, proceed to consider its practical application to contemporary life. In other words, it is by combining philosophy and science (these again alternating with practical effort, though in that the Sociologist passes beyond his own definitive sphere) that the student may enjoy the necessary discipline of specialism in science, and, transcending that by the aid of historical and philosophical studies, may rise into the sphere of pure and applied Sociology.

VI. POPULAR "SOCIOLOGIES."

But the great body of instructed people, who are neither specialists in science nor professed students of philosophy—of what immediate interest to them are sociological studies?

There is a set of questions which popular custom sanctions and even enforces as an appropriate social catechism. We ask about a given person (1) What is he? (or, if a woman, what is her husband?)—a form of question which implies a popular belief in the dominance of the economic factor, for the question is universally interpreted to mean, How does he get his living? (2) What ideas has he? What does he know? (3) What about his character? (4) Is his health good? Does he come of a good stock? and so on.

The asking and the answering of these apparently simple questions imply the dissemination throughout the community of a certain accepted body of knowledge, thought and sentiment—about the classification of occupations and their grading in social repute; about social criteria of wealth production, acquisition, and consumption; about standards of physical development, health, and beauty in the population; about behaviour and bearing in domestic and social life; about the appropriate education of the individual in relation to contemporary standards of requirement in literature, science, art and religion; and finally, about criteria of conduct in business and in public life. There is, in short, implicit in the talk of daily life, a theory of social organisation and social function—a popular "Sociology." This common-sense Sociology is, in the language of the schools, static and not dynamic; it may be in a certain sense historical, but it is not yet evolutionary. It is a theory (or at least, if not a theory a collection of ideas) of social types, of social form, structure, and function, but not a theory of social growth and development. Such notions as are contained in the popular Sociology as to the origin, history, and destiny of Man are usually taken uncritically from other sources and customarily held as dogmas practically unaffecting the theory of social organisation and function. The popular

Sociology rests for the most part upon contradictory assumptions as to "the essential nature" of society, and these are usually held unconsciously, and, therefore, may equally affect the thought and conduct of the same person. Hence, in large measure, the frequent charge of inconsistency, levelled especially against politicians and social reformers. Of these two contrasted assumptions (stated in their extreme form), one is that society is cast in a mould practically unmodifiable by mundane arts, and the other is that society is a piece of mechanism devised by man and alterable at will.

These two equally mechanical preconceptions, surviving in the popular scheme of Sociology from pre-evolutionary political theories, have unfortunate effects on practical life. From ideas of the relation in which stand to each other the past, the present, and the future—*i.e.*, from conceptions of development—are necessarily derived the system of ideals. For what is an ideal but a generalisation of past and present experience from the point of view of the future? Hence it happens that when, in a time like the present, popular notions (if any) of social origins and social development are not in close correspondence with popular notions of social structure and function, duty and reputability, then one of two things is likely to happen. On the one hand, ideals of social life are apt to be so vague and shadowy as to seem hopelessly remote, with a consequent perfunctoriness, and, it may be, hypocrisy in the attempt to organise means towards their realisation; or on the other hand, they are apt to be mere generalised social appetites—in fact, no ideals at all, or at best very crude ones, mere nostrums compounded out of prejudice and abstraction, and conceived in such disregard of the real tendencies and possibilities of human nature and society, that any attempt to apply them to social regeneration necessarily ends in disillusionment and reaction. In this direction doubtless is to be sought an explanation of a certain popular confusion of Sociology with Socialism; for the mind of the multitude has no nice discrimination in the matter of nomenclature, and is ever ready to identify theory either with propagandism or with illusion, or with both at once.

The great want then of popular Sociology is a foundation of precise, systematic knowledge, and a relevant scheme of evolutionary ideals. Whence is to come the means of diffusing the spirit of humanistic science through the social community? How far is a general education capable of doing this? The questions noted above as constituting the elements of the popular social catechism, belong also, it will be observed, themselves to definite groups of specialist studies. Some of them are the elemental enquiries and starting-point of the sciences of Economics, Ethics, and Psychology. Others are fundamental to important branches of Biology, Physics, and *Æsthetics*. The popular social catechism in short is, in a sense, itself the basis of the social sciences, and, moreover, its range touches the whole field of the encyclopædia of the sciences.

VII. THE PLACE OF SOCIOLOGY IN EDUCATION AND CONDUCT.

How then does the mode of questioning adopted by the scientific investigator of social phenomena differ from that of the ordinary man? In a great many ways, but one point only calls for notice here. The aim of the pure scientist is to construct a moving panorama depicting the drama of social evolution as it proceeds through its various scenes and acts. In fact, the chief concern of the scientist is to get a good place from which to view the play on the stage, and to be able between the acts to comfortably occupy himself in thinking about what he has seen. In other words, the interests of the pure scientist are, as a matter of fact, *æsthetic* and theoretical. The ordinary man, to be sure, also wants to enjoy the play, to feel the pleasurable sensations that accompany a stream of vivid impressions; and incidentally it is to be observed that his enjoyment would be immeasurably increased if he were trained to see but a fraction of what the scientist sees. But the chief concern of the ordinary man is naturally rather as actor than as spectator, and then with his own part in the play. His interests are partly contemplative, but mainly

practical. He wants, above all, maxims of conduct, rules of action. For the latter, he has for the most part to rely upon his own personal experience. The former customarily descend to him from previous generations of thinkers. Outside the material interests of life, the ordinary man has received little aid from the science of his own time or generation. The divorce of theory and practice in the higher relations of social life has been for more than a century a constantly-expressed lament. The ordinary man has seen not a few of his long-cherished maxims overthrown by the scientist, and others challenged and made the subject of partisan strife. But from the verified body of contemporary knowledge, there has as yet been derived no accepted principles out of which could be constructed a system of rules for directing the relations of domestic, social, and public life. In former times, this intermediary service between thought and action has been performed by men under various designations—that of priest, philosopher, moralist, theologian, humanist, statesman, educationist, etc. But life has grown immeasurably complex; hence do not even these tend, like the scientist, to be absorbed. in various degrees, in interests of a relatively special kind? Is it not the case that amongst each of these groups, it is the men of broadest sympathies and widest knowledge who feel most keenly the desire for increased powers, to enable them to adequately handle their allotted problems and tasks? In such circumstances the common device of racial experience is a further subdivision of labour, as a preparatory step to a further concentration of knowledge and effort. To meet such needs new social types originate and develop. It is the essential thesis of this paper that a new variety of the cultural stock is, here and now, in process of development. As the type itself, the sociological—to say nothing of its sub-varieties—is of necessity in its early stages wanting in preciseness of characteristic; so the name Sociologist, with its own subdivisions, is correspondingly indefinite. But these deficiencies are surely arguments not for the elimination of this incipient movement, but for care in its development.

The appropriate place of such a movement in the division of labour would seem to be here. It lies with the Sociologist,

as student of pure science, to discover and deduce such social generalisations and such ideals as he may, in the contemporary state of science and progress. And to the Sociologist, as exponent of applied science, it belongs to define the social conditions under which these general ideas are applicable, these ideals approximately realisable. It is as such foundations of sociological doctrine become established,—not, of course, as immutable tenets, but as progressively modifiable,—that the various groups of practitioners build up for their times the great social arts of Education, of Policy, or of Ecclesiastical Organisation. The general precepts and maxims of these arts would be increasingly derived from sociological principles, while immediate practical applications would be guided not only from general principles, but increasingly by the specialist sciences.

And where, in this scheme of things, would be found the ordinary man (with whom, of course, goes the specialist outside his specialism)? It will be easier to answer this question when that branch of sociological science which is growing up under the title of Social Psychology has advanced further in its task of studying the mind of the ordinary man from the natural history point of view. As the zoologist deals with the fauna of a particular region, describing and classifying its animal types; so is the psychologist now beginning to study the mental types of given populations. But this much may be said, that in every adequate scheme of Education, the Sociologist has already some place and function; and educationists of all schools practically agree that increasing effort should be made to impart to every sane adult of the population, what we would here call the sociological habit of mind. Of this mental attitude, is not a chief trait, the power and habit of picturing any particular social phenomenon (say, a loaf of bread, or a band of musicians, a policeman, or a horse-race), not merely as an object of personal use or enjoyment, as something to be sought or avoided, but also as something to be seen and felt in a larger way—as an element in that unfolding series of actions and reactions which we are learning to call social evolution? Every one is doubtless capable of acquiring in varying degrees of

thoroughness a certain power of sociological interpretation, a certain capacity of observing the tendencies of facts and events, and judging of their significance by reference to sociological ideals.

But how to pass from sociological observation and interpretation to the practice of social conduct? It is at any rate among the supreme problems of the Sociologist to work out the conditions of normal evolution under which each type may develop to its highest perfection, yet also those by which the lower types tend to be replaced by or transformed into the higher; it may be regenerated into types higher still. To the moral ideal so well expressed by Schiller, of a society in which the normal type is a beautiful soul, Biology adds as material accompaniment the conception of a stock which breeds true to a norm of physical health and beauty. These two ideals are sociologically inseparable, and to enquire what are the social conditions that make for such individual realisation is the ceaseless quest of applied Sociology. Towards such studies, then, philosopher and scientist, man of affairs and philanthropist, have long been contributing; is it not time that they increasingly unite? *

* The writer of the foregoing paper has obtained the sanction of the Editorial Committee to append to the paper the accompanying "Note on the History of Sociology in Reply to Professor Karl Pearson." It must, however, be understood that the writer is alone responsible for the views therein expressed.

NOTE ON THE HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY IN REPLY TO PROFESSOR KARL PEARSON.

Speaking from the chair at the meeting of the Sociological Society, at which Mr. Galton read his paper on "Eugenics," Professor Karl Pearson expressed views on the history and present position of sociology which merit attention. This they do on two grounds. In the first place, they reflect and represent the attitude of not a few social observers and thinkers—more especially in England—towards sociology. And in the second place, Professor Pearson's eminence as a methodologist, imparts a certain authoritative weight to his remarks on modes of historical growth in science.

Professor Pearson declares his scepticism as to the utility of a Sociological Society, under existing circumstances. He counsels a policy of waiting. He urges delay, attendant on the advent of an exceptional person, who will "create" the first rudiments of a science of sociology. His argument reduced to definitive form would seem to run as follows:—

1. No great branch of science can be "created" by purely group activity. For this there is required the initiation of some exceptional individual—some richly endowed personality. This "must be done by some one man who by force of knowledge, of method, and of enthusiasm hews out, in rough outline it may be, but decisively, a new block, and creates a school to carve out its outlines."

2. No creative genius of this architectonic order has appeared in the history of sociology.

3. It is of at least dubious utility for students of social phenomena to try and organise the resources of sociological

science until the requisite creative initiative and leadership are forthcoming, in the person of such exceptional individual.

One's first exclamation on listening to this sort of argument is doubtless a note of surprise, at hearing the terms of a creationist theology in the mouth of a professed evolutionist discussing a problem of historical science. The spectacle arouses a disquieting sense of reversion. The hypothesis of personality as an independent creative force is doubtless in theology, and possibly in metaphysics, a useful, even a necessary postulate. But the methodological limitations of science preclude recourse to that hypothesis. It is a self-denying ordinance of science to invoke no *Deus ex persona*. For Professor Pearson *qua* theologian and metaphysician one may feel as deep respect as for Professor Pearson *qua* scientist; but a protest must be uttered against a masquerade which mingles and confuses the distinctive methods and apparatus of theology with those of science. Let us respect the cassock in the pulpit and repudiate it in the laboratory.

Taken literally, Professor Pearson's argument may possibly be good theology; it is certainly bad science. But perhaps Professor Pearson's apparent confusion of thought is merely verbal. It may be that, while speaking of the order of creation in science, he was really raising the question as to the mode of development by which science grows. That, to be sure, is a large and difficult question. It is one, moreover, which in a general way is only very partially, if at all, solved. But, fortunately, Professor Pearson narrows the issue by his illustrations.

Professor Pearson cites five instances of the process by which he conceives new branches of science to come into existence. The five examples are those of Descartes, Newton, Virchow, Darwin, and Pasteur. In regard to these, we have to ask what is the use and worth of Professor Pearson's criteria, both in themselves and in their application to the present state and future progress of sociology. In the first place, we want to know if there is common to each of the five instances some characteristic which may serve as a criterion for testing exceptional

progress in science. In the second place, it is necessary to inquire what, if any, result this test gives when applied to the history of sociology. Now, when we ask what new branch of science was originated in each of Professor Pearson's five instances, there will be no doubt as to the answer given in three of them. Descartes founded Analytical Geometry, Virchow, Cellular Pathology, and Pasteur, it will doubtless be agreed, established Bacteriology.

In regard to the other two instances of Professor Pearson—Newton and Darwin—it is not easy to see how they are parallel with the three cited; for what branches of science did Newton and Darwin respectively originate? Professor Pearson would not presumably say that the Infinitesimal Calculus which Newton invented, coincidentally with Leibnitz, was a new branch of science; although doubtless it was a method of science out of which later on a new branch, or branches of science developed. Then in regard to Darwin, Professor Pearson would surely not say that Darwin originated Biology, which certainly had at least two generations of workers before Darwin published "The Origin of Species." May it not, indeed, be cited as an example of societary influence in scientific progress, the fact that the Linnæan Society afforded a rostrum for Darwin, and supplied some of his ablest champions and critics. It thereby functioned, presumably, as an organised agency of cultural selection, alike ensuring and facilitating the survival of the verifiable elements in the Darwinian hypothesis. It may be objected that the Linnæan is not a purely Biological Society. So much the worse for Biology. It might have been all the better for the progress of general biology had the Linnæan concerned itself exclusively with the larger interests of the science, and left the technical and internal questions of its sub-sciences to relevant specialist societies. With a healthy and really functional Biological Society in active existence, surely the biological group would not have incurred the reproach of discovering and acclaiming the work of Mendel after almost a full generation of neglect.

Neglecting then, for the moment, the cases of Newton and Darwin, we have to inquire what was the essential *modus*

operandi in each of the other instances. It is a conventional saying alike amongst historians and scientists, mathematical thinkers and students of philosophy, that Descartes founded Analytical Geometry by combining the point of view and resources of two existing branches of science, namely, Geometry and Algebra. It is also a common saying that Pasteur established Bacteriology by combining the point of view and resources of two existing branches of science, namely, Chemistry and Biology. It would also doubtless be agreed that Virchow's originating impulse came from his command of the resources of several existing specialisms. May we then generalise, and say that the co-efficients of cardinal advances in science are:—(1) the tendency of branches of science to ramify and anastomose, and germinating at points of junction to throw off new shoots; and (2) the capacity of individual minds to control and direct these powers of natural growth. A consideration of the latter, the human factor, to be sure, raises again the question of the place and function of the exceptional individual in the rôle of social evolution. But in regard to that, the duty of the historian of science is surely clear. He must have recourse to no creational hypothesis. He must assume only certain co-relations between individual and racial development. He must assume a certain parallelism between, on the one hand, the growth of racial experience as summed and co-ordinated in science and, on the other hand, the capacity of the individual mind to absorb and manipulate this expanding racial experience. The historian of science must leave to the relevant specialists of Biology, Psychology, and Sociology, all the vexed and difficult questions as to the conditions of normality and abnormality, evolution and degeneration, in the mental life of the individual and of the race. On all these points, it is likely enough that the relevant specialisms have very little to contribute, at the present moment, towards the solution of our particular problem. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps safe to draw only a very simple and tentative inference from such cases as those cited by Professor Pearson. The conclusion we may deduce is this—that in any large and relatively autonomous department of science, we may roughly test the progressiveness of that department by the

frequency with which its different branches unite and throw out fresh offshoots.* That, at least, is the most manifest of possible criteria deducible from Professor Pearson's instances. Let us see what results are yielded by its application to the recent history of that group of sciences which constitutes the sociological department.

According to most systems of classification, the social sciences constitute a fairly distinct and definable portion of the whole body of science. Any accredited list of the social sciences drawn up a couple of generations ago would not have been a very lengthy enumeration. It would certainly have included Economics, Politics, Jurisprudence, and might possibly have included Anthropology, History, Archæology, Ethics. A similar enumeration to-day would be a very much more lengthy one. It would include also Comparative Ethics, Social Psychology, Comparative Religion, Social Geography, Criminology, and perhaps others. In Professor Pearson's own classification of the sciences (given in the *Grammar of Science*) there is a long enumeration of departments of study, bearing on the evolution of man and human society; and as sociology takes as its province the unification of this whole field, we may identify Professor Pearson's list with the sociological department. In Professor Pearson's scheme the three main subdivisions are the sciences of (1) Social Institutions; (2) Mental Faculties; (3) Physique. Studies of Social Institutions are again subdivided into the following sciences:—"Archæology, Folk-Lore, Histories of Custom, of Marriage and Ownership, of Religions, of States, of Laws, etc." Studies of Mental Faculties are again subdivided into the following sciences:—"History of Language, Philology, Histories of Philosophy, Science, Literature, Art." Studies of Physique are again subdivided into the following sciences:—"Craniology, Anthropology, etc." It is true in Professor Pearson's scheme there is a science given as separate

* A fruitful variation on this idea is suggested by the remark of Professor J. G. Clark, that in all use of the branch and tree metaphor in scientific methodology, the tree should be a banyan tree.

and distinct from all the above, and this other science is divided by Professor Pearson into "(1) Morals; (2) Politics; (3) Political Economy; (4) Jurisprudence, etc." For the science which combines these four particular studies, Professor Pearson reserves the word "Sociology"; but that is plainly a usage particular to Professor Pearson; and since his "Sociology" does not include a study of social institutions, it is, we may assume, a usage which is not likely to become general.* However that may be, the point of insistence here is the recent growth and multiplication of scientific studies bearing on the "Making of Man." Professor Pearson's own list of such studies, even long as it is, yet is curtailed, it will be observed, by frequent recourse in his enumeration to the comprehensive though ambiguous symbol "etc."

How has this multiplication of the social sciences, this spreading and ramification of the sociological branch, come about? Has it not been to a large extent brought about by an application of that very process of cross-fertilisation, which we have accepted as a test of progressiveness in science? To take some notable examples—did not Le Play combine the resources of Economics, Anthropology and Geography, to establish a new and prolific branch of science called sometimes Social Geography, sometimes Comparative Economics, and sometimes Social Economics? Have not Ihering and Post combined Jurisprudence and Anthropology to make Comparative Ethics? Did not Lazarus and Steinthal combine Anthropology, History and Psychology to make Social Psychology? Has not Lombroso combined Anthropology, Jurisprudence and Pathology to found Criminology, or at least establish it on a scientific basis? Has not Hirn, by combining Psychology and Anthropology, gone a long way towards establishing Comparative Æsthetics on a scientific footing? And the list of similar initiators might be extended.

* In a recent ordinance of London University (and it is in this university that the distinguished author of the *Grammar of Science* holds his chair) Sociology has been officially defined—for graduation purposes—as the Comparative Study of Social Institutions.

It may be objected that the above names do not rank in scientific status with those cited by Professor Pearson. That is doubtless true. But surely the vitality of science, like that of a plant, is measured rather by ease than by difficulty of germination. The emphasis is on tendency and process and the potentiality of continuous development in these. To put the emphasis on the individuality of the initiator is to misapply our test and to misinterpret the significance of science. The important thing for science is that its branches should grow not in isolation from each other, but should frequently unite and produce fertile combinations. Whether these combinations occur in the personality of A B C or X Y Z is relatively indifferent. In science, surely, if anywhere, the proverb holds—*il n'ya point d'homme qui est necessaire*.

Judged then by the above test, sociology—assuming that title for the collective body of the social sciences—has during the past two generations exhibited a degree of growth and progress hardly, if at all, less marked than in any other large province of scientific investigation during the same period. From this point of view, therefore, sociology would seem to merit Professor Flint's recent characterisation of it as a "very flourishing science." The test here applied is of Professor Pearson's own devising, and if after applying it himself he came to the conclusion that sociology is in a bad way, we can only infer that so careful an observer has seen other and alarming symptoms, and that he has been thereby agitated into a hasty diagnosis.

These other and alarming symptoms are possibly discoverable if not by the Descartes-Virchow-Pasteur test, then by the Newton-Darwin test. Let us see. Professor Pearson's allusion to Newton was conceivably meant to refer, not to the joint discoverer of the infinitesimal calculus, but to the demonstrator of the gravitation formula. In this respect Newton is a unique figure in the history of science, for, as Lagrange regretfully said, we have only one solar system to explain. That being so, it is not easy to see wherein the Newtonian advance might be analogically repeated in other branches of

science ; and yet it has been claimed—doubtless on insufficient grounds—on behalf of more than one initiative advance in the social sciences that it has some analogy with the Newtonian advance in mathematico-physical science.

One instance is Quetelet's mathematical handling of social observations in the mass, instead of individually, and his resulting claim to have inaugurated a new (sociological) science to which he gave the name Social Physics, though he might more appropriately (had he been endowed with Professor Pearson's gift of nomenclature) have entitled it *Sociometry*, since it is rather a method than a science—and then the Journal of the Statistical Society would have been called *Sociometrica*. Another instance is the application, by Jevons and Walras, of the infinitesimal calculus to certain of the problems of economics, a method of investigation which is now in course of revolutionising that antique department of sociology. But both these instances would doubtless be rejected by Professor Pearson as irrelevant to the present issue. And if we admit with him that sociology has not had its Newton, we gain the right to ask him what precisely it is that he conceives to be the function of a Newton in sociology.

As a last resort, let us seek the justification of Professor Pearson's excommunication of sociology in his allusion to Darwin. No one would seriously maintain that Darwin founded biology, but all would agree that he renovated it. He revived the science by impregnating it with a great master idea. The stimulus of a new master idea to any group of scientific workers means the transmission of a thrill of formative energy, which as it passes from one investigator to another rebuilds the fabric of a science. It opens to the observation of each worker a new world of phenomena, it offers him a constructive scheme for the systematic arrangement of his observations, and it helps to generate the mental activity requisite for their interpretation. This is the service which Darwin's modal explanation of organic evolution afforded to the biologists of his day. It is presumably Professor Pearson's contention that in sociology there has appeared no master mason to perform a similar architectonic service for the operative workers in that field of study.

To test the validity of that assertion, it would have to be referred to those who have adequately studied the comparative history of science during the past two centuries—a small and scattered jury.* The answers might differ much among themselves in certain respects. But it is highly probable there would be a consensus of agreement, in the first place, as to certain main lines of development and turning points in the evolution of sociological investigation, and, in the second place, as to the relative significance of these in comparison with progress in other fields of science. It would, for example, in all probability, be agreed that Vico's conception of history (published in the early part of the 18th century) has been an inspiring and determinative idea of the first magnitude. Vico put forward, with convincing clearness, the conception which Comte afterwards called "the master idea of universal social interconnection." And we may fittingly call it Vico's idea, pending the investigation of its antecedent pedigree. And, moreover, he demonstrated its usefulness in unifying the general history of civilisation. He even deduced something in the nature of a modal explanation of social evolution. He endeavoured to show that, throughout the movement of history, all social phenomena—language and literature, politics and religion, law and custom—vary in strict conformity with each other, from age to age; that they are, in fact, nothing but the reflection and expression of certain general movements of humanity in history. But Vico's "*Scienza Nuova*" initiated nothing that could be properly called a "school." More than a half century later, Condorcet developed and applied the same general idea, though he himself derived it from a different source and utilised

* The bias of caste survives amongst scientists with sufficient intensity to cramp and distort their historic sense. Hence it is that in the history of science, as in histories of literature and art, politics and religion, many are the sectional narratives, statistical compilations, and anecdotal records, but few are the comparative studies in evolutionary processes. Indeed the relative backwardness of sociology is itself at once a cause and an effect of defective historical sense in the scientific group as a whole. The growth of sociology approximately measures the rate at which scientists are collectively acquiring consciousness of themselves as a social group inspired by a Heritage, which as it turns to the future becomes a Trust. The adequate achievement of such consciousness will, in its social effect, be marked by the emergence of a new political party in the State. That party will be the scientists, functioning collectively as a social group in advocacy of such policy as sociological doctrine may sanction.

it in a somewhat different way. Like Vico, Condorcet inspired not a few individual workers (amongst them Comte), but also, as in the case of Vico, his hypothesis was not demonstrated with that degree of rigour, comprehensiveness, and verification that at once inspires and convinces. At any rate, whether from this or other causes, his work failed to generate that expansive system of research amongst co-operating investigators which is the form assumed by the subdivision of labour in science.

Next came Comte's application of this master idea of an orderly movement of human phenomena, in which every manifestation of human activity undergoes a correlated modification. But, before this idea could yield a useful working hypothesis of social evolution, other pre-requisites were needed. These included, (1) a distribution of human phenomena into approximately natural groups, and (2) an arrangement of the historic records into approximately natural periods or epochs. The first of these desiderata was provisionally supplied jointly by (*a*) his classification of the sciences; (*b*) his dichotomous conception of the Temporal and Spiritual Powers as respectively embodying and co-ordinating—the first, the whole set of economic and political institutions and agencies, and the second, the whole set of mental, moral, and religious institutions and agencies; and (*c*) his four-fold classification of functional social groups into (1) organisers, (2) workers, (3) thinkers, (4) women—1 and 2 being representative of the temporal, and 3 and 4 of the spiritual power. The other desideratum was provisionally supplied by Comte's generalisation of Turgot's conception of Thought as historically developing through three main manifestations—theological, metaphysical, and scientific. Thus equipped with a scheme of controlling ideas, Comte surveyed the whole known history of western civilisation. He re-arranged the outstanding facts of occidental history, and showed them as integral parts of a system which, as it moved from epoch to epoch, unfolded and revealed itself according to given formulæ. Comte's sociology was thus something more than a descriptive account of social evolution. It was essentially a hypothesis as to the modal explanation of that evolution. And it is contended, in opposition to Professor

Pearson, that in point of fact it has actually served and functioned in the history of speculative thought as a first approximation to such a hypothesis.

The points of view here taken are, of course, purely methodological and historical. The present argument calls for no expression of judgment on the scientific sufficiency or insufficiency of Comte's sociology. What it does call for, is the recognition of a real methodological analogy between the place and work of Comte and of Darwin. Each of them did more than any other writer to popularise the idea of evolution, the one social, the other organic. Each of them selected from the conceptions of their time certain master ideas, which gave a clue to the solution of a great traditional problem. Each of them generalised these ideas, and by their systematic application to a multitude of concrete facts and instances, exhibited a modal explanation of the evolutionary process. In genesis and in method there is a real analogy between the two hypotheses, and their subsequent history has, it is maintained, shown a not dissimilar parallelism. In neither case did an organised "school," in the strict academic sense, inherit and develop the master's doctrine—(the organised Positivist societies being concerned with propagandist and literary, practical and fraternal, rather than strictly scientific ends). But in each case a large number of detached investigators, throughout the learned world, accepted the hypothesis as a working scheme, useful alike for factual observation, and for the systematisation and interpretation of the observed facts.

In this way, innumerable workers become at once disciples and critics of a doctrine. Then, by the processes normal to the growth of science, the original hypothesis undergoes those phases of modification which lead either to its final rejection and replacement, or to the verification and establishment of its core of lasting truth. In either case it has served its function as a psychic organ of scientific progress.

To ascertain what of fertilising and formative power still remains in Comte's hypothesis after subjection to the modifying

influences of three-quarters of a century of active scientific progress, is no matter for dogmatic utterance, but for laborious investigation. Certainly, to sweep aside his contribution to sociology as of no architectonic value, is to confess a comprehensive ignorance of the history of science.

Nearly three generations of sociologists have come and gone since Comte determined the outline of his *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. In the interval every branch of science has undergone profound modification. In the revolutionary changes of this actively fermenting period, sociology has fully participated. The transformation indeed is visible in sciences as widely removed as Mathematics and Psychology. In the former not only have new departments been founded, but some of the elemental conceptions of the science have received vitalising re-interpretations. While as to Psychology, has it not been re-established as an evolutionary science, more unified and more uniformly progressive than Biology itself?

But most significant in its bearing on sociology, has been the extension of Geology and Biology right up to, and indeed beyond the borderland of human history. We have to remember that not only are Darwin and Hæckel subsequent to Comte, but also—in a doctrinal sense—are Lyell and Boucher de Perthes. And all four of these, as also innumerable continuators, have contributed not to the overthrow, but to the development (and, of course, modification) of Comte's Sociology. That this contribution to sociology has been, to a large extent, unconscious, but none the less real, on the part of the Naturalists is clearly seen in the origin and history of the science of Anthropology.

This new branch of science—anthropology—grew out of the junction of biology and geology, at the point where Man appears on the field of nature. To the anthropologist the record of man is not only continuous with, indeed part of, the geological record, but anthropologically the whole modern history of western civilisation is but a subdivision of the Iron Age.

The allotment to the anthropologist of a "prehistoric" period was manifestly the literary device of a transitional order, interesting as such, but without scientific validity. What the

anthropologist has, in point of fact, actually worked at, is not the prehistory, but the natural history of man. This, to be sure, was clear to the naturalist founders themselves — witness the title of Prichard's two great books, *Researches as to the Physical History of Man* (1813) and *Natural History of Man* (1843). Approaching the problem with evolutionist preconceptions, the anthropologist sees in the History of Man a problem to be attacked by methods similar to those which enabled "stratum" Smith and his brother geologists to read the History of the Earth. This method, in application to the Human Record, consists, in its first and simplest aspect, in observing and arranging in their order of development all human phenomena, of no matter what complexity or variety. Stated thus, the primary problem of anthropology is seen to be coincident with what was also the primary historical problem of Vico, Condorcet, and Comte, and which in the hands of Comte grew into a systematic sociology. Thus the Vico-Condorcet-Comte set of ideas, instead of being negated by subsequent anthropological investigation, has, on the contrary, had its range of useful application enormously increased. There can be no doubt that the early endeavours from the side of History and Philosophy to decipher and interpret the Sociological Record, will in time become to the anthropologists a valuable source of unificatory hypotheses. But for that purpose these early sociologists will have to be discovered by the anthropologists themselves. (The mind of the scientist is, like that of the woman, unable to dispense with the personal motive. It differs from the woman's in making the attempt, and imagining it successful.) The field investigations of anthropology are already extending within the walls of those great human hives called modern cities. We may anticipate that before long some industrious anthropologist will discover among "prehistoric remains" a curious document called "*Cours de Philosophie Positive*." Seen as a survival of early culture, the document will arouse sufficient interest to be deciphered. It may even be comprehended. The statisticians will doubtless measure it, and—since there is no limit to the wonders of science—they may even read it.

Thus, for two generations or more, anthropologists have, from the side of natural science, been working towards a sociology of their own. But this they have done with insufficient recognition of the work of the early sociologists, sometimes even in frank ignorance of it, and sometimes in contemptuous misunderstanding. Now this relatively independent anthropological approach to sociology is a typical process. Simultaneously, there have been many other approaches (notably from the sides of economics, of speculative politics, and of religion) initiated and developed, for the most part in relative isolation from each other and from the general movement of sociological synthesis.

Thus has come about a vast extension of the field of sociological investigation, and its subdivision among groups of specialists, trained in their own particular discipline and working at their own particular morsel of the Sociological Record—or, in a larger way, specialising on some particular Social Formation. In this complexity of manifold activity it is, to be sure, easier to see the chaos than the order—just as the traveller in the forest cannot see the wood for the trees. But it is, we must not forget, a process normal to racial evolution, alike in industry and in science, that the larger operations be subdivided amongst temporarily isolated groups of differentiated workers. The counter process of integration, in sociology as in other fields of science, goes on, but it is of necessity less conspicuous to all but a few comprehensive observers. Is not the ordinary labourer, whether in science or industry, traditionally indifferent to the general project towards which his particular job makes a fractional contribution?

Since Comte, there have been two other great master-builders in sociology. Frederic Le Play and Herbert Spencer have both of them contributed new architectonic ideas, new constructive formulæ, which have interpenetrated, if not the whole of sociology, yet many of its departments, or sub-sciences, and have largely determined and stimulated the growth of these. As bearing on the present argument, it has to be observed that Spencer's contribution towards the unification of sociological knowledge, and its general orientation, must be judged not by itself, but in conjunction with Comte's—and this in spite of Spencer's own dis-

avowal. Viewed in proper historical perspective, these two great synthetists are seen to be essentially supplementary, rather than antagonistic. It is perhaps the main sociological service of both to have demonstrated the progressive trend in social evolution to be from a military to an industrial phase of culture, accompanied by correlative spiritual modifications. And while Comte's demonstration applied mainly to historic civilisation, it was no mere accident of Spencerian deficiency in historical erudition, but a happy ordering, that Spencer's demonstration should rest mainly upon the data of barbarous and savage peoples. Thus Spencer verified the chief factor of Comte's hypothesis, by showing its value in helping towards the unification of a vast mass of anthropological knowledge accumulated by two generations of specialists subsequent to Comte's own preparatory period. It is true that a still more prolific generation of specialist investigators has heaped up new data since Spencer's provisional unification was reached. But that is a progress itself stimulated and directed in no small measure by Spencer's own generalisations.

In the case of Le Play, it is eminently a "school" in the strict sense that has to be considered, rather than an individual. In the files of "La Science Sociale"—the organ of the more theoretical and scientific branch of the Le Play school—has accumulated a massive series of social monographs. These are quite explicitly based on laborious observation of fact, collected, arranged, and interpreted by the aid of definitive and verifiable hypotheses. It need not be inquired here how far these researches go towards the verification of the Le Play doctrine that the line of social causation runs from the physical and organic environment through occupation to family life and social institutions, and then back again through the reactions of ideals on family life and social institutions—the reaction of these on occupation, and of this on the environment. But the assertion may fairly be made that here, in this impressive and prolonged research by an ever-growing body of investigators, are both matter and ideas for^u an incipient science of social evolution, did none exist elsewhere. Has Professor Pearson examined and reflected on this line of sociological development, or does he sweep aside that also with a majestic *ipse dixit*?

May we then infer from the foregoing brief notes of evidence, that the progress of sociology is in quite normal fashion, following the history of other general branches of science; and thereby comfort ourselves with the assurance that, in spite of the sceptics, all is well with our science? Assuredly not, for that would be an optimism as uncritical and unwarranted as Professor Karl Pearson's scepticism. There is indeed a point of view from which the contemporary state of sociology is markedly unsatisfactory. That Professor Pearson should take this point of view, and this alone, to the exclusion of all else, is not unnatural; for one of the habitual spheres of his own manifold activity is biological controversy. And in biology to-day, controversy rages with almost theological bitterness, indicating a state of disorderliness and disruption in that science, which is unhappily not without parallel in contemporary sociology. It is, indeed, a strange mark of the times, that, while theological partisanship is relatively mild and quiescent, and even olive branches are being exchanged between theologians and scientists, at this very time the biologists themselves should be disputing with a fervour which inclines the impartial onlooker to impute to biology, a theological heritage. That, to be sure, is itself a social phenomenon which might well call for observation and interpretation by the sociologist. But the taunt to which the sociologist would thereby expose himself, that he should first put his own house in order, would be not altogether unmerited.

The analogy between the history of biology and of sociology is even closer than indicated in the Comte-Darwin parallel. Each of the two sciences has arisen, or, to be sufficiently modest on behalf of incipient science, one should say, *is* arising from the growing coalescence of a large number of separate and more or less dispersive specialisms. The general discipline derived from the doctrine of evolution (in the one case organic, in the other social evolution) has done something towards organising these numerous and dispersive specialisms into a co-ordinated body of unified truth. But, hitherto, this unifying task has been but inadequately performed, alike in biology and in sociology. There are in both sciences whole groups of

rebellious specialists, who not only decry the competence and sufficiency of the synthetic leaders, but who even deny the relevance of all synthetic doctrine, and disclaim all need for architectonic intervention in the organisation of specialisms. And, on the other hand, there are not a few synthetic and philosophic writers producing works generalised on an insufficient basis of fact, because isolated from the groups of specialist workers, and often constructed in relative indifference to the factual researches which these specialists are pursuing. It must candidly be confessed that in both these respects the contemporary state of sociological science is not less disorderly and disruptive than that of biology. How many, for instance, are the economists, anthropologists, folk-lorists, and historians; the specialist investigators of social psychology, comparative religion, and comparative ethics; how many the jurists, and the students of politics, who openly repudiate all sociological discipline, and forsaking science, either aspire to literary ideals or revert to anecdotage? And, on the other hand, how many are the writers of books on general sociology, without adequate training in the necessary specialist disciplines, and without real interest in the organisation of these and the unification of their products?

It is good, because necessary, that every large problem should be parcelled out amongst moderately autonomous squads of labourers specialised for their several tasks. But it is not good that discord should be so conspicuous as to impress the observer—even though he be a superficial observer—with the competitive rather than with the co-operative aspect of the process. That, to be sure, is the appearance presented by the living social community in the civilised world to-day. In occidental communities, certainly, the competitive phase both of group and of individual activity is relatively ascendant. And so long as it remains thus, it must needs reflect itself in the whole field of science, and obviously not least in the sociological province. No individual initiator in science, however unparalleled his capacity, however consummate his genius, can make it wholly otherwise. To sit down and await the avatar of such an impossibilist hero is no ideal either of religion or science, but a reversion to fetichistic

obsession. Science may and does have a unity of its own. It is essentially a unity of order—an ideal ever approached (but never reached) by conscious, persistent, and ever-expanding organisation. If science means anything, it surely means—jointly in its pure and applied forms—the organisation of the culture resources of the race in the service of human life, contemporary and future. And is it not the case that the more effective this organisation, the less does the race depend for progress upon the advent of the exceptionally gifted individual? And, moreover, a scientific society is, as has been well said, a society first, and only scientific afterwards. This means that by the regulated contact and interaction of diverse personalities, voluntary social organisation tends to raise each member of the group to a higher level of psychic potentiality. Applying this principle to the point at issue, we may infer that the mere formation of a Sociological Society appreciably increases the chance of producing the exceptional sociologist, so desiderated by Professor Pearson. So that, if it were the case that sociology had never had its “founder,” it may be, that the setting up a Sociological Society would be the quickest way to repair the omission! But these subtleties apart, the justification of a sociological society rests substantially upon the demonstrated need of organisation amongst imperfectly co-operating groups of specialists at work in the same field.

VICTOR V. BRANFORD.

EUGENICS.

EUGENICS: ITS DEFINITION, SCOPE AND AIMS

By FRANCIS GALTON, D.C.L.; Sc.D.; F.R.S.

Read before the Sociological Society at a Meeting in the School of Economics and Political Science (London University), on May 16th, 1904.
Professor KARL PEARSON, F.R.S., in the chair.

Eugenics is the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage. The improvement of the inborn qualities, or stock, of some one human population, will alone be discussed here.

What is meant by improvement? What by the syllable *Eu* in Eugenics, whose English equivalent is *good*? There is considerable difference between goodness in the several qualities and in that of the character as a whole. The character depends largely on the *proportion* between qualities whose balance may be much influenced by education. We must therefore leave morals as far as possible out of the discussion, not entangling ourselves with the almost hopeless difficulties they raise as to whether a character as a whole is good or bad. Moreover, the goodness or badness of character is not absolute, but relative to the current form of civilisation. A fable will best explain what is meant. Let the scene be the Zoological Gardens in the quiet hours of the night, and suppose that, as in old fables, the animals are able

to converse, and that some very wise creature who had easy access to all the cages, say a philosophic sparrow or rat, was engaged in collecting the opinions of all sorts of animals with a view of elaborating a system of absolute morality. It is needless to enlarge on the contrariety of ideals between the beasts that prey and those they prey upon, between those of the animals that have to work hard for their food and the sedentary parasites that cling to their bodies and suck their blood, and so forth. A large number of suffrages in favour of maternal affection would be obtained, but most species of fish would repudiate it, while among the voices of birds would be heard the musical protest of the cuckoo. Though no agreement could be reached as to absolute morality, the essentials of Eugenics may be easily defined. All creatures would agree that it was better to be healthy than sick, vigorous than weak, well fitted than ill-fitted for their part in life. In short, that it was better to be good rather than bad specimens of their kind, whatever that kind might be. So with men. There are a vast number of conflicting ideals, of alternative characters, of incompatible civilisations; but they are wanted to give fulness and interest to life. Society would be very dull if every man resembled the highly estimable Marcus Aurelius or Adam Bede. The aim of Eugenics is to represent each class or sect by its best specimens; that done, to leave them to work out their common civilisation in their own way.

A considerable list of qualities can be easily compiled that nearly every one except "cranks" would take into account when picking out the best specimens of his class. It would include health, energy, ability, manliness and courteous disposition. Recollect that the natural differences between dogs are highly marked in all these respects, and that men are quite as variable by nature as other animals in their respective species. Special aptitudes would be assessed highly by those who possessed them, as the artistic faculties by artists, fearlessness of inquiry and veracity by scientists, religious absorption by mystics, and so on. There would be self-sacrificers, self-tormentors and other exceptional idealists, but the representatives of these would be better members of a community than the body of their electors.

They would have more of those qualities that are needed in a State, more vigour, more ability, and more consistency of purpose. The community might be trusted to refuse representatives of criminals, and of others whom it rates as undesirable.

Let us for a moment suppose that the practice of Eugenics should hereafter raise the average quality of our nation to that of its better moiety at the present day, and consider the gain. The general tone of domestic, social, and political life would be higher. The race as a whole would be less foolish, less frivolous, less excitable and politically more provident than now. Its demagogues who "played to the gallery" would play to a more sensible gallery than at present. We should be better fitted to fulfil our vast imperial opportunities. Lastly, men of an order of ability which is now very rare, would become more frequent, because the level out of which they rose would itself have risen.

The aim of Eugenics is to bring as many influences as can be reasonably employed, to cause the useful classes in the community to contribute *more* than their proportion to the next generation.

The course of procedure that lies within the functions of a learned and active Society such as the Sociological may become, would be somewhat as follows:—

1. Dissemination of a knowledge of the laws of heredity so far as they are surely known, and promotion of their farther study. Few seem to be aware how greatly the knowledge of what may be termed the *actuarial* side of heredity has advanced in recent years. The *average* closeness of kinship in each degree now admits of exact definition and of being treated mathematically, like birth and death-rates, and the other topics with which actuaries are concerned.

2. Historical inquiry into the rates with which the various classes of society (classified according to civic usefulness) have contributed to the population at various times, in ancient and modern nations. There is strong reason for believing that national rise and decline is closely connected with this influence. It seems to be the tendency of high civilisation to

check fertility in the upper classes, through numerous causes, some of which are well known, others are inferred, and others again are wholly obscure. The latter class are apparently analogous to those which bar the fertility of most species of wild animals in zoological gardens. Out of the hundreds and thousands of species that have been tamed, very few indeed are fertile when their liberty is restricted and their struggles for livelihood are abolished ; those which are so and are otherwise useful to man becoming domesticated. There is perhaps some connection between this obscure action and the disappearance of most savage races when brought into contact with high civilisation, though there are other and well-known concomitant causes. But while most barbarous races disappear, some, like the negro, do not. It may therefore be expected that types of our race will be found to exist which can be highly civilised without losing fertility ; nay, they may become more fertile under artificial conditions, as is the case with many domestic animals.

3. Systematic collection of facts showing the circumstances under which large and thriving families have most frequently originated ; in other words, the *conditions* of Eugenics. The names of the thriving families in England have yet to be learnt, and the conditions under which they have arisen. We cannot hope to make much advance in the science of Eugenics without a careful study of facts that are now accessible with difficulty, if at all. The definition of a thriving family, that will pass muster for the moment at least, is one in which the children have gained distinctly superior positions to those who were their class-mates in early life. Families may be considered "large" that contain not less than three adult male children. It would be no great burden to a Society including many members who had Eugenics at heart, to initiate and to preserve a large collection of such records for the use of statistical students. The committee charged with the task would have to consider very carefully the form of their circular and the persons entrusted to distribute it. The circular should be simple, and as brief as possible, consistent with asking all questions that are likely to be answered truly, and which would be important to the inquiry.

They should ask, at least in the first instance, only for as much information as could be easily, and would be readily, supplied by any member of the family appealed to. The point to be ascertained is the *status* of the two parents at the time of their marriage, whence its more or less eugenic character might have been predicted, if the larger knowledge that we now hope to obtain had then existed. Some account would, of course, be wanted of their race, profession, and residence; also of their own respective parentages, and of their brothers and sisters. Finally, the reasons would be required why the children deserved to be entitled a "thriving" family, to distinguish worthy from unworthy success. This manuscript collection might hereafter develop into a "golden book" of thriving families. The Chinese, whose customs have often much sound sense, make their honours retrospective. We might learn from them to show that respect to the parents of noteworthy children, which the contributors of such valuable assets to the national wealth richly deserve. The act of systematically collecting records of thriving families would have the further advantage of familiarising the public with the fact that Eugenics had at length become a subject of serious scientific study by an energetic Society.

4. Influences affecting Marriage. The remarks of Lord Bacon in his essay on Death may appropriately be quoted here. He says, with the view of minimising its terrors :

"There is no passion in the mind of men so weak but it mates and masters the fear of death . . . Revenge triumphs over death; love slights it; honour aspireth to it; grief flyeth to it; fear pre-occupateth it."

Exactly the same kind of considerations apply to marriage. The passion of love seems so overpowering that it may be thought folly to try to direct its course. But plain facts do not confirm this view. Social influences of all kinds have immense power in the end, and they are very various. If unsuitable marriages from the Eugenic point of view were banned socially, or even regarded with the unreasonable disfavour which some attach to cousin-marriages, very few would be made. The multitude of

marriage restrictions that have proved prohibitive among uncivilised people would require a volume to describe.

5. Persistence in setting forth the national importance of Eugenics. There are three stages to be passed through. *Firstly* it must be made familiar as an academic question, until its exact importance has been understood and accepted as a fact ; *Secondly* it must be recognised as a subject whose practical development deserves serious consideration ; and *Thirdly* it must be introduced into the national conscience, like a new religion. It has, indeed, strong claims to become an orthodox religious tenet of the future, for Eugenics co-operate with the workings of Nature by securing that humanity shall be represented by the fittest races. What Nature does blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly, man may do providently, quickly, and kindly. As it lies within his power, so it becomes his duty to work in that direction ; just as it is his duty to succour neighbours who suffer misfortune. The improvement of our stock seems to me one of the highest objects that we can reasonably attempt. We are ignorant of the ultimate destinies of humanity, but feel perfectly sure that it is as noble a work to raise its level in the sense already explained, as it would be disgraceful to abase it. I see no impossibility in Eugenics becoming a religious dogma among mankind, but its details must first be worked out sedulously in the study. Over-zeal leading to hasty action would do harm, by holding out expectations of a near golden age, which will certainly be falsified and cause the science to be discredited. The first and main point is to secure the general intellectual acceptance of Eugenics as a hopeful and most important study. Then let its principles work into the heart of the nation, who will gradually give practical effect to them in ways that we may not wholly foresee.

FRANCIS GALTON.

APPENDIX.

WORKS BY THE AUTHOR BEARING ON EUGENICS:

Hereditary Genius (Macmillan), 1869; 2nd Edition, 1892. See especially from p. 340 in the former edition to the end, and from p. 329 in the latter.

Human Faculty (Macmillan), 1883 (out of print). See especially pp. 305 to end.

Natural Inheritance (Macmillan), 1889. This bears on Inheritance generally, not particularly on Eugenics.

Huxley Lecture of the Anthropol. Inst. on the Possible Improvement of the Human Breed under the existing Conditions of Law and Sentiment. *Nature*, 1901, p. 659; "Smithsonian Report," Washington, 1901, p. 523.

DISCUSSION

Professor KARL PEARSON, in opening the proceedings, said : * —

My position here this afternoon requires possibly some explanation. I am not a member of the Sociological Society, and I must confess myself sceptical as to its power to do effective work. Frankly, I do not believe in groups of men and women who have each and all their allotted daily task creating a new branch of science. I believe it must be done by some one man who by force of knowledge, of method and of enthusiasm hews out, in rough outline it may be, but decisively, a new block and creates a school to carve out its details. I think you will find on inquiry that this is the history of each great branch of science. The initiative has been given by some one great thinker, a Descartes, a Newton, a Virchow, a Darwin or a Pasteur. A Sociological Society until we have found a great sociologist is a herd without its leader—there is no authority to set bounds to your science or to prescribe its functions. This you must realise is the view of that poor creature the doubting man, *in media vitæ*; it is a view which cannot stand for a moment against the youthful energy of your secretary, or the boyish hopefulness of Mr. Galton, who mentally is about half my age. Hence for a time I am carried away by their enthusiasm, and appear where I never anticipated being seen—in the chair at a meeting of the Sociological Society. If this Society thrives, and lives to do yeoman work in science, which, sceptic as I am, I sincerely hope it may do, then I believe its members in the distant future will look back on this occasion as perhaps the one of greatest historical interest in its babyhood. To those of us who have worked in fields adjacent to Mr. Galton's, he appears to us as something more than the discoverer of a new method of inquiry, we feel

[* With regard to Professor Karl Pearson's remarks on Sociology, *vide* a "Note on the History of Sociology in reply to Professor Karl Pearson," appended to Mr Branford's paper, printed in this volume, "On the origin and use of the word Sociology."—EDITORS.]

for him something more than we may do for the distinguished scientists in whose laboratories we have chanced to work. There is an indescribable atmosphere which spreads from him and which must influence all those who have come within reach of it. We realise it in his perpetual youth, in the instinct with which he reaches a great truth, where many of us plod on groping through endless analysis, in his absolute unselfishness, and in his continual receptivity for new ideas. I have often wondered if Mr. Galton ever quarrelled with anybody. And to the mind of one who is ever in controversy, it is one of the miracles associated with Mr. Galton, that I know of no controversy, scientific or literary, in which he has been engaged. Those who look up to him, as we do, as to a master and scientific leader feel for him as did the scholars for the grammarian.

“Our low life was the level’s, and the night’s;
He ’s for the morning.”

It seems to me that it is precisely in this spirit that he attacks the gravest problem which lies before the Caucasian races “in the morning.” Are we to make the whole doctrine of descent, of inheritance, and selection of the fitter, part of our everyday life, of our social customs, and conduct? It is the question of the study now, but to-morrow it will be the question of the market place of morality, and of politics.

If I wanted to know how to put a saddle on a camel’s back without chafing him, I should go to Francis Galton; if I wanted to know how to manage the women of a treacherous African tribe, I should go to Francis Galton; if I wanted an instrument for measuring a snail, or an arc of latitude, I should appeal to Francis Galton. If I wanted advice on any mechanical, or any geographical, or any sociological problem, I should consult Francis Galton. In all these matters and many others I feel confident he would throw light on my difficulties, and I am firmly convinced that with his eternal youth, his elasticity of mind, and his keen insight, he can aid us in seeking an answer to one of the most vital of our national problems: How is the next generation of Englishmen to be mentally and physically equal to the past generation, which has provided us with the great Victorian statesmen, writers, and men of science?—most of whom are now no more—but which has not entirely ceased to be as long as we can see Francis Galton in the flesh.

DR. MAUDSLEY SAID :

The subject is difficult, not only from the complexity of the matter but also from the subtleties of the forces that we have to deal with. In considering

the question of hereditary influences as I have done for a long period of my life, one is met with the difficulty which must have occurred to every one here that in any family of which you take cognisance you may find one member, a son, like his mother or father, or like a mixture of the two, or more like his mother, or that he harks back to some distant ancestor ; and then, again, you will find one not in the least like father or mother or any relatives so far as we know. There is a variation, or whatever we may call it, of which in our present knowledge we cannot give the least explanation. Take, as a supreme instance, Shakespeare : he was born of parents not distinguished from their neighbours ; he had five brothers living, one of whom came to London and acted with him at Blackfriars Theatre ; yet while Shakespeare rose to the extraordinary eminence that he did, none of his brothers distinguished themselves in any way. And so it is in other families. From my long experience as a physician I could give instances in every department of human activity—in science, in literature, in art—in which one member of the family, born of the same parents and brought up in the same surroundings, has risen to extraordinary prominence, almost genius perhaps, and another has suffered from mental disorder. Now, how can we account for these facts on any of the known data on which we have at present to rely ? In my opinion we shall have to go far deeper down than we have been able to go by any present means of observation—to the germ-composing corpuscles, atoms, electrons, or whatever else there may be ; and we shall find these subjected to subtle and most potent influences of mind and body during their formations and combinations, of which we yet know nothing and hardly realise the importance. I believe that in these potent factors the solution of the problem is to be found why one member of a family rises above others, and others do not rise above the ordinary level, but perhaps sink below it. To me it seems, considering this matter in regard to these difficulties, that in making a comparison with the improvement of breeding of animal stock we may be apt to be misled. We are all organic machines, so to speak ; at the same time when we come to the human being there are complexities which arise from the mental state—its moods and passions—which entirely disturb any conclusions which we are able to form from our observation of the comparatively simple machines which animals are. In view of these difficulties of the subject I think that we must not be hasty in coming to conclusions and laying down any rules for the breeding of human beings and the development of a Eugenic conscience. In fact, we must be on our guard against the overzeal which Dr. Galton has very properly cautioned us against. For, after all, there is the passion of love and the forces referred to in his quotation from Bacon, and I am not sure but that Nature in its own blind impulsive way does not manage things better than we can by any light of reason or by any rules which we can at present lay down. I suspect, indeed, that as in the past, so in the future, it may be as Shakespeare said :—

“You may as well try to kindle snow by fire
As quench the fire of love by words.”

DR. MERCIER SAID :

Mr. Galton speaks of the laws of heredity and of the value of a dissemination of a knowledge of the laws of heredity in so far as we know them, and the qualification is very necessary. For, in so far as we know these laws, they are so obscure and complex that to us they work out as chance. We cannot detect any practical difference in the working of the laws of heredity and the way in which dice may be taken out of a lucky bag. It is quite impossible to predict from the constitution of the parents what the constitution of the offspring is going to be, even in the remotest degree. I lay that down as emphatically as I can, and I think that much widely-prevailing erroneous doctrine on this head is due to the writings of Zola. I believe these writings are founded on a totally false conception as to what the laws of heredity are, and as to how they work out in the human race. He supposes that since the parents have certain mental and moral peculiarities the children will reproduce them with variations. It is not so. Look round among your acquaintances, look round among the people that you know, notice the intellectual and moral character of the parents and children; and as my distinguished predecessor, Dr. Maudsley, has said, you will find that in the same family there are antithetic extremes. No doubt, the tendency of a high civilisation is to reduce the fertility of its worthier members. Undoubtedly, in any particular race of organisms, as in organisms in general, the more lowly organised multiplies more freely than the highly organised. Undoubtedly, we see that insects and bacteria increase and multiply exceedingly, until they become as the sands on the seashore for multitude. But the elephant produces only once in thirty years. And so it is with human beings of different grades of organisation. Those more highly-organised are less fertile than those lowly-organised. But that is not the whole history of the thing. I think we have to regard a civilised community somewhat in the light of a lamp, which burns away at the top, and is replenished from the bottom. It is true that the highest strata waste, and do not reproduce themselves; and it is of necessity so, because the production of very high types of human nature is always sporadic. Broadly and generally and in practice it is so, that we cannot predict from the parentage what the offspring is going to be, and we cannot go back from the offspring and say what the parentage was. If we follow the custom of the Chinese and ennoble the parents for the achievements of their children, are we to hang the parents when the offspring commit murder? And finally, I would say one word about suitable and unsuitable marriages. Most of what I have to say has been already said by Dr. Maudsley. What are suitable and unsuitable marriages? How are we to decide? In the light of our knowledge—I had better say ignorance, I think—he would be a very bold man who would undertake the duties that were entrusted to the family council among those wise and virtuous people of whom Dean Swift has given us a description, and who should determine who should be the father and who the mother, and make marriages without consulting the individuals most concerned. I think if that were done, it is doubtful if the result would be any better than it is at present.

DR. FRANCIS WARNER SAID :

When I had the pleasure of reading the proof of Mr. Galton's paper, I devoted some time to thinking carefully over what might be expected to be the practical outcome of the suggestions offered, in which he purposely deals with only a portion of the means of developing a good nation, viz., marriage selection. I also gather that the tendency of the paper is to advocate marriages between those who are most highly evolved in their respective families. But there is a point in this connexion which I think is apt to be overlooked, and that is the examples often met with of the dangers from intermarriage between the most highly evolved members of two families. A considerable number of degenerates come under my observation professionally ; they are mostly children, and, as far as possible, I get what knowledge I can of their families both on the paternal and the maternal side. It happens in a very considerable proportion of these cases that the father and the mother are the best of the families from which they themselves have proceeded. Where a man has evolved from a humble class to a high degree of mental ability, and his life has attracted the feeling or affection of a lady who has also evolved rather higher mental faculties than the rest of her family, there is danger in such a marriage. It happens very often that the parents of degenerate children are the best of their respective families. I will not go into any details, but I could give you a number of cases to show how frequently it is found that among the families of men who have risen, the first-born child, if a male, is feeble-minded or degenerate. There is also the great question of the girls, as well as the boys, in their personal evolution. It has been constantly said that one reason why apparently the girl's capacity is less than the boy's capacity for many sorts of work is that their mothers have not been educated. I should like to ask Mr. Galton whether the girls inherit mostly through the mother or through the father.

PROFESSOR WELDON SAID :

Two sets of objections have been urged against the position taken up by Dr. Galton. The first set has been formulated by Dr. Mercier and by the authors of several papers which have been taken as read. Dr. Mercier, and those who think with him, object, first of all, that the actuarial method is faulty, because it does not account for the phenomena of inheritance. In the presence of the author of the "Grammar of Science" I am sorry to be obliged to point out that the actuarial method does not pretend to account for anything. It does pretend to describe a large number of complex phenomena with a very fair degree of accuracy, and for this reason it is admirably adapted for the purposes of Eugenic inquirers. As I conceive the matter, the essential object of Eugenics is not to put forward any theory of the causation of hereditary phenomena, but to obtain and diffuse a knowledge of what those phenomena really are. We may be unable by its means to account for the production of a Shakespeare, and we may so far fall short of Dr. Mercier's ideal, but we are certainly able to tabulate

a scheme of inheritance which will indicate with very fair accuracy the percentage of cases in which children of exceptional ability result from a particular type of marriage. If we can do no more than this, we shall have made a very great advance in knowledge, and my view of Mr. Galton's paper is that he wishes to point out to us the way in which such an advance may best be made.

Well, that is the answer I would give to the first class of objector. The business of the actuarial method is not to account for phenomena, but to describe them; and if Dr. Mercier will consult the studies on inheritance which have been made in consequence of Mr. Galton's labours, he will find that it is already possible to describe the distribution of characters in the children of parents of particular kinds with very considerable accuracy. I would refer the meeting to extensive series of such results contained in Professor Pearson's recent "Huxley Lecture."

The objections of another class of critics are summarised in the interesting series of remarks by Mr. Bateson. Carefully conducted breeding experiments, on the lines first indicated by the Austrian abbot Gregor Mendel, have yielded results of great interest, and in many cases of apparent simplicity; many such experiments have been carried out by Dr. Bateson himself, and by Professors De Vries, Correns and others in Europe and America. It has been too lightly assumed that by these experiments the need for actuarial work has been superseded. To this objection I would give two answers. I would say *first* that the actuarial method is an essential part of the equipment of any man who would make and understand such experiments. The question whether such numerical results as those obtained in Mendelian experiments are really in agreement with hypothesis is very often hard to answer, and the answer can only be obtained by the use of that very actuarial method which Mr. Galton has taught to apply to biological problems.

My second answer to these objections is this: That when you have obtained from a laboratory experiment a result which actuarial methods show you to be rightly inferred, you have not achieved all that is necessary for the establishment of a Eugenic maxim. Your laboratory experiment is purposely simplified: you deal with one set of phenomena at a time; and by that very fact, you establish a degree of unlikeness between your laboratory experiment and the infinitely more complex experiment which is being conducted all round you from generation to generation. Before you can be sure that in simplifying your laboratory conditions you have not neglected some important factor which affects the result under the complex conditions of Nature's experiments, you must view your own result in its proper relation to that which occurs under more complex conditions; you must compare the conclusions drawn from your laboratory experiment with those drawn from an actuarial study of the more complex natural experiment. If the two agree, you have realised at least as much of the truth as will suffice for a working generalisation; if they do not agree (and at present the results of Mendelian experiment have not led to a single conclusion which holds for masses of human populations), then in this

case there can be no doubt whatever that for the student of human Eugenics or of organic evolution generally, the conclusions drawn from the larger mass of complex material are far more valuable than those drawn from the simpler, smaller laboratory experiment.

DR. ROBERT HUTCHISON SAID :

My only claim to address a meeting on this subject is that not only in common with all physicians am I acquainted with the factors that make for physical deterioration, but I have devoted special attention to certain of these which I believe to play a large part in the process. I refer to feeding. I believe we have in treating this subject to consider two lines on which a society like this might work. It has to consider, first, the raw material of the race—and that I believe to be the view which commends itself specially to Dr. Galton—and, second, the conditions under which that raw material grows up. I believe, speaking as a physician, and judging from the cases which one sees, for example, in the children's hospitals, that it is not so necessary to improve the raw material—which is not really so very bad after all—as it is to improve the environment in which the children are brought up. Of all the factors in that environment, that which is of the greatest importance in promoting bad physical and bad mental development is, I believe, the food factor. If you would give me a free hand in feeding during infancy and from ten to eighteen years of age, I would guarantee to give you quite a satisfactory race as the result. And I think we would do more wisely in concentrating our attention on such practical questions as those, rather than in losing ourselves in a mass of scientific questions relating to heredity, about which it must be admitted, in regard to the human race, we are still profoundly ignorant.

MR. H. G. WELLS SAID :

We can do nothing but congratulate ourselves upon the presence of one of the great founders of sociology here to-day, and upon the admirable address he has given us. If there is any quality of that paper more than another upon which I would especially congratulate Dr. Galton and ourselves, it is upon its living and contemporary tone. One does not feel that it is the utterance of one who has retired from active participation in life, but of one who remains in contact with and contributing to the main current of thought. One remarks that even since his Huxley lecture in 1901, Dr. Galton has expanded and improved his propositions.

This is particularly the case in regard to his recognition of different *types* in the community, and of the need of a separate system of breeding in relation to each type. The Huxley Lecture had no recognition of that, and its admission does most profoundly modify the whole of this question of Eugenics. So long

as the consideration of types is not raised, the Eugenic proposition is very simple : superior persons must mate with superior persons, inferior persons must not have offspring at all ; and the only thing needful is some test that will infallibly detect superiority. Dr. Galton has resorted in the past to the device of inquiring how many judges and bishops and such-like eminent persons a family can boast, but that test has not gone without challenge in various quarters. Dr. Galton's inquiries in this direction in the past have always seemed to me to ignore the consideration of social advantage, of what Americans call the "pull" that follows any striking success. The fact that the sons and nephews of a distinguished judge or great scientific man are themselves eminent judges or successful scientific men, may after all be far more due to a special knowledge of the channels of professional advancement than to any distinctive family gift. I must confess that much of Dr. Galton's classical work in this direction seems to me to be premature. I have been impressed by the idea, and even now I remain under the sway of the idea, that our analysis of human faculties is entirely inadequate for the purpose of tracing hereditary influence. I think we want a much more elaborate analysis to give us the elements of heredity, an analysis of which we have at present only the first beginnings in the valuable work of the Abbé Mendel that Mr. Bateson has recently revived.

Even the generous recognition of types that Dr. Galton has now made does not altogether satisfy my inquiring mind. I believe there still remain further depths of concession for him. At the risk of being called a "crank," I must object that even that considerable list of qualities Dr. Galton tells us that every one would take into account, does not altogether satisfy me. Take health, for example. Are there not types of health? The mating of two quite healthy persons may result in disease. I am told it does so in the case of the interbreeding of healthy white men and healthy black women about the Tanganyika region ; the half-breed children are ugly, sickly, and rarely live. On the other hand, two not very healthy persons may have mutually corrective qualities, and may beget sound offspring. Then what right have we to assume that energy and ability are simple qualities? I am not even satisfied by the suggestion Dr. Galton seems to make that criminals should not breed. I am inclined to believe that a large proportion of our present-day criminals are the brightest and boldest members of families living under impossible conditions, and that in many desirable qualities the average criminal is above the average of the law-abiding poor, and probably of the average respectable person. Many eminent criminals appear to me to be persons superior in many respects, in intelligence, initiative, originality, to the average judge. I will confess I have never known either.

Let me suggest that Dr. Galton's concession to the fact that there are differences of type to consider, is only the beginning of a very big descent of concession, that may finally carry him very deep indeed. Eugenics, which is really only a new word for the popular American term stirpiculture, seems to me to be a term that is not without its misleading implications. It has in it something of that same lack of a fine appreciation of facts that enabled Herbert

Spencer to coin those two most unfortunate terms, *Evolution* and the *Survival of the Fittest*. The implication is that the *best* reproduces and survives. Now really it is the *better* that survives, and not the *best*. The real fact of the case is that in the all-round result the inferior usually perish, and the average of the species rises, but not that any exceptionally favourable variations get together and reproduce. I believe that now and always the conscious selection of the best for reproduction will be impossible, that to propose it is to display a fundamental misunderstanding of what individuality implies. The way of Nature has always been to slay the hindmost, and there is still no other way, unless we can prevent those who would become the hindmost being born. It is in the sterilisation of failures, and not in the selection of successes for breeding, that the possibility of an improvement of the human stock lies.

MRS. DR. DRYSDALE VICKERY SAID :

The speech which has interested me most is that of Dr. Hutchison. Important as is the quality of hereditary stock, yet at the present juncture I would say that of still greater importance is this—that we have such a vast number of our population growing up under bad conditions. The result is an artificial, a merely economic multiplication of inferior stocks. The question I wish to raise is this: Are we producing in this country, and in all civilised countries, a greater proportion of new individuals than can be favourably absorbed? In a country like Russia, the surplus of births over deaths amounts to two millions in the year; in Germany, the surplus is a million; in Britain, not quite half a million. Can we in an old state of society absorb that amount of new individuals and give them fair conditions of existence? I think not. Dr. Warner spoke of the importance of our teaching of girls. I hold very strongly that the question of heredity, as we study it at present, is very much a question of masculine heredity only, and that heredity in its feminine aspects is very much left out of account. Mr. Galton told us that a certain number of burgesses' names had absolutely disappeared, but what about the names of their wives, and how would that consideration affect his conclusions? In the future the question of population will, I hope, be considered very much from the feminine point of view, and if we wish to produce a well-developed race we must treat our women-kind a little better than we do at present. We must give them something more like the natural position which they should hold in society. Women's specialised powers must be utilised for the intellectual advancement of the race.

MR. BENJAMIN KIDD SAID :

It is, I am sure, a peculiar satisfaction to have from Mr. Galton this important and interesting paper. No man of science in England has done more to encourage the study of human faculty by exact methods, and I hope the

Sociological Society will endeavour to follow the example he has set us. The only item of criticism I would offer, would be to say that we must not, perhaps, be sanguine in expecting too much at present from Eugenics founded on statistical and actuarial methods in the study of Society. We must have a real science of Society before the science of Eugenics can hope to gain authority. The point of Mr. Galton's Paper is, I think, that however we may differ as to other standards, we are, at all events, all agreed as to what constitutes the fittest and most perfect individual. I am not quite convinced of this. Much obscurity at present exists in sociological studies from confusing two entirely different things, namely, individual efficiency and social efficiency. Mr. Galton's fable of the animals will help me to make my meaning clear. It will be observed that he has considered the animals as individuals. If, however, we took a social type like the social insects, a contradiction, which I think possibly underlies his example, might be visible. For instance, it is well known that all the qualities of the bees are devoted to attaining the highest possible efficiency of their societies. Yet these qualities are by no means the qualities which we would consider as contributing to a perfect individual. If the bees at some earlier stage of evolution understood Eugenics, as we now understand the subject, what peculiar condemnation, for instance, would they have visited on the queen bee, who devotes her life solely to breeding. I am afraid, too, that the interesting habits of the drones would have received special condemnation from the unctuous rectitude of the time. What would have been thought even of the workers as perfect individuals with their undeveloped bodies and aborted instincts? And yet all these things have contributed in a high degree to social efficiency, and have undoubtedly made the type a winning one in evolution.

The example will apply to human society. Statistical and actuarial methods alone in the study of individual faculty often carry us to very incomplete conclusions, if not corrected by larger and more scientific conceptions of the social good. I remember our chairman, in his earlier social essays, once depicted an ideally perfect state of society. I have a distinct recollection of my own sense of relief that my birth had occurred in the earlier ages of comparative barbarism. For Mr. Pearson, I think, proposed to give the kind of people who now scribble on our railway carriages no more than a short shrift and the nearest lamp-post. I hope we shall not seriously carry this spirit into Eugenics. It might renew, in the name of science, tyrannies that it took long ages of social evolution to emerge from. Judging from what one sometimes reads, many of our ardent reformers would often be willing to put us into lethal chambers if our minds and bodies did not conform to certain standards. We are apt to forget in these matters that that sense of responsibility to life which distinguishes the higher societies is itself an asset painfully acquired by the race, a social asset of such importance that the more immediate gain aimed at would count by the side of it as no more than dust in the balance. Our methods of knowledge are as yet admittedly very imperfect. Mr. Galton himself, I remember, as the result of his earlier researches into human faculty, put the intellectual calibre of what are called the lower races

many degrees below that of the European races. I ventured to point out, some years ago, that this assumption appeared to be premature, and the data upon which it was founded insufficient. So much is now generally admitted. Yet it would have been awkward had we proceeded to draw any large practical conclusion from it at the time. The deficiency of what have been called the lower races is now seen to be, not so much an intellectual deficiency, as a deficiency in social qualities and social history, and therefore in social inheritance.

Many examples of a similar kind might be given. It may be remembered, for instance, how a generation or two ago Malthusianism was urged upon us in the name of science, and almost with the zeal of a religion. We have lived to see the opposite view now beginning to be urged with much the same zeal and emphasis. A nation or a race cannot afford to make practical mistakes on a large scale in these matters.

I trust and believe that much that Mr. Galton anticipates will be realised. But I think we must go slowly with our science of Eugenics, and that we must take care, above all things, that it advances with, and does not precede a real science of our social evolution. We must come to the work in a humble spirit. Even the highest representatives of the various social sciences must realise that in the specialised study of sociology as a whole, they are scarcely more than distinguished amateurs. Otherwise, in few other departments of study would there be so much danger of incomplete knowledge, and even of downright quackery, clothing itself with the mantle and authority of science.

MR. ELDERTON SAID :

An important item in the study of heredity is the heredity of disease, and I think life assurance offices might be able to give useful statistics. When a person whose life is assured dies, a certificate of death is given to the office and is put away with the papers that were filled up when the assurance was taken out. These original papers state the causes of death of parents, brothers, and sisters, and their ages at death, or their ages if they were alive when the assurance was effected. These particulars give information for the study of heredity in relation to disease, and from the same source light might be thrown on a question of great importance—the correlation between specific disease and fertility. One point in conclusion. Dr. Hutchison spoke of the greater importance of environment, but in that he would hardly get actuaries to agree with him. Their observation, judged by life offices' experience and practice, would seem to show that environment operates merely as a modifying factor after heredity has done its work.

MR. L. T. HOBHOUSE SAID :

I feel a good deal of difficulty in intervening in this extremely interesting discussion at this stage. I, like many of you, am only a listener to what the

biologists have to tell us in this matter. Until we have very definite information as to what heredity can do, I think those of us who are only students of sociology, and who cannot lay any claim whatever to be biologists, ought to keep silence. We have this afternoon had extremely divergent views put before us as to the actual or probable operation of heredity, and it seems quite clear that before we begin to tackle this question, which deals with one of the most powerful of human passions, with a view to regulate it, we must have highly perfected knowledge.

As to the two factors, stock and environment, no one can doubt that both are of fundamental importance in relation to the welfare of society; no one can doubt that, if the kind of precise knowledge which I desiderate could be laid before us by the biologist, it would have considerable influence on our views not only of what is ethically right, but of what could be legislatively enforced. Of these two factors, stock and environment, which can we modify with the greater ease and certainty of not doing harm? It is fairly obvious that we can affect the environment of mankind in certain definite ways. We have the accumulation of considerable tradition as to the way in which a given act will affect the social environment. When we come to bring stock into consideration, we are dealing with that which is still very largely unknown. At the same time, we owe a great deal of thanks to Mr. Galton for raising this subject. The bare conception of a conscious selection as a way in which educated society would deal with stock is infinitely higher than that of natural selection with which biologists have confronted every proposal of sociology. If we are to take the problem of stock into consideration at all, it ought to be in the way of intelligently handling the question, rather than submitting to the blind forces of nature. But until we have far more knowledge and agreement as to criteria of conscious selection, I fear we cannot, as sociologists, expect to do much for society on these lines.

WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS

FROM MR. W. BATESON, F.R.S.

With the objects of the paper every one will sympathise, and there can be no doubt that this discussion will do something to promote the study of Heredity and the introduction of scientific method in the breeding of man and other animals. An exact knowledge of the laws of inheritance will be a factor in the destiny of mankind, as large, if not larger, than any yet brought to bear.

I notice that in the paper, stress is laid on the "*actuarial* side of heredity," and on the application of statistical methods of a comprehensive character to the solution of the problems involved. Students of the subject are well aware what interesting results have been attained by those methods, especially in the hands of Mr. Galton himself—work that did much to develop this branch of science at a time when it was almost abandoned by naturalists. It may, nevertheless, not be inopportune, on such an occasion, which may well prove to be a point of new departure, to recall the fact that though these "actuarial" methods were appropriate to an incipient stage of the inquiry, means of attacking the problem directly and with greater effect are now well developed.

In nearly every case to which the method of accurate experimental breeding has been applied, it has been possible to show that the phenomena of heredity follow precise laws of remarkable simplicity, which the grosser statistical methods had necessarily failed to reveal. Inquiries, therefore, pursued on those older lines are largely superfluous, and give ambiguous results, inasmuch as they serve to conceal an underlying physiological order which closer analysis would make readily evident. It is, therefore, doubtful whether the prodigious labour needed for the collection and reduction of comprehensive statistics as to the distribution of hereditary qualities, is well spent; in view of the probability that the significance of the deductions drawn will disappear so soon as it becomes possible to apply a more stringent method of research.

The "actuarial" method will perhaps continue to possess a certain

fascination in regions of the inquiry where experimental methods are at present inapplicable, but conclusions drawn from facts not capable of minute analysis, can at best be regarded as interim conclusions, awaiting a test which, in all likelihood, they will not endure.

I would, therefore, urge that those who really have such aims at heart will best further "Eugenics" by promoting the attainment of that solid and irrefragable knowledge of the physiology of heredity which experimental breeding can alone supply.

FROM PROFESSOR C. S. LOCH.

1. With regard to the study of Eugenics, and the possibility of the idea which the word represents becoming operative in the lower section of society, an intelligent regard to social welfare, beyond what is now prevalent in any class, is the first condition. Is it possible to promote the objects of the writer of the paper, except indirectly, so far as that section is concerned? As they learn at public elementary schools, or in other ways, the conditions of healthy life, they may realise the necessity of what in a broad sense may be called good breeding.

2. To carry out the suggestions of Dr. Galton for the other higher sections of society may possibly be easier; but propagandism of a certain kind during the last ten or fifteen years has tended rather to promote a reduction in the number of children born, and that amongst a good class, rather than what one may call the better breeding of a larger number of children.

3. It may be agreed that a scientific statement on the subject would touch the imagination of a large number of our people, and that steps towards increasing our knowledge might be more widely adopted; but unless definite laws are discovered which can be practically turned into social commandments, and can be so stated and preached with a kind of religious fervour, it seems hardly possible to make very much further progress on such a question. Are we near the time at which such laws can be formulated in a manner that would meet with general acceptance on the part of all scientific students of the subject?

FROM DR. W. LESLIE MACKENZIE, M.A., M.D.,
Medical Inspector to the Local Government Board of Scotland.

It is to me a great privilege to be permitted to say something in any discussion where Dr. Francis Galton is leader; because from early in my student days until now, I have felt that his method of handling sociological facts has always been at once scientific and practical. Whether the ideas he represents have had some sub-conscious effect in driving me into the public health service, I cannot tell; but since I entered that service fourteen years ago, I have been in a multitude of minor ways impressed with two things—first, that in every Scottish

community, rural and urban, a hygienic renaissance is in progress ; second, that in the many forms it assumes it has no explicit basis in scientific theory. In attempting, some time ago, to penetrate to the root-idea of the public health movement, I concluded that, rightly or wrongly, we have all taken for granted certain postulates. The hygienic renaissance is the objective side of a movement whose ethical basis is the set effort after a richer, cleaner, intenser life in a highly organised society. The postulates of hygienics—whose administrative form constitutes the public health service—are such as these : that society or the social group is essentially organic ; that the social organism, being as yet but little integrated, is capable of rapid and easy modification—that is, of variations secured by selection ; that disease is a name for certain mal-adaptations of the social organism or of its organic units ; that diseases are thus, in greater or lesser degrees, preventable ; that the prevention of diseases promotes social evolution ; that, by the organisation of representative agencies—county councils, town councils, district councils, parish councils and the like—the processes of natural selection may be indefinitely aided by artificial selections ; that thus, by continuous modification of the social organism, of its organic units and of the compound environment of both, it is possible to further the production of better citizens—more energetic, more alert, more versatile, more individuated. Provisionally, public health may be defined as the systematic application of scientific ideas to the extirpation of diseases, and thereby to the direct or indirect establishment of beneficial variations both in the social organism and in its organic units. In more concrete form, it is an organised effort of the collective social energy to heighten the physiological normal of civilised living.

A science of hygienics might thus be regarded as almost equivalent to the science of eugenics ; character is presupposed in both. The fundamental assumption of hygienics is that the human organism is capable of greater things than on the average it has anywhere shown, and that its potentialities can be elicited by the systematic improvement of the environment. From the practical side, hygienics aims at “preparing a place” for the highest average of faculty to develop in.

Take Heredity—one of Dr. Galton’s points. The modern movement for the extirpation of tubercular phthisis began with the definite proof that the disease is due to a bacillus. But the movement did not become world-wide until the belief in the heredity of tuberculosis had been sapped. So long as the tubercular person was weighted by the superstition that tubercular parents must necessarily produce tubercular children, and that the parents of tubercular children must themselves have been tubercular, he had little motive to seek for cure, the fatalism being here supported by the alleged inheritance of disease. Now that he knows how to resist the invasion of a germ, he is proceeding in his multitudes to fortify himself. What is true of tuberculosis is true of many other infections. Consequently, every hygienist will agree with Dr. Galton that the dissemination of a true theory of heredity is of the first practical importance. Nor is the evil of a wrong theory of heredity confined to infectious disease. If the official

"nomenclature of diseases" be carefully scrutinised, it will be found that the vast majority of diseases are due either to the attacks of infective or parasitic organisms or to the functional stress of environment, which for this purpose is better named "nurture." This has recently been borne in upon me by the examination of school children. The conclusion inevitably arising out of the facts is that inherited capacities are in every class of society so masked by the effects of nurture, good or bad, that we have as yet no means of determining, in any individual case, how much is due to inheritance and how much to nurture. There is here an unlimited field for detailed study.

Next, Fertility. It is, I suppose, on the whole, true that the less opulent classes are more fertile than the more opulent. But I am not prepared to accept the assumption that the economically "upper classes" coincide with the biologically "upper classes." May it not rather be that the relatively infertile "upper classes" (economical) are only the biological limit of the "lower classes," from which the "upper" are continually recruited? Until the economically "lower classes" are analysed in such detail as will enable us to eliminate what is due to bad environment, we cannot come to final conclusions on the relative fertility or infertility of "upper" and "lower." Until such an analysis is made, we cannot well assume that the difference in fertility is in any degree due to fundamental *biological* differences or modifications. Dr. Noël Paton has recently shown that starved mothers produce starved offspring and that well-fed mothers produce well-fed offspring. In his particular experiment with guinea-pigs, the *numbers* of offspring were unaffected. If this experiment should be verified on the large scale, it would form some ground for doubting whether the mere increase of comfort directly produces biological infertility. The capacity to reproduce may remain; but reproduction may be limited by a different ethic. The universal fall in the birth-rate has been too rapid to justify *simpliciter* the conclusion that biological capacity has altered.

When the public health organisations have succeeded in extirpating the grosser evils of environment, they will, it is hoped, proceed to deal more intimately with the individual. In the present movement for the medical examination and supervision of school children, we have an indication of great developments. If to the relatively coarse methods of practical hygienics we could now add the precision of anthropometry, we should find ready to hand in the schools an unlimited quantity of raw material. We might even hope to add some pages to the "golden book" of "thriving families." Incidentally, one might suggest a minor inquiry. Of the large thriving families, do the older or the middle or the younger members show, on the average, the greater ultimate capacity for civic life? My impression is that, in our present social conditions, the middle children are likely to show the highest percentage of total capacity. This is a mere impression, but it is worth putting to the test of facts.

To the worker in the fighting line, as the public health officer must always regard himself, Dr. Galton's suggestions come with inspiration and light.

FROM DR. G. ARCHDALL REID, M.B., F.R.S.E.

I think it would be impossible to imagine a subject of greater importance or to name one of which the public is more ignorant. At the root of every moral and social question lies the problem of heredity. Until a knowledge of the laws of heredity is more widely diffused, the public will grope in the dark in its endeavours to solve many pressing difficulties.

How shall we bring about a "wide dissemination of a knowledge of the laws of heredity so far as they are surely known, and the promotion of their further study?" We shall not be able to reach the public until we are able to influence the education of a body of men whose studies naturally bring them into relation with the subject, and who, when united, are numerous enough and powerful enough to sway public opinion. Only one such body of men exists—the medical profession. When the study of heredity forms as regular a part of the medical curriculum as anatomy and physiology, then, and not till then, will the laws of heredity be brought to bear on the solution of social problems. At present, a specialist like Mr. Galton has a very limited audience. In effect, it is composed of specialists like himself. Until among medical men a systematic knowledge of heredity is substituted for a bundle of prejudices, and close and clear reasoning for wild guess-work, the influence of men of Mr. Galton's type, most unhappily, is not likely to extend much beyond the limits of a few learned societies.

The first essential is a clear grasp of the distinction which exists between what are known as inborn traits and what are known as acquired traits. Inborn traits are those with which the individual is "born," which come to him by nature, which form his natural inheritance from his parents. Acquired traits are alterations produced in inborn traits by influences to which they are exposed during the life of the individual. Thus a man's limbs are inborn traits, but the changes produced in his limbs by exercise, injury, and so forth, are acquired traits. All men know that the individual tends to transmit his inborn traits to his offspring. But it is now almost universally denied by students of heredity that he tends to transmit his acquired traits. The real, the burning question among students of heredity is whether changes in an individual caused by the action of the environment on him tend *in any way* to affect the offspring subsequently born to him. Thus, for example, does good health in an individual tend to benefit his offspring? Does his ill-health tend to enfeeble them?

It is generally assumed that changes in the parents do tend to influence the inborn traits of offspring. Thus we have heard much of the degeneracy which it is alleged is befalling our race owing to the bad hygienic conditions under which it dwells in our great growing cities. The assumption is made that the race is being so injured by the bad conditions that the descendant of a line of slum-dwellers, if removed during infancy to the country, would, on the average, be inferior physically to the descendant of a line of rustics, whereas, contrariwise, the descendant of a line of rustics, if removed during infancy to the

slums would be superior physically to the majority of the children he would meet there.

I believe this assumption to be a totally unwarrantable one. It is founded on a confusion between inborn and acquired traits. Of course the influences which act on a slum-bred child tend to injure him personally. But there is no certain evidence that the descendant of a line of slum-dwellers is on the average inferior to the descendant of a line of rustics whose parents migrated to the slums just after his birth. I believe, in fact, that while a life in the slums deteriorates the individual, it does not affect *directly* the hereditary tendencies of the race in the least. A vast mass of evidence may be adduced in support of this contention. Slums are not a creation of yesterday. They have existed in many countries from very ancient times. Races that have been most exposed to a slum life cannot be shewn to be inferior physically and mentally to those that have been less or not at all exposed. The Chinese, for example, who have been more exposed, and for a longer time, to such influences than any other people, are physically and mentally a very fine race, and certainly not inferior to the Dyacks of Borneo, for example.

There is also a mass of collateral evidence. Thus Africans and other races have been literally soaked in the extremely virulent and abundant poison of malaria for thousands of years. We know how greatly malaria damages the individual. But Africans have not deteriorated. Like the Chinese, physically, at any rate, they are a very fine race. Practically speaking, every negro child suffers from malaria, and may perish of it. But while the *sufferings* of the negroes from malaria have produced no effect on the race, the deaths of negroes from malaria have produced an immense effect. The continual weeding out, during many generations, of the unfittest has rendered the race pre-eminently resistant to malaria; so that negroes can now flourish in countries which we, who have suffered very little from malaria, find it impossible to colonise. Similarly, the inhabitants of Northern Europe have suffered greatly for thousands of years from consumption, especially in places where the population has been dense—where there have been many cities and towns, and therefore slums. They also have not deteriorated; they have merely grown pre-eminently strong against consumption. They are able to live, for example, in English cities, in which consumption is very rife, and which individuals of races which have been less exposed to the disease find as dangerous as Englishmen find the West Coast of Africa.

During the last four hundred years, consumption has spread very widely, and now no race is able to dwell in cities and towns, especially in cold and temperate climates, that has not undergone evolution against it. In other words, no race is capable of civilisation that has not undergone evolution against consumption, as well as against other diseases and influences, deteriorating to the individual, which civilisation brings in its train. Many biologists and most medical men believe that influences acting on parents tend directly to alter the hereditary tendencies of offspring. In technical terms, they believe that variations are caused by action of the environment. How they contrive to do

so in the face of the massive and conclusive evidence afforded by the natural history of human races in relation to disease is beyond my comprehension. How *could* a race undergo evolution against malaria (for example), if parental disease altered and injured the hereditary tendencies of the offspring? How could Natural Selection select if all the variations presented for selection were unfavourable? The observations on disease and injury published by Brown Séquard, Cossar Ewart, and many medical men, are capable of an interpretation different to that which they have given.

Mr. Galton speaks as if the causes which have brought about the disappearance of most savage races when brought in contact with high civilisation were obscure. I can assure him, however, that they have been worked out precisely and statistically by many medical observers on the spot. Apart from extermination by war, the only savage races which are disappearing are those of the New World, and in every instance they are perishing from the enormous mortality caused amongst them by introduced diseases against which their races have undergone no evolution. He will find these precise statistics in the tables of mortality issued by all the Public Health departments that exist in America, Polynesia, and Australasia. He will find also many accounts in the journals of travellers. If he will read the records of visits of parties of aborigines from the New World to the cities of Europe, he will find that their mortality, especially from consumption, was invariably high. There is nothing more mysterious about the disappearance of these races than there is about the disappearance of the dodo and the bison. They are perishing, not because, as Froude poetically puts it, they are like "caged eagles," incapable of domestication, but simply and solely because they are weak against certain diseases. If malaria instead of consumption were prevalent in cities, the English would be incapable of civilisation, whereas the negroes and the wild tribes about the Amazon, and in New Guinea and Borneo, would be particularly capable of it. Indeed, it may be taken as a general rule, to which there is no exception, that every race throughout the World is resistant to every disease precisely in proportion to its past experience of it, and that only those races are capable of civilisation which are resistant to the diseases of dense populations.

Before the voyage of Columbus, hardly a zymotic disease, with the exception of malaria, was known in the New World. The inhabitants of the Old World had slowly evolved against the diseases of civilised life under gradually worsening conditions, caused by the gradual increase of population, and therefore of disease. They introduced these maladies to the natives of the New World under the worst conditions then known. They built cities and towns, the natural breeding places of all zymotic diseases, except those of the malarial type. They gave the natives clothes, which are the best vehicles for the transport of microbes. They endeavoured to Christianise and civilise the natives, and so drew them into buildings where they were infected. They forced them to labour on plantations and in mines. In fact, they forced on them every facility for "catching" disease. As a result, they exterminated or almost exterminated them.

The natives of the Gilbert Islands lately petitioned our Government not to permit missionaries to settle among them, as they feared destruction. They were perfectly right. Clothes and churches and school-rooms are fatal to such people. The Tasmanians, before they were quite exterminated, had a saying that good people—that is, people who went frequently to church—died young. They also were perfectly right—that is as regards their own race.

It is a highly significant fact that, whereas every white man's city in Asia or Africa has its native quarter, no white man's city in the New World has a native quarter. To find the pure aborigines of the New World we must go to parts remote from cities and towns. They cannot accomplish in a few generations an evolution which the natives of the Old World accomplished only after hundreds, perhaps thousands of generations, and at the cost of thousands of millions of lives. The Negroes, who were introduced into America to fill the void created by the disappearing aborigines, have perhaps persisted, but they had already undergone some evolution against consumption—the chief disease of civilisation—and much evolution against measles and other diseases. Yet even the Negroes would not have persisted had they not been introduced under special conditions. They were taken to the warmer parts of America at a time when consumption was little rife as compared to its prevalence in the cities of Europe, and they were employed mainly in agricultural occupations. They had a special start, and were placed under conditions that worsened only slowly. As a result they underwent evolution, and are now able to persist in America. But African Negroes, as compared to the natives of the densely populated parts of Europe and Asia, have undergone little evolution against consumption. As a consequence, no African colony has ever succeeded in Europe or Asia. For instance, the Dutch and English imported about twelve thousand negroes into Ceylon a century ago. Within twenty years all except a mere handful had perished, mainly of consumption, and that in a country where the disease is not nearly so prevalent as in Northern Europe, or the more settled parts of Northern Asia.

There can be little doubt that the sterility of the New World races when brought into contact with civilisation is due mainly to ill-health. The sterility of our upper classes is mainly voluntary. It is due to the possession of special knowledge. The growing sterility of the lower classes is due to the spread of that knowledge; hence the general and continuous fall in the birth-rate. Until we are able to estimate the part played by this knowledge it would be vain to collect statistics of comparative sterility.

We have frequently been told that no city family can persist for four generations unless fortified by country blood. That I believe is a complete error. Country blood does not strengthen city blood. It weakens it, for country blood has been less thoroughly purged of weak elements. It is true, owing to the large mortality in cities and the great immigration from the country, it is difficult to find a city family which has had no infusion of country blood for four generations. But to suppose on that account that country blood strengthens city blood against the special conditions of city life is to confuse *post hoc* with *propter hoc*.

Slum life and the other evil influences of civilisation, including bad and insufficient food, vitiated air, and zymotic diseases, injure the individual. They make him acquire a bad set of traits. But they do not injure the hereditary tendencies of the race. Had they done so civilisation would have been impossible. Civilised man would have become extinct. On the contrary, by weeding out the unfittest, they make the race strong against those influences.

If, then, we wish to raise the standard of our race, we must do it in two ways. In the first place we must improve the conditions under which the individual develops, and so make him a finer animal. In the second place, we must endeavour to restrict, as much as possible, the marriage of the physically and mentally unfit. In other words, we must attend both to the acquired characters and to inborn characters. By merely improving the conditions under which people live we shall improve the individual, but not the race. The same measures will not achieve both objects. Medical men have done a good deal for the improvement of the acquired characters of the individual by improving sanitation. They have attempted nothing towards the second object, the improvement of the inborn traits of the race. Nor will they attempt anything until they have acquired a precise knowledge of heredity from biologists. On the other hand, before biologists are able to influence medical men they must bring to bear their exact methods of thought on the great changes produced in various races by their experience, during thousands of years, of disease. I am sure our knowledge of heredity will gain in precision and breadth by a consideration of these tremendous, long-continued, and drastic experiments conducted by nature. No experiments conducted by man can compare with them in magnitude and completeness. And as I have already intimated, the precise statistical information on which our conclusions may be based is already collected and tabulated. I am quite sure it is good neither for medicine nor biology that medical men and biologists should live as it were in separate and closed compartments, each body ignoring the splendid mass of data collected by the other. Much of medicine should be a part of biology, and much of biology a part of medicine.

FROM MR. J. M. ROBERTSON.

1. A difficulty at once arises on the proposition that "The aim of Eugenics is that each *class or sect* should be *represented by its best specimens*." What does this mean? Apparently (judging from the context), that the *average* of each recognisable *type* should be raised, that those who are *now* "best" should be the standard for the future averages. If that be the idea, the formula had better run simply: "The aim of Eugenics is to promote such calculation or choice in marriage as shall maximise the number of efficient individuals." There will always be *some* "best," and it is a contradiction in terms to say that they "represent their class."

2. It seems, again, an oversight to make a multiplication of "*large* and thriving families" the ostensible ideal. If *all* families were "*large*," they certainly could not all be "*thriving*." A great increase of population would make thriving a harder matter: the struggle would be intensified on new lines. Further, "*thriving*" is often a matter of the possession of unsocial or anti-social qualities—unscrupulousness and acquisitiveness—and a vulgar idea of achievement. Given a family of morally and intellectually superior types, all contented with simple conditions, and averse to commercial struggle, are they to be classed as ill-born, or failures? If, finally, it should be shown that a common condition of thriving for large or other families is the possession of capital for a start in business, we are brought to no conclusion in Eugenics, but set asking for one in terms of politics.

3. It is indeed highly important to set up such common standards as shall preclude replication of morbid stocks, including in these those seen to tend to insanity, dumbness, suicide, dipsomania, erotism, violence, etc. Mr. Galton's past work has done much to bring the importance of heredity home to thinking people. But there is a danger of seeming to ask too much. For one thing, we must not overlook the fact that mere high physical stamina is not necessarily, or even very probably, a condition of high brain power. Merely "*delicate*" people, therefore, are not to be warned off marriage. Many great men (*e.g.*, Newton and Voltaire) were extremely fragile in infancy. Some (*e.g.*, Calvin, Pope, Spencer, Heine, Stevenson) were chronic invalids. For another thing, though it seems clear that high capacity in one parent is often neutralised by the lack of it in the other, it is vain to think to eliminate the factor of love or instinctive preference in marriage.

4. It seems impossible, finally, to separate Eugenics from Politics, inasmuch as the bad physical and moral conditions set up by poverty—*i.e.*, ill-feeding, ill-housing, ill-clothing, and early prolificacy on the one hand, and ignorance in child-rearing and begetting on the other—are the great forces of "*Kakogenics*." Mr. Galton says "There is strong reason for believing that the rise and decline of nations is closely connected with" the rate of reproduction in the "*upper*" or other classes. I respectfully suggest that an effect is here put for a cause. The true causation of the rise and decline of nations, surely, is proximately a general economic process, depending primarily on physical environment (that is, natural resources) and secondarily on political direction, which is conditioned by political environment. That is to say, Rome did not rise through the fecundity or fall through the infecundity of her ruling or other classes. In the early period they were normally fecund. In the period of empire they appear to have become infecund, as a result of the bad relation to life set up by their imperialistic economics. But mere fecundity on their part would not have made that economics healthy, or rectified their relation to life. Saracen society has often presented fecund aristocracies, without any arrest of social decline. The depopulation of imperial Italy and of post-Alexandrian Greece, on the other hand, was not a physiological but an economic process. The Greeks went to the new and more

facile economic conditions. For Rome, the import of grain as tribute from rich soils killed the competition of Italian soil, and slave labour was rather a result than a cause of the elimination of the old peasantry.

Perhaps, indeed, Mr. Galton would not dissent from the general proposition that Eugenics involves Politics. But it seems to me that the necessary regression is obscured when it is suggested that Eugenics is mainly a matter of the right adjustment of individual conduct, in a social system politically fixed. If this be meant, I submit that it is a form of the fallacy of prescribing "a new heart" as the sufficient means to social regeneration. Nations can only very gradually change their hearts, and part of the process consists in changing their houses, their clothes, their alimentation, their economic position, and their institutions as a means to the rest.

FROM MR. G. BERNARD SHAW.

I agree with the paper, and go so far as to say that there is now no reasonable excuse for refusing to face the fact that nothing but a eugenic religion can save our civilisation from the fate that has overtaken all previous civilisations.

It is worth pointing out that we never hesitate to carry out the negative side of eugenics with considerable zest, both on the scaffold and on the battlefield. We have never deliberately called a human being into existence for the sake of civilisation; but we have wiped out millions. We kill a Thibetan regardless of expense, and in defiance of our religion, to clear the way to Lhasa for the Englishman; but we take no really scientific steps to secure that the Englishman, when he gets there, will be able to live up to our assumption of his superiority.

It is quite true, as the lecturer suggests, that the violent personal preferences on which most plays and novels are founded, are practically negligible forces in society. They can be, and are, circumscribed by political and social institutions as successfully as the equally violent antipathies which lead to murder. In spite of all the romancers, men and women are amazingly indiscriminate and promiscuous in their attachments: they select their wives and husbands far less carefully than they select their cashiers and cooks. In the countries where they are not allowed to select at all, but have their marriages arranged for them wholly by their parents, the average result seems to be much the same as that of our own more promiscuous plan of letting people marry according to their fancies. In short, for all sociological purposes, it may safely be assumed that people are not particular as to whom they marry, provided they do not lose caste by the alliance. But we must not infer from this that they will tolerate any interference with their domestic life once they are married. Political marriages are perfectly practicable as far as the church door; but once the register is signed there is an end of all public considerations. If the selection is eugenically erroneous, there is no remedy. If it is so brilliantly successful

that it seems a national loss to limit the husband's progenitive capacity to the breeding capacity of one woman, or the wife's to an experiment with one father only, our marriage customs and prejudices will stand as sternly in the way as if no selection had been exercised at all in the first instance. Eugenics under such limitations lose their interest, and relapse into mere Platonic speculation.

I am afraid we must make up our minds either to face a considerable shock to vulgar opinion in this matter or to let eugenics alone. Christianity began by attacking marriage; and though the attack utterly failed, the Catholic Church still regards the marriage of a priest as an abomination. Luther would never have dared to marry a nun if his opinions on the question had not gone much further than any Protestant community now dares to hint. But a merely negative attitude towards marriage is foredoomed to failure. Celibacy is so clearly an impossibilist doctrine that even St. Paul could not press it to its logical conclusion. Luther's views are anarchic, and suggest mere profligacy to the ordinary Philistine. Now, marriage is profligate enough in all conscience; but it is not anarchic. Consequently, marriage holds its own in spite of the revulsions of the higher sexual conscience against the open claim of married people to be exempt from all social obligation and even self-respect in their relations with one another. And as this very licentiousness serves the all-important purpose of keeping the race recruited, it has never been possible to challenge it seriously until the popularisation, about thirty-five years ago, of the sterilisation of marriage. This practice had, for decency's sake, to justify itself as a eugenic one: it was said that when there were fewer children each child would receive more care and nourishment, and have a better chance of surviving to maturity. But a mere reduction in the severity of the struggle for existence is no substitute for positive steps for the improvement of such a deplorable piece of work as man. We may even allow, without countenancing for a moment the crudities of Neo-Darwinism, that it may conceivably do more harm than good. What we must fight for is freedom to breed the race without being hampered by the mass of irrelevant conditions implied in the institution of marriage. If our morality is attacked, we can carry the war into the enemy's country by reminding the public that the real objection to breeding by marriage is that marriage places no restraint on debauchery so long as it is monogamic; whereas eugenic breeding would effectually protect the mothers and fathers of the race from any abuse of their relations. As to the domestic and sympathetic function of marriage, or even its selfishly sexual function, we need not interfere with that. What we need is freedom for people who have never seen each other before and never intend to see one another again to produce children under certain definite public conditions, without loss of honour. That freedom once secured, and the conditions defined, we have nothing further to say in the matter until the necessarily distant time when the results of our alternative method of recruiting will be able to take the matter in hand themselves, and invite the world to reconsider its institutions in the light of experiments which must, of course, in the meantime run concurrently with the promiscuity of ordinary marriage.

FROM V. LADY WELBY.

The science of Eugenics as not only dealing with "all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race," but also "with those that develop them to the utmost advantage," must have the most pressing interest for women. And one of the first things to do—pending regulative reform—is to prepare the minds of women to take a truer view of their dominant natural impulse towards service and self-sacrifice. They need to realise more clearly the significance of their mission to conceive, to develop, to cherish and to train—in short, in all senses to mother the next, and through that the succeeding generations of Man.

As things are, they have almost entirely missed the very point both of their special function and of their strongest yearnings. They have lost that discerning guidance of eugenic instinct and that inerrancy of eugenic preference which, broadly speaking, in both sexes have given us the highest types of man yet developed. The refined and educated woman of this day is brought up to countenance, *and to see moral and religious authority countenance*, social standards which practically take no account of the destinies and the welfare of the race. It is thus hardly wonderful that she should be failing more and more to fulfil her true mission, should indeed too often be unfaithful to it, spending her instinct of devotion in unworthy, or at least barren, directions. Yet, once she realises what the results will be that she can help to bring about, she will be even more ready than the man to give herself, not for that vague empty abstraction, the "Future," but for the coming generations among which her own descendants may be reckoned. For her natural devotion to her babe—the representative of the generations yet to come—is even more complete than that to her husband, which indeed is biologically, though she knows it not, her recognition in him of the means to a supreme end.

But it is not only thus that women are concerned with the profound obligation to the race which the founder of the science of Eugenics is bringing home to the social conscience. At present, anyhow, a large proportion of civilised women find themselves from one or another cause debarred from this social service in the direct sense.

There is another kind of race-motherhood open to, and calling for, the intelligent recognition of and intelligent fulfilment by, all women. There are kinds of natural and instinctive knowledge of the highest value which the artificial social conditions of civilisation tend to efface. There are powers of swift insight and penetration—powers also of unerring judgment—which are actually atrophied by the ease and safety secured in highly organised communities. These, indeed, are often found in humble forms, which might be called in-sense and fore-sense.

While I would lay stress on the common heritage of humanity which gives the man a certain motherhood and the woman a certain fatherhood in outlook, perhaps also in intellectual function, we are here mainly concerned with the specialised mental activities of women as distinguished from those of men.

It has long been a commonplace that women have, as a rule, a larger share of so-called "intuition" than men. But the reasons for this, its true nature and its true work and worth, have never, so far as I know, been adequately set forth. It is obvious that these reasons cannot be properly dealt with—indeed can but barely be indicated—in these few words. They involve a reference to an extensive range of facts which anthropology, archæology, history, psychology and physiology, as well as philology, have brought to our knowledge. They mean a review of these facts in a new light—that which, in many cases, the woman who has preserved or recovered her earlier, more primitive racial prerogative, can alone throw upon them.

I will only here mention such facts as the part primitively borne by women in the evolution of crafts and arts, including the important one of healing; and point out the absolute necessity, since an original parity of muscular development in the animal world was lost, of their meeting physical coercion by the help of keen, penetrative, resourceful wits, and the "conning" which (from the temptation of weakness to serve by deception) became what we now mean by "cunning." To these I think we may add the woman's leading part in the evolution of language. While her husband was the "man of action," and in the heat of the chase and of battle, or the labour of building huts, making stockades, weapons, etc., the "man of few words," she was necessarily the talker, necessarily the provider or suggester of symbolic sounds and with them of pictorial signs, by which to describe the ever-growing products of human energy, intelligence and constructiveness, and the ever-growing needs and interests of the race—in short, the ever-widening range of social experience.

We are all, men and women, apt to be satisfied now—as we have recently been told, for instance, in the Faraday Lecture—with things as they are. But that is just what we all came into the world to be *dissatisfied* with. And while it may now be said that women are more conservative than men, they still tend to be more adaptive. If the fear of losing by violent change what has been gained *for the children* were removed, women would be found, as of old, in the van of all social advance.

Lastly, I would ask attention to the fact that throughout history, and I believe in every part of the world, we find the elderly woman credited with wisdom and acting as the trusted adviser of the man. It is only in very recent times, and in highly artificial societies, that we have begun to describe the dense, even the imbecile man as an "old woman." Here we have a notable evidence indeed of the disastrous atrophy of the intellectual heritage of woman, of the partial paralysis of that racial motherhood out of which she naturally speaks! Of course, as in all such cases, the inherited wisdom became associated with magic and wonder-working and sybilline gifts of all kinds. The always shrewd and often really originaive, predictive and wide-reaching qualities of the woman's mind (especially after the climacteric had been passed) were mistaken for the uncanny and devil-derived powers of the sorceress and the witch. Like the thinker, the moralist, and the healer, she was tempted

to have recourse to the short cut of the "black arts," and to appeal to the supernatural and miraculous, as science would now define these. We still see, alas, that the special insight and intelligence of women tends to spend itself at best on such absurd misrepresentations of her own instincts and powers as "Christian Science"; or worse, on clairvoyance and fortune-telling, and the like. Then it may be, elaborate theories of personality—mostly wide of the mark—are constructed upon phenomena which we could learn to analyse and interpret on strictly scientific and really philosophical principles, and thus to utilise at every point. We are, in short, failing to enlist for true social service a natural reserve of intelligence which, mostly lying unrecognised and unused in any healthy form, forces its way out in morbid ones. And let us here remember that we are not merely considering a question of sex. No mental function is entirely unrepresented on either side.

The question then arises, How is civilised man to avail himself fully of this reserve of power? The provisional answer seems to be, by making the most of it through the training of all girls for the resumption of a lost power of race-motherhood which shall make for their own happiness and well-being, in using these for the benefit of humanity. In short, by making the most of it through truer methods in education than any which have yet, except in rare cases, been applied. Certainly until we do this many social problems of the highest importance will needlessly continue to baffle and defeat us.

MR. GALTON'S REPLY.

Mr. Galton, in the course of his reply, said that much of what had been said might have been appropriately urged forty years ago, before accurate measurement of the statistical effects of heredity had been commenced, but it was quite obsolete now. Under these circumstances he felt unable to deal with the large amount of material, partly spoken, partly printed or written, that was now before the Society. Mr. Galton went on to say: "All I propose to do is to briefly comment on three or four points that have caught my attention:

"Mr. Wells spoke of 'stirpiculture' as a term that had been used by others and was preferable to 'eugenics.' I may be permitted to say that I myself coined that word and deliberately changed it for eugenics. Dr. Hutchison states his belief that environment is far more important than stock, but we know perfectly how enormously one baby, dog, or horse differs from another by nature; and surely it cannot be denied

by any one acquainted with stock breeding that it is well to take pains to increase the multiplication of the best variants. Mr. Elderton in his too few remarks touched on an important point—that the insurance offices might give a great deal of information. I quite agree with him in that, and also on the correlation of certain diseases and fertility. It used to be said that consumptive mothers were prolific. At one time I took great pains to get certain results, but was appalled and deterred by the want of precision in the data. The facts brought forward by one set of medical authorities did not agree with those brought forward by another. I went to the Consumption Hospital at Brompton, and to the Victoria Hospital, and found a total divergence of opinion as to what consumption was. My primary object then was to obtain typical specimens of consumptive patients for the purpose of composite photographs. The results, I may add, appeared in the 'Guy's Hospital Reports' nearly twenty years ago. I do not attach much importance to Mr. Kidd's points. His population of drones would have selected the best drones, and each would have selected the best of its kind and worked out their own salvation in their own way."

PRESS COMMENTS.

PALL MALL GAZETTE (November 11, 1904).

In the very first stage of its existence the Sociological Society did a notable piece of work, by enabling Mr. Francis Galton to develop and further promulgate his new study of *eugenics*.

In pursuance of this purpose, Mr. Galton is giving not only his time and his great intellectual powers—great as ever, we may note, in their ninth decade—but has just given fifteen hundred pounds to the University of London to form a Francis Galton Fellowship in National Eugenics. This initial sum is to be spent in three years. It is to be hoped that the University will obtain the services of a thoroughly competent man. He will need to be uncommonly competent and uncommonly active if he is to keep even approximate pace with Mr. Galton himself, who has done a huge amount of valuable work since he read his paper before the Sociological Society in the summer.

We may observe the modesty of Mr. Galton in this matter. The founder of eugenics is under no delusion that he has yet done more than well and truly lay the foundations of the new science. The architect may be yet to seek. We are not yet in the position of being able dogmatically to dictate a series of imperatives to Society, even assuming public opinion—that “chaos of prejudices” as Huxley called it—to be ripe for them. Eugenics, of course, is entirely at the mercy of heredity. It is indeed no more than an application of the laws of that branch of biology, than which none is more recondite, inchoate, or obscure. Men are not yet agreed as to the facts or data of heredity, upon which, of course, its inductions depend. The facts, however, are slowly but certainly emerging. That last adverb is used advisedly: for the instrument by which these facts are being ascertained is the mathematical method—and mathematics alone can claim to possess certainty. This application of mathematics to the study of heredity and of biology generally, marks an epoch in the history of the science. It already has great achievements to its credit. This kind of biological study is now known as biometrics or biometry, excellent terms which we owe to Prof. Karl Pearson. The reader will very properly inquire the name of the man who founded biometry, and perhaps it will not surprise him to learn that that name is Francis Galton. It is not often that the man of imagination and of broad and lofty projects in the realm of practice, such as eugenics, is also the man who can discern and introduce the rigidly scientific instrument which alone makes these projects possible.

One other subject was specially dealt with by the Sociological Society last summer; and that was *civics*. Students of many different aims, and as diverse as the philanthropist, the psychologist, and the medical man, are coming to see that problems of city life are of immeasurable importance in many various directions. Poverty, the national physique, sex relations, hygiene, the evolution of ethical ideals—even the future of many branches of art—are all concerned with the study of civics, so admirably discussed by Prof. Patrick Geddes last summer. Now, it is an immediate need for the welfare of science and of society that money should be forthcoming for the prosecution of scientific research in civics as in eugenics. Who will follow Mr. Galton's lead?

THE NATION (New York), June 9, 1904:

We do not imagine that Francis Galton has read President Roosevelt's letter on "race suicide," but a recent address of his before the Sociological Society is a good corrective of it, and of the whole order of ill-considered ideas lying behind it. That a nation or a stock should simply multiply is by no means the highest good—is not necessarily a good at all. It is a military conception, to be sure, that there should always be plenty of "food for powder." Napoleon, who asked what were the lives of a million soldiers to a man like him, was anxious that French mothers should make good his ravages. Such barbarous notions still persist. But Mr. Galton brushes them all aside with the statement that the real problem of civilisation is how to improve the race, not merely to give it a cheap numerosity.

What eugenics aims at is to put every class at its finest: to make each sort more and more conform to its best specimens. Only so can the general tone be made better. And social salvation lies in improving the average quality. As Mr. Galton says, if public leaders will insist upon "playing to the gallery," we must give them a better gallery to play to—one that will hiss vulgarities and savagery off the stage, instead of frantically applauding them. In this view the social philosopher is at one with the poet whose prayer was

" O God, make no more giants,
Elevate the race!"

The subject is one of tremendous importance, and the first thing is to get people to believe it so. Mr. Galton is under no illusions. He is well aware of the common ideas and practices related to what John Fiske termed "that stupendous process of breeding which we call civilisation." Better conceptions must begin with the educated and the serious. Eugenics must be an academic question before it can come to be a matter of intense and general practical interest, or be finally, as Mr. Galton hopes it will, "introduced into the national conscience like a new religion." If it is a noble thing to produce a race in which sound physiques, strong minds, and good morals are in widest commonalty spread, to debase the stock is surely a national disgrace. There is, however, no surer way to debase it than to follow rash counsels looking to number rather than quality.

The aim throughout is to give richness to life. And here those who hold to the rabbit theory of national well-being have to face the fact that

it is precisely the most intelligent and conscientious parents of our time who think so much of the happiness of the coming generation that they will not improvidently bring children into the world. They would hotly resent Mr. Roosevelt's implication that unwillingness to have large families is a kind of race treason. The real traitors to race are those who would degrade and weaken it by so diminishing the opportunities of a swarming population that discontent and a fiercer struggle for existence will bring the bestial qualities uppermost. What has been called the "apologetic attitude" of the modern father in the presence of his child goes well with the more serious weighing of the responsibilities of parenthood. It is really a wholesome, not an alarming, thing if people are thinking with deeper intentness about the desirable restrictions on marriage and about the laws of health and happiness as related to the bearing and rearing of children. To give one well-born and correctly brought-up son to the commonwealth is to serve it better than by burdening it with a half-dozen ill-conditioned boys. What the ultimate destiny of the human race may be we do not know; but the duty which lies next at hand for this generation is to study and disseminate the laws of heredity, and to so act upon the knowledge of them, with a due regard to the environment in which children are to be placed, that the level of health, intelligence, and morality shall be at least a little raised.

DR. C. W. SALEEBY (in *THE WORLD'S WORK* of December, 1904), writing under the title, "EUGENICS: THE NEW SCIENTIFIC PATRIOTISM," said:—

Like his immortal first cousin, Charles Darwin, Mr. Francis Galton "does not advertise." The public therefore knows this octogenarian leader of science only as the student of finger-prints. It is not aware of the great advances in biology which we owe to Mr. Galton's application of mathematics to that science, founding the new study called biometry; it is hardly aware of his great work on the inheritance of genius; nor is it acquainted with "Galton's law" in heredity.

Lately, however, Mr. Galton *did* advertise, in a sense. That is to say, the University of London is seeking applicants for the post of Francis Galton Research Scholar in National Eugenics. Mr. Galton has given £1,500 for this purpose by way of a beginning. Now, what is all this about?

Many years ago Mr. Galton invented the word stirpiculture, which many of us have heard, but latterly he has substituted for it the word eugenics—*good reproduction*. His argument is that (1) heredity is a fact; (2) some people are fitter than others to be the parents of posterity; (3) education can only repress or develop hereditary potentialities; (4) it is well to begin at the beginning.

As every one knows, Mr. Galton's illustrious kinsman propounded the theory which usually goes by Herbert Spencer's phrase, the *survival of the fittest*, to account for the evolution of higher from lower living things. We recognise that, on the whole, "natural selection"—to use Darwin's own term—is a beneficent process. The fittest are the happiest; the unfit mercifully die out, leaving no progeny, or but few. Thus—other factors

doubtless aiding—has been so far accomplished what Tennyson called *the making of man*.

This process, I have no doubt, is still tending slowly to elevate the average of our race—but how slowly! Now Mr. Galton steps in with some such argument as this: Here is a great beneficent principle which has been at work, by land and sea, in the animal and the vegetable world, for tens of hundreds of millions of years. It is indisputably one of the laws of that "Power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness." By its agency there has been developed, in its latest product—Man—an intelligence to which its working has been revealed. Is it not, then, the duty of the human intelligence, having discovered this law, to utilise, aid and abet it?

Eugenics, then, is the science which deals with the conditions by which the human race may be physically, mentally and morally improved. But the reader need not fancy that Mr. Galton's eighty years in any way interfere with his active prosecution and development of his own idea. He has lately sent to every member of the Royal Society a request for precise and specified information as to mental achievement on the part of relatives; and the result is to prove that talented families do indisputably exist whose brains are a precious asset to humanity, and whose stock is beyond price. Mr. Galton himself, of course, is a case in point. He is first cousin to Charles Darwin, whose grandfather was the famous Erasmus Darwin, poet and physician, one of the forerunners of the doctrine of organic evolution. In Charles Darwin's veins flowed some of the blood of Josiah Wedgwood. Three of Darwin's sons are now Fellows of the Royal Society, and one of them is the President-Elect of the British Association. It is plain that any circumstances interfering with the marriage of Erasmus Darwin's father would have robbed the world of much which the bankers cannot estimate.

Generally speaking, then, the facts of heredity are facts, despite the hopelessly inaccurate popular conception of them—a conception derived in the main from the novels of Zola. It is true, that, according to the Galtonian law of "regression towards mediocrity," the children of the genius, whilst above the average, tend to descend to it, whilst the children of the criminal, though morally inferior, are yet not quite as black sheep as their parents. But still it is well worth society's while that the genius and the saint, the athlete and the artist, should provide posterity, rather than the idiot, the criminal, the weakling, and the Philistine.

If now the reader asks how this consummation so devoutly to be wished may be reached without any loss or injury to those institutions which society has evolved through much effort, and which are not carelessly to be let go, Mr. Galton will answer him. First, I am sure—and I may note that this article is written entirely on my own responsibility—Mr. Galton would observe that, having only lately discerned a goal, he can hardly be expected already to have paved a smooth highway thereto. If there were nothing more to learn, Mr. Galton would not be spending his money in the high and generous fashion lately noticed. But this is not to say that he has no ideas on the subject. Already, unless I am much mistaken, he has the cardinal idea, and it is this:—

Sneer at it as you or I may, in the last analysis it is public opinion that determines the doings of human society. A serious magazine is entitled to call itself an engine of progress, precisely because of its influence on the factor which determines all progress. What, then, if Eugenics, as Mr. Galton suggests, were incorporated—as who can doubt it will be—in

our national *religion*? Suppose that people come to recognise the appalling amount of misery induced by the marriages of people whom society is perfectly willing to let live, but who in return owe it to society not to burden it with any more of their kind. Social approval and disapproval are already most potent, even in connection with the tender passion, which is supposed to admit of no criticism or external dictation. Every one knows that social disapproval prevents all but a very few marriages between people of very unequal social status. Still more obvious is it that under certain conditions of close relationship, marriage is never even contemplated by young persons who might otherwise easily fall in love with one another. Already the marriages of first cousins are often interfered with, in deference to a belief the evidence for which is very far from convincing. Beyond question the present century will not be out before public opinion and the unwritten laws of society will effectively interfere with the marriages of unsuitable persons. No legal enactment is necessary. The risk of social ostracism will be a powerful deterrent. You ask why such and such an one should be deprived of the privileges of life. But public opinion, obviously, will be cruel to be kind. In time to come, the number of people unfit to play their part in the great task of continuing man's mysterious pilgrimage on this dying planet will be practically negligible. If for two generations there were none but eugenic marriages, the failures of the third generation would be practically nil.

So much for one side of the question—the discouragement of the unworthy. Equally important is the encouragement of the worthy. We must have a national roll of distinguished families, says Mr. Galton. Men must learn to be as proud of being inscribed, and of having their children inscribed, on that roll as of having had an ancestor, probably worthless, who came over with the Conqueror.

In truth, a new ideal of patriotism will arise from the practicable dream of this great biologist of the nineteenth century, who has been spared to preach a new gospel to the youth of the twentieth. It will come to be seen that one can do better things than *die* for one's country, and that one does not need to wear a uniform or cross the seas in order to serve her. The real patriots will number those—not that many sonnets will be written to them—who renounce the satisfaction of even such noble desires as that of parenthood, because they regard themselves as unlikely to father worthy children. Thus, though they will not die in their own persons, they will die in their race. Similarly, family pride will take a new aspect. The man or woman whose name is enrolled as member of a family already distinguished for intellectual achievement will seek, for the sake of the family honour, a partner whose mental equipment is higher than the average; and so the Eugenic cause will be served. The man who knows himself to be intellectually superior will, if he be a patriot, make many sacrifices in order that he leave as many children like himself as possible.

Mr. Galton's proposals may seem timid in comparison with some others; but they do not always shout the loudest who see furthest.

A EUGENIC INVESTIGATION.*

INDEX TO ACHIEVEMENTS OF NEAR KINSFOLK OF SOME OF THE
FELLOWS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY.

By FRANCIS GALTON, F.R.S.

PREFACE.

It is now practically certain, from wide and exact observation, that the physical characters of all living beings, whether men, other animals, or plants, are subject approximately to the same hereditary laws. Also, that mental qualities, such as ability and character, which are only partially measurable, follow the same laws as the physical and measurable ones.

The obvious result of this is that the experience gained in establishing improved breeds of domestic animals and plants

[* This additional paper of Mr. Galton's is, by his kind permission, included here. It appropriately follows his Eugenic address, for it is a type of one of several orders of investigation arising out of that address. It has always been characteristic of Mr. Galton's work that, like all initiating advances, it opens up to scientific research many new lines of investigation. One of the questions immediately springing from his statement of the Eugenic position is the problem of determining the functional groups in a given community, and classifying them on a cultural basis. It would belong to the same investigation to ascertain by observation of family achievements, the main cultural stocks in each group. In this particular paper, Mr. Galton takes the Royal Society as a type of the higher cultural groups, and gives examples of hereditary strains of talent conspicuously illustrated therein. By extending the investigation to other groups it is clear that data would accumulate towards the compilation of the "Golden Book of Thriving Families," which Mr. Galton counsels the Sociological Society to undertake. In point of theoretical consideration, some of the larger questions to be kept in view throughout eugenic investigations would include the following:—(1) what in any given community are the hereditary sources of progressive culture, physical and psychical; (2) by what criteria may the relative cultural worth of different human stocks be estimated; (3) under what conditions do the higher cultural varieties of stock originate and develop; and (4) how may existing selective agencies be relatively modified with a view to the encouragement of the higher types.—EDITORS.]

is a safe guide to speculations on the theoretical possibility of establishing improved breeds of the human race.

It is not intended to enter here into such speculations, but to emphasise the undoubted fact that members of gifted families are, on the whole, appreciably more likely than the generality of their countrymen to produce gifted offspring.

No extensive collection exists of the biographies of Gifted Families, as distinguished from biographies of Individuals; we are therefore without means of obtaining an idea of the distribution of ability in our very mixed race, incomparably more mixed than that of any domestic animal, where some conscious selection is always at work. We cannot tell, *a priori*, how far ability is sporadic at the present time, and how far it clusters in families. As a first attempt to supply the deficiency, both as to matter and form, I submit the present paper, the result of inquiries made through a circular letter to all Fellows of the Royal Society as to the "noteworthy" achievements of their near relatives. The standard of "noteworthiness" was defined as achievement in any occupation which was judged by the writer to be at least equal in dignity, among the fellows of the relative, to that of F.R.S. among men of science. It was the best standard I could think of; no one has as yet suggested a better, and notwithstanding its obvious faults it has served well. About half of the 454 fellows, or thereabouts, replied to my circular. Many of the replies were extremely interesting, while not a few were very jejune; still, I have collected enough material to be serviceable in many ways. I wrote a brief statistical article upon those I had received up to a certain date, in *Nature* on August 11. Evidence was there given that ability, as measured by achievement, tended in a marked degree to be a family characteristic. Besides the families so distinguished, there were others reputed to have a high level of ability, whose members had nevertheless failed to achieve anything noteworthy; again, there were others in whom the ability was, in the language of horticulturists, a "sport"; it was shared by none of the collaterals or ancestry, but, presumably like all sports, may be highly capable of producing its like in descent.

The difficulty of estimating the ability of women, who

have few opportunities of displaying it in a measurable way, was partly met by asking for the achievements of the brothers of the females, which are comparable on equal terms with those of the brothers of males.

Having collected and discussed my material, the question arose how best to present the results so as to bring out the fact that ability, as measured by achievement, is really clustered to a remarkable degree in certain families. Something more vivid was required than statistical figures; something in the nature of those Family Biographies above mentioned. It was, however, difficult to give them, because, although no stipulation whatever was made in the circular letter of inquiry that the replies should be treated as private documents, I found that a feeling existed that such restriction was implied. I could not disregard this view without risking the accusation of breach of trust. At length I thought of the course that has been adopted here. It is to take the replies as *guides* only, and rarely to quote from them, restricting the mention of achievements to those that have *already been published*; to extract the account of them, as a general rule, from publications where they appeared, and to give references as far as seemed reasonably desirable. The publications might be official or only local, but, as a matter of convenience, the references are in almost all cases either to the "Dictionary of National Biography" for deceased persons, and to the "Encyclopædia Britannica" or to "Who's Who" of 1904 for living ones. A biography in either of the first two is in itself a mark of distinction; it is so, but in a much less degree, in "Who's Who." They all have the merit of giving detailed accounts of the achievements of the person in question, while the "Dict. N. Biog." gives full references to the memoirs and other sources whence the information in each article was derived.

The present paper is styled an "Index," because it falls far short of being a collection of biographies, and contains no account of failures. On the other hand, it does more than indicate families deserving of minute study, for it gives a fair idea of the quality of ability that dominates in each. This would be sufficient, if the collection were largely added to, to enable families to be sorted into different groups, according to

their prevailing characteristic, each group being convenient for separate study. I could add other remarkable pedigrees from the same source, but these few will serve as a preliminary attempt to show the quality of material that exists, and a convenient form of treating it, which is the primary purpose of this small paper.

The average number of kinsfolk in each degree should be borne in mind when reading the "Index." This was discussed by me in a paper in *Nature*, September 29. From that discussion I now conclude that the average numbers of near kinsmen who attain an age at which they would have achieved something noteworthy, if they possessed the necessary qualifications, would be roughly as follows:—grandfathers, 2 (1 *father's father* and 1 *mother's father*); father, 1; uncles, 2 (1 *father's brother* and 1 *mother's brother*); brothers, 1; first cousins, 4 (*see Table of Abbreviations*); making 10 altogether. Sons and nephews are rarely taken into account here, because they usually had not attained a sufficient age to enable them to do justice to their potentialities.

Persons who have earned a place, by virtue of their achievements, in the "Dict. N. Biog.," in the "Ency. Brit.," or even in "Who's Who," are so far rarer than one in ten, that the appearance of one of them within the inner degrees of kinship of Fellows of the Royal Society, would give a presumption of hereditary ability; but when, as in the families who are indexed here, an average of four of these noteworthy persons fall within those near degrees, the presumption grows into certainty.

The connection between achievement and ability is technically known as Correlation, though it be of a complex, entangled, and discontinuous kind. Still, it must be governed by the law that links every pair of systems of correlated variables. Let the members of one of the two systems be called "Subjects," and those of the other "Relatives"; then, although we can never guess beforehand what Relative will be associated with any particular Subject, we can tell something about the group of Relatives that will be associated with any considerable number of *similar* Subjects; namely, that the *average* of those Relatives will always be less exceptional than those

Subjects. In other words, *very high* achievement will, on the average, be associated with only *high* ability; *high* achievement with *moderately high* ability; *average* with *average*; *low* with *moderately low*; *very low* with *low*. It is as yet impossible to say much more than this in respect to achievement and ability.

Arrangements are in progress for an inquiry into the Biographies of Modern Families, of every social grade, each of these families being distinguished, *as a whole*, for Ability, Character, or Physique. Chief among these is the following, as extracted from the *Times* of October 27 :—

London, October 26.—At their meeting this afternoon the Senate had before them, and on the recommendation of the Academic Council accepted, an offer from Mr. Francis Galton, F.R.S., to endow a Fellowship in the University for the promotion of the study of "National Eugenics," defined as "the study of the agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either physically or mentally." The person appointed to this Fellowship will be required to devote the whole of his time to the study of the subject, and in particular to carry out investigations into the history of classes and families, and to deliver lectures and publish memoirs on the subject of his investigations. The endowment is sufficient to provide not only for the Fellowship, but also for the salary of an assistant, and for the general expenses of the contemplated work, which it is intended to place in one of the colleges or other institutions connected with the University. Full particulars of the post will be published shortly.

Many persons have expressed interest in the progress of inquiries of this character. I hope, therefore, that some may be disposed to assist actively in procuring and sending information. Blank forms to receive the entries will be sent on application.

It will be assumed that free use may be made of the information that is furnished, unless otherwise stated.

FRANCIS GALTON.

42, RUTLAND GATE, S.W.
October, 1904.

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS.

Males.		Females.	
Grandfather paternal .	<i>fa fa</i>	Grandmother paternal .	<i>fa me</i>
" maternal .	<i>me fa</i>	" maternal .	<i>me me</i>
Father	<i>fa</i>	Mother	<i>me</i>
Uncle paternal . . .	<i>fa bro</i>	Aunt paternal . . .	<i>fa si</i>
" maternal . . .	<i>me bro</i>	" maternal . . .	<i>me si</i>
Brother	<i>bro</i>	Sister	<i>si</i>
Son	<i>son</i>	Daughter	<i>da</i>
Nephew brother's side .	<i>bro son</i>	Niece brother's side .	<i>bro da</i>
" sister's side .	<i>si son</i>	" sister's " .	<i>si da</i>
Male first cousins—		Female first cousins—	
1 son of paternal uncle	<i>fa bro son</i>	1 dau. of paternal uncle	<i>fa bro da</i>
2 " maternal " "	<i>me bro son</i>	2 " maternal " "	<i>me bro da</i>
3 " paternal aunt	<i>fa si son</i>	3 " paternal aunt	<i>fa si da</i>
4 " maternal " "	<i>me si son</i>	4 " maternal " "	<i>me si da</i>

The kinships are reckoned from the person mentioned in the heading to the list, whom we may call P. Then *fa bro* means "P's father's brother is"; *me si son* means "P's mother's sister's son is."

INDEX OF ACHIEVEMENTS OF NEAR KINSFOLK OF SOME OF THE FELLOWS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY.

Rt. Hon. Charles **Booth**, P.C., F.R.S. (*b.* 1840, economist and statistician; president of the R. Statistical Society, 1892-4. Originated and carried through a co-operative inquiry in minute detail into the houses and occupations of the inhabitants of London, which resulted in the volumes "Life and Labour of the People of London"; author of memoirs on allied subjects.—["Ency. Brit.," 26, 306; "Who's Who."]

fa fa, Thomas **Booth**, successful merchant and shipowner at Liverpool.

fa bro, Henry **Booth** (1788-1869), railway projector, co-operated with Stephenson in applying steam to locomotion, published much relating to railways, and invented mechanical contrivances still in use on railways; secretary and then railway director.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 5, 382.]

fa bro, James **Booth**, C.B. (1796-1880), Parliamentary draughtsman; became permanent secretary to the Board of Trade.

me si son, Charles **Crompton**, fourth wrangler, Q.C., and for some years M.P. for the Leek Division of Staffordshire (see **Roscoe**).

me si son, Henry **Crompton**, a leader in the Positivist Community; authority on Trades Union law, and author of "Industrial Conciliation" (see **Roscoe**).

me si son, Sir Henry Enfield **Roscoe**, F.R.S., *q.v.*

Sir John Scott **Burdon-Sanderson**, Bart., *cr.* 1899, M.D., D.C.L., LL.D., D.Sc., F.R.S.; held a succession of important offices, beginning with Inspector med. dep. Privy Council, 1860-65; superintendent Brown Institution, 1871-78; professor of physiology University Coll., London, 1874-82; in Oxford, 1882-95; president Brit. Assoc., 1893; regius professor of medicine at Oxford, 1895-1904; served on three Royal Commissions; author of many physiological memoirs.—["Ency. Brit.," 26, 464; "Who's Who."]

fa fa, Sir Thomas **Burdon**, Kt., several times Mayor of Newcastle, knighted for his services in quelling a riot.

me fa, Sir James **Sanderson**, Bart., M.P., Lord Mayor of London; a successful merchant.

fa, Richard **Burdon-Sanderson**, fellow of Oriel College, Oxford; graduated first-class and gained Newdigate prize; was secretary to Lord Chancellor Eldon.

bro, Richard **Burdon-Sanderson**, the first promoter of the "conciliation board" of coal-owners and colliers at Newcastle-on-Tyne, and of the first reformatory in Northumberland.

si son, Rt. Hon. Richard Burdon **Haldane**, P.C., M.P., high honours at Edinburgh and three other Scotch universities. Author of "Life of Adam Smith" and of memoirs on education.—["Who's Who."]

si son, John Scott **Haldane**, M.D., F.R.S. (b. 1860), university lecturer on Physiology at Oxford; joint editor and founder of "Journal of Hygiene."—["Who's Who."]

si da, Elisabeth Sanderson **Haldane**, "Life of Professor Ferrier" and other works; promoter of education and of reforms in Scotland.

More distant kinsmen and connections.

fa me bro, John **Scott**, first Earl of **Eldon** (1751-1838), famous Lord Chancellor of England.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 51, 49.]

fa me bro, William **Scott**, first Baron **Stowell** (1745-1836), eminent maritime and international lawyer; judge of High Court of Admiralty, 1798-1828.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 51, 108.]

wife's bro, **Farrer**, first Lord **Herschell**, Lord Chancellor of England.

Charles Robert **Darwin**, F.R.S. (1809-1882), the celebrated naturalist. The dates of his works are "Voyage of the *Beagle*," 1840; "Origin of Species," 1859; followed by a succession of eight important volumes, ranging from 1862 to 1881, each of which confirmed and extended his theory of descent. Among the very numerous biographical memoirs it must suffice here to mention "Life and Letters," by Francis Darwin; and "Dict. N. Biog.," 14, 72.

fa fa, Erasmus **Darwin**, M.D., F.R.S. (1731-1802), physician, poet and philosopher. Author of "Botanic Garden," "Zoonomia," and other works, in which he maintained a view of evolution subsequently expounded by Lamarck.—["Life," by Ch. Darwin, "Dict. N. Biog.," 14, 84.]

fa, Robert Waring **Darwin**, M.D., F.R.S. (1766-1848), sagacious and distinguished physician, described by his son, Charles R. Darwin, as "the wisest man I ever knew."—"Life and Letters of Charles Darwin," 1, 10-20.]

fa bro, Charles **Darwin** (1758-1778), of extraordinary promise, gained first gold medal of Æsculapian Society for experimental research; died from a dissection wound, aged twenty, many obituary notices.—["Life and Letters of Charles Darwin," 1, 7.]

bro, Erasmus **Darwin**; see Carlyle's inexact description and the appreciations of him by his brother and others, in "Life and Letters of Charles Darwin," 1, 21-25.

fa, $\frac{1}{2}$ *si son*, Francis **Galton**, F.R.S. (b. 1822), traveller and biometrician; gold medal R. Geograph. Soc., 1853; Royal medal, 1886, and Darwin medal, 1902, of the Royal Society.—["Ency. Brit.," 28, 578; "Who's Who."]

me fa, Josiah **Wedgwood**, F.R.S. (1730-1795), the famous founder of the pottery works.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 60, 140.]

me bro, Thomas **Wedgwood** (1771-1805), an experimenter in early life, and in one sense the first to create photography; a martyr to ill-health later. Sydney Smith knew "no man who appeared to have made such an impression on his friends," and his friends included many of the leading intellects of the day.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 60, 146.]

wife's fa fa (she was her husband's *fa bro dau*), Josiah **Wedgwood**, F.R.S.; see above.

wife's bro, Hensleigh **Wedgwood** (1803-1891), author of "Etymological Dictionary," and other works, partly mathematical.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 60, 140.]

wife's bro dau, Julia **Wedgwood**, essayist.

son, Francis **Darwin**, F.R.S. (b. 1848), botanist; biographer of his father; reader in botany at Cambridge, 1876-1903; foreign sec. Royal Society. Author of botanical works and memoirs.—["Who's Who."]

son, George **Darwin**, F.R.S. (b. 1845), second wrangler, 1868; Plumian professor of astronomy and experimental philosophy, Cambridge. Author of many papers in the "Philosophical Transactions," relating to tides, physical astronomy, and cognate subjects; president elect of British Association in 1905 at Cape Town.—["Who's Who."]

son, Horace **Darwin**, F.R.S. (b. 1851), engineer and mechanician; joint founder of the Cambridge Scientific Instrument Company and its proprietor, but now a limited company, of which he is chairman.—["Who's Who."]

son, Major Leonard **Darwin**, late R.E., second in the examination of his year for Woolwich; served on several scientific expeditions, including transit of Venus of 1874 and 1882; Staff Intelligence Dep. War Office, 1885-90; M.P. for Lichfield, 1892-95. Author of "Bimetallism," "Municipal Trade."—["Who's Who."]

Sir Victor A. Haden **Horsley**, F.R.S., M.D. (b. 1857), eminent surgeon and operator; professor-superintendent of Brown Institution, 1884-90; professor of pathology University College, 1893-96.

fa fa, William **Horsley**, Mus. Bac., Oxford (1774-1858), musical composer, especially of glees, and writer on musical topics.—["Dict. N. Biog.," and Grove's "Dict. of Music."]

me fa, Charles Thomas **Haden**, a rising London physician, who initiated a treatment for gout, much noted at the time; *d.* young in 1823.—[Unpublished information.]

fa, John Calcott **Horsley**, R.A., distinguished painter.—["Who's Who."]

fa bro, Charles Edward **Horsley** (1822-1876), musical composer of oratorios; best known in America. Author of "Text-book of Harmony."—["Dict. N. Biog.," 27, 381, and Grove's "Dict. of Music."]

me bro, Sir F. Seymour **Haden** (b. 1818), surgeon; a well-known sanitarian, especially in respect to the disposal of the dead, and artist in respect to etching; founder and president of the R. Society of Painter Etchers; Grand Prix, Paris, 1899 and 1900; many publications.—["Who's Who."]

fa si son, Isambard **Brunel**, Chancellor to the Diocese of Ely; ecclesiastical barrister.

Ancestors in more remote degrees.

fa me fa, John Wall **Callcott** (1766-1821), composer, mainly of glees and catches; published "Musical Grammar," 1806.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 8, 256, and Grove's "Dict. of Music."]

fa me fabro, Sir Augustus Wall **Callcott**, R.A. (1779-1884), distinguished painter, mainly of landscapes; knighted, 1837.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 8, 256.]

me fa fa, Thomas **Haden**, the principal Doctor in Derby, and of great influence in the town; was three times mayor.—[Unpublished information.]

wife, *nee* **Bramwell**.

wife's fa, Sir Frederick **Bramwell**, Bart., F.R.S. (1818-1903), eminent engineer; president British Association, 1888; of Institution of Civil Engineers, 1884-5; hon. sec. Royal Institution.—[Who's Who."]

wife's fa bro, Lord **Bramwell** (1808-1892), Judge, 1850; Lord Justice, 1876-81; raised to peerage, 1882.—["Dict. N. Biog.," Supp. 1, 256.]

me si son, Sir Joseph Dalton **Hooker**, G.C.S.I., F.R.S., and pres. R.S., 1872-77 (*b.* 1817), eminent botanist and traveller; director of the Royal Gardens, Kew, 1855-65; naturalist to H.M.S. *Erebus* in Antarctic expedition, 1839-43; botanical travels in the Himalaya, 1847-51; Morocco and Atlas in 1871; California and Rocky Mts., 1877; many botanical publications.—[Ency. Brit.," 29, 324; "Who's Who."]

me fa, Dawson **Turner**, F.R.S. (1775-1858), see **Palgrave**.

fa, Sir William Jackson **Hooker**, F.R.S. (1785-1865), eminent botanist; director of Kew Gardens, which he greatly extended and threw open to the public, and where he founded the museum of economic botany; was regius professor of botany at Glasgow, 1820; knighted in 1847; many botanical publications.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 27, 296.]

me si sons, the four brothers **Palgrave** (see **Palgrave**).

Sir Clements R. **Markham**, K.C.B., F.R.S. (*b.* 1830), president for many years of the R. Geograph. Society; served in Arctic expedition, 1850-51; travelled in Peru, 1852-4, bringing thence cinchona-bearing trees for cultivation in India; Geographer to the Abyssinian expedition; author and editor of numerous geographical works. — ["Ency. Brit.," 30, 544; "Who's Who."]

fa fa, William **Markham** (1760-1815), scholar; secretary to Warren Hastings in India.

fa bro son, Lieut.-General Sir Edwin **Markham**, R.E., K.C.B. (b. 1833), constant active service.—[“Who’s Who.”]

fa bro son, Admiral Sir Albert **Markham**, K.C.B. (b. 1841), commander of the *Alert* in Arctic Expedition, 1875-6; various high naval appointments, besides unprofessional work when unemployed on naval duties.—[“Who’s Who.”]

me bro son, Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick **Milner**, Bart., P.C. (b. 1849), politician.—[“Who’s Who.”]

me si son, Rt. Hon. Francis **Foljambe**, P.C. (b. 1830), politician.—[“Who’s Who.”]

me si son, Rt. Hon. Sir Edwin **Egerton**, P.C., G.C.M.G. (b. 1841), Ambassador at Madrid, recently transferred to Rome.—[“Who’s Who.”]

More distant kinsmen.

fa fa fa, William **Markham**, P.C. (1719-1807), Archbishop of York; one of the best scholars of the day; headmaster of Westminster School, 1753-65; Dean of Christ Church; preceptor to the Royal Princes, 1771; Archbishop and Lord High Almoner, 1777.—[“Dict. N. Biog.,” 36, 172.]

fa fa bro, Admiral John **Markham** (1761-1827), many services at sea; twice on Admiralty Board; M.P. for Portsmouth during seventeen years; proposed and carried appointment of Commission on dockyard abuses, 1806.—[“Dict. N. Biog.,” 36, 171.]

fa fa bro, George **Markham** (1763-1823), Dean of York; scholar and numismatist.

Robert Harris Inglis **Palgrave**, F.R.S. (b. 1827), economist and statistician; editor of the “Economist,” also of “Dictionary of Political Economy.”—[“Who’s Who.”]

me fa, Dawson **Turner**, F.R.S. (1775-1858), botanist and antiquary.—[“Dict. N. Biog.,” 57, 334.] His *fa bro*, Joseph **Turner**, was senior wrangler, 1768.

fa, Sir Francis **Palgrave** (1788-1861) (son of Meyer **Cohen**, adopted the name Palgrave in 1823), historian; deputy keeper H.M. Records; assisted in their publication. Author of the “Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth,” 1832; “History of England and Normandy,” 1851; and other works; greatly promoted study of mediæval history; knighted, 1832.—[“Dict. N. Biog.,” 43, 107.]

me, Elizabeth, *née* Dawson **Turner**, greatly assisted her husband in his literary work.—[Unpublished information.]

me bro, Dawson William **Turner** (1815-1885), philanthropist and educational writer; Demy of Magdalen College, Oxford, D.C.L., 1862.

bro, Francis Turner **Palgrave** (1824-1897), poet and art critic; first class *lit. hum.*; prof. of poetry at Oxford; editor of "Golden Treasury"; author of many critical essays and other publications.—["Dict. N. Biog.," Supp. 3, 242.]

bro, W. Gifford **Palgrave** (1826-1888), traveller and diplomatist; at twenty years of age gained first class *lit. hum.* at Oxford, and second class *math.*; became Roman Catholic, and travelled as Jesuit missionary in Syria and Arabia, assuming disguise for the purpose. Author of "A Year's Journey through Eastern and Central Arabia." Severed his connection with the Jesuits in 1865, and thenceforward served as English diplomatist in various distant countries.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 43, 109.]

bro, Sir Reginald F. D. **Palgrave**, K.C.B. (1829-1904), Clerk of the House of Commons. Author of "Oliver Cromwell the Protector," etc.—["Who's Who."]

me si son, Sir Joseph Dalton **Hooker**, F.R.S. [see separate genealogy above].

Sir Henry Enfield **Roscoe**, F.R.S., Ph.D., LL.D., D.C.L., professor of chemistry Owens College, Manchester, 1857-87; president Society of Chemical Industry, 1881; of Chemical Society, 1882; M.P. for S. division of Manchester, 1885-95; president of Brit. Assoc., 1887; Vice-Chancellor of the University of London, 1896-1902; knighted, 1884; author of many memoirs and works on chemistry.—["Who's Who."]

fa fa, William **Roscoe** (1753-1831), historian, poet, and philanthropist; author of "Lives of Lorenzo de' Medici and of Leo X.," and of several volumes of verse; M.P. for Liverpool, 1806-7; promoter and first president of its Royal Institution.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 49, 222.]

fa, Henry **Roscoe** (1800-1836), biographer, including life of his father.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 49, 221.]

fa bro, Thomas **Roscoe** (1791-1871), miscellaneous writer and translator.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 49, 222.]

fa bro, William Stanley **Roscoe**, poet.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 49, 225.]

fa bro, Robert **Roscoe**, poet, "King Alfred."

me, Maria, *née* **Fletcher**, artist and authoress of "Life of Victoria Colonna."

me si, Harriet **Fletcher**, authoress of "Tales for Children."

fa bro son, William Caldwell **Roscoe** (1822-59), poet and essayist.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 49, 225.]

fa si son, William Stanley **Jevons**, F.R.S. (1835-1882), economist and

logician; professor of logic and political economy at Owens College, 1866-79; at University College, London, 1876-80; influential writer.—[Dict. N. Biog.,” 29, 374.]

me si son, Rt. Hon. Charles **Booth**, P.C., F.R.S., *q.v.*

me si son, Charles **Crompton** (*see Booth*).

me si son, Henry **Crompton** (*see Booth*).

Lieut.-General Sir Richard **Strachey**, R.E. (retired 1875), G.C.S.I., F.R.S., LL.D. Camb. Sec. Govt. Central Provinces of India during mutiny, 1857-8; public-works Sec. to Govt. of India, 1862; legislative member of Gov.-Gen.'s Council, 1869-70; Member of Council of India, 1875-89; acting financial member of Gov.-Gen.'s Council, 1878; chairman of East Indian Rly. from 1889; chairman of Meteorol. Council from 1883; pres. R. Geograph. Soc., 1888-90; royal medal of Royal Society, 1897. *Publications* :—“Lectures on Geography”; “Finances and Public Works of India” (jointly with his brother, Sir John **S.**); various scientific memoirs.—[“Ency. Brit.,” 33, 1; “Who’s Who.”]

fa fa, Sir Henry **Strachey** (1736-1810), private sec. to Lord Clive in India; joint under-sec. of state for the Home department, 1782; *cr.* baronet, 1801; F.S.A.—[“Dict. N. Biog.,” Supp. 3, 364.]

me fa, Lieut.-Gen. **Kirkpatrick** (1754-1812), orientalist; military sec. to Marquess Wellesley; Resident at Poona; translated Persian works, expert in Oriental tongues and in manners, customs and laws of India.—[“Dict. N. Biog.,” 31, 222.]

fa, Edward **Strachey** (1774-1832), chief examiner of correspondence to the India House, the other two being Peacock and James Mill (secretaries’ work, writing despatches, &c.).

fa bro, Sir Henry **Strachey**, Bart. (1772-1858), distinguished Indian civilian, described by James Mill [“Hist. Brit. India,” 6, ch. 6] as “the most intelligent of the Company’s servants.”

fa bro, Richard **Strachey**, Resident at Lucknow and Gwalior.

me si, Isabella Barbara **Buller**, well known in her day as a centre of literary and political society.

bro, Sir John **Strachey**, G.C.S.I., eminent Indian statesman; Lieut.-Governor of the N.W. Provinces; financial member of Gov. Gen.’s council; Member of Council of India. *Publications* :—“Finance and Public Works of India,” 1882 (jointly with his brother, Sir Richard **S.**); “Hastings and

the Rohilla War," 1892; "India," 1888, third ed., 1903.—["Ency. Brit.," 33, 1; "Who's Who," 1904.]

bro, Colonel Henry **Strachey**, Thibetan explorer, gold medal of R. Geograph. Soc., 1852.

bro, Sir Edward **Strachey**, Bart. (*d.* 1904), author of "Hebrew Politics in the Time of Sargon and Sennacherib."

bro, George **Strachey** (1873-90), Charge d'Affaires and Minister Resident at Dresden.

bro son, Sir Arthur **Strachey** (1858-1901) (son of Sir John **S.** and of Katherine, dau. of George **Batten**), Chief Justice Allahabad, *æt.* 39; *d.* *æt.* 43.

bro son, John St. Loe **Strachey** (*b.* 1860) (son of Sir Edward **S.** and Mary, sister of John Addington **Symonds**, writer and critic), editor of the *Spectator*.—"Who's Who."]

me si son, Charles **Buller** (1806-1848), distinguished politician, sent as secretary with Lord Durham to Canada, 1838, Chief Poor-law Commissioner.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 7, 246.]

me si son, Sir Arthur **Buller**, judge of the Supreme Court, Calcutta.

Noteworthy kinsfolk in more remote degrees of ancestry.

fa fa bro, John **Strachey**, Archdeacon of Suffolk, Prebendary of Llandaff, preacher at the Rolls, LL.D. Camb., F.S.A.

fa fa fa fa, John **Strachey**, F.R.S. (1641-1743), geologist, said to have first suggested theory of stratification in his work "Observations on Different Strata of Earths and Minerals," 1727—"Dict. N. Biog.," Supp. 3, 364.]

Wife, and her kinsfolk, ascending and collateral.

wife, Jane Maria, *née* **Grant**, 2nd wife, authoress of "Lay Texts," "Poets on Poets," "Memoirs of a Highland Lady," etc.—["Who's Who," 1904.]

wife's fa fa, Sir J. P. **Grant** (1774-1848), Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Calcutta.—["Dict. N. Biog.," 22, 398.]

wife's fa, Sir J. P. **Grant**, G.C.M.G., K.C.B. (1807-1893), Indian and Colonial Governor; Member of Council; Lieut.-Governor of Central Provinces of India; Lieut.-Governor of Bengal; Governor of Jamaica (1866-1873).—"Dict. N. Biog.," Supp. 3, 341.]

wife's me bro son, Sir Trevor Chichele **Plowden**, K.C.S.I., Resident at Kashmir, Hyderabad and Baghdad.

wife's me bro son, Sir Henry Meredith **Plowden**, Senior Judge of chief court, Punjab (1880-94).—"Who's Who," 1904.]

Descendants.

son, Giles Lytton **Strachey**, scholar Trin. Coll., Cambridge, Chancellor's medal for English verse.


son, Oliver **Strachey**, Eton scholarship.

son, James Beaumont **Strachey**, scholarship at St. Paul's School.

da, Joan Pernel **Strachey**, lecturer on old French at Royal Holloway College.

da, Marjorie Colville **Strachey**, prize offered in 1904 by the British Ambassador in Paris to all undergraduates, male and female, of all Colleges in Great Britain for examination in French; scholarship Royal Holloway College in 1904.

CIVICS.



CIVICS: AS APPLIED SOCIOLOGY.

By Professor GEDDES.

Read before the Sociological Society at a Meeting in the School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), Clare Market, W.C., at 5 p.m., on Monday, July 18th; the Rt. Hon. CHARLES BOOTH, F.R.S., in the Chair.

INTRODUCTION.

This department of sociological studies should evidently be, as far as possible, concrete in treatment. If it is to appeal to practical men and civic workers, it is important that the methods advocated for the systematic study of cities, and as underlying fruitful action, be not merely the product of the study, but rather be those which may be acquired in course of local observation and practical effort. My problem is thus to outline such general ideas as may naturally crystallise from the experience of any moderately-travelled observer of varied interests; so that his observation of city after city, now panoramic and impressionist, again detailed, should gradually develop towards an orderly Regional Survey. This point of view has next to be correlated with the corresponding practical experience, that which may be acquired through some varied experiences of citizenship, and thence rise toward a larger and more orderly conception of civic action—as Regional Service. In a word, then, Applied Sociology in general, or

Civics, as one of its main departments, may be defined as the application of Social Survey to Social Service.

In this complex field of study as in simpler preliminary ones, our everyday experiences and commonsense interpretations gradually become more systematic, that is, begin to assume a scientific character ; while our activities, in becoming more orderly and comprehensive, similarly approximate towards art. Thus there is emerging more and more clearly for sociological studies in general, and for their concrete fields of application in city after city, the conception of a scientific centre of observation and record on the one hand, and of a corresponding centre of experimental endeavour on the other—in short of Sociological Observatory and Sociological Laboratory, and of these as increasingly co-ordinated. Indeed, is not such association of observations and experiments, are not such institutions actually incipient here and elsewhere? I need not multiply instances of the correlation of science and art, as of chemistry with agriculture, or biology with medicine. Yet, on the strictly sociological plane and in civic application they are as yet less generally evident, though such obvious connections as that of vital statistics with hygienic administration, that of commercial statistics with politics, are becoming recognised by all. In the paper with which this Society's work lately opened, the intimate connection between a scientific demography and a practical eugenics has been clearly set forth. But this study of the community in the aggregate finds its natural parallel and complement in the study of the community as an integrate, with material and immaterial structures and functions, which we call the City. Correspondingly, the improvement of the individuals of the community, which is the aim of eugenics, involves a corresponding civic progress. Using (for the moment at least) a parallel nomenclature, we see that the sociologist is concerned not only with "demography" but with "politography," and that "eugenics" is inseparable from "politogenics." For the struggle for existence, though observed mainly from the side of its individuals by the demographer, is not only an intra-civic but an inter-civic process ; and if so, ameliorative selection, now clearly sought for the individuals in detail as eugenics, is inseparable from a corresponding civic art—a literal "Eu-politogenics."

A.—THE GEOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF CITIES.

Coming to concrete Civic Survey, where shall we begin? Not only in variety and magnitude of civic activities, but, thanks especially to the work of Mr. Charles Booth and his collaborators, in actual social survey also, London may naturally claim pre-eminence. Yet even at best, does not this vastest of world cities remain a less or more foggy labyrinth, from which sur-

rounding regions with their smaller cities can be but dimly descried, even with the best intentions of avoiding the cheap generalisation of "the provinces"? For our more general and comparative study, then, simpler beginnings are preferable. More suitable, therefore, to our fundamental thesis—that no less definite than the study of races and usages or languages, is that of the groupings of men—is the clearer outlook, the more panoramic view of a definite geographic region, such, for instance, as lies beneath us upon a mountain holiday. Beneath vast hunting desolations lie the pastoral hillsides, below these again scattered arable crofts and sparsely dotted hamlets lead us to the small upland village of the main glen: from this again one descends to the large and prosperous village of the foothills and its railway terminus, where lowland and highland meet. East or west, each mountain valley has its analogous terminal and initial village, upon its fertile fan-shaped slope, and with its corresponding minor market; while central to the broad agricultural strath with its slow meandering river, stands the prosperous market town, the road and railway junction upon which all the various glen-villages converge. A day's march further down and at the convergence of several such valleys stands the larger county-town—in the region before me as I write, one of added importance, since not only well-nigh central to Scotland, but at the tidal limit of a till lately navigable river. Finally, at the mouth of its estuary, rises the smoke of a great manufacturing city, a central world-market in its way. Such a river system is, as geographer after geographer has pointed out, the essential unit for the student of cities and civilisations. Hence this simple geographical method of treatment must here be pled for as fundamental to any really orderly and comparative treatment of our subject. By descending from source to sea we follow the development of civilisation from its simple origins to its complex resultants; nor can any element of this be omitted. Were we to begin with the peasant hamlet as our initial unit, and forget the hinterlands of pasture, forest, and chase (an error to which the writer on cities is naturally prone), the anthropologist would soon remind us that in forgetting the hunter, we had omitted the essential germ of active militarism, and hence very largely of aristocratic rule. Similarly,

in ignoring the pastoral life, we should be losing sight of a main fount of spiritual power, and this not only as regards the historic religions, but all later culture elements also, from the poetic to the educational. In short, then, it takes the whole region to make the city. As the river carries down contributions from its whole course, so each complex community, as we descend, is modified by its predecessors. The converse is no doubt true also, but commonly in less degree.

In this way with the geographer we may rapidly review and extend our knowledge of the grouping of cities. Such a survey of a series of our own river-basins, say from Dee to Thames, and of a few leading continental ones, say the Rhine and Meuse, the Seine and Loire, the Rhone, the Po, the Danube—and, if possible, in America also, at least the Hudson and Mississippi—will be found the soundest of introductions to the study of cities. The comparison of corresponding types at once yields the conviction of broad general unity of development, structure, and function. Thus, with Metschnikoff we recognise the succession of potamic, thalassic, and oceanic civilisations; with Reclus we see the regular distribution of minor and major towns to have been largely influenced not only by geographical position but by convenient journey distances. Again, we note how the exigencies of defence and of government, the developments of religion, despite all historic diversities, have been fundamentally the same. It is not, of course, to be forgotten how government, commerce, communications, have concentrated, altered or at least disguised the fundamental geographical simplicity of this descending hierarchy from mountain-hamlet to ocean-metropolis; but it is useful for the student constantly to recover the elemental and naturalist-like point of view even in the greatest cities. At times we all see London as still fundamentally an agglomeration of villages, with their surviving patches of common, around a mediæval seaport; or we discern even in the utmost magnificence of Paris, say its Place de l'Etoile, with its spread of boulevards, but the hunter's tryst by the fallen tree, with its radiating forest-rides, each literally arrow-straight. So the narrow rectangular network of an American city is explicable only by the unthinking persistence of the peasant thrift, which grudges good land to road-

way, and is jealous of oblique short cuts. In short, then, in what seems our most studied city planning, we are still building from our inherited instincts like the bees. Our Civics is thus still far from an Applied Sociology.

B.—THE HISTORIC SURVEY OF CITIES.

But a city is more than a place in space, it is a drama in time. Though the claim of geography be fundamental, our interest in the history of the city is supremely greater; it is obviously no mere geographic circumstances which developed one hill-fort in Judea, and another in Attica, into world centres, to this day more deeply influential and significant than are the vastest modern capitals. This very wealth of historical interests and resources, the corresponding multiplicity of specialisms, more than ever proves the need of some means by which to group and classify them. Some panoramic simplification of our ideas of history comparable to that of our geography, and if possible congruent with this, is plainly what we want. Again the answer comes through geography, though no longer in mere map or relief, but now in vertical section—in the order of strata ascending from past to present, whether we study rock-formations with the geologist, excavate more recent accumulations with the archæologist, or interpret ruins or monuments with the historian. Though the primitive conditions we have above noted with the physiographer remain apparent, indeed usually permanent, cities have none the less their characteristic phases of historic development decipherably superposed. Thus below even the characteristically patriarchal civilisations, an earlier matriarchal order is often becoming disclosed. Our interest in exploring some stately modern or Renaissance city is constantly varied by finding some picturesque mediæval remnant; below this some fragment of Roman ruin; below this it may be some barbarian fort or mound. Hence the fascinating interest of travel, which compels us ever to begin our survey anew. Starting with the same river-basin as before, the geographic panorama now gains a new and deeper interest. Primitive centres long forgotten start into life; pre-historic tumuli give up their dead; to the stone circles the

worshippers return ; the British and the Roman camps again fill with armed men, and beside the prosaic market town arises a shadowy Arthurian capital. Next, some moment-centuries later, a usurper's tower rises and falls ; the mediæval abbey, the great castles, have their day ; with the Reformation and the Renaissance the towns again are transformed ; and yet more thoroughly than ever by the Industrial Revolution, with its factories, railways, steamships, and all that they bring with them. Thus, for instance, almost more important than the internal transformation and concentration wrought by railway and telegraph, is the selection, amidst the almost innumerable seaports of the older order, of the very few adapted to the deep draught of modern ships. In a word, not only does the main series of active cities display traces of all the past phases of evolution, but beside this lie fossils, or linger survivals, of almost every preceding phase.

Hence, after many years of experiment and practice in teaching sociology I still find no better method available than that of regional survey, historical as well as geographical. Beginning with some popular excursion of obvious beauty and romantic interest like that to Melrose, we see with every tourist how naturally and fully the atmosphere and tradition of the Border found its expression and world influence in Sir Walter Scott. Thence, passing by way of contrast through the long isolated peninsula of Fife, say to representative towns like Kirkcaldy and Largo, we still see the conditions of that individualism of which Adam Smith and Alexander Selkirk ("Robinson Crusoe") have each in his way become the very prototypes. In such ways the connection of regional geography, history, and social psychology becomes increasingly clear. Again we explore the other old Fife sea ports, a series of survivals like those of the Zuyder Zee, or again work out in the field the significance of Stirling, so often the strategic centre of Scotland. Again, Dunfermline, as early mediæval capital and abbey, furnishes a convenient object lesson preparatory to the study of the larger Edinburgh. Here, again, its triple centre, in the port of Leith, the Royal Castle, the Abbey of Holyrood, are the respective analogues of the port of London, the Tower and Westminster ; while each city-group has its outlying circle of minor burghs, tardily and imperfectly incorporated into a civic whole. Again, such a marked contrast of civic origins and developments as those of Glasgow and Edinburgh has to be accounted for ; and thus through such progressively complexer surveys we reach the plane of modern civic problems and policies. Understanding the present as the development of the past, are we not preparing also to understand the future as the development of the present ?

The impressiveness of the aspect of Edinburgh to its visitor is thus not

merely pictorial. Be the spectator conscious of this or no, it turns primarily upon the contrast of the mediæval hill-city with its castle ramparts, its fretted cathedral crown, with park and boulevard, with shops, hotels and railway stations. But the historic panorama is unusually complete. See the hill-fort defended by lake and forest, becoming "*castrum puellarum*," becoming a Roman and an Arthurian citadel, a mediæval stronghold of innumerable sieges, a centre of autocratic and military dictatures, oligarchic governments, at length a museum of the past. So in the city itself. Here the narrow ridge crowded into a single street all the essential organs of a capital, and still presents with the rarest completeness of concentration a conspectus of modern civic life and development; and this alike as regards both spiritual and temporal powers, using these terms in their broadest senses as the respective expressions of the material order and its immaterial counterparts. Thus the royal and noble castles of the Middle Age become with the Renaissance here as everywhere something of palaces, while with the industrial revolution they have become replaced by factories or transformed into breweries. So the guidance of speculative thought, once concentrated in the mediæval abbey, becomes transferred to the Reformation assembly of divines, to the Renaissance college; and again at the Revolution, is largely taken over by the speculative encyclopædists, of whom Hume and Smith were but the most eminent. Nor are later developments less obvious. Of the following generation, we have the neo-classic architecture which everywhere dominated Europe after the French Revolution and during the First Empire, while of the next generation's reaction against all this in the romantic movement, the neo-Gothic monument of Scott is the most characteristic possible representative. Again, just as in the Oxford movement we had the (appropriately regional) renaissance of the idealism of the Cavaliers, so in Edinburgh we have naturally the simultaneous renaissance of the Puritan ideal, *e.g.*, in the Free Church, whose monument accordingly rises to dominate the city in its turn. The later period of prosperous Liberalism, the heroic enthusiasms of Empire, have each left their mark; and now in the dominant phase of social evolution, that of Finance, the banks, the financial companies, the press are having their turn as monument builders. Our Old Edinburgh is thus the most condensed example, the visible microcosm of the social evolution which is manifest everywhere; so that as a teaching model of sociological development it may renew its educational attractiveness when its improving hygiene has lessened its medical advantages.

Setting down now these phases of historical development in tabular form, we have a diagram such as the following:—

ANCIENT			RECENT			CONTEMPORARY			INCIPIENT
Primitive	Matri- archal	Patri- archal	Greek and Roman	Mediæval	Renaissance	Revolution	Empire	Finance	? ? ?

which, were it placed erect, we might now compare to the increasing

nodes of a growing stem, or rather say the layers of a coral reef, in which each generation constructs its characteristic stony skeleton as a contribution to the growing yet dying and wearing whole. I have elaborated this example of the panoramic aspect of Old Edinburgh as a widely familiar instance of the method of literal survey with which social and civic studies may so conveniently begin ; and I press the value of extending these even to the utmost elaborateness of photographic survey : in my view, indeed, a sociological society has at least as much use for a collection of maps, plans and photographs as of statistics, indeed scarcely less than one of books. Of course, in all this I am but recalling what every tourist in some measure knows ; yet his impressions and recollections can become an orderly politography, only as he sees each city in terms of its characteristic social formations, and as he utilises the best examples from each phase towards building up a complete picture of the greatest products of civic evolution, temporal and spiritual, of all places and times up to the present. Such a parallel of the historic survey of the city to that of its underlying geological area is thus in no wise a metaphoric one, but one which may be worked out upon maps, sections and diagrams almost completely in the same way—in fact, with little change save that of colours and vertical scale. The attempt to express the characteristic and essential life and thought of a given region in each period upon a series of maps is in fact the best method of understanding the every-day map at which we commonly look so unthinkingly.

Much of the preceding, I am assured, must be most unsatisfactory to those who look at cities only from the standpoint of so many committees dealing with police, water, finance, and so on ; or to those who are content to view the magnitude, the wealth and the population, the industries and the manufactures, of a great city without considering whence these have come and whither they are leading ; equally unsatisfactory also, I fear, to those to whom civic dignities and precedence, or the alternations of winning political colours, appear of prime importance. I can only hope that some of these may, on consideration, admit that the points of view I have endeavoured to outline above may be worth some thought and study as elementary preliminaries to their own more special and developed interests ; and if the society permit, I hope to approach these more closely in a later paper.

The abstract economist or legalist, the moral or political philosopher may also resent the proposed mode of treatment as an attempt to materialise sociology by reducing it to concrete terms alone. But I would reply that observation, so far from excluding interpretation, is just the very means of preparing for it. It is the observant naturalist, the travelled zoologist and botanist, who later becomes the productive writer on evolution; it is the historian who may best venture on into the philosophy of history;—to think the reverse is to remain in the prescientific order altogether: hence the construction of systems of abstract and deductive economics, politics or morals, has really been the last surviving efforts of scholasticism. Viewed as Science, Civics is that branch of Sociology which deals with Cities,—their origin and distribution; their development and structure; their functioning, internal and external, material and psychological; their evolution, individual and associated. Viewed again from the practical side, that of applied science, Civics must develop through experimental endeavour into the more and more effective Art of enhancing the life of the city and of advancing its evolution. With the first of these lines of study, the concretely scientific, our philosophical outlook will not fail to widen; with the second, the practical, our ethical insight will not fail to deepen also.

As primarily a student of living nature in evolution, I have naturally approached the city from the side of its geographic and historic survey, its environment and functional change; yet it is but a step from these to the abstract interpretations of the economist or the politician, even of philosopher and moralist. Again, since in every-day practice co-ordinating the literal maps of such civic surveys with even more concretely detailed plans as gardener and builder, I find less danger than may at first appear of ignoring the legitimate demands of the needed practical division of labour in the city's service. When the first mutual unfamiliarity is got over, there is thus also a greatly diminished distance between speculative thinkers and practical men, who at present, in this country especially, stand almost unrelated: the evolutionist student and worker thus begins to furnish the missing link between them.

C.—THE CITIZEN IN PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT.

Leaving now the external survey of the city by help of its material framework, its characteristic buildings and predominant styles, for the deeper psychological survey of the citizens themselves, we may conveniently begin with these also in their process of development—in fact our method compels us to this course. We enter then a school; and if we bring fresh eyes we may soon be agreed that the extraordinary babel of studies its time-table and curriculum reveal, is intelligible from no single one of the various

geographic or historic points of view we have traversed from mountain to sea, or from past to present. But this unprecedented conflict of studies becomes at once intelligible when viewed apart from any and every definite theory of education yet promulgated by educationists, and even acquires a fresh theory of its own—that of the attempted recapitulation of the survivals of each and all preceding periods in their practical or speculative aspects, particularly the latter legends and literatures, their rituals and codes. Thus, the inordinate specialisation upon arithmetic, the exaggeration of all three R's, is plainly the survival of the demand for cheap yet efficient clerks, characteristic of the recent and contemporary financial period.

The ritual of examinations with its correlation of memorising and muscular drill is similarly a development of the imperial order, historically borrowed from the Napoleonic one; the chaotic "general knowledge" is similarly a survival of the encyclopædic period, that is, of the French Revolution and the Liberal Movement generally; the Latin grammar and verses are of course the survivals of the Renaissance, as the precise fidelity to absurd spelling is the imitation of its proof readers; the essay is the abridged form of the mediæval disputation; and only such genuine sympathy with Virgil or Tacitus, with Homer or Plato as one in a thousand acquires, is truly Roman or Greek at all. The religious instruction, however reinterpreted by the mediæval Church or the Reformation, has still its strength in some of the best elements of patriarchal literature; while the fairy tale, by which all this superincumbent weight of learning is sometimes alleviated, is the child's inheritance from the matriarchal order. Finally, the apple and the ball, at the bottom of this whole burden of books, complete the recapitulation; as the one, the raw fruit, the other, the ready missile, of primeval man. Our child then is heir of all the ages more fully than he or his teachers commonly realise. The struggle for mastery of the schools is thus no temporary feud, but an unending battle, one destined to increase rather than diminish; for in this there is the perpetual clash of all the forces of good heredity and evil atavism, of all the new variations also, healthy or diseased.

D.—THE APPLIED SOCIOLOGY OF THE PRESENT.

The city and its children thus historically present a thoroughly parallel accumulation of survivals or recapitulations of the past in the present. Few types nowadays are pure, that is, keep strictly to their period; we are all more or less mixed and modernised. Still, whether by temporal or spiritual compulsion, whether for the sake of bread or honour, each mainly and practically stands by his order, and acts with the social formation he belongs to. Thus now the question of the practical civics, that is, of the applied sociology, of each individual, each body of interests may be broadly defined; it is to emphasise his particular historic type, his social formation and influence in the civic whole, if not indeed to dominate this as far as may be. We are all for progress, but we each define it in his own way. Hence one man of industrial energy builds more factories or slums, another as naturally more breweries to supply them; and in municipal or national council his line of action, conscious or unconscious, remains congruent with these. Representative government fails to yield all that its inventors hoped of it, simply because it is so tolerably representative of its majorities; and there is thus great truth in the common consolation that our municipal governments, like larger ones, are seldom much worse than we deserve. Each social formation, through each of its material activities, exerts its influence upon the civic whole; and each of its ideas and ideals wins also its place and power. At one time the legal and punitive point of view, directing itself mainly to individual cases, or the philanthropic, palliating sufferings, dispute the foremost places; and now in their turn hygienic or educational endeavours arise, towards treating causes instead of waiting for consequences. Such endeavours are still undeniably too vague in thought, too crude in practice; and the enthusiast of hygiene or education or temperance may have much to answer for. But so, also, has he who stands outside of the actual civic field, whether as philistine or æsthete, utopist or cynic, party politician or "mugwump." Between all these extremes it is for the united forces of civic survey and civic service to find the middle course.

We observe then in the actual city, as among its future citizens, that our action is generally the attempt to mould both alike to some past or passing social formation, and, therefore, usually towards the type to which our interest and our survey incline, be this in our own city or more probably in some earlier one. Even in the actual passing detail of party politics we are often reminded how directly continuous are the rivals with puritan London, with royalist Oxford; but still more is this the case throughout the history of thought and action, and the intenser the more plainly; for it is in his highest moments of conviction and decision that the Puritan feels most in sympathy with the law or the prophets of Jerusalem, the scholar with Athens; or that the man of action—be he the first French republican or the latest imperialist—most frankly draws his inspiration from the corresponding developments of Paris. It is a commonplace of psychology that our thought is and must be anthropomorphic; a commonplace of history that it has been Hebraomorphic, Hellenomorphic, Latinomorphic, and so on by turns.

This view has often been well worked out by the historian of inventions and discoveries, of customs or laws, of policies or religions, as by the historian of language or the fine arts. What we still commonly need, however, is to carry this view clearly into our own city and its institutions, its streets and schools and homes, until either in the private spending or public voting of the smallest sum we know exactly whether we are so far determining expenditure and influence towards enlarging, say, the influence and example of renascent Florence in one generation or of decadent Versailles in another. There is no danger of awaking this consciousness too fully; for since we have ceased consciously to cite and utilise the high examples of history we have been the more faithfully, because sub-consciously and automatically, continuing and extending later and lower developments.

E.—CITIES, PRESENT AND FUTURE.

Hence, after a Liberal and an Imperial generation, each happy in their respective visions of wealth and expanding great-

ness, the current renewal of civic interests naturally takes the form of an awakening survey of our actual environment. First, a literal mapping of its regional elements, and then an historic interpretation of these—not, alas, merely or mainly in terms of the cities of sacred or classic tradition, nor of the Mediæval or Renaissance cities which followed these, but as stupendous extensions of the mediæval Ghetto, of the Wapping Stairs, of the Lancashire factories and of the Black Country, relieved by the coarse jollities of Restoration London, and adorned, for the most part, with debased survivals from the Italian and the French Renaissance. There is thus no more question in our civic discussions of “bringing in” or “leaving out” geography or history; we have been too long unconscious of them, as was M. Jourdain of his speaking in prose.

But what of the opening Future? May its coming social developments not be discerned by the careful observer in germs and buds already formed or forming, or deduced by the thinker from sociological principles? I believe in large measure both; yet cannot within these limits attempt to justify either. Enough for the present, if it be admitted that the practical man in his thought and action in the present is mainly the as yet too unconscious child of the past, and that in the city he is still working within the grasp of natural conditions.

To realise the geographic and historic factors of our city's life is thus the first step to comprehension of the present, one indispensable to any attempt at the scientific forecast of the future, which must avoid as far as it can the dangers of mere utopianism.

F.—LITERATURE OF CIVICS.

No discussion of the preliminaries and fundamentals of Civics can omit some consideration of the vast and ever growing literature of cities. But how are we to utilise this? How continue it? How co-ordinate it with the needed independent and first-hand survey of city by city? And how apply this whole knowledge of past and present towards civic action?

The answer must plainly be a concrete one. Every city,

however small, has already a copious literature of its topography and history in the past; one, in fact, so ample that its mere bibliography may readily fill a goodly volume,* to which the specialist will long be adding fresh entries. This mass of literature may next be viewed as the material for a comprehensive monograph, well enriched with maps and illustrations, such as many cities can boast; and this again may be condensed into a guide-book. Guide-books have long been excellent in their descriptive and historical detail, and are becoming increasingly interpretative also, especially since Mr. Grant Allen transferred his evolutionary insight and his expository clearness from natural to civic history.

After this general and preliminary survey of geographic environment and historic development, there nowadays begins to appear the material of a complementary and contemporary volume, the Social Survey proper. Towards this, statistical materials are partly to be found amid parliamentary and municipal reports and returns, economic journals and the like, but a fresh and first-hand survey in detail is obviously necessary. In this class of literature, Mr. Booth's monumental Survey of London, followed by others, such as Mr. Rowntree's of York, have already been so widely stimulating and suggestive that it may safely be predicted that before many years the Social Survey of any given city will be as easily and naturally obtainable as is at present its guide-book; and the rationalised census of the present condition of its people, their occupation and real wages, their family budget and culture-level, should be as readily ascertainable from the one, as their antecedents understood or their monuments visited by help of the other.

But these two volumes—"The City: Past and Present,"—are not enough. Is not a third volume imaginable and possible, that of the opening Civic Future? Having taken full note of places as they were and are, of things as they have come about, and of people as they are—of their occupations, families, and institutions, their ideas and ideals—may we not to some extent discern, then patiently plan out, at length boldly suggest, something of

* e.g., Erskine Beveridge, LL.D., Bibliography of Dunfermline.—*Dunfermline*, 1902. 8vo.

their actual or potential development? And may not, must not, such discernment, such planning, while primarily, of course, for the immediate future, also take account of the remoter and higher issues which a city's indefinitely long life and correspondingly needed foresight and statesmanship involve? Such a volume would thus differ widely from the traditional and contemporary "literature of Utopias" in being regional instead of non-regional, indeed ir-regional; and so realisable, instead of being unrealisable and unattainable altogether. The theme of such a volume would thus be to indicate the practicable alternatives, and to select and to define from these the lines of development of the legitimate *Eu-topia* possible in the given city, and characteristic of it; obviously, therefore, a very different thing from a vague *Ou-topia*, concretely realisable nowhere. Such abstract counsels of perfection as the descriptions of the ideal city, from Augustine through More or Campanella and Bacon to Morris, have been consolatory to many, to others inspiring. Still, a Utopia is one thing, a plan for our city improvement is another.

Some concrete, if still fragmentary, materials towards such a volume are, of course, to be found in all municipal offices, though scattered between the offices of the city engineer and health officer, the architect and park superintendent; while the private architect and landscape gardener, the artist, sometimes even the municipal voters and their representatives, may all have ideas of their own. But though our cities are still as a whole planless, their growth as yet little better than a mere casual accretion and agglomeration, if not a spreading blight, American and German cities are now increasingly affording examples of comprehensive design of extension and of internal improvement. As a specific example of such an attempt towards the improvement of a British city, one not indeed comprehending all aspects of its life, but detailed and reasoned so far as it goes, and expressing that continuity of past and present into future which has been above argued for, I am permitted by the courtesy of the Carnegie Dunfermline Trust, to lay on the Society's library table an early copy of a recent study of practicable possibilities in a city typically suitable for consideration from the present standpoint, since presenting within a moderate and readily intelligible

scale a very marked combination of historic interests, and of contemporary and growing activity, both industrial and cultural, with hopeful civic outlook.

That co-adjustment of social survey and social service which has been above argued for as the essential idea of civics as applied sociology is thus no abstract principle, but a concrete and practicable method. Yet it is one not lacking in generality of application. For what we have reached is really the conception of an *Encyclopædia Civica*, to which each city should contribute the Trilogy of its Past, its Present, and its Future. Better far, as life transcends books, we may see, and, yet more, foresee, the growth of civic consciousness and conscience, the awakening of citizenship towards civic renaissance. All this the production of such volumes would at once imply and inspire—life ever producing its appropriate expression in literature, and literature reacting upon the ennoblement of life.

Apart altogether from what may be the quality and defects of particular volumes, such as those cited as examples of each part of such a proposed civic trilogy, one as yet nowhere complete, the very conception of such a possible threefold series may be of some service. For this would present a continuous whole, at once sociological and civic—the views and the resources of the scholar and the educationist with their treasures of historic culture, of the man of action with his mastery of immediate affairs, of the thinker with his vision of the opening future, now all co-ordinated by help of the design of the artist, and thence to be gradually realised in the growing heritage of the city, the enlarging life of the citizen.

NOTE.—As an example of the concrete application to a particular city, of the sociological methods and principles indicated in the above paper, Prof. Geddes exhibited an illustrated volume embodying the results of his studies and designs towards the improvement of Dunfermline, under the Trust recently established by Mr. Carnegie. This has since been published :

P. GEDDES. *City Development. Park, Gardens and Culture Institutes ; a Report to the Carnegie Dunfermline Trust. With 138 Illustrations. Edinburgh, etc.. 1904.*

DISCUSSION

The Chairman (Mr. CHARLES BOOTH) in opening the discussion said:

The paper we have just heard read is one of the most complete and charming papers on a great and interesting subject I have ever heard. I think you will all agree in this, and I hope the discussion which follows will emphasise and, if that is possible, add to the wealth of ideas that this paper contains.

MR. EBENEZER HOWARD

(Founder of the Garden City Association) SAID:

I have read and re-read—in the proof forwarded to me—Professor Geddes' wonderfully luminous and picturesque paper with much interest. He has given us a graphic description of the geographic process which leads to the development of the city. We see vividly the gradual stages by which the city grows and swells, with the descent of the population from the hillsides into the valleys, even as the river which flows through the city is fed continually by the streams which flow down to it. But is there not this essential difference between the gathering waters of heaven, as they pour into the great city, and the gathering tide of population, which follows the path of the waters? The waters flow through the city on, on toward the mighty ocean, and are then gradually gathered upward into the soft embraces of the clouds and wafted back again to the hills, whence they flow down once more to the valleys. But the living stream of men, women, and children flows from the country-side and leaves it more and more bare of active, vigorous, healthy life: it does not, like the waters, "return again to cover the earth," but moves ever on to the great city, and from thence, at least for the great majority, there is no chance of more than, at best, a very short stay in the country. No: the tide flows resistlessly

onward to make more crowded our overcrowded tenements, to enlarge our overgrown cities, to cause suburb to spread beyond suburb, to submerge more and more the beautiful fields and hilly slopes which used to lie near the busy life of the people, to make the atmosphere more foul, and the task of the social reformer more and yet more difficult.

But surely there must be a way, could we but discover it, of imitating the skill and bountifulness of Nature, by creating channels through which some of our population shall be attracted back to the fields ; so that there shall be a stream of population pouring from the city into the country, till a healthy balance is restored, and we have solved the twin problems of rural depopulation and of the overcrowded, overgrown city.

This brings me to the second branch of Prof. Geddes' paper, the historical. The Professor reminds us how vestiges of one civilisation lie super-imposed upon another, like geological strata, and asks, "Understanding the present as the development of the past, are we not preparing also to understand the future as the development of the present ?" Following this line of thought, I venture to suggest that while the age in which we live is the age of the great, closely-compacted, overcrowded city, there are already signs, for those who can read them, of a coming change so great and so momentous that the twentieth century will be known as the period of the great exodus, the return to the land, the period when by a great and conscious effort a new fabric of civilisation shall be reared by those who knew how to apply the knowledge gained by "Social Survey to Social Service." What are the signs? What words can we place under the head of "Incipient" in Prof. Geddes' diagram? I would suggest, for one of Prof. Geddes' interrogation marks might be substituted "Decentralisation of Industry"—as a great, but yet incipient movement, represented by Port Sunlight, Bournville, Garden City. For there are now many agencies at work making for industrial decentralisation. Industries are being driven out of the great towns by the excessive rents and rates which have to be paid there—by the difficulty of obtaining adequate space for the modern factory, a one-storey building ; and for the homes of our workers, which must be vastly different to what they now are if England is to maintain her place among the nations. And while factories are being driven from the city, they are also being attracted to the country by its newly-discovered potentialities. Thus Messrs. Lever Brothers, crowded out of Warrington, established an entirely new town on a new site at Port Sunlight ; and, because the site was new and raw, it was therefore possible for Mr. Lever to plan his little town with a single eye to the best and most desirable conditions, alike from an industrial and a health and housing point of view. And the same is true of Bournville. Bournville is one of the most beautiful villages in the world, largely again because of the potentialities of a new site acquired for the definite purpose of building thereon a village in which overcrowding shall be deliberately and permanently prevented,

and in which work inside the factory may be varied by work in the garden. Now that these successful experiments have been carried out in this country, is it not time that the idea of establishing new industries on new sites, and of surrounding those industries with healthy homes, should be carried forward, on a larger scale, with wider and more concerted aims—carried forward, too, in such a manner as to make it possible for the small manufacturer to take part in a movement which has proved to be so beneficial alike to employer and employed? It is out of this thought that the Garden City idea has grown, an idea now in course of being fulfilled. Three thousand eight hundred acres of land, or nearly ten times the area of Bournville or Port Sunlight, have been acquired in Hertfordshire, two miles west of the town of Hitchin, and on the branch line of railway between that town and Cambridge. State aid has not been sought; that would indeed be weary work. But a company has been formed, through the untiring efforts of the Garden City Association; plans for the town have been carefully prepared, plans which, of course, have regard to the contours of the land (which were first taken, showing every change of level of five feet), to the preservation of its natural beauties—its trees and the picturesque villages of Norton and Willian; to the necessity for railway sidings and railway station, now, thanks to the Great Northern Railway, already provided; to the making of roads of easy gradient and of suitable width, affording access to different parts of the estate, actual work on which is progressing; the careful guarding from contamination of our water supply, already proved to be abundant; the provision of a reservoir of suitable elevation, now in course of construction; a system of drainage, about to be started with; the provision of parks and playgrounds within the town, as well as a wide belt of agricultural land around it; sites for homes for 30,000 persons, with good sized gardens. About six cottages have already been built, not by the Company but by private enterprise, while many others are just about to be started upon; the setting apart of sites for schools, churches, and other public buildings, while plans are in preparation for lighting the town, as well as for providing it with motive power.

The programme which I have sketched out is certainly not too bold or comprehensive for the British race. If a hundredth part of the organising skill which the Japanese and the Russians are showing in the great war now in progress were shown by ourselves as citizens in our great civil war against disease and dirt, poverty and overcrowding, we could not only build many new cities on the best models, but could also bring our old towns into line with the new and better order. Prof. Geddes wishes well, I know, to the Garden City Association, a propagandist body, and to its first child, the Garden City Company; and I am sure you will all unite with me in the hope that the best and most lasting success may crown the generous gift of Mr. Carnegie of £500,000 to the City of Dunfermline, and reward the efforts of the Trustees and of Prof. Geddes to make, by the application of modern

skill, science and art, the ancient city of Dunfermline a centre of sweetness and light, stimulating us all to higher and yet higher efforts to secure civic, national and imperial well-being.

MR. C. H. GRINLING SAID :

Like most of the audience, doubtless, he came not to speak but to draw ever fresh inspiration from Prof. Geddes. But there was one aspect of the subject he would like to bring out and emphasise. He referred to the sociological institute, which, under the name of the Outlook Tower, had grown up in connection with the School of Sociology which Prof. Geddes had founded and developed in Edinburgh. That institute was at once an organisation for teaching and for research, for social education, and for civic action. It was, in fact, a concrete and working application of the principle indicated in the paper as the very foundation of Civics—"social survey for social service." And, seeing that the Outlook Tower was an institution designed in every respect for application to any given locality, he urged the Sociological Society to advocate its general extension, so that no region should be without its own sociological institute or Outlook Tower.

If one individual could accomplish so much, what could not be accomplished by the sociologists of our day who would concentrate themselves, each on his own locality, not necessarily to do the work, but to give the inspiration which would call out the work of collecting just that material which Prof. Geddes suggested all through his paper was one of the great needs of our time? And so one hoped that papers of this kind would not merely lead to discussion, but to workers accumulating results of this kind, giving the inspiration to others, and thus laying up treasures for the sociologists of the future for their interpretation. Thus, the Sociological Society should be not only the one scientific society in constant touch with all the leading brains over the country, but it should be an inspiration, as Prof. Geddes has himself been, to groups of workers everywhere for just the kind of work which the Sociological Society has been founded to develop.

MR. J. M. ROBERTSON SAID :

I would first add my tribute to this extremely interesting and stimulating paper. It recalled confabulations I had with Prof. Geddes, many years ago, when he was first formulating in Edinburgh those ideas which have since become so widely known. I would like, however, to suggest a few criticisms. The paper is, broadly speaking, an application of the view of a biologist to Sociology. It is not so much an application of Darwin's view as that of Von Baer. Prof. Geddes has characterised his paper as one of elementary preliminaries, but he has really contributed a paper that

would form part of a preliminary study in a series of studies in Sociology. The paper does not quite bear out its title: "Civics: as Applied Sociology." The application has not begun. The somewhat disparaging remarks on encyclopædias of general knowledge, further, might well be applied to the scheme of an encyclopædia of the natural history of every city and every village as an original centre. This atomism will not help Sociology. Had he to master all that, the sociologist's life would be a burden not to be borne, and we would never get to applied sociology at all. There is a danger, too, in following this line, of fastening attention on one stage of evolution and leaving it there. The true principle is that evolution is eternal and continuous; and I think harm may be done, possibly, when you take, say, the phenomenon of the communication of general knowledge in schools and call it a derivation from the French *Encyclopedie*. Why leave it there? Where did that come from? If you are going to trace the simple evolution of civic forms, if you are to trace how they have come about, it will not do to stick at a given point. This is a survival of that. That is a survival of something else. The French *Encyclopedie* will have to be traced back to the encyclopædia of the mediæval period; and even to the still earlier period of Isidore of Seville. Then again, there is a danger, I think, analogous to the danger met with in early botany—the danger of confusing a resemblance with a relationship. It is extremely interesting to speculate that the Place de l'Etoile is an evolution from the plan of the game-forest, with its shooting avenues radiating from a centre, but it would be difficult to show that there is any historical connection. The thing is not proved.

Of course, the vital question is not this tracing of evolution. The question is: Is "Civics" to be only the study of forms? If so, Sociology is a dead science, and will effect little practical good until it is vivified by such suggestions as Mr. Crane has put in his paper. Mr. Walter Crane brought in a vital question when he said: "How are you going to modify the values of your civic life unless you grapple with political problems?" I am not forgetting that Prof. Geddes promises to deal in another paper with the civics of the future; but I insist that it will have to grapple with political questions. As he says, a city is not a place, but "a drama in time." The question for the sociological student of history is: How has this inequality of wealth and of service arisen, and how is it to be prevented in the future? That is the problem we have to study if we wish to make sociology a vital interest. A definition of progress is really the first step in sociology. Prof. Geddes' next paper should give us a definition of progress, and it is better that we begin to fight over a definition of progress, in order to get a dynamic agreement, than that we should multiply the archæological study of many towns. I admit that it is very interesting. In travelling in South Africa, I often tried to gather how communities began; what, for example, was the nucleus of this or that village. It was surprising how very few had an idea of any nucleus at all. I deprecate the idea, however, that

we are all to amass an enormous accumulation of such researches. Mr. Booth's single compilation for London is a study for years; but Mr. Booth's admirable investigation of the difficulties of life among the poor of London does not of itself give any new impulse to the solution of the problem of London. It merely gives exact knowledge in place of general knowledge. The problem of sociology arose on the general knowledge. I fear lest the work of sociology should run to an extension of this admirable study instead of to the stimulation of action taken on that particular knowledge, or on more general knowledge. We all knew there was plenty of poverty, and how it was caused. We all had ideals as to how it was to be got rid of in the future; but the question is: Is the collection of detail or the prescription of social method the kind of activity that the Sociological Society is to take up?

SIR THOMAS BARCLAY SAID :

I am not sure that I agree with Mr. Robertson that it is desirable to define either "progress" or "civilisation." On the whole, their chances lie rather in the great variety of ideas of what constitutes them than in any hard-and-fast notion of their meaning. They are generalisations of what is, rather than an object towards which effort should tend. But neither do I agree with Prof. Geddes' restriction of "civics" to the mere outward part of municipal effort. In America the word "civics" is applied to the rights and duties of citizens, and I should like to see Prof. Geddes include in Civics the connection between citizen life and the outward improvement of cities. I am sure, however, Professor Geddes, as a practical man, will deal rather with realities than theoretical views on the subject for which he has done so much himself. Edinburgh owes more than many are willing to admit to Prof. Geddes. I think Ramsay Lodge one of the greatest embellishments of the Castle Hill in Edinburgh. I hope he will now be successful in doing something still more admirable for my native town of Dunfermline. My friend Mr. Carnegie, whose native town it also is, I believe intends to show by an object lesson what can be done for all cities. Prof. Geddes is helping him in this work with his suggestions. I hope they will be carried out. In America there are several very beautiful cities. No one can ever forget Washington, which is truly a garden city. No money is spared in America to beautify and healthify (excuse the barbarism) the habitations of the thousands. A beautiful city is an investment for health, intellect, imagination. Genius all the world over is associated, wherever it has been connected with cities, with beautiful cities. To grow up among things of beauty ennobles the population. But I should like to see Prof. Geddes extend his projects for Dunfermline to the population itself. Most of you know what Mr. Henderson did to utilise the Edinburgh

police in the care of children. The future of the country depends upon them. The subject is too serious to continue to be left to the haphazard mercies of indifferent parents. Every child born is an agent for good or for evil among the community, and the community cannot afford to neglect how it is brought up, the circumstances in which it has its being, the environment from which it derives its character and tendencies. Necessity may be the mother of invention, but need of food and insufficient clothing develop in the child an inventiveness that is not for the good of the community. It seems a matter of too great an importance to be left even to private initiative, as was done under Mr. Henderson's régime in Edinburgh; but everywhere else, or nearly so, very little is done by even private initiative for the protection of the children against their vicious environment. In short, I do not think that civics, in the sense in which my friend Prof. Geddes treats it, is a complete subject at all. Civics, to my mind, includes everything that relates to the citizen. Everywhere something is being done in one direction or another to make them capable, prosperous, and happy. In America happiness is taught in the schools. Every schoolmaster's and schoolmistress's first duty is to set an example of a happy frame of mind; smiling and laughing are encouraged, and it is not thought that the glum face is at all necessary for the serious business of life. In fact, the glum face is a disqualification; is associated with failure, and bad luck and ill-nature. In Germany the schoolmaster is in the first place a trainer of the body. One of his chief duties is to watch and prevent the deterioration of the eyesight, to promote the development of the lungs, to prevent spinal deviation. The second part of his business is to watch over the character of the child, and only the third part is to ram knowledge into the poor little mind. And wherever you go over the world you will find something in the course of being done in civics, as I understand the subject. I thank Prof. Geddes for what he is doing for Dunfermline, and hope he will understand "progress" without requiring to define it.

DR. J. LIONEL TAYLER

(*Author of "Aspects of Social Evolution"*) SAID:

While agreeing with Prof. Geddes in his belief in the importance of institutional and geographical studies as a basis for the investigation of the development of cities, it yet seems to me that these studies cannot prove of supreme value to society unless they are accompanied by a detailed examination of the *natural* characteristics of all individuals who have been born into and existed in, or merely dwelt in, these surroundings. It is not enough to trace out, however accurately, the various stages of a town's growth from its commencement to the present time, because *the cause of*

the evolution of any city aggregate lies deeper, is in large part animate, and not inanimate, in character. The value of the surroundings depends at least as much upon the capacity of the individual citizen, singly and collectively, to utilise what he or she is brought in contact with as upon the peculiarities of these surroundings themselves. Place, tradition, social organisation, individual development, education, are factors in town evolution that cannot safely be overlooked, and they all vary from age to age and in place and place.

If it were possible to completely exchange the inhabitants of a large town in England with those of an equally large town in France two groups of changes would become more or less rapidly observable: (1) the French and English citizens would adapt themselves, as far as they desired and were able, to their altered conditions; (2) the characteristics of both towns would gradually change, in spite of geographical position, in response to the altered human needs. Similarly, a town composed of individuals who are naturally uncultured and unprogressive will tend to preserve its uncultured and unprogressive characters more than another that has alert citizens to carry on its activities. Every profession and every trade tends to foster its own social atmosphere; and towns will vary with their industrial life, and individuals favourably disposed to this atmosphere will come to the town, and those unfavourably inclined to it will leave. *These changing citizens, as they act upon and react to their surroundings and vary in their powers age by age, are the real evolvers of the conditions in which they dwell*; hence the citizen must not be omitted from our study if we are to understand city growth.

In other words, I think that every investigation of civic, and for that matter country life should be studied from two aspects: (1) to note the peculiarities, growth and development of the material, non-living and non-thinking elements in the problem—the buildings, their geographical position, their age, their fitness for past and present life, and the distinctive local features that are evolving or retrogressing with the multiplication of some trades and industries and the decline of others in each area that is studied; (2) the change in the quality of the citizens themselves through racial, educational, and other factors, noting how far ideals are altering, not only in the mass of individuals taken as a whole, but also by examining the changing outlook in every trade and profession. With these two parallel lines of investigation to study, we could then determine how far environment—social and climatic—how far racial and individual characteristics have been powerful in the moulding of the fabric around us.

With these two lines of study to our hands, we could predict the vitality, the growing power, and the future possibilities of the social life of which we are a tiny though not an insignificant part; we could, knowing something of the response that we make to that which surrounds us, form some estimate of how the future ages will develop, and, knowing the

intensity of the different national desires for progress *and the causes which are likely to arouse such desires*, we could realise what will stimulate and what will retard all that is best in our civic life.

PROFESSOR EARL BARNES (in moving a vote of thanks) SAID :

For years I have been accumulating a debt of obligation to Prof. Geddes for ideas, suggestions, and large synthesis of life, and it gives me special pleasure to voice the feeling of this meeting concerning the paper read to us this afternoon. To me, as an American, it is especially interesting to hear this presentation of life as an organic whole. Life is but a period of education, and if there is nothing behind this present moment of life it is all extremely insignificant. To an American, who has lived at No. 1067 in 63rd Street, Philadelphia, and at No. 1718 in G Street, in Washington, it is profoundly interesting to think of the possibility of a man's so living that his whole existence shall be significant, so that the realities of his world, geographical, geological, and material, and all that long development of humanity through the historic past—that all these things will be really and truly significant to him. Prof. Geddes has himself shown us that is possible. Any man who has gone to Edinburgh and seen the restoration of the old life that has been carried out there under his hand knows it can be done. I suppose we all came here to hear Professor Geddes speak on practical affairs because his name is now connected with the plans for making a city that shall be really expressive of all its potentialities to all of its people. I am personally profoundly grateful to him for his paper; and I move you that he be given a very hearty vote of thanks.

The Chairman (Mr. CHARLES BOOTH), in closing the discussion, said :

I myself entirely agree with what Mr Robertson has said as to the extreme difficulty of bringing investigations of the kind referred to, to practical conclusions—practical points. Practical work at present needs the most attention. I perhaps am too old to do it, but I feel the attraction of that kind of work, and that was one reason I was sorry Mr Loch had to leave before we could hear what he might have to say. The description I have given of London does seem to be a foggy labyrinth I agree, but nevertheless I cannot but think that we do require a complete conception if we are to do the definite work of putting different people in their proper places in an organic whole, such as a city is. I do not think we can do without it, and I regard the paper of this evening as an important con-

tribution to that complete conception which I feel we need. I should like each worker and thinker to have and to know his place in the scheme of civic improvement ; and I think it perfectly possible for every man to know what it is that he is trying to do, what contribution it is that he ought to give to that joint life which is called here civics, which is the life of a city and the life in the city. One man cannot possibly concentrate it all in himself. Within a society such as the Sociological Society a general scheme is possible in which each individual and each society shall play its acknowledged and recognised part. It does not follow that the work done in one city can apply as an example to another. Individuality has too strong a hold ; but each town may work out something for itself. I have been very much interested in the work which Mr. Rowntree has done in York, on which he was kind enough to consult me. He entered upon it on quite other grounds from mine, but so far as the ground was common between him and me we tried to have a common basis. Those of you who have not read Mr. Horsfall's volumes on Manchester would do well to do so. Prof. Geddes gave us a vivid picture of a larger regional unit which culminates geographically in the city as industrial climax. In his particular instance he referred, I take it, to Dundee. In Dundee there is at this moment an inquiry being started, and I am in communication with those who are doing it, and I hope it will add something to the completeness of the picture we have of that city. In Dundee they have excessive difficulties in respect to crowding and female labour. What I suggested was, that they should make a special study of such circumstances as are special to Dundee. Labour there is very largely sack-making and jute manufacture, and there is a great deal of girl labour ; and that is one of the special subjects that will be considered in that inquiry.

Then, with regard to the preservation of such of the natural beauties that do remain even quite near to busy town centres, surely it is of the greatest importance that they should be watched and protected and preserved. Prof. Geddes has contributed a portion of his practical work to that practical question at Dunfermline. His charming volume on Dunfermline ("A Study in City Development") shows what beautiful features there are near Dunfermline, and how much may be done to preserve and improve them in ways that are most interesting to study. His use of photography in this matter is extraordinarily successful. Prof. Geddes has photographed a scene as it now is, with its background and distance and its squalid foreground, already ruined by the debris of the city—old tin pots and every

kind of rubbish—thrown down by the side of the stream, which is naturally beautiful. By manipulating the photographic plates he wipes out that which he does not want and introduces other features, including a little waterfall; and you have, instead of a miserable suburb, a dignified park. Well now, that is practical work. It has in it that element which he has described by a question-mark in his diagram, the element of forecast. You have the same idea in Manchester, in Mr. Horsfall's work. They have laid out their map of Manchester and shown in what way it may develop, so as not to spoil the beauty that remains on two sides of Manchester. There is really exquisitely beautiful natural scenery close to Manchester, which may be entirely spoiled or preserved, according as a forecast is made and forethought taken. This is not a question on which there is reason to think that people will disagree. The difficulties are always supposed to be financial. It is a sad thing that we should be so hampered by our methods of finance that we throw away opportunities to retain these actual beauties which undoubtedly add to the actual money value of a district. I cannot suppose that the way in which cities are laid out with narrow streets really results in an increase of value. The surroundings of our cities are undeveloped estates, which we have only to agree amongst ourselves how to lay out, and everybody would benefit by such joint action. There is an excellent illustration in regard to that in Mr. Horsfall's work in connection with Germany. It must be said that from Germany there is a great deal to learn in civic matters. In one of its towns the properties lie in extraordinarily long strips. It is the final result of properties having been measured by the length of the plough's run. When that method is applied to town sites, it is not convenient for streets; and there are some quarters in this German town ruined in this way, and the people have agreed together to improve matters. Every owner is to be given credit for his share in the total value of the improvement that is found to accrue from the re-arrangement of these undesirable divisions, and any difference of opinion as to the just share and proportion is to be referred to an impartial arbitrator. All the owners will gain, though some a little more than others. That is an example that we may do well to try and follow, and in some way or other improve the money value, and social value, and hygienic value of towns, and if necessary compel the carrying out of improvements when some few might be disposed to hold out against them.

WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS

FROM PROF. BALDWIN BROWN

(Professor of Fine Art in the University of Edinburgh).

I am glad of this opportunity of saying how cordially I agree with the method adopted by my friend Professor Geddes in dealing with the life of cities. He treats the modern community and its material shell as things of organic growth, with a past and a future as well as a present, whereas we too often see these wider considerations ignored in favour of some exigency of the moment. A historic British town has recently furnished a striking object-lesson in this connection. The town possesses portions of an ancient city wall and fosse that were made at a time when the town was, for the moment, the most important in Great Britain. Yet the Town Council, a year ago, destroyed part of this wall and filled a section of the fosse for the purpose of providing a site for a new elementary school. No doubt, in that school, books "approved by the Department" will instruct scholars in the past history of the burgh, but the living witness of that history must first of all be carefully obliterated. All the rest of this ancient and historic enceinte was condemned a few weeks ago to complete destruction, merely on the plea that the site would be convenient for workmen's dwellings. The monument has now been saved, but it has taken the whole country to do it!

Here were chosen officials, governors of no mean city, absolutely oblivious of these important interests committed to their care, and all for want of having drilled into them these broader views which Professor Geddes puts forward so well.

He has himself done practical work in Edinburgh on the lines he lays down, and I have lately had occasion to note, and call attention to, the advantage to the city of much wise conservatism in regard to our older buildings which he and his associates have shown.

In Edinburgh we have the advantage that our older monuments,

in which so much of the past life of the city is enshrined, are firm and solid; and it takes some trouble to knock them down. Hence for some time to come we shall preserve here object-lessons in civic development that will be of interest to the country at large.

FROM MR. WALTER CRANE

(President of Arts and Crafts Exhibition Society).

Professor Geddes' very interesting "Study in City Development" is highly suggestive, and shows how great a difference thoughtful and tasteful treatment might make in dealing with such problems. It is sad to think of the opportunities wasted, and of the more ignorant and often too hasty clearances for traffic which have often been apparently the sole motives in city improvement. The conservation of historic buildings, whenever possible, the planting of trees along our streets, the laying out of gardens, the insistence upon a proportional amount of air and open space to new buildings would go a long way towards making our bricks-and-mortar joyless wildernesses into something human and habitable.

Whether, under favourable circumstances and the rare public spirit of private owners, much can be done, or to any wide extent, so long as absolute individual ownership in land and ground values is allowed, seems to me very doubtful. We cannot hope to see great social improvements without great economic changes, but every effort in the direction of improving the beauty of our cities is welcome to all who have the well-being of the community at heart; and such work as Prof. Geddes is doing should arouse the keenest interest and the earnest attention of all who realise its immense social importance.

FROM MR. J. H. HARLEY, M.A.

If sociology is ever to vindicate itself as an art, it must be able to analyse and explain the present, and to some extent at least to cast the horoscope of the future. It must feel its way through all the tangled labyrinths of city life, and show us where we have arrived and whither we are going. But this is exactly the part of Professor Geddes' Applied Sociology where he becomes most vague and unsatisfactory. "Enough for the present," we are told, "if it be admitted that the practical man in his thought and action in the present is mainly as yet the too unconscious child of the past, and that in the city he is still working within the grasp of natural conditions." Now we must all be willing to admit that the present is the child of the past, and that we cannot adequately understand

the present until we have led up to the present by the study of its antecedents more and less remote. But what Professor Geddes fails to bring out is that it is only in the present or the more immediate past that the City has really become a City in the modern sense of the word. The City as City is a product of the Industrial Revolution. Its huge and casual assemblages of human life, its overcrowding, its poverty line, its East End and its West End, its infantile mortality, its trades massed in their own particular districts, its aliens, its criminals and its vices—all these problems of social pathology arise from the fact that the conditions of modern industry have brought people together who have few interests in common, and who were compelled to arrange themselves in some kind of decent order within a limited area, without sufficient time being given to evolve a suitable environment, or to prepare themselves for the environment which they actually found on every side of them. London in the past, therefore, cannot help us so very much to solve the riddles of London in the present, because London in the past had not developed these social growths or offered a mature ground to those social parasites which make us sometimes despair of being able to get much insight into the London of the present.

The fact seems to be that Prof. Geddes conceives sociology too much as a primary and too little as a secondary science. He defines applied sociology as the application of social survey to social science, when social ratiocination or social philosophy are needed before one can be said to have gauged the extent of the influence which this comprehensive science may have in our actual practice or on our Budget of the future. No doubt, "observation, so far from excluding interpretation, is just the very means of preparing for it," but this preparation must be made in the various specialisms which make up the complete or encyclopædic science of sociology. To me it seems an unwarrantable narrowing of the scope or significance of sociology to say that there is no better method available of teaching it "than that of regional survey, historical as well as geographical." Surely "regional survey" is the appropriate method in the very simplest and most concrete parts of the complete science of sociology, and even when we come to history proper we must do very much more than make a regional survey. It is very interesting, no doubt, to "survey" history in the course of a summer ramble to the ruins of some old monastery, but unless the monks had kept records of what had been done there in bygone days, the mere outward survey will not carry us further than Prof. Geddes is carried in the very general map which he makes of the whole field of history. In other words, history, in any proper sense, demands more than "survey" in Prof. Geddes' sense of the word. It calls to its aid linguistics, criticism, archæology, jurisprudence, and politics—there must be comparison and criticism as well as "survey." History is the laboratory in which the sociologist sees his social experiments working out their

results, and history is to the sociologist what experiment is to the physician, or the comparative method to the biologist.

This being so, the scope of "civics" as "applied sociology" is immensely widened. The present is the child of the past, but we see that it is only in the present that such ancient groups as the colony of Hanseatic merchants in Old London have shown us what has been the ultimate significance of their embryological life. The modern city bristles with sociological problems which demand a knowledge of most of the specialisms included in the complete science of sociology, and almost invite us to cast the horoscope of the future. We see, as Booth and Rowntree saw before us, the poverty line like a fiery portent at every point of our study, and we are led finally to ask ourselves whether M. Arthur Bauer was not right in choosing the title "*Les Classes Sociales*" as the most characteristic title he could give to his recent and most suggestive analysis of the general characteristics of social life.

FROM MR. T. C. HORSFALL

(*President, Manchester Citizens' Association, &c.*).

The teaching of the paper seems to me to be most sound and helpful. The town of the future—I trust of the near future—must by means of its schools, its museums, and galleries, its playgrounds, parks and gymnasia, its baths, its wide tree-planted streets and the belt of unspoilt country which must surround it, bring all its inhabitants in some degree under the *best* influences of all the regions and all the stages of civilisation, the influences of which, but not the best influences, contribute, and have contributed, to make our towns what they are.

FROM H. OSMAN NEWLAND

(*Author of "A Short History of Citizenship"*).

The failures of democratic governments in the past have been attributable, in part, to the lack of intelligence and self-consciousness among the mass of those who were given a voice in the government of their country. Citizenship, like morality, was allowed to grow by instinct; it was never systematised as a science, or applied as an art. Sparta and Athens approached towards a system of civics much less elaborate than that expounded by Professor Geddes; but in Sparta citizenship became inseparable from Nationalism, and in Athens it scarcely rose above Municipalism. In more modern times, civic education has had to encounter the same difficulty as in America, where the young citizen's first duty is to salute his flag, and as in London, where "Civics" is distributed in doles of local

history in which the municipality plays a part altogether out of proportion to its relation to the country, the age, and the world. Civics, as the applied sociology of each individual and each body of interests, has but begun to be dreamed of; and before it can be properly developed it is desirable, if not necessary, that the general public should know something more than at present both of the historic development of the "civic" idea, and of the psychology of aggregations as differentiated from the psychology of the individual. Not until we can make "the man in the street" a conscious citizen, instead of a political automaton, shall we be able to enlist his sympathies with "Civics"; and without those sympathies the sociologist's "Civics" will, I fear, be but partial and inaccurate.

FROM MR. G. BISSET SMITH

(*H.M. Registration Examiner for East of Scotland*).

There is an elusiveness here and there in this paper which has helped to confirm me in the opinion that it is well to emphasise the fact that Prof. Geddes is not only a dreamer of lofty dreams but a doer and a practical initiator. He has expressed himself not only in words but in art and in architecture, and in educational organisation; and he has in many ways, sometimes indirectly, influenced scholastic and civic activities.

If from the Outlook Tower he dreams of an idealised Edinburgh he has only to reply to the scoffer who asks, "What have you done?" "*Circumspice!*" There stand the settlements he initiated, the houses beautiful, bright, delectable; and the tower itself is an embodiment of his ideas, an encyclopædia in stone and in storeys.

We must, in criticising this paper, take into account these attempts towards realisation of its principles. The sociological evolutionist is "concerned primarily with origins, but ultimately and supremely with ideals," we were reminded in a recent paper read before this Society. And in the same paper it was affirmed that, "through the formulation of its larger generalisations as ideals, sociology may hope to achieve the necessary return from theory to practice." Thus, if Civics is applied Sociology, we must rest its claims on these criteria. What, then, we have to ask is:—(1) What actually are the generalisations of the present paper? (2) How far they are warranted by verifiable sociological testimony, and (3) What results do they yield when transformed by the touch of emotion into ideals of action? To attempt an adequate answer to these questions would perhaps transcend the limits of this discussion. But merely to raise these questions of presupposition should tend to clarify the discussion. Coming to detail, I may say, as one whose occupation is demographic, I regret the unavoidable briefness of the reference in "Civics" to a "rationalised census of the present condition of the people."

No one, however, who has studied the concluding portion of "The Evolution of Sex" can accuse Prof. Geddes of ignoring questions of *population*; and his eulogium, written ten years ago, of "Mr. Charles Booth as one of our own latest and best Economists," is familiar to all readers of "Education for Economics and Citizenship." In that extremely suggestive treatise, Prof. Geddes further points out that population must have a primary place in consideration, and that "our studies of the characteristic occupation of region by region are the essential material of a study of its whole civilisation."

Accepting Mr. Branford's definition of *occupation* as "any and every form of human endeavour, past, present, and future," we see that occupation must have a large place in the description, explanation, and forecasting of the evolution of cities—such as Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee—in the scheme of survey outlined so sweepingly in "Civics."

"Life and Labour of the People in London" contains several general observations almost equally applicable to our largest Scottish cities, with the demographic conditions of which my official duties give me special opportunities for becoming familiar and for regional survey.

In the concluding volume of that great contribution to sociology Mr. Booth (page 23) remarks:—

"Many influences conspire to cause the poor to multiply almost in proportion to their poverty, and operate in the other direction in the case of the better off, almost in proportion to their wealth. But," says Mr. Booth, "when we bring the death-rate into account this law no longer holds."

With the poor living under bad conditions in crowded homes the net increase is diminished. To those of us who are hopeful of improvement by eugenics it is pleasing to note that Mr. Booth—somewhat unlike Mr. Kidd in his well-known "Social Evolution"—is optimistic in his conclusion that "on the whole it may fairly be expected that concurrently with a rising standard of health we may see a fall in birth-rate as well as death-rate, and thus have no cause to fear, as the result of better sanitation, that the largest natural increase in population will ever be contributed by the lowest class." So the heritage of the city may grow not only in quantity but also in quality.

FROM PROFESSOR W. I. THOMAS

(*Professor in the University of Chicago, U.S.A.*).

From the standpoint of its applicability to new countries like America, Professor Geddes' programme is inadequate because of its failure to recognise that a city under these conditions is formed by a rapid and contemporaneous movement of population, and not by the lapse of time.

The first permanent white settler came to Chicago precisely one hundred years ago, and the city has a population at present of about two and a quarter millions. It is here not a question of slow historic development but of the rapid drifting towards a certain point, of a population from all quarters of the globe, and the ethnological standpoint therefore becomes of more importance than the historical.

PROFESSOR GEDDES' REPLY.

I am sincerely glad to be able to express myself in substantial agreement with the majority of my critics, only asking them in turn to recognise that this is but the first half of my subject—an outline of civics as in the first place a matter of science, a geographic and historic survey of past conditions, a corresponding census of present ones—here discussed and insisted on as affording the needful base for their demands upon civics as an art, that of effective social service.

In this respect various critics have in fact anticipated large elements of this future portion of my paper, so that in general views, at least, critics and writer are not so far apart as would appear were the preceding pages submitted as a comprehensive outline of the subject, instead of as its scientific introduction merely.

Of criticisms strictly applicable to this paper as it stands, there are really very few. I am confident that the chairman must be quite alone in too modestly applying to his great work that description of London itself, with which the paper (Section A, pp. 104-107) opens, since his volumes offer really our first effective clue to the labyrinth, and his method of intensive and specialised regional survey, the intensest searchlight yet brought to bear upon it.

Taking, however, a concrete point of criticism, such as that of the monumental planning of modern Paris as derived from forest rides, the critic need only walk through any French forest, or even to consult a Baedeker, or other guide-book, with its maps of any historic dwelling and its surroundings, from Chantilly or Fontainebleau to minor ones, to see that this plan, originally devised for the pleasure, success and safety

of the hunt, and later adapted to domination and defence, became next appreciated as affording the finest possible perspectives of the palatially rebuilt chateau. So that it is not at all a fantastic hypothesis, but an obvious and inevitable conclusion that Napoleon's and Haussman's plans were not at all invented by them for Paris, but were directly imitated from the familiar landscape architecture of the preceding century, which again was but the simplest development from the spacious forest rides of older hunting nobles, laid out without any thought of the architectural and city developments they were destined in later centuries to determine.

The citizen of Washington had till lately often forgotten that the magnificent perspectives of his city are due to the French landscape-architect (Major L'Enfant) whom Washington imported for the express purpose of laying out his capital; yet it is no less clear that this most magnificent of the New World city plans is derived from Old World forest rides, than that its monumental edifices descend from Renaissance and classic exemplars.

I plead indeed for such studies of the plans of any and every city from the point of view of its natural development. The too purely abstract and subjective sociology of the dwellers of great cities like London would in this way be helped by the facts of their own topographic history, already well known and clearly explained by geographer and historian, towards again feeling with the naturalist that even the modern city is but the most complex evolutionary expression and development of the life of Nature.

This view I take to be indeed a commonplace in France; but I account for its apparent unfamiliarity to English readers from the fact of our scanty forests in this island being left practically wild, our nobles not inhabiting them, but the cultivated pasture and arable regions below—planting trees indeed, “plantations,” but seldom woods, and practically never forests at all. This again brings out the fact that the French nobles, despite our urban associations with regard to them, have belonged far more than ours to the social formation and tradition of the hunter—while ours, despite their love of sports, are yet fundamentally squires, *i.e.*, essentially and historically approximating to the peasants of their villages. The bearing of all this upon their respective history will be obvious. Here again we have the origins of the vivid contrast of the English or so-called naturalistic style of landscape-gardening with the more formal French tradition. Yet in a very true sense we see the former to be even more highly artificial than the latter.

The English citizen who may even admit this way of looking at the contrasted city plans of London and Paris may fail, unless he has appreciated the principle here involved, to see why London and Paris houses are so different—the one separate and self-contained, with its door undefended and open upon the street, while the normal Parisian house is a populous, high-piled tenement around a central court, with high *porte cochère* closed by massive oaken doors and guarded by an always vigilant and often surly *concierge*.

A moment of historical reflection suffices to see that the former is the architecture of a long-settled agricultural place, with its spreading undefended villages, in which each household had its separate dwelling, the other a persistence of the Continental fortified city crowded within its walls.

But beyond this we must see the earlier historic, the simpler geographic origins of the French courtyard house as a defensible farmyard, of which the ample space was needed nightly for defence against wild beasts, if not also wilder men, against whom the *concierge* is not only the antique porter but the primitive sentinel.

I may seem unduly to labour such points, yet do so advisedly, in order to emphasise and make clearer the essential thesis of this portion of my paper—that every scientific survey involves a geographic and historic exploration of origins, but that of the still unwritten chapter, that the far-reaching forelook, idealistic yet also critical, which is needful to any true and enduring contribution to social service, is prepared for by habitually imaging the course of evolution in the past.

Speaking personally, as one whose leisure and practical life have alike been largely spent in the study and the preservation of ancient buildings, I may say that this has not been solely, nor even essentially, from an antiquarian interest in the historic past, but still more on behalf of a practical interest—that of the idealistic, yet economic, utilitarian, because educational and evolutionary, transformation of our old cities—old Edinburgh, old Dunfermline, and the like—from their present sordid unhygienic failure; and therefore industrial and commercial insufficiency, towards a future equalling if not transcending the recorded greatness of the civic past.

It has, therefore, been to lay the broadest possible basis of evolutionary science, of geographic and historic fact, for what would otherwise be open to ridicule as a Utopian hope, that of Civics as Applied Social Art, that I have insisted at such length above upon Civics as Applied Social Science.

PRESS COMMENTS

THE TIMES (JULY 20, 1904), in a leading article, said :

In the paper read on Monday at a meeting of the Sociological Society by Professor GEDDES—an abstract of which we print—are contained ideas of practical value to be recommended to the study of ambitious municipalities. This is the age of cities, and all the world is city-building. Almost everywhere is a flow from the country townward. China and India may be still, in the main, lands of villages. But the West, Russia perhaps excepted, is more and more peopled by dwellers in cities. In a dim sort of way many persons understand that the time has come when art and skill and foresight should control what so far has been left to chance to work out ; that there should be a more orderly conception of civic action ; that there is a real art of city-making, and that it behoves this generation to master and practise it. Professor Geddes truly said the land is already full of preparation as to this matter ; the beginnings of a concrete art of city-making are visible at various points. But our city rulers are often among the blindest to these considerations ; and nowhere probably is to be seen a municipality fully and consistently alive to its duties in this respect. London may be left out of the question. Still a province rather than a city in the strict sense, wanting what, in the view of the early master of political science, was an essential of the true city, that it could “easily be overseen,” with a vast floating population, it will be some time before it can be dealt with as an organic whole. But the rulers of such communities as Manchester and Newcastle and York ought long ago to have realised, much more than has been done, that they are not so much brick and mortar, so much rateable area, so many thousands of people fortuitously brought together. They have all a regional environment of their own which determined their origin and growth. They have all a rich past, the monuments of which, generally to be found in abundance by careful, reverent inquirers, ought to be preserved ; a past which ought to be known more or less to all the dwellers therein, and the knowledge of which will make the present more interesting. Even when old buildings have disappeared, ancient roads, pathways, and streets can be traced ; place names keep alive much history ; and the natural features reveal to the practised eye what must have been the look and condition of a town in past ages. Professor Geddes gives a sketch of what he conceives the vast and ever-growing literature of cities will one day be. Even if the comprehensive monographs which he foreshadows are never

written, it is not surely fanciful to expect that, with education universal, almost every dweller in our old towns will acquire some sort of that feeling with which a member of an ancient family looks upon its ancestral house or lands—will, even without much reading, have some sort of notion of his predecessors and a certain pride in his membership of an ancient community. If he has not the good fortune to be a De Vere, a De Bohun, a Howard, Mowbray or Cavendish, he may perhaps be a citizen of a town which flourished when some of these families were unknown.

Such pride, or, as the lecturer preferred to term it, such “growth of civic consciousness and conscience, the awakening of citizenship towards civic renaissance,” will be the best security for a worthy city of the future.

Professor Geddes glanced at the opening civic future, “the remoter and higher issues which a city’s indefinitely long life and correspondingly needed foresight and statesmanship involve,” the possibilities which may be early realised if only there be true civic pride, foresight, and unflagging pursuit of a reasonable ideal. It remains to be seen what our cities will become when for some generations the same spirit of pride and reverence shown by old families as to their possessions has presided over all civic changes and developments. Ruskin somewhere points out the mediæval love of cities, unwholesome, dirty, and forbidding though they were. He did not teach his generation that that affection might with more reason attach to the modern city if its people knew what it had been and steadily strove to make it better, if there was in every large community patriotism and a polity.

DR. J. H. BRIDGES IN *THE POSITIVIST REVIEW* (Sept., 1904), SAID :

Under the title, “Civics, as applied Sociology,” Prof. Geddes read on July 18th a very interesting paper before the Sociological Society. The importance of the subject will be contested by none. The method adopted in handling it, being in many ways original, invites remark.

What is wanted is first a survey of the facts to be dealt with—a regional survey. This point of view has next to be correlated with corresponding practical experience acquired by practical civic life, but “aiming at a larger and more orderly conception of civic action.” Students of Comte will not forget his well-known maxim, *Savoir pour prévoir, afin de pourvoir*.

What is to be the area of survey? Prof. Geddes decides that the City may be taken “as the integrate of study.” Whether any modern towns, and, if so, what, may be taken as integrates in the sense which would undoubtedly apply to ancient Athens or to mediæval Florence, may be questioned; but it is too soon to interrupt our author. Every one who heard the lecturer must have been fascinated by his picture of a river system which he takes for his unit of study; the high mountain tracts, the pastoral hill-sides, the hamlets and villages in the valleys, the market town where the valleys meet, the convergence of larger valleys into a county town, finally, the great city where the river meets the sea. The lecturer went on to advocate the systematic study of some of the principal river-basins of the world for the purpose of examining the laws which govern the grouping of cities. All would agree that much instruction might be derived from such

a survey, provided two dangers be avoided. One is the exaggeration of the influence of the environment on the social organism, an error into which the Le Play school have sometimes fallen; as when, for instance, it was sought to explain Chinese civilisation by the rice-plant. The other danger, which needs much care and thought to avoid, is the accumulation of such a mass of irrelevant detail as renders (perhaps sometimes it is intended to render) all generalisation impossible. Thinking men are at last beginning to regard the accumulation of memoirs as one of the principal obstacles to scientific progress. On the pretext of "more evidence," conclusions are adjourned, not merely *sine die*, but *sine spe diei*. Yet so long as man is man, he must, and will, have conclusions; be they final or otherwise.

From the physiography of the city we pass to its history. . . . In this part of his subject he has, as we all know, many precursors and fellow-workers. The remarkable series, entitled "Historic Towns," instituted by Prof. Freeman, is known to most. The study of towns was the life and soul of Mr. Green's historic labours. Eloquent and powerful pictures of the great cities of the world fill the greater part of Mr. Harrison's well-known volume, "The Meaning of History"; and the student of universal history (a few of these, it may be hoped, are still left) finds them very stimulating and helpful. The special note of Prof. Geddes' method is that he does not limit himself to the greater cities, but also, and perhaps by preference, deals with the smaller, and with their physical environment; and, above all, that he attempts not merely to observe closely and thoroughly, but to generalise as the result of his observation. In biology, the study of any single organism, however minute and accurate, could reveal no laws (*i.e.*, no general facts) of structure or function. As for instance, many forms of heart must be examined before the laws governing blood-circulation could be revealed; so here. Countless, indeed, are the forms of cities; even limiting our field of observation to those that have grown up in the last century they are numerous enough. Their differences and analogies would doubtless repay analysis, always supposing that we are clear how far the modern town, as contrasted with the mediæval or Græco-Roman city, can usefully be treated as "an integrate." This raises large questions of nation, of groups of nations, finally of Humanity, which cannot here be touched.

Meantime, from the teacher's standpoint, there can be no question at all, among those who look upon education as something more than a commercial asset, as to the utility of looking on every old town, with the neighbourhood around it, as a condensed record, here and there perfect, elsewhere lamentably blotted, yet still a record, of the history of our race. Historic memories survive in our villages far more widely than is thought. The descendants of the man who found the body of Rufus in the New Forest still live hard by. The builder whom the first William set to build Corfe Castle was Stephen Mowlem; and the Dorsetshire firm of Mowlem still pave London causeways. A poor woman in a remote hamlet, untouched by tourist or guide-book, has shown me the ash-tree under which Monmouth was seized after Sedgemoor; a Suffolk peasant, equally innocent of book-knowledge, has pointed out "Bloody Mary's lane," through which that bugbear of Protestants passed three hundred years before on her way to Framlingham. The abbey immortalised in Carlyle's "Past and Present," and still the wonder of Eastern England, is surrounded now by the same villages that Jocelyn tells us of. The town named after St. Alban, with its memories of Cassivellaun and Julius Cæsar, of an old Roman city, of the Diocletian persecution, of the great King Offa, founder of the abbey that was to become

at once a school of historical research, and our best epitome of mediæval architecture—all this, with the monument of the author of the "Novum Organum" crowning the whole—sums up for us sixteen centuries of history.

Professor Geddes for more than twenty years has adopted this method of teaching sociology in the open air; "in the field," as geologists would say

This is much more than the study and the description of buildings and places of historical interest. His aim is first to study the way in which a city grows, always having due regard to its physical environment; secondly, by comparing like with like, as a naturalist compares the individuals of a species, or the species of a genus, to throw light on the laws which govern civic development, and thus to help forward and direct civic action.

All this is set forth with greater fulness in the Report which Professor Geddes has been asked to write for the Carnegie Dunfermline Trust. The purpose of the Report (printed, but not yet published) was to suggest the way in which the revenue of the Trust, amounting to £25,000, should be spent for the benefit of this ancient and historic town. The scheme, with its many pictures, real and ideal, of workshops, parks, culture-institutes—physical, artistic, and historical—will deeply interest even those who reject much of it as Utopian. But it is at least a Utopia specially adapted to a given place and time, one in which every feature of landscape and history is made the most of, one in which a beginning can be made at once, leaving room for further developments as occasion may serve. Moreover, it is penetrated through and through with the Republican ideal of bringing the highest truth within the reach of all.

Comte has pointed out, in the fifth chapter of his "General View of Positivism," and elsewhere, that it is not enough to enunciate sound principles of social renovation unless they can be rendered visible and palpable. "The principal function of art," he says, "is to construct types on the basis furnished by Science. However perfectly the first principles of social renovation may be elaborated by thinkers, they will still not be sufficiently definite for the practical result. But, at the point where Philosophy must always leave a void, Art steps in, and stimulates to practical action. Hence, in the future, systematic formation of Utopias will become habitual; on the distinct understanding that as in every other branch of art, the ideal shall be kept in subordination to the real."

Now, the Dunfermline Report is an admirable example of art thus allied with science for social service. It is an ideal picture, strictly adherent to local colour and conditions, of an ancient city prolonging its vitality into the present and future by providing a very high form of training for its citizens, a training not of intellect only, but of the senses, of manual dexterity, of imagination, of Republican sympathy—a training in which "laborious inacquaintance with dead languages," infusing into the few touched by it a tincture of caste and militarism, gives way to comprehensive study of the evolution of Man, preparing the whole, and not a section merely, of the new generation for social service.

Such a Utopia as this may be looked upon as fulfilling the true social function of Art; standing midway between theory and practice; inspired by thought, and stimulating action. Only the social artist has to look to it that his thoughts be not merely true but adequate, lest he degenerate into a mere decorator. How far will a series of "regional surveys," like those of

Mr. Booth in London and Mr. Rowntree in York, carry us! Not so far, I fear, as Professor Geddes seems to hope. Cities in our modern life are organs inseparable from a larger whole, the nation; and before the life of cities can be much changed, we have to ask ourselves, What is the national life? What is its ethical and religious standard? What is its practice as to the acquisition and distribution of wealth? And, again, What is to be the intercourse of nations? Is it to be war or peace?

Mr. Carnegie has given half a million for the benefit of a town of 30,000 inhabitants. Magnificent as the donation is, it is not too much; not nearly enough, indeed, for the full realisation of Professor Geddes' scheme. Still, wisely used, it might accomplish great results. What we have recently sunk in the work of suppressing two free States in South Africa would have made it possible to do for three hundred towns what has been done for Dunfermline. Half of what we are now spending on our army and navy would enable us to endow thirty more of such towns annually.

MR. ISRAEL ZANGWILL IN *TO-DAY* (AUG. 10, 1904), SAID:

The Sociological Society is forging ahead at American speed; the professors jostle one another, and Geddes treads on the heels of Galton. After "Eugenics," or the Science of Good Births, comes "Civics," or the Science of Cities. In the former Mr. Galton was developing an idea which was in the air, and in Wells. In the latter Professor Geddes has struck out a more novel line, and a still more novel nomenclature. Politography, Politogenics, and Eu-Politogenics, likewise Hebraomorphic and Latino-morphic and Eutopia—quite an opposite idea from Utopia—such are some of the additions to the dictionary which the science of Civics carries in its train. They are all excellent words—with the double-barrelled exception—and still more excellent concepts. But I fancy the general idea of them all could be conveyed to the man in the street under the covering of "the human shell." This shell of ours is the city. It is the protective crust we have built round ourselves. In a smaller sense our house is our shell, but in a larger sense each house is only a lobe of the complex and contorted whole. Geography shapes our shells from without, and the spirit of our particular community shapes it from within. History tells us how it has been shaped in the past, Art tells us how it should be shaped in the future. Professor Geddes, in fact, envisages our civic shell as becomes a brilliant biologist, who also happens to be a man of historic imagination, ethical impulses, and æsthetic perceptions. For the human shell is not merely geometrical and architectural, like those of apian or beaverish communities; it holds and expresses all those differences by which we are exalted above the bee or the beaver. It is coloured with our emotions and ideals, and contorted with all the spirals of our history. And all these manifestations of humanity may be studied as systematically as those of the lower orders of creation, which have till recently monopolised the privilege of pin and label. The old lady who admired the benevolence of Providence in always placing rivers by the side of large towns was only expressing in an exaggerated way the general failure to think of Civics scientifically. The geographers, in whom may be found the bases of the science, have always pointed out that the river system is the essential unit for investigation. From source to sea goes the line of evolution. And yet even the peasant hamlet at the source depends, as

Professor Geddes reminds us, on the hinterland of pasture, forest, and chase ; and the hunter is the germ of the soldier and the aristocrat. The whole region contributes to the ultimate city, as the whole river to the ultimate sea. The Professor says, justly enough, that we should try to recover the elemental or naturalist point of view, even for the greatest cities. He sees London as "fundamentally an agglomeration of villages with their surviving patches of common around a mediæval seaport." This is accurate vision ; but when he discerns "even in the utmost magnificence of Paris, say, its Place de l'Etoile, its spread of boulevards, but the hunter's tryst by the fallen tree, with its radiating forest rides, each literally straight," I cannot help suspecting the over-ingenuity of a prolific intellect. The view of London as a growth from embryos, and the view of Paris as the outcome of atavistic instinct, belong to different planes of scientific thinking. That Haussmann in reconstructing Paris was merely an unconscious hunter and woodlander, building as automatically as a bee, is a fantastic hypothesis ; since cities, if they are to be built on a plan at all, cannot avoid some unifying geometrical pattern ; and there are not very many possibilities. In the department of Eu-Politogenics we shall be confronted with the problem of consciously overriding what evolution has unconsciously evolved, and building towards a fairer future. No doubt much of our creation will be imitation, and Professor Geddes is particularly suggestive in bidding us, at least, to be aware which of the tangled strands of influence we desire to follow ; but a measure of artistic free-will remains. With the development of a corporate conscience we should be able to turn out far more satisfactory shells than many that have blundered into being. "Garden City" is only a particular application of the science of Civics.

Eu-Politogenics concerns itself, however, with more than the mere configuration of our human shell. Its colour and the music it holds are considerations no less important. But they are too important to touch at the fag-end of an article. Professor Geddes must, however, be congratulated on a stimulating paper, and upon his discovery of Eutopia. For Eutopia (unlike Utopia, which is really Ou-topia, or no place) is merely your own place perfected. And the duty of working towards its perfection lies directly upon *you*. "Civics—as applied sociology" comes to show you the way.

WOMAN IN EARLY CIVILISATION

THE POSITION OF WOMAN IN EARLY CIVILISATION:

BY E. WESTERMARCK, PH.D.

Read before the Sociological Society at a Meeting in the School of Economics and Political Science (London University) on April 18th, 1904, Rt. Hon. JAMES BRYCE, M.P., in the Chair.

The position of women in early civilisation is a subject which, of course, cannot be adequately dealt with in a single lecture. All that I can do is to present a few general conclusions, together with some illustrative examples to support those conclusions. The subject is full of difficulties. Not only is the position of women among the lower races variable, but our knowledge of the matter is very defective. It is seldom that a traveller gives us a minute account of the customary rights and duties of women among the people whom he visits. Not infrequently are conflicting statements made by different authorities, or even by the same writer. And, as regards the *status* of women, as in many other points, we often have reason to suspect that the European visitor expresses his opinion without a full insight into all the facts bearing on the question with which he is dealing.

The popular view is that, among the lower races, the position of women is one of abject slavery. This opinion is no doubt correct to some extent, so far as certain savage peoples are concerned. Among many of them, the husband has power of life and

death over his wife, at least within certain limits and under certain circumstances. The man is often described as the sole proprietor of his wives and daughters, entitled to barter them away, or to dispose of them in any manner he may think proper. Yet it seems that even in cases where the husband's power over his wife is said to be absolute, custom has not left her entirely destitute of rights. Take, for instance, the Australian aborigines, who have long been reputed to be perhaps the greatest oppressors of women on earth. Among certain tribes, at least, if a man kills his wife, her death is avenged by her brothers or kindred, or the husband has to deliver up one of his own sisters for his late wife's friends to put to death. Sometimes he must have the consent of the tribe for punishing or divorcing his wife. As Dr. Nieboer has pointed out, there are even cases in which a wife whose husband has been unfaithful to her, may complain of his conduct to the elders of the tribe, and the husband may have to suffer for his fault. In North-West Central Queensland the women themselves are on one special occasion allowed to inflict punishment upon the men : at a certain stage of the initiation ceremony "each woman can exercise her right of punishing any man who may have ill-treated, abused or 'hammered' her, and for whom she may have waited months or perhaps years to chastise." These facts ill agree with Mr. Curr's broad statement that among the Australian natives "the husband is the absolute owner of his wife."

Other instances may be added to show that the so-called absolute authority of husbands over their wives is not to be taken too literally. Of the Guiana Indians Mr. Im. Thurn observes : "The woman is held to be as completely the property of the man as his dog. He may sell her if he chooses." But in another place the same writer admits that the women not only influence the men in a quiet way, but that even if the men were inclined to treat them cruelly—though this is in fact quite contrary to their nature—public opinion would prevent this. Among the Chippewyans in North America, the women are said to be "as much in the power of the men as any other articles of their property"; yet, at the same time, "they are always consulted, and possess a very considerable influence in the traffic with Europeans,

and other important concerns." The Russian traveller Prejevalsky states that, among the Mongols, a woman is "entirely dependent on her husband"; but on a following page he adds that "in the household the rights of the wife are nearly equal to those of the husband." In Dr. Paulitschke's great monograph on the Somals, Danakil, and Gallas of North-Eastern Africa, the confusion reaches its height. A wife, he observes, has no rights whatever in relation to her husband, being a mere piece of property; and subsequently we learn that she is his equal, and "a mistress of her own will."

Among many uncivilised peoples the hardest drudgeries of life are said to be imposed on the women; all the heavy work is performed by them; their life is an uninterrupted succession of toil and pain. There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of these and similar statements; but however correct they be, they hardly express the whole truth. In early society—just as among ourselves—each sex has its own pursuits. The man is responsible for the protection of his family and its support. His occupations are such as require strength and ability: fighting, hunting, fishing, the construction of implements for the chase and war, and the building of huts. On the other hand, the principal occupations of the woman are universally of a domestic kind: she procures wood and water, prepares the food, dresses skins, makes clothes, takes care of the children. She, moreover, supplies the household with vegetable food, gathers roots, berries, acorns, and, among agricultural savages, very commonly cultivates the ground. Cattle-rearing is generally a masculine pursuit, because it has developed out of the chase. Agriculture, on the other hand, originally devolves on the woman, because it has developed out of collecting seeds and plants. Thus the various occupations of life are divided between the sexes according to definite rules. And though the formation of these rules has undoubtedly been more or less influenced by the egoism of the stronger sex, the essential principle from which they spring lies deeper. They are, on the whole, in conformity with the indications given by nature itself.

There is nothing for which savages and barbarians have been more commonly blamed than the apparently cruel practice

of using their women as beasts of burden. As M. Pinart (quoted by Dr. Nieboer) remarks, with special reference to the Indians of Panama, it may indeed seem strange to the superficial observer that the women should be charged with a heavy load, while the man, walking before her, carries nothing but his weapons. But a little reflection will make it plain that the man has good reason for keeping himself free and mobile. The little caravan is surrounded with dangers. When traversing a savannah or a forest, a hostile Indian may appear at any moment, or a tiger or a snake may lie in wait for the travellers. Hence the man must be on the alert, and instantly ready to seize his arms to defend himself and his family against the aggressor. A similar observation has been made by Dobrizhoffer. He writes:—"The luggage being all committed to the women, the Abipones travel armed only with a spear, that they may be disengaged to fight or hunt if occasion requires."

Moreover, whatever may have been the original reason for allotting a certain occupation exclusively to one sex, any such restriction has subsequently been much emphasised by custom, and in many cases by superstition. It is a common belief that if a man does a woman's work he himself will become effeminate; besides, he will be laughed at, and called a woman. Among the Beni Ahsen tribe in Morocco, the women of the village where I was staying were quite horrified when one of my men was going to fetch water; they said they could not allow him to do so, because the fetching of water was a woman's business. So, also, among the Bakongo, a man would be much ridiculed by the women themselves if he wanted to help them in their work in the field.

It is obvious that this division of labour in savage communities is apt to mislead the travelling stranger. He sees the women hard at work and the men idly looking on; and perhaps it does not occur to him that the latter will have to be busy in their turn, within their own sphere of action. What is largely due to custom is taken to be sheer tyranny on the part of the stronger sex, and the wife is pronounced an abject slave of her husband, destitute of all rights. Yet, as a matter of fact, the strong differentiation of work, however burdensome it be to the woman, is itself a source of rights. It gives her authority within

the circle which is exclusively hers. In the house she is very commonly an autocrat. Even where she is said to be the slave of the husband, custom may prevent him from parting with a single household article without first asking the permission of his wife. Nay, in early society women are sometimes the only landowners. As already said, they till the ground, they sow the corn. The soil, therefore, in certain cases is regarded as theirs.

The supreme authority which, among many savage peoples, the husband is said to possess over his wife appears thus to be considerably modified by circumstances which have generally been left out of consideration by the generaliser. And we must distinctly and emphatically reject as erroneous the broad statement often met with, that the lower races, taken as a whole, hold their women in a state of almost complete subjection. Among many of them the married woman, although in the power of the husband, is known to enjoy a remarkable degree of independence, to be treated by him with great consideration, and to exercise no small influence upon him. In several cases she is even stated to be his equal, and in a few his superior. In support of this I shall quote some statements made by reliable observers in various savage lands.

Among many, or most, of the North American Indians, the position of women appears to have been anything but degraded. "The Indian woman," says Mr. Grinnell, "it is usually thought, is a mere drudge and slave, but, so far as my observations extend, this notion is wholly an erroneous one. It is true that the women were the labourers of the camp, that they did all the hard work, about which there was no excitement . . . but they were not mere servants. On the contrary, their position was very respectable. They were consulted on many subjects, not only in connection with family affairs, but in more important and general matters. Sometimes women were even admitted to the councils and spoke there, giving their advice. . . . In ordinary family conversation women did not hesitate to interrupt and correct their husbands when the latter made statements with which they did not agree, and the men listened to them with respectful attention." Among the Navahoes the women "exert a great deal of influence;" they "are very independent of menial

duties, and leave their husbands upon the slightest pretext of dislike ;" "by common consent the house and all the domestic gear belong entirely to the wife." Among the Omahas the women had an equal standing in society with the men—both the husband and wife were at the head of the family and the joint owners of the hut, robes, etc., so that the man could not give away anything if his wife was unwilling. Mr. Morgan says of the Seneca tribe :—" Usually the female portion ruled the house, and were doubtless clannish enough about it. The stores were in common, but woe to the luckless husband or lover who was too shiftless to do his share of the providing. No matter how many children, or whatever goods he might have in the house, he might at any time be ordered to pick up his blanket and budge." Among the Nootkas "wives are consulted in matters of trade, and, in fact, seem to be nearly on terms of equality with their husbands, except that they are excluded from some public feasts and ceremonies." The Thlinkets and Kamchadales held their women in much respect. Concerning the Chukchi, Nordenskiöld states :—" The power of the woman appears to be very great. In making the more important bargains, even about weapons and hunting implements, she is, as a rule, consulted, and her advice is taken. A number of things which form women's tools she can barter away on her own responsibility, or in any other way employ as she pleases."

Passing to other quarters of the world. Among the Kandhs, one of the uncivilised tribes of India, women are uniformly treated with respect ; the mothers of families generally with much honour. Nothing is done either in public or in private affairs without consulting them, and they generally exert a powerful influence upon the councils of their tribes. They have extraordinary matrimonial privileges. Constancy to her husband is not at all required in a wife, whereas infidelity on the part of a married man is held to be highly dishonourable, and is often punished by deprivation of many social privileges. And a wife may quit her husband at any time, except within a year of her marriage, or when she expects offspring, or within a year after the birth of a child, though, when she quits him, he has a right to reclaim immediately from her father the whole sum paid for her. Of the Todas, another people in India, Mr. Marshall states

that their women "hold a position in the family quite unlike what is ordinarily witnessed amongst Oriental nations. They are treated with respect, and are permitted a remarkable amount of freedom." The same is said of many of the aboriginal tribes of India. The Bheel husband has always had the credit of allowing his wife to domineer over him. "A Kol or Ho makes a regular companion of his wife. She is consulted in all difficulties, and receives the fullest consideration due to her sex." Among the Indo-Chinese races equality of the sexes prevails, and prevailed long before Buddhism took any hold upon the country.

Mr. Crawford maintains that, in the Malay Archipelago, the lot of women may be considered, on the whole, as more fortunate than in any other country of the East; they associate with the men "in all respects on terms of such equality as surprise us in such a condition of society." The Dyak shows great respect for his wife, and generally asks her opinion; he regards her "not as a slave, but as a companion." In Bali the women are on a perfect equality with the men. In Serang they have equal rights with the men in all communal matters, and are consequently treated well. In some parts of New Guinea the position of women is described as one of dignity: "they have a large voice in domestic affairs, and occasionally lord it over their masters. It is not only in domestic affairs, but also in the affairs of State that their influence is felt." In the Pelew Islands, according to Kubary, the women are in every respect the equals of the men; the eldest man, or Obokul, of a family can do nothing without taking advice with its eldest female members. In the Kingsmill Islands very great consideration is shown to the women; they seem to have exclusive control over the house, and all the hard labour is performed by the men. In Tonga "women have considerable respect shown to them on account of their sex"; they are not subjected to hard labour or any grossly menial work, and their *status* in society is not inferior to that of men. In Samoa they "are held in much consideration treated with great attention, and not suffered to do anything but what rightfully belongs to them." Among the Line Islanders "no difference is made in the sexes; a woman can vote and speak as well as a man,

and in general the women decide the question, unless it is one of war against another island."

Turning, finally, to the African continent, we find that, among the negro races, the woman, though often heavily burdened and more or less subservient to her husband, is by no means without influence. "When we become more closely acquainted with family conditions," Büttner observes, "we notice that there, as elsewhere, husbands are under petticoat government, and those most of all who like to pose before the outer world as masters of their house. The women, including the aunts, have on all occasions, important and unimportant alike, a weighty word to contribute." The Monbuttu women, according to Dr. Schweinfurth, maintain the highest degree of independence with regard to their husbands. "The position in the household occupied by the man was illustrated by the reply which would be made if they were solicited to sell anything as a curiosity, 'Oh, ask my wife; it is hers.'" Hahn writes of the Khoikhoi (Hottentots)—"In every Khoikhoi's house the woman, or *taras*, is the supreme ruler; the husband has nothing at all to say." While in public the men take the prominent part, at home they have not even as much power as to take a mouthful of sour milk out of the tub without the wife's permission. Should a man try to exert supreme domestic control his nearest female relations will levy a fine from him, consisting of cows and sheep, which is to be added to the stock of the wife.

All these statements certainly do not imply that the husband has no recognised power over his wife, but they prove that his power is by no means unlimited. And to these facts—to which reference has just been made—numerous others concerning matrimonial matters might be added. Thus, among many savage peoples, the husband has the right to divorce his wife only under certain conditions, whilst the wife is allowed to separate for some special cause, or simply at will. In certain parts of Eastern Central Africa divorce may be effected if the husband neglects to sew his wife's clothes. Among the Shans of Burma the woman has the right to turn adrift a husband who takes to drinking or otherwise misconducts himself, and to retain all the goods and money of the partnership. Among the Savaras, an

aboriginal hill people in the south of India, "a woman may leave her husband *whenever she pleases*." Surely all this is very different from the absolute dominion which hasty generalisers have attributed to savage husbands in general.

It will perhaps be argued that savages live in polygamy and that polygamy is degrading to the wife. But to this may be answered that many savages are strictly monogamous, and among the great bulk of them polygamy is an exception. Almost everywhere it is confined to the minority of the people, the vast majority being monogamous. Moreover, where there are many more women than men in a community—and this is not unfrequently the case among uncivilised peoples, owing to war and other causes—it is questionable whether, under savage conditions of life, polygamy does not become a necessity. It is also worth noticing that among polygamous peoples the women themselves sometimes approve the custom. Livingstone tells us that some Makalolo women, on hearing that a man in England could marry but one wife exclaimed that "they would not like to live in such a country; they could not imagine how English ladies could relish our custom, for, in their way of thinking, every man of respectability should have a number of wives as a proof of his wealth." In Equatorial Africa also, according to Mr. Winwood Reade, the women are the stoutest supporters of polygamy:—"If a man marries, and his wife thinks that he can afford another spouse, she pesters him to marry again, and calls him 'a stingy fellow' if he declines to do so."

Again, it will be objected that most savages purchase their wives, and that this means that the woman is treated as a piece of property. But we must certainly not conclude, as some eminent sociologists have done, that where women are exchangeable for oxen or other beasts, they are "of course" regarded as equally without personal rights. The bride-price is a compensation for the loss sustained in the giving up of the girl and a remuneration for the expenses incurred in her maintenance till the time of her marriage. It does not *eo ipso* confer on the husband absolute rights over her. There are peoples among whom the husband's authority is almost nil, although he has had to pay for his wife. Moreover, where the marriage by purchase prevails as a true

custom, it is considered disgraceful for a woman to be given away for nothing. In Morocco it would certainly mean that the girl is considered good for nothing. When I told my Moorish friends that in Christian countries a man pays no money at all for his wife, but on the contrary often gets money with her, my friends apparently got the idea that our estimation of the female sex is very low indeed, and that our men are very greedy.

To sum up, among the uncivilised races the position of women varies. Among some it is undoubtedly very bad; among others it is extremely good, and, generally speaking, it is much better than it is commonly supposed to be. We now come to a very important problem, but one extremely difficult to solve—Why are women treated so differently in different societies?

It has been suggested that the social *status* of women is connected with the system of tracing descent. As is well known, among many of the lower races kinship is reckoned exclusively through the mother. This means that a person is considered a member of his mother's clan, not of his father's, and that property and rank succeed in the female line—for instance, that a man's nearest heir is not his own, but his sister's son. In a few exceptional cases, the system of maternal descent even implies that a man's children are largely in the power of their maternal uncle. But this system does *not* imply that the mother is the head of the family; and however it may have originated, no sociologist nowadays believes in Bachofen's theory, that the system of tracing descent through the mother is a consequence of the supremacy of women. But Dr. Steinmetz, the well-known Dutch sociologist, has tried to show that the husband's authority over his wife is, broadly speaking, greater among those peoples who reckon kinship through the father than among those who reckon kinship through the mother only. The cases examined by Dr. Steinmetz, however, are too few to allow of any general conclusions, and the statements concerning the husband's rights are commonly so indefinite and so incomplete that I think the evidence would be difficult to produce even if the investigation were based on a larger number of facts. When I compare with each other peoples of the same race, at the same stage of culture, living in the same neighbourhood, under similar conditions of life, but differing from

one another in their method of reckoning kinship, I do not find that the prevalence of the one or the other line of descent materially affects the husband's authority. Nothing of the kind is noticeable in Australia, nor, so far as I know, in India, where the paternal system among many of the aboriginal tribes is combined with great or even extraordinary rights on the part of the wife. And among the West African negroes the position of women is, in all appearance, no less honourable in tribes like the Eboes, among whom inheritance runs through males, than in tribes who admit inheritance through females only.

According to another theory, the position of women and the degree of their dependence among a certain people are largely influenced by economic conditions. With reference to the North American aborigines, for instance, the observation has been made that, where the women can aid in procuring subsistence for the tribe, they are treated with more equality, and their importance is proportioned to the share which they take in that labour ; whereas in places where subsistence is chiefly procured by the exertions of the men, the women are considered and treated as burdens. Thus, the position of women is exceptionally good in tribes who live upon fish and roots, which the women procure with equal expertness to the men, whereas it is among tribes who live by the chase, or by other means in which women can be of little service, that we find the sex most oppressed. Dr. Grosse, again, emphasises the low *status* of women not only among hunters, but among pastoral tribes. "The women," he says, "not being permitted to take part in the rearing of cattle, and not being able to take part in war, possess nothing which could command respect with the rude shepherd and robber." Among agricultural peoples, on the other hand, Dr. Grosse adds, the position of the female sex is generally higher. The cultivation of the ground mostly devolves on the woman, and among peoples who chiefly subsist by agriculture, it is not an occupation which is looked down upon, as it is among nomadic tribes. This gives the woman a certain standing owing to her importance as a food-provider. Now, in these generalisations there is no doubt a great deal of truth ; but they do not hold good universally or without modifications. Among several peoples who subsist chiefly by the chase or the rearing of

cattle, the position of women is exceedingly good. To mention only one instance out of many, Professor Vámbéry observes that, among the nomadic Kara-Kirghiz, the female sex is treated with greater respect than among those Turks who lead a stationary life and practise agriculture. Indeed, the general theory that women are more oppressed in proportion as they are less useful is open to doubt. Commonly, they are said to be oppressed by their savage husbands just by being compelled to work too hard; and that work does not necessarily give authority is obvious from the institution of slavery. But at the same time the notion, prevalent in early civilisation, that the one sex must not in any way interfere with the pursuits of the other sex, may certainly, especially when applied to an occupation of such importance as agriculture, increase the influence of those who are engaged in it. Considering, further, that the cultivated soil is not infrequently regarded as the property of the women who till it, it is probable that in certain cases at least, the agricultural habits of a people have had a favourable effect upon the general condition of the female sex.

It is often said that a people's civilisation may be measured by the position held by its women. But at least so far as the earlier stages of culture are concerned, this opinion is not supported by facts. Among several of the lower races, including peoples like the Veddahs of Ceylon, the Andaman Islanders, and others of a very backward type, the females are treated with far greater consideration than among many of the higher savages or barbarians. Travellers have often noticed that of two neighbouring tribes the less cultured one sets an example in this respect to the other. "Among the Bushmans," says Dr. Fritsch, "the women are life-companions, among the Kafirs they are beasts of burden." Lewis and Clarke even affirm that the *status* of women in a savage tribe has no necessary relation to its moral qualities in general:—"The Indians whose treatment of the females is mildest, and who pay most deference to their opinions, are by no means the most distinguished for their virtues. . . . On the other hand, the tribes among whom the women are very much debased possess the loftiest sense of honour, the greatest liberality, and all the good qualities of which their situation demands the exercise."

That the condition of women, or their relative independence, is no safe gauge of the general culture of a nation, also appears from a comparison between many of the lower races and peoples of a higher civilisation, like the Chinese, Hindus, Hebrews, and civilised Muhammedan nations. Among these peoples the married women are, or have been, much more subjected to their husbands than they are among many, if not most, of the uncivilised races. The great religions of the world have had a tendency to treat women as inferior beings. They attach much importance to ceremonial cleanliness; nothing unclean must approach the deity. And women are regarded as unclean.

It is pleasant to note that, even where the position of the female sex, from a legal, religious and social point is disgracefully low, the women, in spite of their physical weakness, are not quite unable to influence the men, and even to make their husbands tremble. They have in their hands a weapon which is invisible to the superficial observer, but which is powerful enough to give them secret authority which may be very considerable. They have their curses, and they have their profound knowledge of magic. Being commonly invested with a certain mystery, they are supposed to have the command of mysterious magic powers. It is said in the Laws of Manu, the mythical legislator of the Hindus, that a man ought to be kind to the women of his house, because otherwise they may burn the whole house with their fury—that is, with their curses. And during my stay among the country people of Morocco, Arabs and Berbers alike, I was often struck by the fear with which the women imbued the men. A woman is looked upon by them as quite a dangerous being. First, a man may be sure that if he maltreats his wife, she will have the support of the other women of the village, whereas he himself will not be equally supported by the other men. But the chief danger is of a supernatural kind. For instance, the wife only needs to cut a little piece of a donkey's ear and put it into the husband's food. What happens? By eating that little piece, the husband will, in his relations to his wife, become just like a donkey; he will always listen to what she says, and the wife will become the ruler of the house. It is better, therefore, to treat her with kindness than to provoke her anger.

In Muhammedan countries married women also derive much influence from the children's affection for their mother. We must not look upon the Oriental woman only as a wife, we must also take into account her position as a mother. The Berbers of the Atlas have a saying—attributed to their great sage, Sidi Hammu—which indicates the feelings of the men both towards women in general and towards their mothers. Sidi Hammu said, "Oh you women, you seed of the Oleander tree, I should like to burn all of you, if my mother were not one of you."

As I said in the beginning of my lecture, I could offer you only a fragment. I have emphasised a few points which, I think, have often been more or less overlooked. But I have also been anxious to point out how little we know at present about the real causes on which the position of women in the various human societies depends. I dare say that some twenty years hence we shall know much more. Those who are interested in sociology should well understand that sociology is still only in the making. But if kindly taken care of, it will no doubt grow rapidly. Hence all sociologists must hail with extreme gratification the foundation of the society which is now having its first meeting. As a foreigner, I think I may be allowed on this occasion to pay to its founders the tribute of Continental esteem and express the conviction, widely shared, that the new tree could not possibly have been planted in better soil.

LIFE IN AN ENGLISH VILLAGE

LIFE IN AN AGRICULTURAL VILLAGE IN ENGLAND.*

BY P. H. MANN.

I.

During the past few years the whole question of the economic condition of the population of the cities and towns in England has come before the public in a measure far greater than at any earlier time. This result has been largely due to the admirable investigations made by Mr. Charles Booth in London, and by Mr. Seebohm Rowntree in York. To complete the chain of evidence as to the economic position of the people it seems of great interest and importance to follow the methods used by these investigators in obtaining evidence as to the life in

* [The inclusion of this paper—offered by the author through the intermediacy of Mr. Seebohm Rowntree—in a volume professedly sociological, calls for a word of explanation.

The distinction between what properly belongs to Sociology and what is internal and technical to the several social sciences, whether economic or other, is not always easy to make. But in this case, one may admit that Mr. Mann's investigation was made from a point of view mainly economic, and yet claim for it a place alongside those "*Monographies Sociales*" of the Le Play investigations which mark an important phase of transition in studies alike sociological and economic. The change from the more abstract and general writings of the older economists to the more concrete, geographical, and particular investigations of Le Play, Booth, Rowntree, etc., is itself indicative of a growing re-orientation of Economics in a sociological direction, *i.e.*, its re-organisation as a specialised department of a generic sociological science. Mr. Mann's paper is noteworthy as continuing and developing this sociological re-orientation of Economics, and it gains further importance from being—we believe—the first effort to apply the Le Play-Booth method in a comprehensive way to English village life.—EDITORS.]

our agricultural villages in different parts of the country. The following is an attempt to obtain, in so far as my spare time and that of my coadjutors allowed, and to set out information, obtained during the autumn of 1903, as to the condition of the population of a Bedfordshire village, which lies in the centre of one of the largest purely agricultural districts in England.

II.

Ridgmount, the village in question, lies from one to two miles from the station of the same name on the Bletchley and Cambridge branch of the London and North-Western Railway. It lies, moreover, twelve miles from the county town of Bedford, and sixteen from the industrial centre of Luton. The village is bounded on one side by the Woburn Park of the Duke of Bedford, who is the greatest landowner, houseowner, and employer of labour in the district. Until a few years ago, however, a very considerable amount of freehold land existed in the village, but by slow stages this is being bought up, and apparently, if the present process of absorption goes on, in a very short time the whole parish will be in the hands of the Duke of Bedford.

The parish is an old one. A pre-Reformation church exists, but has been replaced during the last century by a new building, and the old one is only now used for burials. There is also a Baptist chapel, founded, so it is said, by John Bunyan himself, and also a Wesleyan chapel. There are three farms in the parish, and several more just adjoining the border and even partly contained in it, as well as a portion of the Duke of Bedford's park. I have not, however, dealt in my inquiries with the whole of the population of the parish, as about one hundred people live in farms and cottages far removed from the village itself, and it seemed neither possible nor advisable to complicate the data obtained by the introduction of these outlying members of the community. The figures and arguments which follow are therefore strictly limited to the population resident in the village itself, and are thus concerned with a population of 467 residing in 127 houses.

III.

The village was chosen for investigation partly because of its purely agricultural character, and partly because it was the one most typical of the character of the surrounding districts with which I was acquainted. The lower land in the parish is a heavy clay, but as one ascends to the higher sections it becomes much lighter in character. The farms, on the whole, are about equally divided between arable and grass land, and from an agricultural point of view there is little to distinguish the place. From two of the farms, I understand, a little milk is sent to London. The markets attended by the farmers are Bedford (Saturday), Leighton Buzzard (Tuesday) and, occasionally, Ampthill (Thursday).

Almost all the village people are, therefore, employed directly or indirectly in agricultural pursuits. The sole exceptions of any importance consist in the residence of two railway signalmen in the village, and of one man and three lads who work in a printing works at Aspley Guise, two-and-a-half miles distant. At one time the village was a large centre for pillow lace-making, and for straw-plaiting. Of these I shall have more to say a little later on, but, for the present, it may be pointed out that the latter has entirely and the former nearly died out.

IV.

Before any conclusion could be drawn as to the economic condition of the people, it was necessary to find the minimum standard, on the basis of local prices, of life, consistent with the physical efficiency of the population; and I have, thanks to Mr. Rowntree, been able to fix this with much greater ease than could have been done prior to his investigations. It will be wise to divide the consideration of this question, as he does, into three parts: (1) the necessary cost of food, (2) the necessary cost of rent, (3) the necessary cost of clothing and household sundries.

FOOD.—To take first the question of food. The local prices for materials in the autumn of 1903 are set out in the following list, and, alongside, are placed the prices found by Mr. Rowntree to be current in York in the autumn of 1899:—

		RIDGMOUNT, 1903.	YORK, 1899.
Flour	1s. 8d. per stone.	1s. 4d. per stone.
New Milk	1½d. „ pint.	1½d. „ pint.
Skim or Separated Milk	½d. „ pint.	¾d. „ pint.
Oatmeal	2d. „ lb.	2d. „ lb.
Bacon	8d. „ lb.	6d. „ lb.
Cheese	7d. „ lb.	7d. „ lb.
Sugar	1½d. „ lb.	1¾d. „ lb.
Potatoes	½d. „ lb.	½d. „ lb.
Margarine (Lard)	6d. „ lb.	8d. „ lb.
Butter	1s. to 1s. 4d. „ lb.	1s. „ lb.
Biscuits	4d. „ lb.	4d. „ lb.
Cocoa	1s. „ lb.	1s. „ lb.
Tea	1s. 4d. „ lb.	1s. 5d. „ lb.
Coffee	1s. „ lb.	1s. „ lb.
Treacle	3d. „ lb.	1¾d. „ lb.
Onions	½d. to 1d. „ lb.	½d. „ lb.
Currants	3½d. „ lb.	3½d. „ lb.
Suet	6d. „ lb.	8d. „ lb.

In this list I have set out Flour and not Bread, in order to bring it into comparison with the prices at York; all bread in the village is, however, bought from the baker; none is made at home. Owing to the presence of the County Council Farm School in the village (founded by the Duke of Bedford), separated milk is obtainable easily and cheaply. The remainder of the articles of food are bought usually from Luton firms, who send vans round several times each week to these villages. No meat is specified in this list, my object being to get a minimum ration, so far as cost was concerned, and yet one which would be sufficient for physical efficiency. Meat, however, costs quite as much as in a city like York.

The figures given approach so near to those given by Mr. Rowntree that I decided at once to adopt his standard of

necessary minimum cost for food, for the maintenance of physical health, which is as follows :—

		s.	d.	
Man	3	0	per week
Woman	3	0	"
Young person over 16	...	3	0	"
Child 8—16	2	3	"
Child 3—8	2	1	"
Child 0—3	2	1	"

} average 2s. 3d. per week.

In this it is supposed that all necessaries are bought, but allowance is made later on, in considering revenue, for materials produced on allotments or obtained otherwise, as far as possible, in each individual case.

RENT.—The lowest rent is about 1s. per week, but this is for very wretched cottages. As a general rule, there are two standards for rent. The first is that of the Duke of Bedford's cottages, in which a good four or even five-roomed cottage is obtainable for 1s. 6d. per week including rates, and in fact, there is hardly any higher rent. In these cases the Duke has recently compelled the tenants to pay the rates, and reduced 1s. 6d. rent to 1s. 4d. as compensation. In the present paper I have, however, taken the old rent, which included rates, as the actual rent. The error, if any, will make the rent slightly too low.

The other class of houses are those *not* belonging to the Duke of Bedford, which are alone open to those whom he will not have as tenants for any reason whatever. They are generally higher in rent for similar accommodation, not much of any value of more than three rooms being obtainable for 1s. 6d. On the whole I have thought it fair to take the following as the minimum adequate rents, merely noting that accommodation is increasingly limited, as houses are being pulled down, thrown together, or closed when the land passes into the Duke of Bedford's hands, and no new ones have been built for a good many years.

For one person it is possible 1s. per week might be a sufficient rent.

For a family up to man, wife and 6 children, 1s. 6d. per week would be a minimum.

For a family exceeding this number 2s. per week would, at least, be necessary.

HOUSEHOLD SUNDRIES.—On inquiries I found that Mr. Rowntree's standard of 6d. per week for a man or woman, and 5d. per week for a boy or girl under 16 years of age, for clothes, was regarded by the people as an absolute minimum, and I have therefore retained these figures.

As far as fuel is concerned, it is considered that if the amount of wood, brush, thorn, etc., which could be picked up,* be taken into consideration, 1s. per week throughout the year would probably be enough to allow as the necessary expenditure for coal per household, independent of the number of its members.

Beyond this, 2d. per head per week has been allowed for other sundries, such as soap, light, furniture, crockery, and similar articles.

Taking the above expenditure together we have, as the minimum necessary expenditure per week, as follows :

Family.	Food.	Rent.	Household Sundries.	TOTAL.
1 Man, or 1 Woman	3/-	1/-	1/8	5/8
1 Man, and 1 Woman	6/-	1/6	2/4	9/10
1 Man, 1 Woman, 1 Child ...	8/3	1/6	2/11	12/8
1 Man, 1 Woman, 2 Children ...	10/6	1/6	3/6	15/6
1 Man, 1 Woman, 3 Children ...	12/9	1/6	4/1	18/4
1 Man, 1 Woman, 4 Children ...	15/-	1/6	4/8	21/2
1 Man, 1 Woman, 5 Children ...	17/3	1/6	5/3	24/-
1 Man, 1 Woman, 6 Children ...	19/6	1/6	5/10	26/10
1 Man, 1 Woman, 7 Children ...	21/9	2/-	6/5	30/2
1 Man, 1 Woman, 8 Children ...	24/-	2/-	7/-	33/-

If a child be replaced by an adult in this table, 10d. must be added to the allowance (9d. for food, 1d. for clothes) per week.

*There is no right to a certain amount of faggots yearly in Ridgmount, such as exists in several adjoining villages.

If we now compare these figures with those in York, it is here found that a man, wife and three children will need 18s. 4d. per week at least to keep them in physical efficiency; while in York 21s. 8d. was found by Rowntree to be required, the difference being accounted for by lower rent and lower cost of fuel.

V.

“*Primary*” Poverty is here taken to be that poverty caused by an insufficiency of earnings, even when most economically applied, to provide for physical efficiency. “*Secondary*” Poverty is here taken to be that due to an uneconomical application of earnings.

Before giving the figures of the proportion of poverty of either kind in the village, I will indicate the additional possible sources of income, over and above the actual wages earned, obtained by the people of the village. In all cases cited below, I have indicated every family or household by a number which will serve to identify them in my lists.

The principal of these additional sources are as follows :—

(1) MONEY SENT HOME BY CHILDREN.—This occurs in a few cases only, in which the amount estimated to be received has been allowed for. The following are some of these.

No. 12 is a family in which one daughter is away at service, but has quite enough to do to keep herself. I know the family well, and the amount of income to her parents from this source is negligible.

No. 46 is an old widow. In conversation during December 1903 she told me that her parish allowance just paid for rent, fire and light, but that her children were good to her, though she found it hard to get along.

No. 52 is a tailor and wife, with two daughters away in service. I know the family well, and it is practically certain that nothing is received from this source.

No. 64 is a widow and daughter, who are raised

substantially out of poverty by children living away in town. The amount varies, and cannot be exactly got at.

(2) ALLOTMENTS.—In view of the fact that a great deal has been made of the profits to be obtained by holding an allotment, it is interesting to have obtained the views of some of those who hold them in the village. This particular village is, however, not quite a typical case, for most of the allotments lie too close to the Duke of Bedford's park, where game is strictly preserved; and the result is that havoc is usually wrought among the crops sown. Corn of any sort is, in fact, rarely grown here, and the crops are limited to potatoes and a few other vegetables. Potatoes are considered the most profitable crop, and hence I have taken these in measuring the actual value of an allotment.

Taking these special conditions into account, the following estimates of allotment value may be considered as perhaps typical—the first of a piece of better land, the second of a piece of very poor land, near the park and its game. In each case the acreage is twenty poles or one-eighth of an acre.

No. 1 (fairly good land).

Average crop.—27 bushels potatoes at 2/- per bushel
£2, 14s.

Expenses.

Rent (1/8 to 3/4)	say	3s.	4d.
Manure	say	10s.	od.
Seed	say	3s.	od.
Digging land and potatoes	say	10s.	od.
					<hr/>
					£1 6s. 4d.

This leaves a profit on the allotment of £1, 7s. 8d. per annum, or say 6d. weekly throughout the year.

No. 2. (bad land).

Average crop.—14 bushels potatoes at 2/- per bushel £1, 8s.

Expenses.

Rent	3s.	2d.
Manure (2 loads every 2nd year)	5s.	od.
Seed	3s.	od.
Digging land and potatoes	5s.	od.
					<hr/>	
					16s.	2d.

This leaves a profit on the allotment of 11s. 10d. per annum, or say less than 3d. weekly throughout the year.

It may be stated that these estimates were given to me by actual allotment-holders of many years standing.

The following notes may be made with regard to several of these items of expenditure.

Rent.—This varies very much with the class of land and may run, for twenty poles, from 1s. 8d. to 3s. 4d. per annum. It will be noticed that this rate (even the higher one) is lower than the average for agricultural land in the neighbourhood, but as a matter of fact much of the allotment land could not be let agriculturally. Some choice pieces go up to 6s. 8d. for twenty poles.

Manure.—It is commonly stated that if a cottager keeps a pig, this will manure his allotment. In this village, however, pigs are not encouraged by the principal landlord; and, in any case, as the cottagers have to buy the straw for litter, they gain little in this way. See below, however. Most of the allotment-holders buy the manure, and for a full crop two loads at five shillings per load will be required for a twenty-pole allotment. Less than this will mean a smaller crop of potatoes.

Seed.—Most of the seed is got by exchange, or the old seed is used over again. But a little seed always must be bought, and my informants put this as needing about 3s. per annum for one-eighth of an acre.

Labour.—Again and again I was informed that one man cannot work an allotment, and do full time at his regular work. If he does do it, he has to take two or three days off twice a year at least. The allowance of 5s. given by my second informant is regarded as a minimum to be paid for hired labour, or lost by stopping away from regular work.

Taking all estimates received into account, I have allowed 6d. per week as profit on a 20-pole allotment, and less or more proportionately for smaller or larger ones respectively. To show that the game trouble is a real one, I may mention

that one field near this village was set apart by the Duke of Bedford for allotments just outside the park. The number taking up allotments became, however, less and less, and it has now been attached to the adjoining farm, and taken out of allotment culture. On inquiring the reason, I found that the cottagers with one voice declared that owing to game the crops were so damaged that they did not pay the cost of working.

(3) **HARVEST MONEY.**—To labourers on farms in these districts the harvest money (both for the hay and corn harvest) has been in years past a great stand-by. This has been paid in two ways—(1) by a special payment for the corn-harvest month of double the ordinary wages, and allowance for overtime at hay-harvest, or (2) by piece-work during the harvests.

The rate for harvest-money on several farms round Ridgmount at present is as follows:—

Corn Harvest.—£5, 10s. for the month, inclusive of ordinary wages, beer, overtime, &c., &c.

Hay Harvest.—3d. per hour overtime, giving from 12 to 20 hours overtime each year.

I have calculated that these extra payments to the men getting them are worth, as a maximum, 1s. 6d. per week throughout the year.

Where piece-work is paid instead of harvest-money, the amount extra earned by this means has a tendency to get smaller. The men themselves working at farms where this is in vogue tell me that they must not earn as much as they could, or the rate would be immediately lowered, and that really their piece-work gives them little or no extra pay.

There is only one farm in the parish affected by this piece-work system, and I have allowed special harvest-money at the same rate as at the other farms, as I could get no reliable estimates from the labourers.

The men who work in the Duke of Bedford's park are quite different. Only those in certain departments get extras at all, but in these departments they receive 1/- per day extra

in hay-harvest, and this includes beer-money and overtime. I have calculated this to be worth 9d. per week throughout the year.

Some of the men also, during the shooting season, are employed as beaters, and get 1s. extra per day for this; and one or two, specially employed game-watching on Sundays, occasionally make, by this means, an extra full day's pay.

(4) PAROCHIAL CHARITIES.—The income of the parish for charitable purposes is, now, £72, 12s. per annum. Of this one-third is devoted to church purposes, one-third to school purposes, and one-third to directly charitable uses. Of these the principal are—(1) an annual dole of 3s. 6d. per head to applicants belonging to the village at Christmas; (2) £10 paid occasionally for the apprenticeship of a boy. This is under the control of two trustees, and is only available once in several years.

(5) HOME INDUSTRIES.—Ridgmount used to have a considerable industry done in the cottages in *lace-making* and *straw-plaiting*. The latter has entirely disappeared, and the former is now only carried on by a few middle-aged or old women. One woman, (*No. 42*) maintains herself by this means, but, working ten to twelve hours per day, can only get about 3s. per week from the dealers. I was talking to some of the old women in the village early in December 1903, and was told that there was not perhaps one woman in the village who could earn, by working all the time, a shilling per day. 6d. was the usual maximum, and this would mean very hard and constant work. A poor worker will only make 2d. to 3d. per day, and the work is very trying. All the lace now made is Maltese; old point-lace can only now be made by two people, and as it requires very close work it is never done. Lace-making as a supplementary source of income has, however, been taken note of in my tables.

Carving and *Carpentering* have been taught in the village for several years, at considerable sacrifice by the public-

spirited teacher. There are several who make a little by this means, but only one perhaps anything material, and in this case it has been allowed for.

(6) PIGS AND FOWLS.—There are seven households of the working classes who keep a pig in the village. As a rule it is not allowed in the Duke of Bedford's cottages, unless special structural provision exists for the purpose. The value of a pig to a household is so intimately bound up with the growth of barley on the allotment at the same time, and the provision by this means of barley-meal and litter, that in a village like the present, where the allotment-holders rarely grow barley (as, if they did, it would be destroyed by game), the profit of pig-keeping is quite different from that in one where circumstances, in this respect, are dissimilar. One case came to my notice in January 1904, where a man, on killing and selling his first pig, only received from the butcher sixpence more for the pig than he had paid for the pig originally and the barley-meal and straw required.

As a rule, the men in the village estimate the profit per pig at about ten shillings, and as two can be fattened per annum, this would amount to about one pound for the year, or say five pence per week. The value of the manure is little, if any, more than the cost of the straw-litter; that is to say, if the manure had to be bought, it would cost practically the same as the straw-litter of which it is made.

Comparatively few fowls are kept by the working-classes, as here again the Duke of Bedford, I understand, does not encourage the practice. Those who do keep fowls declare the income from this source to be negligible, when they are kept as a cottager keeps them.

(7) ODD JOBS.—Quite a number of people supplement their income by outside work, and the boys before leaving school do odd jobs in several cases. The following is a complete list.

No. 17 is Parish Clerk and gets £4 per annum.

No. 23 helps with cleaning the church, and earns about 1s. 6d. per week. The amount, however, varies.

No. 33 cleans the reading-room. This is often closed, and then payment is only made for special meetings. It cannot amount, regularly, to more than 1s. per week.

No. 87 acts as caretaker of the Baptist Chapel, which brings in £7, 10s. per annum, or with additions for special occasions to about £9 per annum.

As to boys and girls, the following are the only ones, not in regular employment, who earn anything. There is practically no absolute casual earning for boys and girls in the village.

No. 37.—One girl (12) is employed to help at the school and gets 6d. per week.

No. 41.—One girl (12) is employed paper-carrying, and gets 1s. per week.

No. 90.—One boy (13) is employed as messenger, and gets 2s. per week.

(8) FRUIT FARM.—During the height of the season, a few women and girls have been employed picking fruit on the Woburn Experimental Fruit Farm. This, however, is getting less and less, and I was repeatedly informed that in 1903, it was negligible as a source of income in the village.

(9) PENSIONS.—Quite a number of old people are pensioners, principally of the Duke of Bedford. These have all been noted, and allowed for. The fact of the existence of such pensioners increases very considerably the number of old people in the village.

(10) POOR RELIEF.—According to a list supplied in January 1904 by the clerk to the Board of Guardians (Ampthill), there are 25 households in receipt of parish-relief in the village (and one in the outlying part of the parish, which is, hence, not included here). Three of these are on account of children, the remainder being principally old or feeble people. The amount varies from 2s. 6d. to 5s. per individual.

The households obtaining poor-relief contain 75 persons, with a total receipt of £5, 6s* or an average of 4s. 3d. per family. Of these families 12 were *principally* dependent on the parish-relief, with a population of 21 and a weekly receipt of £2, 17s. This gives an average per family of 4s. 7½d., or 2s. 8½d. per individual member of these households.

I have now set out all the sources of income available in the village to ordinary working-class people, and making every allowance for all the additional sources here set out, the following table sets out the final result with regard to the primary poverty in the place :—

Total population	467
Total working-class population	390
Total number of families	127
Total number of working-class families	104

	Number.	Percentage on Total.	Percentage on Working Class.
Families in Primary Poverty ...	40	31·5 %	38·5 %
Population in Primary Poverty...	160	34·3 %	41·0 %

It may also be remarked that the average number of members to each household was as follows :—

Number of members per household in total population	...	3·68
Number of members per household in working-class population	...	3·76
Number of members per household in primary poverty	...	4·00

The conclusion to which we come from a consideration of the figures, after every allowance has been made for subsidiary sources of income, is that no less than 34·3 per cent. of the population of a typical agricultural village in Bedfordshire

* This included one family with two members, obtaining 3/-, who do not occur in the table supplied to me. The person here obtaining parish-relief had, however, died in December 1903, and I have retained the household here as my inquiries were made in October and November, 1903.

do not contain the necessary amount of money to enable them to remain in physical health. This percentage rises to no less than 41·0, when the working class alone is considered.

If we consider those just above the primary poverty line, by taking the number of those whose income does not exceed that required for physical efficiency by—(a) two shillings per family per week, (b) six shillings per week (the latter being the average amount given by Rowntree and Sherwell as spent in England per family per week in drink), we have still more striking figures below :—

	No. of persons.	Percentage of the Wage Earners.	Percentage of total Population.
Persons below primary poverty line	160	41·0	34·3
Persons belonging to families with less than 2s. per week above the primary poverty line	213	54·6	45·6
Persons belonging to families with less than 6s. per week above the primary poverty line	284	72·8	60·8

VI.

We will divide the causes of primary poverty into the following sections, which appear to include all cases.

- (1) Death or desertion of wage-earner.
- (2) Illness or old-age of wage-earner.
- (3) Wage-earner out of work.
- (4) Irregularity of work.
- (5) Largeness of family, *i.e.*, more than four children.
- (6) Lowness of wages.

Though in dividing the cases it is often difficult to say

to which a family properly belongs, yet the following table shows the *immediate* causes without much room for doubt :—

No.	No. of Families.	Immediate cause of Poverty.	No. of children affected.	No. of adults affected.	Total number affected.	Percentage on Population in Primary Poverty.
1	5	Death or Desertion of wage-earner.	11	8	19	11'9
2	14	Illness or Old-age of wage-earner.	3	23	26	16'2
3	...	Wage-earner out of work.
4	6	Irregularity of work.	13	14	27	16'9
5	4	Largeness of family.	25	8	33	20'6
6	11	Lowness of wages.	31	24	55	34'4
	40		83	77	160	100'0

Let us now carefully consider in detail each section of those in primary poverty.

SECTION I.

Poverty caused by death or desertion of the wage-earner.

The following are notes of some of the cases which come under this heading.

No. 3.—In this house the family has been deserted by the husband, probably owing to the immorality of the wife. In any case it is now a squalid abode of drink and immorality. The female head of the house makes a variable amount from unknown sources, but the only certain earnings are made by a boy of 13, who has recently gone labouring (4/-).

No. 10.—Another bad case. All the children in this house are illegitimate. The female head of the house earns

about 1/- per week by washing, but the principal earnings are by a grandson of 21. I understand that the children are the grandchildren of the head of the house, being the illegitimate children of a daughter who is away. The husband is dead.

No. 12.—The husband in this case died during the last three years, but was little loss to the family. The female head of the household gets her living chiefly by carrying goods in a perambulator to Woburn. She also does a little charring (about 10/- per week, altogether). One of the boys has recently gone to work.

The following are statistics with regard to this section.

Total number	19
Number of families	5
Average size of family	3·8
Average earnings	8s. 10½d.
Average rent	1s. 9d.

Of the total earnings, 24s. 3d. or 4s. 10d. per house is contributed by the head of the house, while 20s. 2d. or 4s. 0½d. per house is earned by other members of the family.

SECTION II.

Poverty caused by illness or old-age of the wage-earner.

Details of some of the families in this section are here given.

No. 2 is an old spinster, chronically ill, and somewhat demented, who subsists entirely on parish-relief.†

No. 6 is an old couple, the man being deaf and quite incapable. The woman works at lace-making, and tells me she cannot do much more than about 2d. per day. Parish-relief counts for practically all the income.

No. 7, an interesting old couple, who have lived together for 20 years, but who were recently compelled to get married by the guardians, as otherwise the parish-allowance would be

stopped. The man is quite senile and useless ; the woman does odd jobs round the neighbourhood.

No. 18 is distinctly a case of premature old age and break-up of constitution through drink. The wife takes in washing.

No. 27.—An old man and two daughters, both of whom are semi-invalids. They are lace-makers, and thus supplement the parish-relief.

No. 43 is an old labourer who has had a very little money. Owing to not being able to pay his way, he has drawn on this and is still drawing, but it is nearing exhaustion. Very respectable and no debt.

No. 46.—A widow who has recently lost husband and daughter. One of the best lace-makers in the village. She can do old point-lace, but says it is too hard on her eyes now. She is helped by her children, for she told me the parish-allowance only covered rent, fire and light.

The statistics of this section are as follows :—

Total number of persons	...	26
Number of families	...	14
Average size of family	...	1'9
Average earnings	...	6s.
Average rent	...	1s. 6d.

Of the total earnings, 63s., 4½d or 4s. 6d. per house is supplied by the head of the household, while 20s. 6d. or 1s. 6d. per house is earned by other members of the family.

Taking sections 1 and 2, and opening a debtor and creditor account for them together, we have—

INCOME.			EXPENDITURE.		
	£	s. d.		£	s. d.
Weekly income of { (1)	3	8 10	Weekly rent (1)	0	8 9
19 families { (2)	4	3 10½	(2)	1	0 11
Deficiency per week	2	0 11½	Weekly minimum cost of food, &c.	8	4 0
	<hr/>			<hr/>	
	9	13 8		9	13 8

This shows a deficiency per head on 31 adults and 14 children of 11d. per head, or of 2s. 1¾d. per family.

Of those householders earning money other than parish-relief we have as follows:—

Washerwomen	1
Charwomen	3
Pensioners	2
Labourers	2

SECTION III.

Poverty caused by wage-earner being out of work.

In this class should be included all where the head of the family is out of work, due to inability to obtain employment. In a country village, the occurrence of an excess of employment for the labour at hand, or an excess of labour for the work to do, is largely a matter of season. If these figures had been obtained a month or two months later, it might, and would probably, have been the case that quite a considerable number would have been out of work. As it is, there were none. All decent men, who wanted work on the land, could find it; but it must not be supposed that this is a condition of affairs which exists all the year round, even in the village we are considering.

SECTION IV.

Poverty owing to irregular work.

This section includes those whose poverty is caused by irregularity of work, whether due to illness, to vice, or any other similar cause. The following are details as to some of these families:—

No. 1 is an old and incapable cobbler, who lacks regular work chiefly because he is a very bad workman. I have no information as to why the elder daughter is not earning anything.

No. 9 is a case of irregular employment through drink and vice. Otherwise the house would, for the present, be out of poverty.

No. 16 is an ordinary case of uncertain work, no information as to the cause of the irregularity being attainable.

No. 20.—Another case of irregular employment through drink, though this is only partly the cause of the poverty.

No. 24 is one of the worst cases in the village. The man is said to be a regular poacher, but, at any rate, with drink, vice, and laziness, this was the worst case with which I have come in contact.

No. 4.—The man is often ill, but is also a confirmed drunkard, the drinking probably causing, in large measure, the illness.

The statistics of this section are as follows:—

Total number of persons	...	27
Number of families	...	6
Average size of family	...	4·5
Average earnings	...	11s. 9d.
Average rent	...	1s. 8½d.

Of the total earnings, 55s. 5d., or 9s. 3d. per house, is supplied by the head of the household, while 15s., or 2s. 6d. per house, is earned by other members of the family.

Taking section 4 and opening a debtor and creditor account for it, we have—

INCOME.			EXPENDITURE.		
	£	s. d.		£	s. d.
Weekly income of 6 } families	3	10 5	Weekly Rent	0	10 3
Deficiency per week	1	14 1	Weekly minimum cost of food, &c.	4	14 3
	5	4 6		5	4 6

This shows a deficiency for each of 27 persons of 1s. 3¼d., or, for each of 6 families, of 5s. 8d. per family per week.

In this group, four of the six householders are agricultural labourers, one is a cobbler, and one a hawker.

SECTIONS V AND VI.

Poverty caused by largeness of family or lowness of wages.

These are the groups in which poverty is caused by low wages, for the group (V) in which it is attributed to largeness of family is merely a variant of the same cause. This lowness of wages, or largeness of family, in some of the cases cannot be regarded as the sole, but only as one of several causes.

The following are notes on some of the families. In section V.

No. 37 is a blacksmith, who drinks badly.

No. 51.—The amount of income is a maximum. Drink is a cause of a certain amount of uncertain employment.

In section VI the following notes could be made.

No. 16.—The head of this house is one of the only cases where a man has benefited materially by learning carving, from a financial point of view. He makes about 1s. a week, and possibly a little more by his work in this way.

No. 42 is a very bad case. A spinster makes her living entirely by lace-making, and works 10 to 12 hours per day for an income of about 3s. 6d. per week. The guardians refuse poor-relief, as she is a middle-aged woman; but heavy work is impossible to her; and as her sight is failing, it is not likely she will be able to keep up the present close work long.

Statistics relating to these two classes are here given.

	Section V.	Section VI.
Total number of persons ...	33	55
Number of families ...	4	11
Average size of families ...	8·2	5·0
Average earnings ...	21s. 4d.	15s. 6½d
Average rent ...	1s. 10d.	1s. 8¼d.

Of the total weekly earnings of Section V, 69s. 9d. or 17s. 5d. per house is supplied by the head of the house, while 15s. 3d. or 3s. 10½d. per house is earned by other members of the

family: similar figures for Section VI show a weekly income of 152s. or 13s. 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ d. per house supplied by the head of the house, and 1s. 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ d. per house by other members.

Taking Sections V and VI together, and opening a debtor and creditor account for them, we have:—

INCOME.				EXPENDITURE.			
		£	s. d.			£	s. d.
Weekly income	(5)	4	5 3	Weekly Rent		1	5 10
of 15 families	(6)	8	11 0	Weekly minimum neces-			
Deficiency per week		2	11 7	sary cost of food, &c.		14	2 0
		£15	7 10			£15	7 10

This shows a deficiency for each of 88 persons of 7d. per week, or for each of 15 families 3s. 4 $\frac{3}{4}$ d. per family.

In these groups the householders have occupations as follows:—

Labourers...	12
Blacksmith	1
Lace-maker	1

Now taking all the five sections of the primary poverty prevalent in the village, the deficiency works out according to the table given:—

	Sections I & II.	Section IV.	Sections V & VI.	TOTAL.
Per family	2s. 1 $\frac{3}{4}$ d.	5s. 8d.	3s. 4 $\frac{3}{4}$ d.	3s. 8d.
Per individual	11d.	1s. 3 $\frac{1}{4}$ d.	7d.	11d.

One of the most interesting and striking results which can be obtained from a consideration of my figures is that relating to the proportion of the population in primary poverty at various ages. These figures are set out below:—

Ages.	Sections I & II.	Section IV.	Sections V & VI.	Total.
Under 16 ...	14	13	56	83
16—25 ...	1	4	7	12
25—55 ...	7	6	23	36
Over 55 ...	23	4	2	29

This table gives the percentage of those under 16 to the total in primary poverty of 51·9: between 16 and 25, of 7·5:

between 25 and 55 of 22·5, and finally of those over 55 of 18·1. The significance of these figures will become clearer when similar statistics are shown for the population not in poverty.

VII.

SECONDARY POVERTY.—In a village lying in the heart of the agricultural districts of England, and of which the bulk of the place belongs to landlords who are particular as to the character of their cottage-tenants, the amount of secondary poverty is necessarily limited. But it does occur, though in much less proportion than in town life. In deciding whether a particular household is to be classed as poverty-stricken, the personal feeling of the enumerator also affects the results considerably. But the following statistics represent very closely the amount of that poverty which is not due to lack of means, but to waste of means.

Persons in Secondary Poverty	33
Families in Secondary Poverty	10
Percentage of working-class population	9·0%
Percentage of total population	7·1%
Number of individuals per family	3·3

CAUSES OF SECONDARY POVERTY.—The general cause of secondary poverty is the unwise and vicious expenditure of money or the deliberate avoidance of work when it can be obtained. It is manifestly impossible to apportion satisfactorily the immediate circumstances that cause such poverty. They not only overlay, but also vary at different times. With every reservation, however, for such causes of uncertainty, we may roughly divide the poverty of the ten families thus enumerated as being due in five cases to drink and its associated vices; in three cases to bad management of the home, sometimes through the overwork of the head of the household in getting a living; and in one case to uncertainty of work. The last is one of those cases where the man is a good workman, but will not work regularly.

The crying cause of secondary poverty is the drink

habit. Further, it has a great deal to do as a contributory cause of much primary poverty. In the village there are three public-houses, so that, considering that the through traffic is not now of much importance, the allowance is very excessive, and while this does not altogether account for the amount of drinking, and hence of poverty, the large number of opportunities has probably a very considerable influence on it.

The occupations of those householders marked as being in secondary poverty is as follows:—

Labourer	6
Carpenter	1
Cobbler	1
Charwoman	1
Pensioner	1

VIII.

The following figures show the total amount of poverty both primary and secondary.

			Primary.	Secondary.	Total.
Families in poverty	40	10	50
Population in poverty	160	33	193
Percentage of working-class population			41·0	9·0	50·0
Percentage of total population	34·3	7·1	41·4

Families <i>not</i> in poverty	77
Population <i>not</i> in poverty	274

IX.

There remains now only to consider the portion of the population which is above both the primary and secondary poverty line, and the inhabitants thus included, as has just been stated, number 274, comprised in 77 households. They may be divided into those who belong to the wage-earners and those who belong to the trading and upper classes. Let us take these two separately.

Wage-earners not in poverty.

Total number of persons	...	197
Number of families	...	54
Average size of family	...	3'71
Average family earnings	...	23s. 7½d.
Average rent	...	1s. 6½d.
Per cent. of population	...	42'1

The amount of these earnings contributed by the head of each household and by others is as follows:—

	Total.	Per family.
Contributed by householder...	£41 8s. 4½d.	£0 15s. 4¼d.
„ by others	£22 7s. od.	£0 8s. 3¼d.

If classified with respect to occupations, we have these 54 heads of households showing as follows, as regards the principal source of income:—

Agricultural foremen	4
Engineers and machine-minders	2
Bakers	1
Painters	2
Tailors	1
Signalmen	2
Labourers	26
Pensioners	6
Charity, Parish-relief and supported by lodgers	8
Policemen	1
Lodge-keepers	1

The economic position of this group is shown in the following table:—

INCOME.	EXPENDITURE.
£ s. d.	£ s. d.
Weekly income of 54 households	Weekly Rent
63 15 4½	... 4 2 10
	Weekly minimum cost of living
	... 36 2 6
	Excess income over what is absolutely necessary
	23 10 0½
63 15 4½	63 15 4½

The excess over what is absolutely necessary works out at 8s. 8¼d. per family and 2s. 4½d. per head.

It must be remembered that this satisfactory result has only been obtained by the inclusion of every penny earned by every member of the household.* Thus for instance in No. 68 there are four young men all earning a full labourer's wage and living at home with their parents. Of course, it is certain that the whole of their earnings are not available for the household expenses of the family in which they live, and therefore these figures show a much more favourable economic state of affairs than is really the case. That the position of the families in this group is largely due to the number of young wage-earners living at home with their parents is shown by the following age-table, the figures in which though not absolutely reliable in every case are very nearly so, and the figures are certainly accurate to the unit place. It shows the number at various ages in the families of wage-earners *not* in poverty and the proportion they bear to the whole number in such families.

Age.		Number.		Percentage of Group.
Under 16	...	53	...	26·9
16—25	...	28	...	14·2
25—55	...	70	...	35·5
Over 55	...	46	...	23·4

If we compare this table with those already given for the population living in primary and secondary poverty, the point on which I am trying to insist becomes very much more striking, as follows :—

Age.		Primary Poverty. Percentage.	Secondary Poverty. Percentage.	Wage-earners not in Poverty. Percentage.
Under 16	...	51·9	30·3	26·0
16—25	...	7·5	15·2	14·2
25—55	...	22·5	39·4	35·5
Over 55	...	18·1	15·2	23·4

One of the causes of poverty, as shown here (provided resources are not wasted as with those in secondary poverty), seems therefore to be the removal of the young wage-earners from the home, or from the children not having arrived at the wage-earning stage. That the latter consideration does enter into the calculation seems to be shown by the fact that in the

* Except mere lodgers.

group we are at present discussing (the families *not* in poverty), the head of the household alone would only just manage, *on the average*, to earn sufficient to maintain the family above the primary poverty line. If, however, one more child appeared in each family, the heads of the households would no longer be in a position to do this.

I say, "on the average," however, for a vast proportion of households are quite dependent on the supplementary earners, or in other words, usually, on the children of the house, to be enabled to live out of a poverty-stricken condition. Out of the 54 families in the present group only forty would be above the poverty line, and fourteen below it if only the head of the household were earning money; in other words, 25·9 per cent. of the families above the poverty line would be in poverty but for the supplementary earners.

X.

I have only now to speak of the trading and upper classes in the village, and a very few words will suffice with regard to them, as they are presumably all well above the poverty stage. The following data will be of interest :—

Trading and Upper Classes.

Number of persons	77
Number of households	23
Percentage of total population...	16·5 per cent.
Average size of family	3·35

The heads of these households pursue the following occupations :—

Engineers	2
Clerks, etc.	2
Shopkeepers	3
Publicans	3
Ministers of religion	2
Wheelwright	1
Baker	1
Butcher	1
Farmer	1
Carrier	1
School-teacher	1
Blacksmith	1
Gentlemen, or undefined	3

There are three farms in the parish, and part of the Duke of Bedford's Woburn park. If the farmers and their dependents in the outlying parts of the parish were included, the proportion of the classes would only be very slightly different from that here presented, but the object of this investigation being to obtain the data for the village, I have not thought it necessary or even advisable (nor, indeed, have I had the opportunity), to complicate it by including outside cottages and houses.

XI.

The final question remains. What is the present economic status of agricultural labourers in districts where this has not been very materially modified by the near approach of manufacturing or mining centres? For determining this point there are a considerable number of data in existence; the best and latest of which are those given by Mr. Wilson Fox in a report to Government (in connection with the recent Agricultural Commission) on the condition of agricultural labourers. For the county of Bedford, he there gives as the normal wages (without extras) for June and December in various years as follows:—

		June.	December.
1851	...	9s.	9s.
1861	...	11s.	11s.
1871	...	11s.	11s.
1881	...	13s.	13s.
1891	...	13s.	13s.
1899	...	13s.	13s.

While with extra payments, he quotes the average of agricultural labourers in the county as being 16s. 2d. at the times of his investigation (1899-1900). Unluckily he does not give analytical details showing how the last figure was obtained in Bedfordshire—the nearest specific cases cited being at Newport, Bucks—where various classes of labourers earned as follows:—

(1) Shepherd.—15s. per week (£36); Harvest £6;

Lamb Money £1, 7s. 8d.; Cottage £6, 10s.; or a total of £49, 17s. 8d., equal to 19s. 2d. per week.

(2) Cattleman.—13s. per week (£31, 4s.); Harvest £5, 4s.; Cottage £6, 10s.; or total of £42, 18s., equal to 16s. 6d. per week through the year.

(3) Horseman.—16s. per week (£41, 12s.), and casual allowances equal to 9s.; or a total of £42, 1s., equal to 16s. 2d. per week.

(4) Ordinary labourer.—12s. per week (£28, 16s.); Harvest £4, 19s.; Cottage £6, 10s.; or a total of £40, 2s., equal to 15s. 5d. per week throughout the year.

(In each case beer was given at hay and threshing, in addition.)

How do these figures compare with those obtained at Ridgmount? I have gathered together the wages and extras of the fully-adult labourers, working on full wages (that is to say, I have excluded those who were earning little owing to age and who were earning little owing to youth), and I have calculated at full time those whose wages were irregular. With all this the wages in Ridgmount are distinctly less than the average given by Mr. Wilson Fox for Bedfordshire when extras are included, though distinctly more when the bare wages themselves are taken. In fact, as I have indicated in an earlier portion of this paper, certain extras, common elsewhere, are here not given; the most important of these being that cottages are nearly always paid for by the labourers, and rarely, if ever, supplied free by the employers. The average amount of *extra* pay earned by the labourers in this village (exclusive of beer which may be supplied at hay-harvest, corn-harvest, and threshing, which I have neglected) is 8½d. per head per week throughout the year, or a total for the year of £1, 6s. 10d. This may appear to be very small, but the smallness is accounted for very largely by the fact that the Duke of Bedford, in many departments of the employment he gives, has less extra payment than the farmers around—but considerably better wages—a state of affairs which appears on the whole to be preferable from the labourers' point of view, and to be preferred by them.

If foremen be excluded, the average wages paid in the village amounts to 13s. 7½d. per head per week for pure agricultural labourers, sixty-five in number, who are working at full rates. The Duke of Bedford's standard is about 15s. per week; the standard of the other farmers 12s. to 14s.; though, as has been said, the latter usually carry more extras than the former. This gives an average weekly wage, including extras, of 14s. 4d. per head.

On the other hand, a foreman makes, as a rule, from 20s. to 30s., and if these be included as agricultural labourers, the average amount without extras touches 14s. 3d. per week, and including extras reaches 14s. 11d. per week, a sum very considerably below that obtained by Mr. Wilson Fox. After a very careful examination of Mr. Fox's figures, I cannot help thinking that in working out his averages, he has not allowed enough for the enormously greater number of the lower grade of labourers over higher grades; and I think if this were taken into account, his figures would not be very different from mine. But taking the actual figures obtained, it appears clear that a man earning the average rate of wages, and the head of a household, must descend below the primary poverty line so soon as he has two children, unless he is able to supplement his income by an allotment, by fattening and breeding pigs, or by other means. It is also clear that he will remain below the poverty line until the eldest child leaves school and begins to earn money, and that, even if he has no more than two children, his only chance to save will be in his later life when the children are grown-up, and are earning money or have left home. This is the most favourable case: if there are more children the period of poverty is longer and the chance of saving less. In any case during life it is a weary and continual round of poverty. During childhood, poverty conditions are almost inevitable. As a boy grows up, there are a few years intermission till, as a young man, he has two children; then poverty again till these children grow up, and, finally, at best, a penurious old age, barely lifted above the poverty line.

I do not wish to draw conclusions in the present paper, but one thing I must say. The cry of "back to the land" has a

curious commentary in the results I have obtained. As at present existing, the standard of life on the land is lower than in the cities; the chances of success are less and of poverty are greater; life is less interesting; and the likelihood of the workhouse as the place of residence in old age the greater. It is evident that the outcry against the depopulation of the country and the concentration of population in the towns must remain little more than a parrot-cry until something is done to raise the standard of life, and hence the standard of wages in our purely agricultural districts—to increase the chances of success in life, to make life more interesting, and to bring about a more attractive old age than at present, when under existing conditions the workhouse is apt to loom too large on the horizon of the agricultural labourer.

SOCIOLOGY:
ITS SCOPE AND DEFINITION

ON THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND TO PHILOSOPHY.

ABSTRACT OF TWO PAPERS

(I.) by PROFESSOR DURKHEIM AND (II.) by MR. BRANFORD.

Laid before a meeting of the Sociological Society at the School of Economics
and Political Science (University of London), Professor Bosanquet in
the Chair, June 20th, 1904.

I.*

The prime postulate of a science of society is the inclusion of human phenomena within the unity of Nature. Thus only can social phenomena be subjected to those precise observations which may be resumed in general formulæ called natural laws. To Comte is due the establishment of this idea of extending natural law to human societies. But the sociology of Comte was in actual construction philosophical rather than scientific; *i.e.*, it was characterised by general views, and a certain indifference for factual detail and the researches of specialists. The same is true of the sociology of Spencer. But by demonstrating the applicability of the evolution hypothesis to human societies as well as to the physical and the biological worlds, Spencer still more closely linked human to natural phenomena. In other respects Spencer

*In the absence of Professor Durkheim, this was read by the chairman, Professor Bosanquet.

also helped to complete and rectify the general conceptions of the Comtist sociology. Thus, for example, in positing the differentiation of social types, ignored by Comte, Spencer opened the way for those taxonomic studies necessary for a scientific classification of human societies.

Most subsequent sociologists have continued the Comte-Spencer tradition of seeking to discover the general laws of social evolution by speculative rather than observational methods. And yet it is evident that the multitude of facts which are called social can only be studied in a scientific manner by disciplines equally multiple and special. It cannot suffice to survey the complex social world with general views prematurely unified, and hence confused and vague. It is necessary to separate the different categories of phenomena and study each apart. It is necessary that sociology become a body of particular sciences.

These particular sciences are not objects to be created afresh. During the past half-century or thereabouts, the different disciplines that treat social phenomena from a special point of view have become transformed and oriented themselves in a sociological direction. The notion of natural law has commenced to penetrate them. The comparative method, the sole means of discovering these laws, is practised by them.

Thus, the several social sciences have, more or less independently and automatically, been reorganising themselves on a sociological basis, but without explicit reference to philosophical synthesis; while, at the same time, recent sociologists have tended to work in comparative isolation from the specialists. Thus, at the present time is manifested a certain tendency to create a general science of sociology outside, and in some degree opposed to, the several specialisms concerned with the scientific study of different departments and aspects of human society. Thus there is developing in social studies a position which is the very negation of that which Comte posited as the necessary foundation of a science of sociology.

How are we to arrest these perilous tendencies towards isolation—isolation of the social sciences one from another, and of general sociology from the mass of the social sciences?

The sociologist must recognise that in no other way can a

unified science of society be developed than by the systematisation of all scientific specialisms, which are essentially sociological in character. As conspicuous examples of such necessary and legitimate sociological specialisms, the following may be mentioned: the Comparative Study of Institutions, as transformed and developed by juristic historians like Maine, philosophical historians like Fustel de Coulanges, and their successors; Economics, as pursued by investigators of the type of Schmoller and Bucher; Anthropology, as developed by Prichard, Waitz, Gerland, Morgan, McLennan, etc.; Comparative Ethics, as studied by A. H. Post, Steinmetz, etc.; Comparative Religion and Folklore, as studied by Tylor, Robertson Smith, Frazer, Nutt, Hartland, etc.; Comparative Psychology, as established by Lazarus, Steinthal, and their successors; Social Statistics, as continued by the successors of Quetelet; Social Geography, as studied by Ratzel.

Thus the specialisation of which sociology has need, in order to become a truly positive science, is already a well-established movement, but one very imperfectly organised. For this development is proceeding in an unconscious manner. Each of the social sciences is constituting itself apart without an adequate knowledge of the links which unite it to its neighbours. In other words, the sociological character of the social sciences remains still very uncertain. To aid in perfecting the organisation of the several specialisms is the task that lies immediately to the hand of the sociologist. Amongst the more conspicuous of existing imperfections may be mentioned (1) the want of a sufficiently wide and effective recognition of the interdependence and unity of all social phenomena, as a necessary working hypothesis; (2) the tendency of the specialists to needlessly multiply entities (like the "judicial conscience" of Post), and satisfy themselves with facile explanations and naïf simplicist formulæ; (3) the tendency to interpret all social phenomena in terms of one specialism (as in the "economic," or the "religious" interpretation of history); (4) the tendency of contiguous specialisms to unconsciously overlap (like Religion and Jurisprudence, Social Geography and Demography, etc.); (5) the tendency of specialisms to move at random without adequate conception of a definitive purpose, and hence

not only to waste effort, but also to leave important areas of the sociological field uncultivated.

What the sociologist specially needs to do, in correction of these imperfections, is to interpenetrate the diverse technical studies more fully with the sociological conception of unity. It is true that these specialisms are themselves spontaneously moving towards this directing idea (*i.e.*, are acquiring the sociological orientation), but with slow and halting steps. To work towards accentuating the movement and making it more conscious, more precise, is the urgent problem of sociology. It is only through the systematisation of the several social sciences that the Comtist conception will cease to be a philosophical aspiration, and become a reality. For the unity of the social kingdom cannot hope to find an adequate expression in a few general and philosophical formulæ detached from the facts and the detail of specialist research. An adequate sociology can only have for its organ a body of sciences distinct, but animated by the sentiment of their solidarity. And it may be predicted that these sciences, once organised, will return with accumulated interest to philosophy what they have borrowed from it.

II.

The urgent problems that confront the sociologist at the present juncture are the methodological and the historical. Most pressing is the systematisation of the several sociological specialisms. For, on the adequacy of the organisation of the extant body of knowledge, depends the effective co-operation of the different groups of specialists; and on it also depends the doctrinal unification from which may be derived general precepts for the guidance of social action.


By sociological specialism is meant the researches of investigators who specialise on some particular aspect of human phenomena—such as the historical, the political, the economic, the ethical, the psychological, the anthropological, etc. These specialisms have, for the most part, grown up as independent autonomous studies, without the self-discipline that comes from

an adequate consciousness of their own historical evolution and of their own methodological apparatus. Hence it is that they have been, and are, without the controlling and unifying influence of a common idea or ideal. Such unificatory principles as have hitherto been most readily available are survivals of a pre-evolutionary culture, and therefore inoperative for the synthesis of evolutionary science.

The deficiency of order and systematisation in the interrelations of the several sociological specialisms is to be taken as the reflex of a corresponding deficiency of order and system in the interrelations of the different departments of practical life, economic, political, educational, ethical, etc. But it does not follow that the organisation of the several sociological specialisms into an adequate working system should not precede the re-organisation of practical life and conduct. On the contrary, it is a primary postulate of consciously methodised science, that theoretical must precede practical reconstruction.

But the interdependence of social theory and practice does necessitate the classification of the social sciences being treated as a parallel and correlative problem with the classification of the social arts. By classification it is here intended to convey no implication as to specific, generic, and ordinal differentiation, but merely the acquisition of such common understanding of the relation of parts to the whole, and of theory to practice, as is needed for a working systematisation available for the effective co-operation of sociological specialists. In short, the contention is, that the main requirement at the present moment, as regards general sociology, is an abstract mapping of the existing field of verified and verifiable sociological knowledge.

What are the resources available for this abstract mapping of the sociological field? A preliminary question is this—How far does the history of biology afford a suggestive instance of a parallel problem? The schematisation of a large number of practically independent and dispersive specialisms by subordination to a few elemental categories of known relationship has been more or less fully achieved in biology. The value of this systematisation in suggesting a parallel schematisation and nomenclature of sociological specialisms is, it must be remembered, a totally



different problem from that of the traditional "biological analogy." In any case, it is only an item in the enumeration of resources.

These resources, apart from such as are contained within the sociological specialisms themselves, are, in the first instance, those available for the general problem of the classification (*i.e.*, the systematisation) of the whole circle of the sciences and the arts. For every science and every art has a threefold social aspect, *viz.*, in respect of (1) historical derivation, (2) practical dependence on co-operative effort, and (3) every science being a logical integrate of, and every art a practical resultant of the aggregate of, social experience. The sciences collectively are just that part of social experience that has evolved a conscious need of systematisation. But by the great majority of scientists this need has been explicitly felt on æsthetic and economic grounds only. The needed ethic has remained implicit, and can only be brought into consciousness, and therefore made scientifically verifiable, by explicit reference to the arts collectively and in detail. In other words, a controlling science of sociology is, as Comte showed, a necessary postulate of science itself.

Traditionally, a problem that has belonged more to philosophy than to science—the classification of the sciences—is thus in one at least of its aspects, essentially sociological. But, in passing over from philosophy to sociology, the problem necessarily takes on a more specifically historical aspect. For, as an evolutionist, the sociologist treats it not as a mere systematisation of contemporary experience, but as a phase of a continuing process, which has to be carried back as far as historical data reach, and also projected forward into the immediate future. The sociological evolutionist is concerned primarily with origins, but ultimately and supremely with ideals. And, through the formulation of its larger generalisations as ideals, sociology may hope to achieve the necessary return from theory to practice. The derived practice assumes, of course, the form of rational art based on applied science, and aims at replacing empirical art based on unanalysed experience.

The universal interdependence of social phenomena thus imposes on the sociologist, working as he does under the conception of evolution, the threefold task: (1) of constructing a

reasoned account of the existing phase of that interaction of the sciences and of the arts which we call contemporary civilisation ; (2) of reconstructing the corresponding phases, which historically have preceded and developed the contemporary phase ; and (3) of working out ideals of more ordered development for the future.

If the word occupation be taken, not in its economic sense, but as signifying any and every form of human endeavour—past, present, and future—then the most generalised statement of the problem of pure sociology is to describe, to explain, and to forecast the evolution of human occupations. To address himself to this task—in part methodological and abstract, in part historical and concrete—is, it is contended, for the sociologist a specialism as definitive and legitimate as any of the other at present more prominent specialisms of science.

NOTE.—The writer of the second paper desires to call particular attention to the two following amongst existing classifications of the social sciences—(a) that in use in the *Année Sociologique* ; and (b) that adapted from Professor Geddes by Dr. Haddon in his Presidential Address to the Anthropological Institute, 1903 (*vide* exposition and criticism of the latter in Flint's *Philosophy as scientia scientiarum : and a history of classifications of the sciences*).

DISCUSSION

Professor BOSANQUET, speaking from the Chair, said, that considering how many distinguished speakers they hoped to hear he would make his remarks very few indeed.

In the first place, they would see that sociology was claimed as a natural science. That was the point which Prof. Sorley had taken up in his communication. One remark he would make as to whether sociology was to be a science within the limits of nature as understood by the votaries of exact science: he thought when they got the ferment of the social idea within the conception of "Nature" that ferment would take care of itself. The ferment of the social idea would perhaps not break the old bottles, but it would sufficiently stretch those bottles and bring us back to something like the Greek conception of nature, which he thought was the true conception. The next thing was a more serious matter, on which he found himself at issue with Prof. Durkheim, and to some extent with Mr. Branford also. He merely mentioned the point in passing because, whether he was right or wrong, it went to the heart of the subject. It was presented to them rather that evening, as if the important problem of the systematisation of the specialisms subordinate to sociology was a question of classification. What struck him when he came across it was this, that, *e.g.*, from the point of view of logic, classification was not a primary form of thought. It was, in his mind, always a secondary form of thought. Classification was to him merely a way of representing conveniently the actual relations, attributes, and affinities of things, ideas, in short, of experiences—distinctive experiences of various kinds. With that he did not propose again to go further that night, but merely to say this—his main point—it appeared to him that the real work to be done in all systematisations of this kind, in all science in fact, was the analysis and estimate of

the contents of special provinces of experience, distinctive types and forms of experience which constituted the object-matter of the different sciences. The problem did not present itself to his mind as classificatory, but as one to be solved in actual concrete working in the various domains of experience. Otherwise it might seem to be a purely formal and methodological problem. He thought many of the men who had written contributions to their discussion had seen something of this difficulty. They must beware of systematising too soon. That was how the problem presented itself to his mind. He drew this conclusion:—As to the nature of the unity to subsist in sociology—whether of a science or of a group of social sciences—every science had a distinct type of experience, and sociology itself would certainly be a distinct science in the sense that it dealt with a distinct and distinctive type of experience. When you came to consider sociology in relation to other sciences it was not a problem for the logician or the classifier, but for the person who carefully, critically, and laboriously pursued these sciences themselves. All these sciences possessed a sociological aspect, and all went beyond sociology. They would tell you themselves where they needed to join hands as sciences dealing with society. Take the science of ethics in particular, it would tell them that, *viz.*, how far it was a social science and how far something more. In the same way let them pursue the distinctive experience which they called social as a subject of itself, and it would tell them of itself when they must go out to seek the sociological part of those various special disciplines which have been mentioned in connection with it. Therefore the question which Prof. Durkheim raised was merely a verbal question. It presented itself to him (the speaker) like that. It was the old logical trouble between the general and the particular. People thought that the general excluded the particular, or that the details excluded the general. But the concrete and special way in which these sciences should be studied, both on their own ground and also in the light of social experience, would give rise to a system of their own, in which part of them would deal with purely logical relations of object-matter and part with such relations as showed themselves among groups of people animated by the same mind (taking this as a rough description of social groups).

So that what he said was that they must certainly have a single sociological science with an analysis of the distinctive experience they called social experience. But that did not mean that they did not have passing out of it a group of sciences which, so far as their sociological

part was concerned, took light from and gave light to the analysis of the social experience. Only they were not to think that if they described the system as a unity of social sciences that that made sociology into an empty generality. The idea that a unity of a number of things must always be a generality was what they had to make war upon. It would be more like the conception of some kind of living creature or phase of life, some concrete living thing of some kind or another, aspects of life which would be illuminated by the several sciences which treat the different sides of life.

They should never get into their minds that false formal antithesis that sociology was either a number of sciences which had no central science as their connection, or a single science which was not part of a number of sciences. It was quite certain that the true unity and universality would always be not a generality but something concrete and individual. Therefore, he said the alternatives in the question: "Is there a science of sociology or a group of sociological sciences?" were not exclusive of one another. He thought the method to be pursued was the definite work of collecting data and their analysis in the various realms of experience, of which the facts of social life and grouping form a distinct realm or province. But in science, unlike actual space, all provinces overlap, and the distinctive social science, though not abstract nor general, will include portions of sciences dealing with various positive kinds of experience so far as these have a social aspect, an aspect manifested in and through groups of persons. Concrete work in the matter of the sciences will tell what these portions are and how connected. Classification will merely register the results. This could be easily illustrated from the science of religion, ethics, æsthetics, psychology, statistics, or other sciences.

Dr. J. H. BRIDGES SAID :

M. Durkheim admits that to Comte is due the establishment of the idea of extending natural law to human societies. But he thinks that Comte's actual constructive work was characterised "by general views and a certain indifference for factual detail and the researches of specialists," and that he set the example of seeking the laws of social evolution "by speculative rather than by observational methods." During the last half-century there has been, Professor Durkheim maintains, with perfect justice, a revolutionary change in many special branches of research. This change consists in the introduction of the historical and the comparative method in application to the evolution of institutions. The problem

before us is to incorporate these renovated specialisms into the science of sociology; to arrest the threatened isolation of general sociology from these important branches of research which are rising everywhere so vigorously, and which threaten to overlap each other, and, so to speak, to crowd each other out.

If in the few remarks that follow I speak principally of Comte, it is not as a matter of literary interest, not because as an avowed disciple of Comte I wish to take every possible opportunity of thrusting his name forward, but in order to call attention to a special section of his work on Positive Philosophy, which appears to me to throw light on the problem proposed for our consideration by Professor Durkheim. I am referring to the 48th chapter of his work, entitled "*Principal characteristics of positive method in the rational study of social phenomena.*" It occupies 128 pages of the fourth volume of Littré's edition.

Professor Durkheim speaks of Comte's constructive work as being "philosophical" (that is, I suppose, metaphysical) rather than scientific; as characterised by "general views and indifference to factual details and the researches of specialists," and again, "as using speculative rather than observational methods."

Now, it seems to me that there is some danger of misconception here—a misconception which it is important to avoid—because it relates not merely to our judgment of Comte (a matter in which some of us here may not be interested), but to our whole method of procedure in this society.

This chapter of Comte to which I am referring deals with methods of observation in sociology. The whole purpose of his work being to raise political and social theory above the level of speculation spun from some individual brain, and lift it to the plane of scientific observation; the first question with him, as it must be with us, is, What to observe and How to observe?

Now, if there is one lesson which the history of scientific discovery forces on the student, it is the impossibility of observing accurately, of observing to any good purpose without a guiding theory, in other words, without a working hypothesis. This is true even in the advanced stages of a well-established science; but the truth applies with far greater force to a science in its early stages. Here there is a sort of vicious circle. Without a theory you cannot observe; and yet without observation you have no right to a theory. Comte dwells on the difficulty that besets the sociologist, a difficulty much greater sixty years ago than now, but still extremely real, of producing laws and observations simultaneously. Nevertheless, this difficulty has to be faced. Without a rational working hypothesis, you may pile up enormous accumulations of alleged facts, but they will be of little use, and indeed often worse than useless, because they will often encumber the process of scientific discovery.

On the other hand, when he has been armed with such a provisional hypothesis as to the interdependence and the succession of social events, the means of exploration open to the sociologist, are, says Comte, more numerous and more various than in any other science. "He is not limited to the immediate inspection or direct description of events: the consideration of apparently in-

significant customs, the examinations of monuments of every sort and kind, the analysis and comparison of languages, and numberless other modes of research of greater or less importance, provide sociology with useful channels of positive research. In a word, a rational observer, adequately trained, will be able, after sufficient practice, to transmute spontaneous impressions received from most of the occurrences of everyday social life into valuable indications of sociological truth. Penetrated with a sense of the universal interdependence of the various aspects of the social state, he will be able to see the connection of these familiar social events with the highest generalisations of the science."

From this literal translation of words used by Comte more than sixty years ago, it will be seen that he looked forward hopefully to the appearance of many of those important specialisms to which Professor Durkheim and Mr. Branford are now calling our attention. Professor Durkheim speaks of the revolution that has been effected during the last half century, amounting, he says, to a creation or re-creation of these specialisms as departments of sociology; and he remarks that one of the chief factors of this change has been the introduction of the historical and the comparative method. Here I find myself in entire agreement with Professor Durkheim. But I would point out that in the important chapter of Comte to which I have already referred, both these methods are fully expounded, and that the first of them—the method of Social Filiation—is for the first time brought into logical prominence, as one of the most potent instruments, perhaps on the whole more potent than any other, in sociological research. It is in the use of this method that Comte is principally distinguished from Spencer who, in ignoring it, made, as I believe a retrograde step in science. In any case no candid reader of the chapter of Comte's work to which I have referred, can come to any other conclusion than that small justice is done to him by the assertion that he sought to "discover the general laws of social evolution by speculative rather than observational methods." Like every true philosopher (I use that word in the sense in which Newton and Faraday used it) he speculated. But his speculations were founded on observation; and they acknowledged observation as their test.

We come then to the question raised by both of the papers before us—the systematisation of sociological specialisms. It is admitted that there is want of correlation of such specialisms, and that many of them overlap. It is admitted that they need to be penetrated with the sociological conception of unity. On the other hand, it is admitted also that they are spontaneously moving towards this directing idea, only too slowly. Under these circumstances, Mr. Branford suggests that the main requirement at the present moment is "an abstract mapping of the existing field of verified and verifiable sociological knowledge." I do not know if I apprehend his meaning rightly; but I own to some apprehension lest premature classification may increase rather than diminish our confusion. I would rather postpone it, or I would at least regard any such attempt at classification as essentially provisional, until there is somewhat more agreement as to what I will call the central principles of sociological science:

principles that may be regarded as holding the same position in sociology as in the century of Galileo and Newton was held by the laws of motion in dynamical science.

One of these laws is insisted on by Professor Durkheim as a necessary working hypothesis ; namely, the interdependence and unity of all social phenomena ; the consensus of the social organism. There remains the work of analysing the succession or filiation of social states—what Comte called social dynamic, as opposed to social static. In the development of these central conceptions, the aid afforded by the special branches of research to which attention has been so rightly called will become more and more obvious and prominent, and thus the unification so much desired by all will be gradually attained—not all at once perhaps, but gradually and surely.

DR. EMIL REICH SAID :

I am afraid I am bringing a very discordant note into this discussion. When, as a student, I took up the study of history, I asked certain questions. My first question, of the utmost importance, was this—How can we account for the existence of Roman Law? Its perfect systematic form, its charming clearness, its definite shape, were so wonderful to me that it seemed amazing that the Romans made such a wonderful thing. I was told they were a military nation, a nation of warriors. How did it come about they could make so scientific a system of law? When you come to think that that law was not public law or constitutional law, but that it was private law, not criminal or international, but the question of commerce and trade, of *meum* and *tuum*, then it becomes still more wonderful. These Romans despised commerce and trade. They despised their slaves. How did they come to make that system of law? The problem is of first-class historical import. Again, why did the Reformation break out in the sixteenth century and not at some other time, and why in Germany and not in France or elsewhere? Fully believing in sociology as I did, I tried to get light from sociological writers. I studied Comte, but I derived no light from him on these and similar problems. Let me give you a concrete instance of the sort of problem I refer to. I lived in France for a long time. I know that the young girl in France is a nonentity. She is not supposed to exist. The young man is not supposed to have acquaintance with her. That seemed to be most annoying, especially as I was a young man myself, and also most important from a higher standpoint. If the young man is not supposed to have acquaintance with the innocent girl he will have acquaintance with the young girl who is not innocent. Now, that is not only a very grave social question, but it has all sorts of psychological and literary reactions. Take, for example, the case of French lyrical poetry. Lyrics are supposed to have to do with the young man and the young girl. We write lyrical poems when we are twenty or

twenty-five, and they come from the inspiration given by the young girl. That being absent, it happens that France produces no true lyrics. French lyrics do not appeal to us strongly. Naturally, they sound as prose, for they are addressed to persons whom we do not consider the right persons to address poetically. I asked sociologists—How can you help me in the solution of these problems? but I found no help. In history we must have very definite help. Buckle's conception of history was vitiated by a fundamental fallacy. He believed in laws. People, at the time Buckle wrote, were so much taken up with the triumphs of science; they believed so thoroughly in physical and biological science that they thought the science of history must be modelled on these lines. It must have laws. Buckle was searching for laws. He thought that was the end of all wisdom. But as a matter of fact I contend there are no historical laws. It would be a historical law if you could say the number of reigning dynasties in England are three; therefore in Ireland there are so many. That would be a law proper. But of such laws I have never been able to find a trace. History is a movement that is constantly going on. There is a creative synthesis in history as in life. Really, history does not repeat itself. There is always some x that cannot be found in the analytical factors of that x .

But doubtless there are books that are helpful in these matters. I have, for instance, found some light in Hansen's book on the movement of people from the country to the town, in which he, on the basis of statistical data, comes to the conclusion that the movement is owing to the scope for greater energy in towns. That is somewhat of a guide.

If sociology is a system, a concentration of laws, I am afraid it can do very little for history. In history there are correlations, but no laws. Darwin mentions startling correlations in ordinary nature, such as that white cats with blue eyes are generally deaf. Huxley added many more, and Haeckel I don't know how many. We cannot account for them. In the same way we have no laws of history, but only correlations of groups of facts. We can account for the Greeks having Olympian games. We can show the psychological connection with a few things. What we need in history is, not so much sociology, but psychology. I mean that we require to see very clearly the psychic forces and motives which are at work, and which account for events happening at the time they do and not at another time.

DR. SHADWORTH H. HODGSON SAID:

I find myself in very considerable agreement with the remarks that have fallen from Dr. Reich in one important respect, namely, on the subject of psychology. I think that the question before us to-day turns chiefly on the point of whether sociology is a science on its own basis, independent, aiming at

some definitely defined purpose and based upon some principle or set of principles connected closely together as its basis; or whether, on the other hand, it is synonymous with what we call drawing lessons from a study of history. History, and sociology drawing lessons from history, may be considered in one respect as the same thing as sociology. The practical lessons were all obtained from the complete and thorough observation of the facts of history, whether as handed down to us from authentic sources, or as observed by ourselves or by contemporaries at the present time. Now, I will venture, after these few introductory remarks, to read some observations which I have already transmitted to the secretary of the Sociological Society.

It seems to me that assuring the unity and systematisation of the various specialisms, spoken of in the first paper as the task most immediately incumbent on sociologists, and the solution of "the problem of pure sociology," the problem spoken of in the second paper as being "to describe, to explain, and to forecast the evolution of human occupation," in the wide sense there given to this word, can only be attained by founding sociology as a whole, and the various special sciences which it includes, upon physiological psychology, which is the youngest or latest to take its place among the positive sciences—not by including physiological psychology as one of the specialisms embraced by sociology, conceived as constituted by a purpose of its own. Sociology as a science is rather a specialism under physiological psychology than the latter a specialism under it. I mean, that only by basing it on physiological psychology can it acquire a scientific character, the character of a positive science.

The reason for this view, briefly stated, is this: All branches of human occupation or endeavour consist of some mode or modes of consciousness, as well as of some mode or modes of physiological energy: they are describable as *what* they are only by terms of consciousness. Now, it is physiological psychology which specially studies the laws of this connection between physiological energy and consciousness. It is a positive science (though as yet in its infancy) standing at and covering the meeting point of the purely physical (including physiological) sciences and those which are commonly taken as purely mental or psychical, as for instance, those of logic, ethic, and æsthetic, with their subdivisions or dependencies. The ultimate scientific explanation of all branches of human endeavour must therefore, in my opinion, be sought in physiological psychology. This, of course, I need hardly remark, postpones to a remote period the foundation of sociology, if it claims the strict rank of science.

But if sociology is, on these grounds, not *per se* a science, neither is it—nor indeed any positive science, or even system of sciences—a philosophy. It is not generalising, organising, unifying, or systematising that makes science philosophical, or gives it a philosophical character. What, then, constitutes the difference? I should answer, a total change in the point of view. In philosophy we make consciousness, awareness, thinking, knowing, experience, as distinguished from the things thought of, known, experienced, or of which we are

conscious or aware, our object of study. They, the former, it is of which all knowledge consists; they are our only *evidence* for anything whatever, for *existence* of any and every kind, including their own. And we are driven forward to this philosophical line of inquiry simply by adopting the experiential method—also, and not altogether unfairly, called the English method; for we have not pushed that method to its limits until we analyse experience itself in its character of experience and that without making any assumptions to begin with—not even that of a conscious being, as its bearer or experiencing subject, the nature and existence of which must be learnt, like everything else, from the content of consciousness or experience itself. This evidential character of consciousness is that which gives philosophy the widest possible scope among all the branches of human inquiry.

MR. J. A. HOBSON SAID:

There are two chief related conditions of the growth of sociology, regarded as a science. One is the increase of knowledge in the special social sciences, political, economic, ethical, etc. The other is what Mr. Branford terms "the systematisation of the several sociological specialisms."

But I am inclined to distinguish these conditions of the growth of sociology from the growth of sociology itself, refusing on the one hand to admit the accuracy of Professor Durkheim's statement—"It is necessary that sociology become a body of particular sciences"—or on the other hand the assumption, implicit (I think) in Mr. Branford's paper, that systematisation of the social sciences *constitutes* the chief part of the science of sociology.

It is unquestionably true that for the progress of sociology we urgently require "to interpenetrate the diverse technical studies more fully with the sociological conception of unity." Both writers therefore rightly emphasise the importance of methodology. But Mr. Branford's language seems almost to identify this study of methodology with the substance of the unified science of sociology. Now it is, of course, true that the successful systematisation of the several sociological specialisations implies reference to what Mr. Branford calls "the controlling and unifying influence of a common ideal or idea" and, as the growth of unitary principles in sociology proceeds, this systematisation will become more accurate.

But though every discovery and statement of the laws of the unified science improves the systematisation of the special sciences, this improved systematisation is not the direct and primary object of this advance in the substance of sociology. In a word, sociology does not *consist* in the methodology of the social sciences: the construction of sociological hypotheses, the discovery of sociological laws, are not merely a part of this systematisation. It seems to me that in these papers the claims of methodology and of the special sciences are so stated as to make

them virtually cover the whole work of sociology, leaving little, if any, space for the recognition of the substance of the unified science of sociology.

Though it may be true that "the main requirement at the present moment as regards general sociology is an abstract mapping of the existing field of sociological knowledge," this mapping, if conducted exclusively from the standpoint of systematisation of the social sciences, does not constitute progress in sociology. Nor does it, I think, relieve students of sociology of the right and obligation to build up the substance of a sociological science out of the existing materials, however imperfect and ill-ordered, furnished by the special sciences.

I am disposed to question Mr. Branford's statement that "the classification of the sciences is—essentially sociological." Sociology, like every science dependent on other sciences for its material, will rightly and necessarily classify these sciences with reference to their relations to it. If "pure sociology" be taken, as Mr. Branford takes it, to be concerned for its subject-matter with "the evolution of human occupations," or, as Dr. Lester Ward puts it, with "human achievement," it is right to classify other sciences provisionally from this standpoint. But sociology cannot depose philosophy from the supreme seat of intellectual authority in the classification of the sciences. To endorse the view of Comte that "a controlling science of sociology is a necessary postulate of science itself" is to subordinate the objective universal standpoint to the subjective practical standpoint, *viz.*, human occupations or achievements, as interpreted or valued according to some ideal of desirable human attainment. The recent development of philosophic doctrine entitled Pragmatism may lend some support to this attribution to sociology of a function formerly attributed to philosophy, but most students of philosophy repudiate Pragmatism as involving a negation of the philosophic standpoint. I cannot admit that it belongs to sociology to take over from philosophy "the classification of the sciences." Sociology requires and must make a classification not of all the sciences, but of the social sciences which are its direct feeders; and in this classification human occupations, as interpreted in terms of motive, effort, or nature of achievement, may form the basis of classification. But this narrower standpoint of classification for the purpose of the science of sociology does not supersede the broader cosmic standpoint of classification adopted by philosophy.

One other point. For its progress sociology requires the instrument of a stable and fitting terminology. At present we are virtually obliged to borrow tools from physics, biology, and psychology not really suited to the work they are required to do. Either we must broaden and alter this borrowed terminology until it is adapted to our purposes, or we must invent a better sort. Meanwhile we run risks of slipping from analogy to unity of law, and of appearing to force unduly the resemblances between the laws of

social phenomena and those of what from the standpoint of sociology are the lower sciences.

MR. J. M. ROBERTSON SAID :

While deeply interested in the study of sociology, I confess to a certain reluctance about approaching it on the methodological line followed in this discussion. After listening to that, I have a good deal of sympathy with a biological friend who insists that no good ever comes of a discussion which sets out with a definition. But that, of course, is an extravagance. There are cases where definition should be the first step, and there are cases where it should not. Our case, I contend, is one of the latter. I think our discussion might be more luminous and more fruitful if we directly handled some of the concrete problems of sociology. Dr. Hodgson has told us that sociology can never become an exact science until it is founded in psychology. I respectfully dispute that thesis, though I fully recognise that in given cases psychology may be a help. Take the question—Why did the Reformation break out at such and such a time and place? In answering such a question as this, no doubt physiological psychology may give us help; but the problem is not properly a psychological one. Sociology is the science of history. It deals with a certain type of experience—the general type of experience collected for us in the histories of societies; and its subject matter is to be handled for its own sake, like that of the other sciences.

Then, as to the question whether sociology is to be a body of special sciences or a unification of them, the answer is, once more, that we get help from them, but sociology will make its own classification of the other sciences. It will use them for sociological purposes. Sociology, indeed, will look to almost every one of the sciences for some help. When it carries its research a certain distance it will come into biology, chemistry, etc. It will use these sciences; but it will clearly be a science of itself. Dr. Hodgson's account of the matter did not even look at the historical factor. To exclude the factor of history from the purview seems to me to confuse the methodological problem at the outset. There is no such difficulty in finding sociological solutions to problems as has been suggested. My friend Dr. Reich was pessimistic. He said he had found that "sociologists could not help him in solving the problems of history, and particularly as to why the Reformation occurred when and where it did." I venture to think they could. I think Comte would help him a little; Buckle would help; and Spencer, too, would help, though he is unduly unhistorical. You can arrive at certain rational statements of causation going to show why the Reformation broke out in Germany at the time that it did. Dr. Reich says that in social sequences there is always, over and above the operating factors, a mysterious or additional outcome, which we may call x . But I would remind him that exactly the same thing happens in all the other sciences. In any process of causation there is always an x . To take a familiar instance— H_2O is the formula of water:

that is to say, hydrogen and oxygen yield that which is neither, to wit, water. You have an x there. You have further the phenomena of reaction. Again, you may variously arrange the same chemical elements so that, being in different arrangements, you get extremely different results. That is the x . There is no more x in sociology than in any other science. When we wish to understand how history happened in the way it did, we ought to go about that business in the spirit of a scientific man. There is a justification for taking the physical sciences as a type or model for social sciences. What they have in common is the critical study of causation in terms of observed processes. The earlier sociologist too often had a peculiar aversion to the physical sciences, which, however, he had special need to emulate as regards method. He had to get rid of rhetoric, of the tendency to explain historic phenomena in terms of themselves, or of alleged racial tendencies and characters, a species of explanation which I venture to describe as empty verbalism. We are told, for instance, that the Romans did certain things because of the Roman character—that is, because they tended to do them. That is a purely verbal explanation, which would never be offered if men followed the model of physical science. Let me remind Dr. Reich, who says we cannot get explanations and laws, that he himself gave us a law in the case of slavery. Discover the effect of slavery on the minds of master and man, and it will be a sociological case for all time. If it is a correlation about which you may be sure, you get what is possible in the way of law in social things. There must be social law in the broad and general sense of the term if there be law at all.

While, again, I do not at all endorse Dr. Ingram's somewhat extreme admiration of Comte, I would say it would be a very good thing if the Sociological Society did discuss Comte, but without stopping there. There was good sociology done in the eighteenth century by a whole group of writers, French, Scotch, and English; and they were all worth tracing. If we were to discuss Comte, however, we should get to practical conclusions a great deal quicker. For my own part, I did study Comte with the greatest interest, though I found his historical explanations too often verbalist. In his narrative we were asked to ascribe causation to abstract forces: chivalry did one thing; the church another; woman did a third; and so forth. I venture to think that the metaphysical method, which he repudiated, lingered into Comte's system. Still, I think we must admit that Comte left the whole question a stage advanced, and that, as Spencer freely testified, his method was better than any previous method; and while we detect errors in such pioneers, the natural course of sociology is to rise on their work as on stepping-stones. We may derive a great deal of profit from criticism as well as study of the pioneer writers; and I trust that course may be taken in our discussions.

MR. L. T. HOBHOUSE SAID:

I would not rise at all at this late hour if it were not that I wished to say a little more on behalf of the two papers, which deserve rather more

cordial recognition than they have received from the greater part of the speakers to whom we have listened. I think it has hardly been realised sufficiently that those papers refer to the position of sociology at the present moment. I do not think that they endeavour to lay down an ideal of what sociology is to be in the future, but to state what it is at the present juncture. It is very easy to say that sociology must be a body of truth which is to illuminate social questions, but does this body of truth at present exist? It is easy to say that there must be certain working hypotheses, but we in this society should be very sorry if we had to identify ourselves as a society with the hypothesis of any particular school. The question, What do you mean by sociology? is not easy to answer without going at once into very disputed matters. I think the papers endeavour to give a simple and clear answer to that question. They endeavour to say what is sociology at the present moment, in what form does it exist, in what sense is it a realised science and not a future science, not merely what hypothesis, but what actual realised scientific matter is in existence sufficient to form a basis for a sociological society? They tell us that there is such a body of truth in a number of specialisms, and they go on to say that these specialisms are suffering from the want of co-ordination. All that seems to me to be matter of considerable value, and I think it is distinctly a fruitful line of thought to lay before the Sociological Society. I believe that any one who wishes to study the subject will proceed on the method of the papers before us. He will endeavour to acquire such competent knowledge of a certain number of specialisms as to enable him to bring them together for the purpose of comparison. He will study them, and in the process he will find much irrelevant detail, which will detach itself, and a great core of relevant matter will remain; and the student will soon find himself led by the subject itself to concentrate himself on that part of it which is necessary to bring the diverse special studies into relation.

As soon as the point of view is stated, other considerations arise. Are you to call this philosophy? This involves the further question: What do you mean by philosophy on the one hand and sociology on the other? I should agree with Mr. Hodgson in saying that philosophy is more comprehensive than sociology, that it endeavours to give us a view of reality as a whole. If I understood the papers before us, they only speak of a synthesis of the social sciences, not of all sciences, and therefore they are within their right in speaking of the social sciences. I do not think they can be charged with any confusion. I do not agree with every word of the papers, but it does seem to me that they have indicated in a way that certainly deserves our thanks, what sociology claims to be at the present time, and therewith have indicated the next steps which investigation ought to take.

WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS

FROM PROFESSOR PAUL BARTH

(Professor of Philosophy, University of Leipzig).

All historical phenomena are, I think, social phenomena, because what is not determining, nor typical for the life of a society, never is nor has been the object of history. The most singular man that exists, the alienated man with an idea peculiar to himself, which is shared by none but him, is not a historical man.

Therefore, sociology, scientifically treated, is identical with history, scientifically treated. For history is not only political history, as the historians generally think. The *science* of history is usually named philosophy of history. Therefore, sociology is the same as philosophy of history, if this is not metaphysically dealt with, but empirically. Sociology is the continuation of this department of theoretical history.

If sociology turns to practice, it is the continuation of politics, a department of practical philosophy.

I agree with M. Durkheim that the sociologist must know the results of the sciences of the particular branches of social life, of the history of jurisprudence, of the history of the economics of nations, of their moral conduct, of the forms of government, etc. And I acknowledge the need of a common idea which Mr. Branford mentions. This common idea for the specialists and for the sociologists must be the endeavour to find empirical laws in every part of the history of social life. These particular empirical laws must be united into common empirical laws, and these, if it may be, be derived from causal laws, or formulated as causal laws. These causal laws can be no other than psychological, either known to the psychology of to-day or to be learnt by it; for the ground of all history is the human will, which tends to overcome all hindrances opposed by nature. For, in the development of law, it is evident that the independence of the single man has been growing; the evolution of art shows that the work of art has gradually become richer in content (fuller of suggestive ideas); the

history of religion is characterised by the fact that the progressive religions do not lay the main stress on good works, but on the religious sentiment. Is it possible to conceive all these special laws under some common laws of the development of human personality? And if these be so, how does the current psychology derive these common laws from constant psychological principles, or must it assume new principles hitherto ignored? Such seem to me to be the questions of sociology to be answered by comparative study of the single areas of social life and by cautious generalisations, of which the most general and the causal laws for the present may be regarded only as hypotheses, serving for directing the investigation.

FROM PROFESSOR MARCEL BERNES

Professor Durkheim tells us that the time has come when sociology, if it is to achieve true progress, must reconstitute itself as a body of sciences : these sciences to be distinct from each other, yet animated equally by a sense of their solidarity. He further holds that this progress will essentially consist in our bringing human phenomena within the unity of nature ; or, putting it otherwise, that sociology will begin to be truly a science when it has realised within its own domain that revolution that has supplied the point of departure for the positive or natural sciences in modern times.

It seems to me that the thesis, thus expressed, is not quite free from obscurity. I shall indicate what I mean by taking up first one and then the other of the two points indicated above.

I. SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.

Professor Durkheim charges it as a fault against certain sociologists that they have been willing to isolate sociology from the social sciences ; that is, I take it, that they have been disposed to set up general sociology by a *a priori* process, as a sort of ontology of the social theme, existing antecedently to the social sciences, and independent of them. But is he himself prepared to say, as certain specialists do say, that there is no room for a general sociology distinguishable from all these ? Here it seems to me that his thought is not quite homogeneous enough. In one part of his argument he seems to say that general sociology cannot come into existence save as a product of the systematisation of the different social sciences ; and that, in so far as these sciences remain imperfectly developed, to that extent also must general sociology be a premature birth. In another part, again, he maintains that these special sciences must be penetrated not only with a vague sentiment, but with a clear and formulated consciousness of their interdependence ; and he regards with equal distrust both the isolation of the specialisms from one another and the isolation of these collectively from general sociology. If the one misdirection leads to the systematisation of abstractions and the building of scientific structures without

material foundations, the other begets a succession of fruitless interests, a merely internal or domestic interpretation of facts, and the encroachment of one science upon the field of another. I should myself go further, and say that both of these evils proceed from a single source—from the tendency, namely, of the systematising spirit to transform into absolute and exhaustive principles what are really no more than provisional notions, based either upon highly general, or else upon detailed but incomplete, comprehension of the subject-matters in question.

If such be Professor Durkheim's view of the matter, I must say that the two formulæ by which he expresses it are hardly in complete accord. For if the first sets up a barrier against anything claiming to be a science of general sociology which is not simply the resultant of the various pre-existing social sciences, the second implies, not indeed that general sociology exists in advance of the social sciences, but that it co-exists with them from the first; and that its function is to keep them supplied with guiding hypotheses, and at the same time to correct and re-state these hypotheses by means of the results achieved in the progress of these sciences themselves. This I take to be the true conception of their relations. But Professor Durkheim would seem to have it that we must choose between a sociology existing in advance of the social sciences, or else regard the social sciences as existing in advance of sociology. He overlooks, or at least he does not explicitly recognise, a third possible position; namely, the view of general sociology and the social specialisms as co-existing historically, and continuously exercising a reciprocal influence.

General sociology, then, has for its essential object to lay before the specialisms, from moment to moment, a conception, sufficiently precise and yet sufficiently large, of the social realm, while never failing to take account of the result of research within their several domains—in this way giving an intelligible meaning to the idea of social unity. It establishes the interdependence of social phenomena by viewing them as but the multiple aspects of a single social reality. It recognises, therefore, equally the distinctiveness, the analogy, and, finally, the mutual relations of all these phenomena. Being at any given time a synthesis of merely relative value, formed from factors which are analytically apprehended, it is essentially philosophic in character—assuming that one must give the name philosophy to whatever syntheses those multiple aspects which the complex reality that we become aware of as unity resolves itself into when it is made the subject of scientific investigation. I believe then, and have maintained for a long time (as in my course of general sociology, delivered in the University of Montpellier, 1894, and my Lectures on the Psychological Bases of Sociology, delivered at the Collège Libre des Sciences Sociales, 1899) that general sociology is to be defined as a *Philosophy of the Social Sciences, and that its function is to determine and make clear the point of view appropriate to each of these sciences.*

II. SOCIOLOGY AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES.

To this view Professor Durkheim would doubtless object that it gives a reason the more for placing sociology after the social sciences, seeing that the

philosophy of these sciences cannot precede, but must follow, the sciences themselves. He would say that in so far as it does precede them, it is a hindrance to their progress. Here the social sciences must play the same rôle as the natural sciences; which are always regarded, by modern workers, as severally existing prior to any and every system of natural science which they may elaborate. To effect this parallelism here would be what Professor Durkheim calls "bringing human phenomena within the unity of nature."

At this point, also, I think the thesis is not free from some degree of confusion, due to an incomplete analysis.

If the phrase "within the unity of nature" is to be taken in a merely general sense, there need be no harm in accepting it, vague though it is. It only amounts to saying that the social sciences, like all others—like the physical sciences, for instance, which were developed much earlier, must have nothing to do with absolute principles or *a priori* conceptions of any sort. It must be based upon given social facts, just as the physical sciences are based upon the actual data of the physical universe. The phrase would mean, further, as regards method, that the social sciences must severally work out their own progress by continually comparing and interrelating the phenomena which come within their respective purviews.

All this is incontestable. But if we push the analogy further, and transfer it, as Professor Durkheim seems to do, from the form (*i.e.* from indicating merely a corresponding relation of parts within two distinct systems) and apply it to the subject-matter themselves of these systems—if we are to assimilate social phenomena to physical phenomena, or are to state their differences merely as differences in degree of complexity, the more and the less—*then* we fall into the sin of *a priorism* once more. We are absolutely without ground or warrant in assuming that there is an essential identity between the facts of the social and those of the physical domains: and I think a little reflection will show that the facts of the one domain are not presented to our thought under the same conditions as the facts of the other.

Without attempting any complete treatment of the question here, I may at least say that one essential difference, and one most readily seen, is this: namely, that social phenomena, like all human phenomena (meaning by that, those which are presented in us and not merely represented to us—*sentis* as well as *representis*) are irreducibly synthetic as parts of our experience. On the other hand, physical (or, in the ordinary usage of the word, natural) phenomena—that is, all those which we are accustomed to regard as void of psychology or sensation, and which we are content to consider merely under the category of spatial representations—these are essentially analytic as objects of our experience. If they present themselves in congeries or composite forms, these congeries are readily reducible to simpler elements, from which again the composite form can be reconstructed, by combining afresh the elementary quantities which analysis has yielded.

And though this fundamental distinction is in theory ignored by Professor

Durkheim, who has long insisted that we must regard social phenomena as THINGS, yet he has to accord it recognition in practice. For he admits that no social phenomena can be investigated or understood without reference to its connection with and dependence on other social phenomena. Now this, if I mistake not, amounts to saying that although there do arise, as we prosecute our social studies, certain difficulties compelling us to project such and such particular aspects of the total social phenomenon and to consider these aspects separately under the name of ECONOMIC FACTS, for instance, or JURIDICAL FACTS—yet we have, in general, no right to perform this isolating or abstracting process, or to attribute a separate existence to the phenomenon or aspect thus thrown into relief, or to forget that within it, separate as we will, other elements (psychological elements, *e.g.*, or ethical elements) have their place and influence.

Very good. But who would dream of applying such a rule in the domain of natural science, or would require the physicist to concern himself with the chemical or the biological phenomena with which the facts that he is investigating are complicated? He takes account of them, it is true, but only in order to eliminate them—not to complete, or rectify by means of them, an incomplete conception of his own subject. They must be taken account of also in passing from the purely theoretic and the purely analytic preoccupations of science to the adventure of practice, that is, in the human and social application of scientific conquests.

In the investigation of social facts, on the other hand, though it is true that we do not look to find at every turn some answer, some result, that is immediately applicable to social practice, utilisable in the art of life, yet we can never rid ourselves of a sense of the interdependence of it all, of a sense of what Professor Durkheim calls the social unity, of what he also calls the common end and point of reference of all the diverse phenomena of the social state. Amongst social phenomena, as amongst others, there are possible distinctions manifold: as in other domains, these distinctions define themselves and increase their numbers as investigation proceeds, as new data are continually brought into view, and new lines of comparison and relation are established between them. But these distinctions can never be themselves the whole matter, the verifying of them can never be the end. Here the advance of thought is to be achieved only along a double route; synthesis and analysis must do their work simultaneously, and all the time keeping pace with one another, reacting upon one another. I would express my conception of this duality of aspect and process by saying that we ought, in our study of the social or human realm, to distinguish more and more sharply between (on the one hand) that immediate action which is the issue of our own feelings, our actual impressions—whether reflected upon or no, whether rationalised or no—and (on the other hand) all action that is more or less fortuitous and external in its origin; and that we should as much as possible give precedence to the former class of phenomena. Such a principle of distinction would be in the true line of scientific advance; but it cannot, unless by an abuse of words, be made to cover a separation of theory from practice and a setting of

theory in front of practice. Theory cannot pretend to show practice the way save in those subjects which are only amenable to analytic investigation ; which is not the case with human phenomena, as such.* To recapitulate them : I find an imperfect agreement as between Professor Durkheim's affirmation of the unity of sociology and his view that general sociology cannot come into existence save as the product of all the social specialisms. Equally I find it difficult to harmonise the said leading affirmation with that reduction of human and social phenomena to natural—that is, to physical—data, which he views as the process and the end of scientific advance. Let me add that those who have followed attentively the evolution of Professor Durkheim's thought have been able to recognise how his leading thesis—which I myself hold to be true and to be well based on observation and social reality—has little by little forced back into a secondary position his more theoretic or systematist postulate. I do not think, however, that this process of reduction has been carried far enough, nor that all the consequences thereof, thus far, are yet fully perceived by my distinguished compatriot himself. I believe that the conception of sociology which he holds to-day might still go on happily enlarging itself and becoming less systematic.

II.

Between my own views and those of Mr. Branford there are, I think, few differences that would not be found to be merely differences of terminology.

Like myself, Mr. Branford maintains that sociology has its own special task ; and for him this task means, primarily, the classification of the social sciences. Here he affirms that principle which Professor Durkheim calls the oneness of sociology ; what I have called the irreducibly synthetic character, in certain regards, of social phenomena. And, from what I have said above, it follows that by the nature of such a task sociology acquires a philosophic stamp and value.

Further, Mr. Branford maintains that there is an effective correspondence between the phases of science and of social life ; and that scientific or theoretic reconstruction must precede that practical reconstruction in which the art of life or of society would achieve itself. But though his position just here seems to approximate to that of Professor Durkheim, he yet uses the word *science* in so large and comprehensive a sense that I do not feel that his meaning is at all remote from my own as I have expressed it above. For instance, he would consider as incomplete, and for the purposes of social study entirely inadequate, any "classification of the sciences" which was merely a schematisation of social knowledge as it now is, *i. e.*, merely a statistical presentment of actual fact. He

* Nay, more: there can be no purely theoretic system anywhere save in the study either of mental concepts—concepts created by the mind—or of Nature, regarded as the external complement of the mind, and therefore as translated into re-presentations ; these being, however, nothing but a highly specialised or particularly defined kind of mental concepts.

would have the classification to be an evolutionary one. And here, again, he gives to his terms their largest and fullest meaning, seen in the double task which he assigns to this evolutionary classification. The first is to reconstruct those earlier phases of social science and art which, by the ordinary laws of causality have developed that systematisation of them which we now find around us. Here we do not yet pass from the so-called natural, that is, the physical and historical point of view. The second task, however, is to help in bringing about a more reasonable development in the coming time. Here we have the ideal, the ethical element making up into what I call Practice, in the full sense of the word, Practice being an integral part of that world of phenomena which sociology investigates and rationalises. Mr. Branford also, by the way, justly accuses scientists of having been too apt to ignore the indefeasible part which it belongs to Ethics to play in the evolution of the sciences themselves.

It will be seen, then, that if I understand him aright, we are for the most part in agreement. My criticisms would be pointed mainly at his mode of expression, which does not always, perhaps, give his meaning either with sufficient fulness or sufficient clearness. But these are minor questions which it would be out of place to discuss in a brief and rapid note like this.

FROM PROFESSOR LÉVY BRUHL

(Professor of Philosophy, University of Paris).

I have read with great interest the abstract of the two papers on sociology. As to the first one, I can say that I fully agree on the main points with M. Durkheim on the scope and definition of sociology, as with his methodological principles. Mr. Branford's views are newer to me, and they deserve a careful and minute examination, for which more time is necessary than I could just now afford. I am particularly interested in the problem, the importance of which Mr. Branford also emphasises, to ascertain what are, and what ought to be, the relations between sociological theory and practice. My views on the question—if I may be allowed to refer to my own work—are stated in my book, "*La Morale et la Science des mœurs*."

I think much is to be expected from the discussion that will take place at the meeting of the Sociological Society on June 20th, and I regret not to be able to take part in it.

FROM THE RIGHT HON. JAMES BRYCE.

Though unable to agree with the ascription of a very high value to what Comte did for sociological inquiries, and still less able to concur in Durkheim's estimate of Spencer's work—for he seems to me to have contributed little beyond formulas—I am quite at one with Mr. Branford's contention, that it is of

great consequence to have an endeavour now made to map out the whole field covered by the various sciences that deal with man's activities as a moral and intellectual being, so as to show the relation of sociology in its widest meaning to the biological sciences on one side and to history on the other, which, indeed (as Mr. Branford observes), may in a sense be deemed a branch of sociology, or sociology studied by one method. Such a mapping out may well be fruitful and suggestive, for it would set in a clear light the interdependence of the several branches of sociology, indicating how each may profit by the development of the others, and if it be abstract in one sense, it is eminently practical in another.

FROM PROFESSOR J. BURY

(Professor of History, Cambridge).

Sociology, I should say, is concerned with two closely related subjects, the evolution of societies and the relations of interdependence among the various social phenomena, which themselves form the subjects of special sciences. It would thus be outside and, in a sense, above them, and deal with the material which they provide. I do not quite know whether it is suggested that the methods at present pursued by these special sciences is faulty and ought to be reformed, or whether it is merely proposed that something should be done to enforce the doctrine that special investigations should never lose sight of the general sociological aspects of their own subject.

FROM PROFESSOR S. J. CHAPMAN

(Professor of Economics, the Victoria University, Manchester).

The papers seem to me satisfactory.

FROM THE VISCOMTE COMBE DE LESTRADE

(Laureate of the Institute of France).

At the Congress of the International Institute, held at the Sorbonne, in 1903, one of the speakers expressed the hope that the relevant sciences would co-exist with sociology, "as," he said, "co-existing with physics are barology, hydro-dynamics, acoustics, etc." It is quite evident that physics is only the totality of these branches of knowledge, and does not exist outside of them, and that there is no such thing as pure physics that is not barology, hydro-dynamics, acoustics, etc. If this comparison was anything else but a means of reaching intelligibility, if it aimed at exactness, it would tend to reduce sociology to nothing, and to render it but a collective name. Sociology tends to develop the different scientific specialisms which are essentially sociological, and to give them a sociological orientation ; in other words, to transmit to other

sciences its essence, its mission. But is it not the case, that the learned public will be led to believe, if the conclusions of M. Durkheim and Mr. Branforda re accepted, that sociology—incapable of performing the superb task that its originators assigned to it—is retiring from the scientific arena, and is dividing amongst the specialist sciences that are older than itself, the domain which it had conquered, and which it has not known how to hold.

Certain sociologists will refuse to give up the stronghold of their science. Outside of the specialisms of more or less sociological character—and even if they did not exist—sociology exists; the specialisms are the tools which serve it, which augment its efficiency, but which neither create it, nor form it. Wherever there is a community, there exists a collective psychology. And that is sociology!

FROM PROFESSOR COSENTINI

(*Editor of "La Scienza Sociale"*).

I have always held sociology, in the strict sense of the word, to be one of those sciences essentially synthetic which become necessary, after a period of specialised sciences has enlarged the domain to be surveyed, in order to harmonise and bind into an organic whole the results which these sciences have attained.

It must not be supposed, however, that this work is a mere piece of collation: it is not too much to describe it as one of transformation, for when we compare and harmonise scientific conceptions we also discover the existence of new relations.

And when we come to synthetic science, I perceive another phase of sociology—it exercises a unifying influence on the particular sciences. Indeed, a study of the present sociological movement discloses two tendencies at work:—

(1) A unitary *AFFERENT* tendency, which leads back the results of the particular social and natural sciences to general sociology, considered as the unitary science of human society. In this respect, sociology has profited largely by the discoveries of the natural, economic, juristic, and philosophical sciences. But, hence comes the differing systems of sociology, the variety and discordance between which are due to the fact that sociologists are recruited from among students of the most widely differing sciences, and starting from different points of departure.

(2) An *EFFERENT* tendency, which leads down from sociology to the particular sciences into which it introduces a new spirit of research; and thus arise the specialised sociological sciences, *e.g.*, socio-geography, anthropo-geography, social psychology, juridical, religious, economic, æsthetic, ethical, demographic and other sociologies.

It must be effected that these two tendencies become reconciled and

mutually corrective, with the result that the unity achieved will be no mere collection of vague notions, and that false criteria and methods will be excluded from the specialised social sciences. It was on this account that when I entered on the publication of my "Review," I pleaded for a critical spirit which should be able to evaluate the different sociological sciences, and to combine them in a synthesis at once harmonious and solid.

FROM DR. BEATTIE CROZIER

(*Author of "History of Intellectual Development, etc."*).

As I am in hearty agreement with so much that is said by Professor Durkheim and Mr. Branford, the points I would venture to submit will be brought out best, perhaps, by marking out those aspects of the problem in which I differ from them; principally, I think, from Professor Durkheim, for with Mr. Branford I am almost entirely in agreement. Broadly speaking, then, sociology may be defined as the Science of General Civilisation, or of civilisation in general, and before it can have a definite status of its own, and the specialisms that fall under it can be worked with advantage, its function in relation to these specialisms must be clearly determined. In my judgment, sociology performs a double function in reference to these specialisms, at once a *controlling* and a *receptive* function—a controlling function, inasmuch as it is to it that we must look for the general laws and principles which are to guide the specialisms in arranging and distributing the material with which they severally deal; a receptive function, inasmuch as it must be continually perfecting these laws in their application to detail by the reports of fresh facts that are being constantly sent up to it by these specialisms. Its function may be compared to that of the brain, which, while controlling and co-ordinating the action of the different organs of the body, is in turn affected by them; or to the central government of a country, which, while guiding and controlling the action of the various provinces and municipalities, is in turn modified in its action by them. In other words, while sociology is *distinct* from the specialisms, it is not *separable* from them, while *in and among* them, as it were, it is not *of* them. For its laws, although mingling in all the work of these specialisms, are not drawn *from* the specialisms, but on the contrary have to be introduced *into* them as a seminal principle before they can become fruitful and effective. And it is here that I differ from Professor Durkheim, who appears to think that the laws of sociology are to be got only by generalisations *from* the specialisms, for whose reports in consequence they have to wait, as we have to wait for the milk before we can skim off the cream. I contend, on the contrary, that just as the laws of psychology, although bound up with physiological processes, and in their action affected by them, require a separate method for their discovery, *viz.*, that of introspection; so sociology, although not to be separated from the specialisms dealing with human evolution, draws its laws from other quarters, *viz.*, from

psychological penetration, from insight into the world of to-day, and the relation of its institutions to the human mind. For example, the effect of slavery on the mind and character of both master and slave is to be determined by direct penetration and insight into the condition of slavery as it exists around us. Once discovered, it can be reduced to a definite law which will hold good for any time or place in the world's history, and so belongs to sociology as a science; but whether, and to what extent, at any given time or place slavery would work beneficially or the reverse in comparison with alternative organisations of society is a question of the *collateral conditions*, and must wait for its solution until the reports of the specialisms dealing with the details of the country or period in question are sent in. While, therefore, I agree with Professor Durkheim that sociology must keep in touch with all the facts disinterred by the historical specialisms—ethics, psychology, politics, political economy, anthropology, folklore, social statistics, etc.; while I also agree that these specialisms have now found the right road on their own account—*viz.*, the method of history, comparative study, and evolution, as distinct from the old theological or metaphysical methods, I disagree with him in his belief that sociology has to wait for the specialisms to come up, and then to extract its laws from them by skimming them off as generalisations. On the contrary, I hold that the laws of sociology have to be determined in the first instance quite apart from the historical specialisms, *viz.*, by general insight and penetration into social life around us—by philosophical speculation, in a word, and then projected into the specialisms; the entire process being first the discovery of the laws in a crude general way, then these laws to be carried with us as a lamp wherewith to ransack and illuminate the garret of the specialisms; the new facts discovered forming an ever increasing aureole of lesser laws surrounding the major ones and giving a more delicate scientific shading to their original bareness and crudity, and so on.

And this leads us to ask, What are the elements which these laws of sociology when discovered are supposed to connect and weave into a unity? The answer is, certain great general factors which are common to every age and condition of the world, and which like the x , y , and z 's of algebra, resume them and sum them up—such as religion, government, philosophy, science, physical conditions, material and social conditions, and the like. And the first problem of sociology is to determine what these are, both in number and character—neither lumping together those that have a separate sphere of operation nor separating those that can be handled as one. (I may say in passing that I have myself been in the habit of using all of those just mentioned.) When these factors are determined, we then have to find the laws of their connexion and how they act and interact on each other; and this, as I have said, cannot be got arithmetically, as it were, by generalisations from the concrete facts supplied by the specialisms, but only by direct penetration and psychological insight—as in a calculus, where certain abstract factors have to be determined as functions of others, varying directly or indirectly with them, and

united with them by certain laws. If then we ask how sociology stands at the present time in reference to all this, we may say that there are some half-a-dozen competing systems in the field which differ from each other either in the number of factors with which they operate, the way in which these factors are connected, or in both; but as to which, if any, of these is the true system has scarcely yet been debated, much less settled. Buckle, for example, operates with two factors, *viz.*, physical science and physical geography, or practically with one only, physical science; making the progress not only of knowledge but of civilisation in general depend entirely on this, and wiping out at a stroke religion, government, philosophy and literature, as mere obstructions; lumping them all together in a kind of outer darkness, as in a picture by Rembrandt, with no determined relations at all beyond the merely negative one of doing more harm than good. Carlyle, too, selects a single factor as all-important, *viz.*, the moral force of individuals, of heroes and great men, degrading all the other factors of philosophy, of science, and the organised machinery of religion and government, as well as the material and social conditions of men and nations, into better or worse appendages merely; and leaving their positive functions a mere blank, without attempt at scientific determination or co-ordination. Hegel, again, in his "Philosophy of History" also settles on one factor as all-important, in his case that of philosophical concepts or categories; figuring all the other factors as being dragged along in the train of these by a chain of logical necessity, as if they were a kind of baggage; as if men could act in this world from no motives but philosophical conceptions alone. These three sociologists may be called the specialists of *principles*, in the same way that the ordinary specialists are specialists of *facts*; and fall therefore under Professor Durkheim's censure of those who would interpret all social phenomena in terms of one specialism; as of political economy, or of the religious interpretation of history, or what not. Comte, on the other hand, deals with nearly all the factors I have mentioned, but while he draws, in my judgment, the true law of relationship between religion and physical science, he fails, I think—owing to his confusing of concomitants with causes, and putting causes for effects—to give proper weight to the material and social conditions of men and nations, or else he leaves their relationships confused. But this is, of course, only an opinion of my own on which I have no right to dogmatise, and is a proper subject for the discussion of a sociological society. And now for Herbert Spencer—what shall we say of his work? His position is somewhat peculiar; and here I am obliged again to differ from Professor Durkheim, who seems to think that Spencer by positing the differentiation of social types helped to rectify the general conceptions of the Comtist sociology. In my judgment, on the contrary, Spencer has done nothing whatever towards establishing a science of sociology in the true sense of the term, as we have above defined it. For if we consider it, the single law of sociology under which he worked was that of evolution in general; and as that is common alike to the organisation of the planets and stars and the growth from the egg of the chick, it is too general for human purposes. The fact that

societies in their progress through the ages, like everything else, split and differentiate, passing from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous condition, and integrating while they differentiate, is rather a statement of facts, and a careful sorting of them under the general law of evolution, than a compend of laws connecting the definite social factors of religion, government, science, material and social conditions, etc. However true, therefore, it may be, it cannot fulfil the function of a science of sociology, whereby one or more elements or factors of a society are given, others may be in a measure anticipated or predicted—the only true test of a science. What Spencer really accomplished was rather excellent pieces of special work, such as, for example, his tracing of the different stages passed through in the evolution of the conception of God, or the Gods, and of morality, among savage and civilised races; but all this, original and suggestive as it was, like everything else of his, formed rather the material on which a science of sociology could operate, than any part of the science itself.

The above were among the main attempts that had been made to establish a science of sociology when I first entered on the study of it, some quarter of a century ago. Of my own small contribution to the subject it would be unbecoming in me to say anything, but I may perhaps be permitted to express my entire agreement with Mr. Branford in what he states to be the task imposed on the sociologist at the outset. He lays it down that the sociologist must (1) construct a reasoned account of the existing phase of that interaction of the sciences and of the arts which we call contemporary civilisation, (2) that he must reconstruct the corresponding phases which historically have preceded and developed the contemporary phase, and (3) that he must work out ideals of more ordered development for the future. Now these, if I may venture to say so, are precisely the problems which I have myself attempted to work out—the first in my "Civilisation and Progress," the second in the first volume of my "History of Intellectual Development," to be continued in the second volume, and the third in the third volume of that work.

And if, in conclusion, I may be permitted to say a word in reference to the tasks that lie before a young sociological society, it would be this: that just as when Darwin announced his law of Evolution, botanists, geologists, palæontologists, and zoologists with one accord laid down for awhile their hammers and scalpels, their microscopes and lenses, to take part in the fray, until it was once for all settled whether the law of Natural Selection and its corollaries was the law under which they were in future to work; so before the specialisms connected with the evolution of man and his civilisation can become fruitful and effective, they must pause for a time and give themselves up to determining under what system of sociology they are to work—whether under one or another of those I have mentioned, or under none of them, but under some other more true and complete which has yet to see the light. Until this is done, the specialisms of history, psychology, ethics, religion, political economy, etc., must one and all continue to wander in the dark, wasting much of their time, and laboriously losing their way.

FROM R. DARESTE

(Member of the Institute of France.)

Social sciences, such as law, morals, political economy, are, in short, branches of what is called to-day "sociology," and the latter cannot neglect them. I admit that there are very intimate relationships between them, in that they ought to reciprocally explain each other; but before determining these relationships with scientific precision, it seems to me necessary to allow the specialists to work each in his own sphere. For example, the history of law has made immense progress during the century, and will certainly continue to do so, on condition that it remains self-contained and does not abandon the study of facts and texts, and above all that it does not place itself at the service of any system whatever. Philosophy will come later, when the specialist sciences have progressed further. It will profit from their work and will produce synthesis. It will indicate if the evolution of human society is subjected to constant laws, and in what measure. At the present moment this question seems to me premature, and I fear it will only trouble and disconcert researches that are being made on all sides, and which ought to be accomplished independently.

FROM MONSIEUR ALFRED FOUILLÉE

(Member of the Institute of France.)

The ideas upon the present subject which have been submitted in the papers of Professor Durkheim and Mr. Branford are worthy of our closest attention. They seem to me to be profoundly true; at the same time they seem to me to stand in need of being complemented by some others.

According to my own conception of this science, a genuine sociology must take account not only of all the social phenomena which have their origin, so to say, in the action of individuals, but also of those social phenomena which have their origin in society itself—those phenomena, I mean, which result from the very existence of a society, and from the consciousness which that society has of itself and of its own tendencies, purposes, and ideals. The true sociologist, therefore, will have before his mind from the beginning the conception of society as something which is not merely the medium in which things happen, not merely the environment and theatre for the play of individual actions, but as itself an actor or agent, and an agent which consciously reacts upon itself.

I would submit, therefore, that sociology must take cognisance of all those phenomena which are not explicable merely by a reference to the action of individuals as such, but which must be explained (1) by a reference to those laws of *reciprocal action* according to which certain psychological conditions at the one part are set up by certain psychological actions exercised at the other—states of consciousness determining states of consciousness through the medium of society; and (2) by a reference to those laws of self-reaction, or the reflexive

action of the (social) self upon itself, by which it comes that the collective consciousness realises certain ideas by the very fact of conceiving them. In other words, sociology, as it appears to me, views its subject-matter under the two collective processes of *mutual determinism* and *auto-determinism*. It seeks to give an account of the functions and the organs of the social being—their origins, their forms, the consciousness which they have of themselves, and the reactions resulting from the fact of that consciousness. Of course it will be necessary, in following this quest, to separate and allow for the material particularities or the special historical relations of given social facts, and also to leave out of view the moral value of their ends—this question belonging properly to the science of ethics.

It will be seen, then, that the most essential characteristic of the social state is, as I regard it, this—that of being submitted to a continual course of modification by the process of its own ideas and ideals of itself, that of involving a continuous determinism and trend of idea-forces and of sentiment-forces, while at the same time we may also say that it is in a perpetual act and state of auto-determination. This conception of the play of idea-forces (to use a term which I applied here a long while ago) seems to me to be too little taken account of by sociologists and philosophic thinkers; yet it affords us, for the study of society, a point of view which is indispensable and complementary to all the others. It allows us also to recognise a certain kind of *liberty* as belonging to society in the exercise of its higher functions. I do not say that this liberty is necessarily to be understood as meaning what is called *free-will*. I only mean to say that society, is not at any time a thing made and finished by other or vanished agencies, but is itself a living organisation which, in the exercise of its higher functions, is perpetually in the act of making itself. And from this process of social auto-determinism there results an ever-increasing flexibility of function, and even of structure, which in turn throws open a way into an infinity of variation.

If this view be correct, it will not do for us to follow in the steps of Comte and Spencer and transfer, bodily and ready-made, the conceptions and the methods of the natural sciences into the science of society. For here the fact of *consciousness* entails a reaction of the whole assemblage of social phenomena upon themselves, such as the natural sciences have no example of. Yet the complexity of the determinism exercised by this reactive function does not hinder it from being a determinism all the same—an extremely fluid determinism, it is true, and highly susceptible to disturbing influence, pressure or impact, but yet subject to the law of causation; and consequently involving a small number of fundamental laws of determination, and a much larger number of secondary laws. Those laws will be found to have affinities in two diverging directions; on the one side will be those with an affinity to biological, and on the other side those with an affinity to psychological law. But they will always have, this notwithstanding, their own originality of formula and their own specific value.

It is very true, as Mr. Branford says, that sociology must (1) describe in

the present, (2) explain by the past, and (3) project in the future, the evolution of social life. But I would submit, as a complement to this, that when the object of our contemplations is human society, then prevision, or attempting to project the future, is no mere anticipative visualising of things that will be, independently of our action or the action of human kind—we are not in the position of an astronomer who forecasts an eclipse of the sun. In human society, the act of looking forward already modifies and determines the object looked at. Vision is then not entirely passive any more, but is itself act and energy—because it is Thought, and because the *idea* of an end as possible and desirable is itself a *force* capable of furthering the realisation of that end. Sociology ought, therefore, to guard carefully against the tendency to crystallise that which is essentially fluid and moving, the tendency to consider as given fact or dead data that which creates itself and gives itself into the world of phenomena continually by the force of its own ideal conception.

FROM PROFESSOR GIDE

(*Professor of Political Economy, University of Paris*).

I think sociology is not an autonomous science, but a *Method* applicable to all the social sciences, as well as to history.

From Mr. J. STUART-GLENNIE.

(*Author of the New Philosophy of History, etc.*)

If it is permissible, in reply to the courteous request of the Secretary, frankly to "express my views" on the abstracts of the two papers kindly sent me, I would submit that as Comte, though not Spencer, clearly saw, there can be no science of sociology, and hence no "systematisation of sociological specialism," without discovery, or some approximation to discovery, of one or more general laws of history; and having devoted a whole lifetime to systematic researches towards such discovery, I may perhaps be excused thinking that it would be well if an inquiry were instituted into the value of my principles of Method, courses of Research, and resulting Theories.

I refer more particularly :

- (1) To the fundamental principle of Co-existence (every existent determines and is determined by existents), and the course of Physical Research, encouraged both by Faraday and Maxwell, which led to the statement of this principle ;
- (2) To the conception of Sociological—or, as I should rather say, Historical—Method thus illustrated in directing, first of all, to Physical as the basis of Biological, as that is of Psychological, and that of Sociological Research ;

- (3) To the special result of these primary Physical Researches, the conception of Atoms as mutually determining centres of Pressure, centres of Lines of Force, or centres of Energy—verified as this conception seems to be by the later discoveries which have led to Prof. J. J. Thomson's theory of "Electricity and Matter";
- (4) To the later development of my 1859-'60 and '61 Theory of Atoms, my Theory, namely, of the correlation of Matter and Mind as the Ultimate Factors of all evolution, and the Bases of a New Synthesis;
- (5) To my theory of the Primitive Conceptions of Nature; the special, and particularly Greek, Researches on which the theory is founded, and the New Method of Folklore Research, and classification of Folklore which was incidental to the working out of this theory;
- (6) To my theory of the Origin of Civilisation in the conflict of Higher and Lower Races—a theory going back to my skull-collections in 1862 from Tombs on the Plain of the Pyramids, synthetising all the latter relevant results of research, and including a new classification of Human Races;
- (7) To my Theory of Matriarchy, as a deduction from the general Theory of the Conflict of Races—a deduction, so far, at least, verified, by an exhaustive analysis of Miss Garnett's two volumes of the Folklore of the Peoples of the old Amazonian Lands;
- (8) To my Theory of the Three Correlative Laws of Racial Evolution, of Intellectual Development, and of Economic Progress, as the aims of a scientific Anthropology, classed with Kosmology, and Biology, as the Second or Evolutional Order of Sciences—the First Order of Sciences being the Physical or Natural; and the Third Order, the Ethical or Humanital.
- (9) To my demonstration of—or rather, as yet, but indication of—the great classes of facts demonstrating the Unity of the History of Civilisation, not only in the origin of the Primitive and the relation thereto of the Secondary and Tertiary Civilisations, but in the synchronism of similar Asian and European events, and in the Law of Periodic Epochs already demonstrable in, at least, the Age since the great Asian-European Movement of the Sixth-Fifth Century, B.C.
- (10) To the Law of Intellectual Development, synthetising all these various results of research as to (a) the nature of that differentiating and integrating Activity manifested in Thought; as to (b) Primitive conceptions of Nature; as to (c) the Conflict of Races and the Origin of Civilisation; as to (d) the unity of the History of Civilisation; and as to (e) the character of the later scientific conceptions of Nature and their historic relation to the Primitive Conceptions.

And, I may add (11), the ethical, æsthetic, and juridical corollaries from this Central Law, though these I have not yet been able to publish, even in so partial a form as each of the other theories of my system have appeared in.

Finally, I trust that I may be permitted respectfully to protest against the double use of the term "Sociology" to signify both a causal or "pure" science, "a theory of the origin, growth, and destiny of Humanity"; *and* an applied science—a science concerned with "the construction of principles applicable to the ordering of social life." Anthropology is commonly—as by, for instance, the President of Section H at the last meeting of the British Association—used as "the most general term denoting the study of Man in a wide and all-embracing sense." Surely it would be desirable with less vagueness to define both Anthropology and Sociology (or, as I should rather say, *Politology*) by restricting the connotation of the former term to the Causal, and the other to the corresponding Applied, general science of Man.

FROM MR. J. H. HARLEY, M.A.

The relation of philosophy to sociology seems *a priori* the relation of the whole to the part; but of late sociology has become almost convertible with philosophy. At an earlier date the philosopher was "the spectator of all time and existence," and philosophy laid bare the methodology of the absolute Thought, but so soon as that is given up it becomes apparent that knowledge must be limited to the world of humanity, though "value judgments," in the sense of Ritschl, may claim the authority of emotion to go somewhat beyond reasoned knowledge. In this case it becomes important to have a general science of sociology which shall rigidly scrutinise the implications of the special sciences included under that name. Durkheim, however, seems to leave the special sciences spreading all over the field of the general sciences, without suggesting some general principle which gives them all their due place and limits their relation to the whole.

FROM PROFESSOR INGRAM

(Formerly Professor of Political Economy, Trinity College, Dublin).

I do not recognise the multiple "social sciences" spoken of in the papers. There is, in my view, only one abstract sociology, which deals with the constitution, the working, and the evolution of society in all their aspects. (There are, of course, studies of different actual societies, but these are foreign to the present question.) The only philosophical division of abstract sociology, as distinguished from those dictated merely by convenience, is into social statics and social dynamics. The "social

sciences" enumerated in the papers are, for the most part, in reality only chapters of general sociology. Thus, the abstract study of economics is a part of sociology. Anthropology is only the first section of dynamical sociology. The study of the nature and development of religion is an element—the most important element—of general sociology. Statistics is not a branch of science at all; it is a congeries of observations ancillary to several sciences. Education is not a science, but an art, borrowing materials from several sciences. So also is Jurisprudence. "Social geography" must, from the nature of it, be concrete. Morals, indeed, *is* a true science—one of the seven rightly enumerated by Comte—distinct from sociology, though closely akin to it, being the theory of individual human nature. The attempt to set up a number of "social sciences" can only tend to encourage pedantry and idle research, in a province where broad principles are not only the one thing needful, but are alone accessible.

Sociology cannot be built up out of the "several sciences;" like biology, it is radically synthetic; and as in the latter we start from the general notion of the organism and analyse it afterwards, still referring everything to its unity, so we must in sociology set out from collective humanity and its fundamental attributes, and study all sociological phenomena in the light of the social consensus.

To me this endless trituration of social inquiry, and separation of the workers into distinct specialisms, appears to overlook the real meaning and end of sociology, which is to establish on scientific bases a non-theological religion. It is positivism, as a foundation, first of social renovation, and then of permanent social guidance, that seems to me to supply the explanation of historical tendencies in the past, and to point to the goal of future effort. The notion of the construction or development of sociology by the joint work of theologists and positivists I regard as chimerical. We cannot shirk the previous decision as to the reality or non-existence of a supernatural interference in human affairs. The attempt to do so will break down. The world has come up to this question and must face it, whilst, if I understand the case aright, the Sociological Society proposes to evade it.

What is now, in my judgment, most wanted is a real study of Comte, who, though his fame has been irresistibly rising and spreading, is more talked of than understood, and is not, as yet, at all adequately appreciated. Some would set him aside as pre-evolutionary, the fact being that, so far as *social* evolution is concerned, he has done immensely more than any one else, and at an earlier date. I have endeavoured to expound his principles, with which my own essentially coincide, in several publications, to which—especially to "Human Nature and Morals" and "Practical Morals"—I would refer any one who cares to know my opinions more in detail than they could be presented in these few sentences.

FROM PROFESSOR KOVALEVSKI

*(Vice-President of the Ecole Russe des Hautes Etudes Sociales, Paris.
Formerly Professor of Legal History, University of Moscow).*

My studies on questions relating to the origin of marriage, property, criminal and civil responsibility, etc.* have brought me to the conclusion, that no one limiting his researches exclusively to history, or law, or ethnography, is capable of resolving the greatest problems of genetic sociology. It is not by chance that the most interesting works on such topics have been written by persons belonging neither to the legal profession, nor to the number of specialists in history, philosophy, and so forth. Let me mention the name of the great Edward Tylor, as an instance of what self-exertion, in the most different branches of social knowledge, can do in order to prepare a man for deep sociological research. Who will dare to deny the great part Tylor has taken in settling the most arduous and complicated questions as to our social origins? And yet you cannot call him a specialist. I dare say that it is even on account of his not being a specialist, but a man equally learned in history, and ethnography, psychology, and the science of religions, that Tylor has been able to become the author of "Primitive Culture."

We certainly want scholars like Maspero and Sayce, men enriching us with the knowledge of the smallest details in the history of Egypt, or Babylonia, because these smallest details contain sometimes the most precious information a sociologist may require as to the existence in ancient civilisations of survivals of beliefs and usages still alive among the savage and barbarous tribes of our days. But, as a rule, specialists are not fit to treat the subject of their investigations from a comparative point of view. They have neither the necessary leisure to acquire all the information required for such a purpose, nor the desire to detach their attention from the limited field of knowledge they have succeeded in making their own.

On the contrary, a sociologist will be right not to risk himself in special investigations. These last require a sureness of method which may be acquired only by lifelong exertions in some very limited field of knowledge.

A division of labour becomes, therefore, necessary between those who discover new facts and those who try to construct, with those facts, theories as to our social origins; and our social evolutions. The specialist is inclined to consider the task of his fellow-workman, the theorist, as a kind

* See the following works: (1) "La coutume moderne, et l'anci droit," Paris, Larose, 1895. (2) "Les origines de la famille et de la propriete," Stockholm, 1871. (3) "Modern customs and ancient laws in Russia," London, David Nutt. (4) "A History of Russian political institutions," Chicago University Press, 1901.

of inferior labour, having no other scope but to reveal to the larger public the specialist's discoveries. I suppose none of you will agree with that. It would be true only if theories were to be constructed by persons wanting sufficient information in the most different branches of the social sciences. The difference between a compilation and a synthetical essay lies, as I think, only in this, that the compiler has nothing to say of his own, while the generalising spirit takes advantage of his encyclopædical knowledge in order to throw a new light on the subject studied by the specialist.

This brings me to speak of the danger a sociologist would incur by attaching himself only to the study of institutions, or only to economics, or anthropology, or history of religions and folklore. Such a study must be reserved for specialists, whose scope is to discover new facts. As to the sociologist, it is only on account of his general information that we may expect him to give us some new ideas on the question treated by the specialist.

Let me show you, in one single instance, the impossibility of treating, from a general point of view, sociological problems, without a previous study of almost each and every one of the concrete social sciences. I take the long debated question as to the origin of private property. In order to treat the subject scientifically, you must be acquainted not only with matters of technology and economics, but as well with legal and political history, ethnography, folklore, history of religions, and magic! Think only about the amount of information one gets by the study of early funeral rites, or magic symbolism, as to the question what were the first objects of private appropriation. The funeral rites, by stating what movables were destroyed by fire, or buried with the dead, reveal to us the fact that weapons and ornaments, and, as a rule, everything in close relation with its owner, were the first to become private property. On the other hand, the knowledge of early magic is necessary to understand the reason for which a savage considers certain things to be reserved to his exclusive use the moment he has performed on them some symbolical act or pronounced some sacramental words. What else, if not a deep insight into early religion, will give us a clear view of the state of mind of those numerous tribes which refuse to live in the house where a dead body has been found, keep it locked up for ever, or even pull it down and scatter it to pieces?*

On the other hand, is it possible to acquire a general idea of the evolution of property without a previous study from a comparative point of view both of family law, and of that of legal succession—not to speak of the various customs still regulating these matters among savage and

* As is the case with the Abipones, the Indians of Guiana, the Ojibways, the Yoruba speaking peoples, and, which is less known, also with the Armenian peasants almost to our own day.

barbarous tribes, sometimes even among the lower classes of civilised societies and states? Can you equally treat the subject of the origin and evolution of property unless you have acquired a sufficient knowledge of clan organisation, both maternal and paternal; unless you have studied in detail the various causes which have produced feudalism, and, later on, the emancipation of serfs and the establishment of free village communities?

But once we admit, with Comte and Spencer, this general truth, that social relations at any given moment are exceedingly complicated, and want for their right understanding most various information, how can we pretend that sociology "has need of specialisation in order to become a truly positive science?" I do not believe it. I am inclined to think that Comte and Spencer were right in saying quite the reverse.

Duly prepared by an encyclopædical education for the difficult work of a synthetic co-ordination of all social knowledge, these great thinkers succeeded to a great extent in their endeavours. We owe to them a general sketch of our social origins and of our social evolution. If on more than one point their general conclusions cannot be accepted to-day, it is partly on account of their information having been scanty and insufficient on more than one point,* and partly because the concrete social sciences have considerably advanced in the second part of the nineteenth century.

The task we have to perform is to bring sociology to the level the concrete social sciences have reached to-day. But this cannot be done if we remain inferior, as far as general information goes, to our great predecessors. We must, on the contrary, rise above them on this point. But how can we manage to do so in face of the rapid development of concrete social knowledge? Is it not to be foreseen, that this knowledge shall always advance more rapidly than sociological theory? Why should we undertake such a sisyphæan work? why should we construct sociological schemes knowing that they have to last but for a while?

These fears would be justified if the division of labour was not invoked to make our task easier. I insist, just as well as M. Durkheim, on the necessity of such a division of labour, but I understand it in a way quite different from him. Instead of specialising one's self on certain definite questions of sociology, I should like to see those who cultivate this science attach themselves to certain definite periods of social evolution.

What we require most for the further advance both of sociology and of the concrete social sciences is a general and comprehensive view of all the transformations through which society has passed from the earliest time of its existence. I feel inclined to call such a science the natural history of mankind.

* Comte knew very little of comparative philology, economics and legal history. Spencer was badly informed as to the evolution of philosophy, not to speak of his ignorance of politics and law.

This subject may be successfully treated only by persons having received the encyclopædical education of Comte or Spencer. But they may divide it among themselves in the following way. First of all, they must come to an understanding as to the general phases of social evolution. These I consider to be (1st) maternal and paternal clanship; (2nd) feudal and free communities placed under an elective or hereditary ruler (I mean both village and city communities, with such other social divisions and corporate institutions, as castes, social orders, guilds, confraternities, religious and civil, and so forth); (3rd) self-government of large bodies of people, called nations, and organised in autonomous or federal states; each composed of unities, enjoying more or less equal rights, if not equal fortunes.

This scheme or any other may be adopted. But this once done, every sociologist engaged in the common task of writing a general history of social evolution, must treat, by himself, the whole period he has selected for his private investigation. He will do it as a man equally aware of the modern state of each and every one of the concrete sciences which have to deal with society and its different aspects, because it is in these sciences that he will find the materials necessary to his constructions.

This combined work may be brought to a happy end only on one condition, that all those who contribute to it will remain in constant correspondence with each other. Very often a later period of development contains survivals of beliefs, customs and institutions, generally diffused in a previous one. Therefore, a reciprocal communication of facts and ideas between persons engaged in the study of two different, but closely united periods of human development seems to be a necessity. Worked out by congenial spirits, never losing sight of the general scope of their common endeavours, the social history of mankind will, I have no doubt, be called to the same high destinies as those of natural history. As biology has been preceded by great masses of genetic studies, so must sociology be preceded by a general history of the evolution of societies.

Both social statics and social art (under which I understand the different schemes that may be proposed for the bettering of social conditions) cannot find a scientific basis so long as we shall not precisely know what social progress really means and in what it has manifested itself in history.

Each period in the development of mankind has its own social statics. Unless we know, in its details, the structure of clannish, feudal, and modern society, we are unable to give to our schemes of social reform any other significance than that one of expressing our inmost feelings and desires. Any serious social movement must necessarily have for its scope a new advance on the way followed till now by the human race in its social evolution. It is, therefore, only on condition of having a clear understand-

ing of our past that we are authorised to take on ourselves the responsibility to ask for reform.

* * * * *

I have said enough to show the difference which exists between my conception as to the necessary conditions of a further advance of sociology and that of M. Durkheim.

I beg to apologise for the length of this paper. Clearness is not easily attainable without giving details. I tried to be as short as possible, but I could not escape the temptation to prove, at least partly, what I affirm, by certain instances and illustrations.

FROM PROFESSOR LATTA

(Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, University of Glasgow).

I agree with both writers as to the great advantage that would be derived from a systematising of the social sciences. Such a task seems to me to be essentially a philosophical one. It at once raises questions as to the relative functions and value of various institutions, of many great human desires and motives, of the physical and biological conditions of society, etc. These questions can be satisfactorily decided only by a philosophy which has a definite standpoint, and is thus able to criticise, not merely current, but also historical definitions and conceptions. Such a philosophy need not be abstract, purely *a priori*, or indifferent to observed facts. It must be speculative; but it need not be in conflict with observational science.

The practical question, then, is—Have we such a philosophy, a philosophy that is logically satisfactory, and that has also taken account of the whole work of the “sociological specialisms?” I very much doubt its existence. Of course, approaches have been made to it; but there is nothing which would be generally accepted as meeting the requirements. And if we do not have it, we cannot at once sit down to make it. It may come through the indirect co-operation of many thinkers; but it will appear as the work of one. And I am afraid we must wait for the man.

Meantime, in spite of the disadvantage of the separation of studies, must we not practically trust to the “specialisms” “spontaneously moving towards directing ideas?” Discussion may be good in “accentuating the movement and making it more conscious, more precise.” But a too hasty systematisation would probably only add to the confusion, and thus defeat its own end.

The opening sentences of Professor Durkheim’s “abstract” seems to me to illustrate the difficulty of any present attempt to construct a general science of sociology (or even to lay down a few general principles) which

would receive assent enough to be acted on. The "inclusion of human phenomena within the unity of nature" may be interpreted either in a "naturalist" or in an "idealist" sense, and the conclusions drawn from the principle on these opposite interpretations of it would, of course, differ essentially.

The recent book of Stuckenberg ("Science of Sociology") is an attempt in the direction indicated by the papers. I don't think it is satisfactory, but future writers may improve upon it.

FROM PROFESSOR ACHILE LORIA

(Professor of Political Economy, University of Turin).

I have been much pleased by the interesting memoranda of MM. Durkheim and Branford. With their main arguments I am entirely in accord. They are, I think, quite right in maintaining that the specialised social sciences should not be treated independently, but should be studied in the light of their mutual solidarity, their sociological nexus. But I am not at one with M. Durkheim in his protest against the tendency to interpret all social phenomena in terms of one of these specialisms, *e.g.* economics. On the contrary, I believe that the kernel of sociological structure and development must be sought amid the phenomena, or groups of phenomena which are the subject-matter of some specialised science, and that only the specific analysis of this phenomena can lead us to appreciate all its sociological importance and its character as generative phenomena of the social complexus.

With reference to the economic interpretation of sociology, in which I myself am most particularly interested, I venture to add that, up to the present, this interpretation is the only one which has furnished us with a solid body of harmonised and co-ordinated doctrines, presenting in their development an exact and truly scientific character, while the encyclopædic sociologies which assert the equal dignity and sociological causality of all the phenomena comprised under particular sciences, have not advanced beyond vague generalisations and systematisations lacking in precision. The significance of this contrast should not be forgotten by those who maintain such stubborn opposition to our theory.

I regret that the tyranny of time and space precludes me from here developing and proving my assertions, but I could not let the statements of these eminent and qualified savants pass without contributing a few words of sympathy and support.

FROM PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD

(Professor of Philosophy, University of Birmingham).

I find myself in agreement with Professor Durkheim's very able analysis of the disadvantages resulting from the absence in the minds of workers in

particular fields of what he calls "the sociological conception of unity." But I could have wished that he had made it clearer what this conception is which is to give birth to the "sentiment of their solidarity." The value of Mr. Branford's paper seems to me to lie in his suggestions on this head. He seems to regard the historical and analytic work of sociology as secondary in importance, and the science to be concerned "ultimately and supremely with ideals." This statement raises the whole problem, for if this is so, the unity that both writers desire must be looked for in some common agreement as to what is meant by an ideal; how it is possible, how it operates, whence it derives its contents—questions of psychology, individual and social, and of general philosophy. In this view I entirely agree; but it involves the paradox that the more fully we recognise it the more difficult we shall find it to treat society as continuous with nature in the sense assumed by Professor Durkheim in his opening sentences. Comte, it will be remembered, denied the possibility of a psychology in the modern sense, and it was only natural that he should assimilate sociology with the natural, or physical sciences. There is, of course, no harm in defining sociology as the aggregate of sciences which treat of social phenomena from whatever point of view commends itself to the specialist; but both papers seem to seek for some more unified conception of it, and the direction in which Mr. Branford's seems to point is doubtless the right one—the utilisation of the results of these sciences in constructing a reasoned account of contemporary civilisation, and in working out ideals of more ordered development for the future. Professor Durkheim's own admirable monograph on "The Division of Social Labour" is an example that occurs to me of how this may be effected. So soon as a considerable body of work of this philosophical kind has accumulated, it cannot fail to react on the labours of specialists in particular fields, part of whose aim will then be to render their work available for such co-ordination; and in this way the solidarity Professor Durkheim seeks will be gradually achieved.

FROM MR. H. OSMAN NEWLAND

(*Author of "A Short History of Citizenship"*).

The introduction of this subject should sound the depths of the Sociological Society and determine its capacity to harmonise, adjust, and systematise the conflicting schools or modes of thought which are represented in its heterogeneous membership. If these papers be representative, the society will not be found wanting either in its theoretical or practical work.

The day has passed when a Comte or a Spencer could aspire to be the Alpha and the Omega of sociology, and the day is passing, let us hope, when the specialists can interpret the complex phenomena of society in the terms of their own specialisms, when the abstract idealist can make of sociology a new creed, and when practical statesmen can disregard both the technical specialist and the idealist. The time has arrived, in short, for the creation of a new class

of specialist—the sociologist, *per se*—which shall combine something of the old scientist, something of the idealist, and something of the practical statesman, but without claiming genetic relationship to any one of these classes.

The new sociologist will have to recognise that it is impossible to study human society in the seclusion of solitude. He must be ready, like the practical statesman, to devise expedients to meet present emergencies, while he scrutinises the past, which the practical man too oft despises, and evolves ideals for the future, which the practical man is content to leave to posterity. As a practical man, the new sociologist will, however, be likely to fall more easily into the pitfalls and prejudices which everywhere surround him, unless he possess the culture of the specialist. In short, he will have to preserve in the midst of the crowd the independence of solitude. Can such a class be evolved? Undoubtedly. Hitherto, discussion and dissemination of the conflicting ideas of the specialists, the idealists and the practical statesmen have been unorganised. Now, not these ideas alone but their exponents are organised upon a common basis. Compromise must take place, and the new sociology be evolved therefrom.

FROM PROFESSOR J. S. NICHOLSON

(*Professor of Political Economy, University of Edinburgh*).

I am not sure that I quite understand the argument of the papers. As I understand it, I agree that sociology must be founded on particular social sciences, each of which requires its own evidences and methods, whilst at the same time efforts should be made towards unity and co-ordination. But the chief danger seems to me that the unification may be *a priori* and premature. An economist would no doubt be the better for some knowledge of every other social science. I was much interested lately in discussing with a folklorist the influence of superstitions on the origins of property, and even on the origin of the cultivation of land. In the same way, as an economist, I have been interested in archæology, anthropology, &c.; but it seems to me that a sociology founded on the particular social sciences must wait, and that at present an independent sociology would only be *a priori* anticipation.

FROM PROFESSOR A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON

(*Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, University of Edinburgh*).

So far as I can see, I should have no difficulty in subscribing to all that is said in the first paper. The inclusion of human phenomena within the unity of Nature means, I presume, simply the establishment of laws in social phenomena, and is not intended to obscure important differences that may exist between human phenomena and other phenomena of Nature.

The second paper is probably more severely condensed and difficult to

follow. The sixth paragraph in particular remains, after repeated reading, very obscure to me. But if I understand the rest of the paper aright, it seems to me quite correct, though I should not favour the adoption of the "generalised statement" in the last paragraph as a "definition" of sociology. I do not know whether that is intended, but for such a purpose something less highly generalised would seem to me more suitable.

FROM THE HON. BERTRAND RUSSELL

(*Author of "Principles of Mathematics," &c.*)

The only point on which I distinctly disagree is the statement that "a controlling science of sociology is, as Comte shows, a necessary postulate of science itself." To my mind, this view involves a confounding of origin and validity.

FROM PROFESSOR SORLEY

(*Professor of Moral Philosophy, Cambridge*).

I have time only for the briefest comment on the very interesting abstracts kindly forwarded.

Professor Durkheim lays stress upon two points: the need for a synthesis of the different departments of social investigation; and the importance of the fundamental postulate that the facts with which the science of society deals must be included "within the unity of nature," the evolution hypothesis being applicable to human society as it is to the physical and to the biological world. With the latter point he begins; and on it I should like to make a single remark, not by way of objection, but perhaps as supplementing what he says.

In this regard, the sociologist has, I think, two things to do. In the first place, he may show how far the processes of social growth correspond to the processes of cosmical and of biological evolution. He has also, in the second place, to show the special *modus operandi* of evolution in the social sphere.

Evolution was an almost fruitless hypothesis in biology until Darwin laid his finger upon Natural Selection as its method. In doing this he did not merely bring biological evolution into line with cosmical evolution; he showed that biological evolution derived its direction and effectiveness from a principle which applies to living beings only, and not to inorganic matter. He distinguished the method of biological evolution from the method of cosmical evolution.

The sociologist has to consider whether the passage from the animal world to human society does not involve a similar distinction. Natural Selection is found operative in social evolution; but I think it can be abundantly

shown that it is neither the sole nor the chief operative force. Subjective Selection and Social Selection are both present; Social Selection is always more or less subjectively determined; and the purposive factor which they both involve becomes increasingly intelligent as development proceeds. When we speak of social evolution as governed by Natural Selection, we are, I think, more often than not, misled by an analogy which conceals a fundamental difference of character.

I do not think that it is any longer necessary to contend that the evolution hypothesis applies to social processes. That is now admitted. What remains to be done is to analyse the method of social evolution for its own sake, instead of simply transferring uncritically to social science the conception of biology. The point that needs careful examination is the method of social evolution as compared and contrasted with the method of biological evolution.

FROM PROFESSOR L. STEIN

(Professor of Philosophy, University of Berne).

An universally satisfactory definition of sociology can only be possible when sociology shall be developed and brought to a final settlement in its most important parts. Definitions do not anticipate sciences, but they succeed them. They have the task to bring the quintessence, the sap of the sciences they intend to describe in its shortest expression. It is, however, necessary that these sciences have a conditional settlement—science never has a final one.

Sociology is still in its genesis. The methodological questions standing in the foreground of the discussion to-day may represent as much as the pains of labour of the science entering in existence. It is, therefore, too early to give, at present, a definition of sociology as a science. What sociology is in need of to-day, is not a definition but a programme.

The programme of sociology, its curriculum, has been properly outlined by Durkheim. The present objective, in fact, is to have every individual social specialism separately investigated, in order finally to establish a comprehensive whole. Divide for marching and unite for striking. On the other hand, I am not in sympathy with Durkheim's main postulate, "the inclusion of human phenomena within the unity of nature." The unity of nature and history is a contention of metaphysics which generalises that "unity of the Ego" every individual observes in himself, projects it into the outside world and applies it to the universe. This psychological necessity, *i.e.*, to apply one's individual unity to the world at large, gives rise to monotheism in religion, pantheism in the speculative and monism in the positive philosophy. But this projecting of the unity of the subject into the (supposed) unity of the object, is a metaphysical hypothesis which strict adherents of positivism who do not wish to lose the bases of fact cannot accept. If sociology intends to be and to remain an

empirical science, it cannot accept *a priori* the unity of subject and object, of spirit and nature, of laws of thought and of nature, as Comte and Spencer have done. They can only win this unity gradually *a posteriori*, in a comparative method through the systematising of individual social specialisms.

Nature, Fichte's "non-ego," Kant's "Ding-an-sich," belongs to the reign of laws; history, however, to the reign of teleology. In nature causality reigns, in history finality. Natural formations develop along mechanical lines, social ones teleologically. Natural phenomena develop in accordance with the mechanical formulæ of cause and effect, social phenomena in accordance with the teleological formulæ of purpose and means. The movement in lifeless nature is a purely mechanical one, in accordance with "*causa æquat effectum*"; the movement of the living cell, however, is a purposed one, adapted to the maintenance of self. "Struggle for life and survival of the fittest" are not mechanical but teleological principles. In view of the fact that sociology deals with men, that is to say, living creatures in the highest possibilities, it is not amenable to any mechanical formulæ as are physics, astronomy or chemistry, but to teleological formulæ, as is biology. In inorganic nature we find the reign of laws, in the living organical, however, teleological tendencies—"conatus," "impetus," "tendencies," as they were called before; "dominanten," as the biologist Reinke calls them to-day. Therefore we can well accept for philosophy the separation, proposed already by Hobbes, into natural and social philosophy.

If philosophy denotes—as Comte and Wundt assert—unifying or even unified knowing, the unifying process of philosophy is a double, a mechanical-causal for natural sciences and a teleological-causal for social sciences—or what we call "*Geisteswissenschaften*." For what was called before "*Geisteswissenschaften*," we characterise to-day by the designation of sociology.

So philosophy is falling into two chief parts:—Natural philosophy, which has to combine the mechanical laws of the universe into an unified system, and social philosophy, which has to unify and to systematise the "purpose laws" of human acts, relations and institutions. The solution of the last question, *i.e.*, to show how mechanical laws of nature (which rule the cosmos) are in contact with those laws of purpose (which govern human society) is the task of metaphysics. There we interrogate astro-physics, chemistry, physics and the exact sciences; here we study by the comparative-historical method all those social individual sciences Durkheim has enumerated. But the method here is as well as there the empirical-inductive one, proceeding from the simple to the complex, rising gradually from multiplicity to unity. If we consider as Durkheim, Comte and Spencer, social phenomena as natural ones; if we deduce social purposes of men in their deepest roots from mechanical laws of nature, we apply the deductive method, while sociology, as well for Durkheim as for Branford, intends to

be and to remain an empirical-inductive science. We have to deduce the "teleological imperative," *i.e.*, how we have to act in the future, from the study of human institutions teaching us according to which laws of purpose men have acted till now. If natural philosophy looks for the unity of laws—the law of the preservation of energy—social philosophy has to look for the unity of purposes, that is, a law for the preservation of social energy. This can be done in the surest manner by means of the comparative-historical method, as I have shown thoroughly in my essay on "Wesen und Aufgabe der Sociologie." So any sociology has to begin with classification, not of the sciences in general, but of all social science or "Geisteswissenschaften." In this way sociology is social philosophy, a department of the whole philosophy which systematises and brings into the most complete formulæ the unity of the different kinds of relations of men which are investigated separately by the respective specialisms, as are anthropology, ethnography, and folk-psychology. Natural philosophy seeks the unity of natural laws, sociology seeks the unity of all human purposes (*Telesis*). So sociology is, as Comte rightly says, the philosophical controller of all social individual specialisms. The "three-fold-task" of sociology proposed by Mr. Branford has been followed by me word for word in my "Social Frage im Lichte der Philosophie," 2. Auflage, 1903, Stuttgart, Enke. Only the sequence is a little changed. My development is the following:—(1) the story of all social institutions; (2) the story of all social theories; (3) the "working out of ideals of more ordered development for the future," just as Mr. Branford demands it.

FROM DR. S. R. STEINMETZ

(*Lecturer in the University of Leyden*).

The classification of the sciences and of every science is, in an eminent degree, a product of history. One can acknowledge this, and at the same time endeavour to reform this classification according to our better notion of the needs of any particular science to fulfil its task more completely.

So the different social sciences have grown out of different prior occupations: economics out of practical politics, comparative religion out of religious interests, etc.

One of the most important faults of all these special social sciences was their utter negation of the most intricate relation between their phenomena. The most elaborate justification of this negation has been found in the defence of the abstract method by political economists. They forgot that the abstract method can only be a provisional one; that the artificially isolated phenomena are in reality united, that we want to know the real facts, not the artificial ones.

Isolation may have its preliminary methodical advantages, but never can it be final, being a distortion of the facts.

In all histories of religion the mighty influence of political, economical, and other social factors was neglected.

The great principle of sociology is to reverse these faults. Sociology is the theory of *all* the phenomena of the living together of human beings. Its object is the discovery of all the laws of co-existence and succession of the whole of these phenomena.

The abstraction and isolation of the historical social sciences can only be corrected by this recognition of the unity of social science, by their feeling and behaving themselves as chapters of science. Otherwise the isolation will be eternal, and all the results of these abstract disciplines will be vitiated by it. On the contrary, the special social sciences truly living up to the consciousness of the most intimate relation of their objects, are they not inevitably mere chapters, parts of one whole?

The substitution of the abstract and fantastical methods of the old sociology, not yet vanished, by truly positive ones, will not necessarily be the consequence of the specialisation of the social disciplines, according to the expectations of Prof. Durkheim, as political economy has sufficiently demonstrated. Correct methods will be the result of the ardent desire of scientific truth, here as elsewhere.

The unity of sociology will be advanced by a preliminary course in sociology for all future students of social sciences. This science might be divided, as I have been doing in my university lectures for many years, into the following parts.

I. *General Problems*: (1) the social units (the socially important differences between men, the sexes, ages, etc.); (2) the classification of societies; (3) general concepts (social laws, social causation, etc.); (4) methods, etc.

II. *Social Morphology*: all the forms of human co-existence and co-operation.

III. *Social Physiology*: the functions of social institutes and organisms.

IV. *Social Evolution*: the forces that produce this, the laws of their operation, etc.

V. *Social Pathology*: all that hinders the function and evolution of society and its organs.

By this scheme the unity of sociology is accentuated. The special sciences, independent till now, will, as clues of special researches, contribute to the work of the whole.

I quite agree with Prof. Durkheim, that the earlier we get rid of phraseological speculations, the sooner will sociology be a positive science, but it should not only be a bond between special disciplines, but the *Alma Mater*, out of which spring several children. We want, not special disciplines, but *special researches*.

Sociology is in the same case as those older, better-organised and

already positive sciences: botany and zoology. They are divided into widely differentiated parts, they are advanced almost only by special and positive researches, but these are all parts of and originating in one science, the unity of which is the inevitable result of the unity of its object. Since the facts of social life are unquestionably one whole, indissolubly related, their science can be only one. Abstraction, isolation, are never more than laboratory methods.

A model, so far, to the whole science of sociology may be found in what in some aspects may be called its first chapter, *i.e.*, what the English call the non-somatic part of anthropology; on the Continent, I think better, designated as ethnology. Here we have the full recognition of the inseparable, the real unity of all social life, and the earnest consciousness that its study can only be advanced by special researches, quite so as in all other sciences. Mr. Branford tells us, very truly, the main requirement of sociology at the moment is a mapping of the existing field of verified and verifiable sociological knowledge. But it should not be abstract. It should repose entirely on what has been established positively for social theory, *i.e.*, of the conformities discovered between social facts. We are in want of a really good handbook, one that gives the resultant of the researches already executed, and practical suggestions as to those most needed at present. Sociology should be emancipated from philosophy, in the same way as all other sciences in their evolution towards positivity. After making many discoveries in its field, sociology will be able, as the other sciences, to enrich philosophy with its part of knowledge and truth. But without emancipation it never can do that work for its mother.

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I think one of the first wants of sociology is the conquest of a place in the universities—firstly, to get a living for its scholars; secondly, to give a thorough sociological propædæsis to all students who will occupy themselves with historical or social disciplines.

FROM DR. J. L. TAYLER

(*Author of "Aspects of Social Evolution"*).

There is one point I should like briefly to allude to, and that is the need for determining the *relative* importance of the many different social sciences *as sources for supplying information for sociological investigation*. All such sciences are not of equal relative value in this matter: some cover largely the same ground as sociology does, deal with the same facts, often grouping them into wide generalisations which differ only in aspect and outlook, but not in principle, from like generalisations in our main subject; others only touch the boundaries of the work we have in hand.

If we do not treat the more important contributing sciences more

fully than the less important, we shall lose sight of the greater issues which have to be considered to make our work scientific. We can easily give our investigations a predominantly industrial, medical, legal, philosophical, or moral colouring, *without desiring to do so*, if we merely let our studies be guided by the views that the majority of us hold as a result of our daily habits and occupations. In proportion as any one of the contributing subjects takes a disproportionately large place in our scheme, so will the true sociological character of sociology be lost. It seems to me, therefore, necessary to approximately determine what are the major social sciences that ought to be studied very fully by sociological investigators, and what are minor, that can be treated more briefly.

FROM PROFESSOR TÖNNIES

(*Professor of Philosophy, University of Kiel*).

The destination and task of sociology to become the centre or the goal towards which all the special social sciences should be directed has been very well brought out in both papers. But the second one lays, in particular, stress upon the just perception, that the purport and significance of science generally, and consequently of the social sciences also—or as it is expressed “the interaction of the sciences and the arts”—is to be examined in a science of civilisation, and that from this point of view also the special social sciences are in principle subordinated to sociology. This almost coincides with my own notion, and I fully endorse what is said in the two last paragraphs of the second paper.

But I should wish to qualify the evolutionist, by what may be called the dissolutionist principle, for, with respect to everything existing—therefore with respect to contemporary civilisation also—we have as much reason to consider the decay as the growth, the descending as the ascending part of its life and development. On the other hand, I should strictly discriminate and disjoin the practical aspect of *ideals* from the theoretical investigation of the problems; and I even suggest that the former might be left (to the benefit of the scientific character of sociology) to the ethical and political philosopher, who again will leave the practice itself—realisation of ideals—to educators and statesmen.

But, however so much I agree with the general tenor of both papers, I dissent from them in this, *viz.*, that I put a very great weight upon the mission of sociology, not only to *receive* from the special social sciences, but to give them from its own store. Philosophy has the same relation to sciences generally, which sociology has to the social sciences. There is a part of first principles which ought to be more than merely methodical. It ought to be an inquiry into the ideas—a working out of the notions of social matter and motion—or of the realities that underlie all social evolution. These are, in the first instance, what I call social entities, the various modes and forms of human association, including as well a rowing or walking club as colleges and universities, trades unions and monastic orders as well as church and state, archaic gentes and tribes as well as mediæval guilds. The thorough investigation of these forms—which I refer

to a communist and a socialist type respectively, apart from what these words mean, if *ideal* forms are concerned only—I say, this preliminary investigation is the proper work of *pure* sociology, which, by fulfilling this task, will forge a key for the understanding of *history*.


FROM PROFESSOR L. WINIARSKI

(*Professor of Political Economy, University of Geneva*).

In conformity with the general law of evolution, all sciences originate in a state of chaos, when the observation and description of facts is confused with theories and with the practical conclusions deducible from them, and when subjectivity and want of precision pervade the whole procedure.

The next stage of evolution is characterised by progress towards subdivision of labour and growing precision. By slow degrees, out of the primitive chaotic state of each science, three distinct parts emerge:—a theoretical science (abstract, pure), a descriptive science (concrete), and a practical science (an applied science, an art). Thanks to this division of labour, each one of these sciences becomes more objective and more exact, although still retaining its purely descriptive character. With a further advance in precision, descriptions crystallise under the form of numbers (statistics), theories develop into strictly mathematical forms of reasoning (pure mechanics), and the art shares the accuracy of the first two divisions, of which indeed it is the synthesis (applied mechanics).

This evolution might be represented by the following diagram:—



Experience is the common ground and source of all science. The distinction between philosophic theory, observation, and art is only made in order to facilitate and economise labour. Theory, the philosophy of all science, is grounded upon facts and observation, but it becomes more logical and coherent when developed into a special branch of study. Physics and chemistry have almost completed the course of evolution sketched above, but the biological * and social sciences are still in the second, *i.e.*, qualitative, philosophic and historic phase.

The social sciences, however, are already entering—at least as far as their descriptive portion is concerned—into the third, or quantitative phase; economics, moral and legal statistics, etc., already exist.

As to the general science of society—first general history as descriptive science—then the philosophy of history developed into general sociology, as abstract science, have hitherto filled this rôle.

The special social sciences have emerged from these general studies and have pursued their course independently, but here the working of another and evolutionary principle, that of integration, begins to manifest itself. None of these special social sciences, in spite of their sturdy development, are able to formulate scientific general rational laws. Historical and statistical studies, even when based on the comparative method, can only furnish empirical and relative laws. These studies, however important they may be, at present still allow of the formulation of the most contradictory theses and provide the weapons for party strife. And the philosophical branches of each of these sciences, as long as they do not pass beyond the assemblage of facts presented in each domain, can do no more than register and formulate these contradictory theses. Hence arise a multitude of widely diverging theories, which we find in economics, in law, ethics, politics, etc.

In other words, the special social sciences cannot succeed in formulating rational, natural laws, or can only do so in an incomplete manner. The explanation of this state of things is to be found in the fact that such laws can only be formulated from a point of view which comprehends the totality of the social sciences and their interrelations. And this study is the object matter of general sociology. It alone has its mission, the formulation of rational laws, inaccessible to any of the social sciences considered independently; for these, as we have said, can only discover relative laws and momentary regularities. On this account, some distinguished savants in Germany restrict economics entirely to a descriptive and historical method—wrongly, as I take it; for economics happens to be the one field in which progress has been made sufficient to the co-ordination of its various doctrines, in rigorously mathematical fashion. But even pure economics has, so far, only been able to formulate a static theory of equilibrium (Walras). For a rational theory of dynamic economics we have still to wait.

* Zoology is already moving in this direction as is proved by Professor F. Houssaye's work "*La Forme et la Vie, Essai de la methode mecanique en zoologie.*"

Such a theory demands the co-operation of a rational sociology, which, alas ! is also non-existent. As to the other social sciences, they welter in theoretic confusion.

The inability of the social sciences to formulate rational laws of a general character arises from the fact, that this problem is beyond their strength, outside their natural domain.

To expect progress in this direction from the development of the special social sciences is to wish to sail against the stream of scientific differentiation and integration—to misunderstand the whole historic evolution of these sciences, which has rendered them, considered separately, incapable of such progress, but at the same time has exhibited their solidarity with general sociology, which represents their integration.

If we glance at the future development of the special social sciences, we see them condemned to more and more detailed descriptions; whilst, unless general sociology progresses concurrently with them, their conclusions will be received with more and more caution; for it is only from general sociology that we may hope, some day, to receive scientifically formulated rational laws, which will serve as curb and counter-proof to the empirical or incompletely rationalised laws formulated by the special social sciences. Sociology then, far from retreating, is called to play a great part in the future; for on its progress depends that of all the special social sciences.

Unfortunately, however, up to the present, general sociology is no less contradictory in its rational laws than are the distinctive social sciences in their empirical laws.

And this is not astonishing, considering that general sociology is still in the intermediate qualitative phase; but, subject to the evolutionary process which all sciences pass through, it must enter into the abstract quantitative phase, just as the concrete sciences will transform themselves into statistics.

Under such conditions, the further progress of sociology cannot be better served, and its divergent systems unified, than by the application of the mathematical method, by which it is demonstrable that the contradictions between existing social systems are only apparent.*

In this work of synthetical reconstruction, pure sociology should take, as its starting point, certain recognised general principles—such, for example, as those of least effort, of the transformation of energy; and should, from these, deduce a rational system, which must, of course, be regarded as hypothetical†

* In saying that mathematics can be useful to sociology, I do not mean to say that the latter should be handed over to mathematicians, which, at present at any rate, would be useless, superfluous; but that sociologists ought to have adequate notions of the fundamental principles of mechanics, physics, and pure economics; that they ought also to have to express these under the form of mathematical symbols.

† As an example of such a combination, at once rational and hypothetical, I venture to quote my "*Essais sur la Mécanique Sociale*," (1898-1903, *Revue Philosophique*), which are not yet completed; and to mention, that I hope soon to bring out a "*Classification des Sciences Sociales, basé sur le principe du moindre effort*."

until it has received definite confirmation, by exhibiting the possibility of forecasting and regulating social phenomena.

At present, it must be frankly acknowledged, that general sociology is still in the second, or qualitative, phase, although projected in part, by means of statistics, into the third phase; but even statistics can as yet, owing to the lack of a quantitative social theory, a social mechanics, only indicate regularities (*Gesetzmässigkeiten*), without assigning any general character.

It is only by substituting the concrete values furnished by statistics for the unknown quantities which occur in the equations of social mechanics, that we can attempt to forecast, and regulate scientifically, social phenomena. And should the forecasts be realised, a striking proof will be afforded of the accuracy of the reasoning and the precision of the statistics. Then only, too, can the synthetic and hypothetic constructions of social mechanics be considered proved; and then only can we announce the possession of a scientific and quantitative theory of society, and of the rational law of its development. But at present, hardly anything of this kind exists.

We are still in the midst of phase two. Sociological forecasts are as yet innocent of scientific character, and if at all involved, complex, hardly ever verify themselves—witness the entire list, the category of social and economical forecasts, from those of W. Petty to those of Karl Marx.

As to attempts to regulate social phenomena by sociological methods, we are still wandering through the realms of gross empiricism and systematic error!

FROM DR. RENÉ WORMS

(*General Secretary of the International Institute of Sociology*).

The social sciences must not remain isolated; for each of them studies society only from a particular aspect, and cannot, therefore, give a complete conception. Therefore, they must unite in order to give an entire picture. This task devolves on sociology. The social sciences analyse society, each from its own point of view. Sociology produces its synthesis. Thus, it does not absorb the social sciences, but is the crown of their work. Sociology cannot dispense with the social sciences, because it derives all its materials from them; and, in their turn, the social sciences need sociology, for by its synthetic views it provides them with guiding ideas. Sociology may, therefore, be called the philosophy of the social sciences. According to modern interpretation, philosophy is a synthesis of the sciences. Sociology accomplishes this synthetic task in the social world, as biology and cosmology accomplish it in the organic and inorganic worlds. I have shown in detail how it operates in Vol. I of my book entitled "Philosophy of the Social Sciences" (published fifteen months ago), and of which Vol. II. is now in the press.

MR. BRANFORD'S REPLY.

Mr. Branford said he would refer to two points only. He had no authority to speak for Professor Durkheim, but he felt convinced that the intention of Professor Durkheim's paper had been apprehended and clearly set forth by Mr. Hobhouse. For, what Professor Durkheim had, he believed, intended to do, was to ask, and answer so far as may be in the short space at his disposal, the following questions:—What body of verified and verifiable knowledge, which can be called sociological, is to-day in existence, and where is it to be found? What are its main conditions, methods, and processes of continued growth? What are its most conspicuous defects, and how may we at the present moment work towards their remedy? The only other point he would refer to, was a misunderstanding of the aim and intention of the papers, which seemed to have arisen in the mind of several of the critics. In particular the Chairman had deeply misunderstood the purpose of the papers in one fundamental respect. Professor Bosanquet seemed to think that the writers of the papers advocated the systematisation of sociological specialisms by the exercise of mere logical faculty, apart from the experiential realities of the phenomena to be systematised. That was precisely what the papers did *not* advocate. They pressed the need for systematisation upon the attention of the sociological specialists themselves. Nothing was further from their intention than an appeal to the mere logician. The appeal was addressed to the specialist investigators themselves to employ, not the logician, but the resources of logic, in an endeavour to remedy the present disorder existing in the sociological province. In the same way an appeal was made to the specialists themselves to work towards a better organisation of sociological research, by employing, not the professed historian, but the resources of historical science. His diagnosis of the present situation in sociology, led him to believe that co-operation of all specialising groups would be greatly facilitated by a systematic survey of the whole sociological province. To insist that this survey must be at once logical and historical, was neither a counsel of perfection

nor a platitude, but a specific recommendation to sociological investigators to take better stock of, and more adequately utilise, the resources available for their problems. To the sociologist, logic and history should represent two aspects of one ideal—the ideal of Optimum Order in dealing with the phenomena of his research—the one aspect being order in dealing with co-existing phenomena, and the other, order in dealing with successive phenomena. The classification, or, as he preferred to say, the systematisation—or, better still, perhaps, the organisation—of the social sciences, was thus a problem at once historical and logical. And it was by emphasising the historical factor—as he had endeavoured to do in his paper—that two purposes might be served. In the first place, it would help to keep the problem real, and concrete; in the second place, it would serve as a continual reminder that classification or systematisation was only a recurring step in a never-ending process of unifying the work of dispersive specialisms. If the sociologist were faithful to his synthetic mission, he of all men would be the last whom the philosopher would be called upon to remind, that classification, systematisation, organisation are but means to an end—pathways to a higher goal. At the same time it must not be forgotten, that where natural affinities determined the arrangement, the classification itself expressed the most general aspect of the phenomena. Or, putting the same truth (doubtless a commonplace one to most of them) historically rather than logically—the more closely do sociological schemes of filiation approximate to actual phases of social evolution, the more does historical grouping itself express the largest evolutionary generalisation.

LETTER FROM PROFESSOR DURKHEIM IN
REPLY TO CRITICISMS.

Dear Sir,—Thank you for sending me the observations called forth by our communications to the Sociological Society. I am glad to see, by the number and importance of the answers received, the interest the question has aroused.

I should have wished, in turn, to reply to some of my critics ; but for that, the compilation of a considerable essay would be needed ; and I cannot, for the moment, entertain this idea by reason of total lack of leisure.

However, many of the criticisms seem to me to rest on a misinterpretation. I was especially concerned to combat the conception—still too widely accepted—which makes sociology a branch of philosophy, in which questions are only considered in their most schematic aspect, and are attacked without specialised competence. Consequently, I urged, above all, the need for a systematic specialisation, and I indicated what this specialisation should be. But I am far from denying that, above these particular sciences, there is room for a synthetic science, which may be called general sociology, or philosophy of the social sciences. It belongs to this science to disengage from the different specialist disciplines certain general conclusions, certain synthetic conceptions, which will stimulate and inspire the specialist, which will guide and illuminate his researches, and which will lead to ever-fresh discoveries ; resulting, in turn, in further progress of philosophical thought, and so on, indefinitely.

If I have somewhat neglected this aspect of the question, it is because of the special object in view in my paper. However, I have purposed for more than two years past, to develop this idea in an essay which would be the sequel and complement of the one summarised for the Sociological Society. Unfortunately, lack of time hitherto necessitated the postponement of this project, and I do not know when it will be possible to put it into practice. But, if at length I am enabled to publish this second part of my work, I shall be only too happy to lay it—as in the first case—before the Sociological Society.—I am, etc.,

E. DURKHEIM.

To the Secretary,
The Sociological Society.

SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.*

BY E. DURKHEIM AND E. FAUCONNET.

Sociology, in common parlance, is said to be the science of social facts, that is of the phenomena which reveal the true life of societies; and this definition may pass for a truism no longer disputed. The object of the science fails, however, to be determined by that alone. In fact, these very facts, which are assigned to it as subject matter are already the object of study of a host of special disciplines; such as the history of religion, of law, of political institutions, the sciences of statistics and economics, etc. We are confronted then apparently by the following alternative: either sociology really has the same object as the so-called historical and social sciences, and then is confounded with them, and is merely the generic term serving to denote them collectively; or it is really a distinct science, with an individuality of its own, in which case it must have an object peculiarly its own. Now, where is this to be found outside the circle of phenomena of which the various social sciences treat?

The aim of this essay is to point out the way of escape from this dilemma. We propose to establish, on the one hand, that sociology is and can only be the system, the corpus of the social sciences; on the other hand, that this *rapprochement* under a common title constitutes not merely a verbal operation, but implies and indicates a radical change in the method and organisation of these sciences. We do not intend to pursue the

* Translated from the *Revue Philosophique*, May, 1903.

demonstration of this by purely dialectical methods. We are not concerned with the logical analysis of the contents of an *a priori* idea. The discussion of mere mental concepts to which this leads is rightly recognised as sheerly unprofitable gymnastics. Sociology exists; it has a history displaying its nature; there is, therefore, no place for efforts to imagine what it is. We can observe it. Though no good purpose is served in disputing *in abstracto* what the science ought to be, there is on the contrary a real interest in becoming acquainted with the course of its development, in giving an account of the various elements whence it resulted, and of the parts they occupy respectively in the whole structure. We wish to attempt this in the pages which follow.

The reduction of sociology to be only the system of the social sciences sets us—so it seems at first sight—in opposition to the founders of the new science, and breaks with the tradition established by them. To mention only the greatest of them, Auguste Comte, it is very certain that he never regarded sociology as other than a single and integral branch of speculation, narrowly bound up with general philosophy. It is its crown and *pièce maitresse*. It is not there for its own sake, but because it alone can furnish the principle necessary for a complete systematisation of experience. Further, it could be said, not without reason, that in one sense it was not “a special science,” but “the only science,” “the universal science”; since the other sciences can be regarded as great sociological facts, and since the ensemble of what is given to us is subordinated to the supreme idea of humanity.* The Law of the Three Stages, indeed, which is the keynote of the whole *Cours de Philosophie Positive* is emphatically a sociological law; and since, on the other hand, the demonstration of this law rests on philosophical grounds relative to the conditions of knowledge, it results that the positive philosophy is wholly a sociology and the Comtist sociology is itself a philosophy.

Not only has the growing science of sociology displayed this character, but, further, it displayed it of necessity. It could only be born from the womb of a philosophy; for the traditions

* Lévy-Bruhl, *La Philosophie d'Auguste Comte*, p. 403.

opposed to its formation were philosophical. The first of these obstacles was the religious or metaphysical dualism which made of humanity a world apart—sheltered by some inscrutable privilege from the determinism whose existence is affirmed by the natural sciences in the remainder of the universe. For the foundation of the new science, the idea of natural law had therefore to be extended to human phenomena. As long as this primary condition was unfulfilled, no application of thought to social facts could give rise to a truly positive and progressive science. Want of this fundamental principle prevented the judicious and penetrating observations which Aristotle and Bossuet, Montesquieu and Condorcet, were able to make on the life of societies, from constituting a sociology. It could only result from a progress of philosophical thought. The dualist prejudice could only give way before a bold assertion of the unity of nature, and this assertion in its turn could only be the crown of a synthesis, more or less integral, of the different domains of knowledge already won by scientific investigation. Only by setting before itself the vision of the completed work, could the human mind pluck up the courage requisite for pushing it further. If the intellects of physicists, chemists and biologists are of a "positive" type, it is most frequently because their sciences have long been positive in character. Constant practice of the method usually pursued in them, knowledge of the results obtained, of the laws established, suffice to form their education. But to perceive the positive character of a science which was not yet formed, to assert of an order of phenomena that it is governed by laws before these laws are discovered—this needed a philosopher founding his positive faith in an encyclopædic culture, and fortifying it, moreover, by a summary outline of the science, without this sketch being separable from the general philosophy which had suggested the idea of it, and to which in turn it supplied a confirmation.

In yet another connection, sociology and positive philosophy imply one another. The assertion of the unity of nature was not in itself sufficient to invest social facts with the character of a new science. Materialistic monism also postulates that man is part of nature; but by making human life, whether individual or collective, a mere summation of physical forces, it renders sociology

and psychology alike superfluous. From this standpoint, social phenomena and their individual representations are, so to speak, reabsorbed in the material substratum which alone allows of scientific investigation. For the birth of sociology it was therefore not sufficient to proclaim the unity of reality and knowledge. This unity had to be affirmed by a philosophy which did not ignore the natural heterogeneity of things. It was not sufficient to have established that social facts are governed by laws; it had to be added that they have their own laws specific and comparable with physical or biological laws without being immediately reducible to the latter. Further, it was necessary for the discovery of these laws that the mind be applied directly to the study of the social kingdom, considered in itself without intermediary or substitute of any kind, leaving it in all its complexity. Now, we know that, for Comte, the various fundamental sciences are not reducible to one another, though their totality forms a homogeneous system. The unity of the method is no hindrance to their nature being specific. Thus, by the mere fact that sociology was put in the rank of the natural sciences, its individuality was assured. But the principle which guaranteed this evidently supposed a large comparison of the older sciences, of their methods and results, a comparison which could only be made in the course of a vast philosophical synthesis such as the positive philosophy.

Born from the womb of a philosophy, sociology had therefore of sheer necessity to display at its birth the distinctive character of every philosophical discipline, *i.e.*, a taste for general considerations and totality; and, on the other hand, a comparative indifference to the details of facts and the researches of specialists. Consequently, it was natural that it should grow up outside the circle of the special techniques as a kind of independent and self-contained speculation. This attitude, moreover, was justified by the condition of the sciences at the time, by the spirit in which they were pursued, which, on essential points, was radically opposed to that in which the new science proceeded. Not without reason, indeed, did Comte reproach the political economy of his time for being no truly positive science—with being honeycombed with metaphysical philosophy, with wasting time in

unproductive discussions on the elementary notions of value, utility, production,—discussions which bring to mind, says he, “the strange debates of the schoolmen of the Middle Ages on the fundamental attributes of their pure metaphysical entities.”* Further, the general confession of the economists “as to the isolation necessary to their pretended science in regard to social philosophy in general” appeared to him, with good reason, to constitute “an involuntary recognition, decisive though indirect, of the worthlessness of this theory from the scientific standpoint. For, by the nature of the subject, in social studies as in all those relating to animate objects, the various general aspects are, of necessity, mutually interdependent and logically inseparable, so as to be thoroughly elucidated only by the help the one of the other.”† It is certain, in fact, that the idea of natural law, as understood by Comte, was foreign to economic science. Doubtless, the economists made a wide use of the word law; but it had in their mouths a widely different meaning from that which it had in the natural sciences. It did not denote relations of facts which could be objectively observed among things, but purely logical connections between ideally conceived premises.

The economist was not occupied with discovering what happened in the actual world, nor with endeavouring to investigate how given effects are derived from causes similarly given; but with mentally combining purely formal ideas, such as those of value, utility, scarcity, supply and demand, etc.; and the same reproach could be levelled at the theories on law and morals most in vogue, both at that of Montesquieu and that of Kant.

For these different reasons, sociology could only therefore have its birth as a philosopher's idea, far from special disciplines and their influence. This characteristic itself was connected with causes too deep-rooted for all its *raison d'être* to have been lost in the day when the science received its beginning of organisation. For this reason, we should not be surprised at finding it reappearing with Spencer—Comte's immediate successor. What Spencer did for sociology as a philosopher is perfectly obvious:

* Cours de Phil. Pos. IV., p. 215.

† Ibid., p. 216.

he proposed not to study social facts in themselves and for their sake, but to show how the evolutionary hypothesis was verified in the social kingdom. But in doing so he found himself compelled, on a number of points, to correspondingly complete or rectify the generalisation of the Comtist sociology. Though Comte had definitely included human societies within the domain of nature, the extreme intellectualism with which his doctrine was imbued agreed ill with this fundamental axiom of all sociology. If it be the evolution of science which determines evolution in politics, in economics, in morals, and in the fine arts, there is a great gulf fixed between sociological explanations and those in vogue in the other natural sciences ; and it is difficult to refrain from falling again into mere ideologism. By showing that, under diverse forms, one and the same law governs the social and physical world, Spencer drew more tightly the bonds connecting societies with the rest of the universe. From him also we derive the conception that under the facts appearing on the surface of the social consciousness, obscure forces are in motion which move men, though not in the way of sheer logical necessity analogous to that which links together successive phases of scientific development. Again, Comte did not admit a plurality of social types. According to him, there existed only a single society, that is human association considered generally ; and the particular "states" merely represent the different moments in the history of this single society. Sociology thus occupied a strange position among the sciences, since it had for its subject a being unique of its kind. Spencer got rid of this anomaly by pointing out that societies like organisms can be classified in genera and species, and, whatever the value of his classification, the principle at least deserved to live and has lived. Though elaborated philosophically, these two reforms therefore constituted invaluable gains for the science of sociology.

But though this method of understanding and constructing sociology has certainly been at a given moment necessary and useful, this necessity and this utility were only provisional. For its constitution, and even for the taking of its first steps in progress, sociology had to lean on a philosophy, but to become truly itself, it was indispensable that it should adopt another character.

II.

The very example of Comte may serve as a proof of this ; for, on account of the philosophical character of his mind, the sociology which he constructed is found to satisfy none of the conditions which he himself demanded for every particular science.

In fact, of the two divisions into which he has separated this science—statical and dynamical—he really dealt with the latter only. The dynamics of sociology was, moreover, the more important from this standpoint. For if there are, as he tells us, social facts distinct from the purely individual phenomena, this is chiefly owing to there being a progressive evolution of the human race—that is, owing to each generation's work surviving it, and being added to that of succeeding generations. Progress is *the* social fact *par excellence*. Now, social dynamics, as he explained it, presents in no degree "that continuity and fertility," which, according to the criteria of Comte himself, constitute "the least equivocal marks of every truly scientific conception."* For Comte considered the science as virtually completed by himself. In fact, it is wholly contained in the law of the three stages ; and this law once discovered, it is not easy to see how it would be possible to complete it, extend it, and still less what laws other than this could be discovered. The science was brought to a conclusion with its foundations barely laid. Those disciples of Comte, in fact, who are strictly adherents to the letter of his teaching, could only reproduce their master's propositions—illustrating them sometimes with new examples—but these purely formal variations did not constitute really new discoveries. Thus is explained the arrested development of the true and orthodox Comtist school : the same formulæ have been piously repeated without any advance being realised. A science cannot live and move when it is reduced to a single and unique problem, on which a mighty intellect sets his seal for ever and ever. For progress, it must be resolved into an ever-increasing number of special questions, so as to render possible the co-operation of different minds and successive genera-

* Cours, IV., 214.

tions. On this condition alone will it have the general and impersonal character without which scientific research is non-existent. Now, this single philosophic conception to which Comte was moulding sociology was antagonistic to this division of labour. Further, is not his social dynamics at bottom a philosophy of history, remarkable for its profoundness and novelty, but constructed on the model of earlier philosophies? It is concerned with tracing the law governing "the necessary and continuous movement of humanity," which alone will allow of the introduction into the historical "march of events," of that unity and continuity which is wanting to it. But Bousset himself had this object in view. His method and solution are both different, but his investigation is of the same character.*

Nevertheless, despite the instruction to be gained from the check of such an attempt, sociology has remained as regards the majority of our contemporaries almost what it was for Comte—an essentially philosophical speculation. During the last twenty years we have witnessed a veritable flood of sociological literature. The production of works upon this subject, formerly intermittent and rare, has become continuous; new systems have been built up; they are in course of construction every day. But they are always or almost always systems in which the whole science is brought back, more or less openly, to a single and distinctive problem. As with Comte, and as with Spencer, the attempt is still made to discover the law governing social evolution in its entirety. Here we have the law of imitation, there the law of adaptation or the struggle for existence, more particularly the struggle between races; there again, it is the action of the physical environment, etc. In good sooth, to see all these workers searching for the supreme law, for the cause which

* Comte's *Social Statics* consists in a small number of theories which in character recall the philosophical speculations of "politics," of preceding centuries, on the family, the nature of the social bond, that of government. Without doubt, one finds there valuable indications. But not only are most of the modes of grouping—clans, classes, castes, corporations, cities, towns, etc.—not considered, but even the fundamental element, the family, is conceived as always identical; the idea of a classification of different types of domestic organisation, which implies the idea of different correlations between the family and the largest organisations, did not present itself to Comte's mind. There was therefore no room for fresh discoveries, and the theory of the family was complete at a stroke.

determines all causes, for the key* which opens all locks—one can hardly help thinking of the alchemists of former times in search of the philosopher's stone.

Far from progress having been achieved by these labours, the net result has rather been a relapse. Comte, at least, looked on sociology as the science integrating all social facts; as comprising the multifarious aspects of the collective life; no category of phenomena was excluded on principle. If he refused to see a social science in political economy, that was because political economy was treated in a totally unscientific spirit, which mistook the true nature of social reality. But he nowise aimed at banishing economic facts beyond the pale of sociology. Consequently, the way remained open to an ultimate division of labour, to an increasing specialisation of the problems, in proportion as the bounds of the science were extended, and its complexity was better realised. On the contrary, amongst the most recent sociologists there has, little by little, emerged this idea—that sociology is distinct from the social sciences, and that there is a general social science, in contrast with these particular disciplines, which has its own object, its peculiar method, and for which is reserved the name of sociology.

Starting from the fact that the social sciences have been built up outside the great philosophical synthesis for which the word sociology was coined, recent sociologists have concluded that there ought to exist two sharply differentiated sorts of investigation, viz., the social sciences on the one hand and sociology itself on the other. Thus, while each particular social science is confined to a definite series of social phenomena, to sociology has been allocated for its object, collective life in general. That is to say, it is in virtue of its title as a *general* social science that sociology has been endowed with a distinct individuality.†

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In whatever way we look at it, to separate sociology from

* The phrase is Mr. Tarde's (*Laws of Imitation*, q. v.) who brings it forward under the authority of a philosopher who appears to be Taine. But, whatever the author, it appears to us very little scientific. We do not believe there is any science in which a key of this kind exists. Locks have to be opened, it may even be said forced, one after another, and laboriously.

[† In several succeeding sections of their paper MM. Durkheim and Fauconnet here proceed

the social sciences is to separate it, or at least to place it out of contact with reality ; it is to reduce it to the position of a formal and vague philosophy ; it is, in consequence, to deprive it of the distinctive characters of all positive sciences. And it is certainly to this unnatural separation that must be attributed the alarming state in which one finds sociological studies to-day. It must, indeed, be recognised that in spite of a relative abundance of production, sociological studies give one the impression that sociologists are merely marking time ; and this, if prolonged, must end in general discredit. Each sociologist makes it his aim to construct a complete theory of society. Now, systems of this amplitude, whatever their merit, must of necessity suffer the grave inconvenience of being too closely linked to the personality and temperament of their author to be readily detached. Consequently, each thinker being tied to his own doctrine, all division of labour and continuity in research become impossible, and as a result no progress can, in a scientific sense, ensue. For in order to master a reality of such large extent and such complexity, it is necessary, and that moreover at each moment of time, that the greatest possible number of workers should participate in the task, and that even successive generations should co-operate. Now, such a co-operation is only possible if the problems are taken out of this indefinite generality for purposes of differentiation and specialisation.

III.

The lesson to be learned therefore from the actual condition of sociology is not at all that the Comtist conception was sterile, that the idea of a positive science of societies comparable with biology must be abandoned. On the contrary, this idea keeps still to-day all its value, and we must resolutely maintain it. Only to make it a fruitful one, it must be applied to suitable

to examine in detail the sense in which J. S. Mill, Giddings and Simmel respectively have used the word "general" in their postulation of a general science of sociology with a subject matter distinct from that of the special social sciences. In each case, MM. Durkheim and Fauconnet find the claim invalid, and they declare the resulting study to partake of a literary, philosophical and personal character, and to be without the essential criteria of science.—*Editors.*]

subject matter, *i.e.*, to the sum of social facts without exception. There is no place for the isolation of this or that aspect to make it the special object of study of the new science, any more than that biology should treat one aspect of the phenomena of life rather than another. Sociology is nothing if not the science of societies considered from the point of view of their organisation, functions, and future. All that enters into their constitution, or enters into the course of their development, is the sociologist's province. Such an immense number of phenomena can clearly only be studied by the aid of a certain number of special disciplines, among which the facts are apportioned and which mutually complement each other. Therefore, sociology can only be the system of the social sciences.

But this is not saying that it is only a new name labelling a category of things long existent, and that the Comtist reform is merely a verbal one. The word sociology sums up and implies a whole order of new ideas: namely, that social facts are indissolubly linked together, and, above all, must be treated as natural phenomena governed by invariable laws. To say that the various social sciences should be particular branches of sociology is therefore to state that they should be positive sciences themselves; that they should be developed in the same spirit as the other sciences of nature, and inspired by the methods which these employ, while keeping their own individualities. Now, they were born outside the circle of the natural sciences. Social studies were brought potentially within the circle of the sciences by the mere birth of the idea of sociology; and, by that fact alone, the social sciences are brought under sociological influence. Integrating them into a sociology is not simply imposing a new generic name on them; it is claiming that they must be oriented in a new direction. This conception of natural law, which it is Comte's glory to have extended to the social kingdom in general, must be applied to detailed facts, and found a home among these special researches from which it was originally absent, and into which it cannot be introduced without accomplishing an entire revolution in them. There, in our opinion, lies the task of the sociologist of to-day and the true way of continuing the work of Comte and Spencer; for it

maintains their fundamental principle, but gives it its true value, by applying it no longer to a restricted category of social phenomena, more or less arbitrarily chosen, but to the whole area of social life.

Such an enterprise is so far from connoting only an enrichment of our vocabulary, that the more immediate reason to fear is lest its achievement may be deferred to the distant future. Given indeed the original antagonism between sociology and the other so-called sciences (history and political economy, etc.), it would appear that the latter are unsusceptible of assuming a sociological character, except through a veritable revolution which could make a clean sweep of all which exists, and draw from the void a whole body of as yet non-existent sciences. Were that the task of the sociologist, it would be an extremely difficult one, and of uncertain issue. The changes spontaneously produced during these last fifty years, however, in the leading ideas of specialists, facilitate the task, and give hopes of results in the near future. The specialists themselves have of their own accord begun to reorient their studies in a sociological direction. A very important work has been done in this respect, which, although not the work of sociologists properly so called, is undoubtedly destined to profoundly affect the future development of sociology. It is of importance to note this; for not only does this spontaneous evolution prove the possibility of the progress, the need for which we have explained, but it allows us the better to understand how it can and should be realised.

It is not necessary to recall at length the great transformation through which the historical method has passed during the century. Beyond the particular and contingent events whose succession constitutes the apparent history of societies, historians went in search of something more fundamental and permanent, to which their researches might be connected. This they have found in Institutions. To them, institutions are in fact to these external incidents what the structure and functioning of the physiological organs are to the movements of all kinds which make up our daily life. Owing to this, history ceases to be a matter of narrative, and is opened to scientific analysis; for the

facts which are eliminated or rejected, on the second plan, are of all collective manifestations the most difficult for science to deal with, being essentially peculiar to each social unit considered at a definite moment of its career. No analogies to them exist either in the same or in different societies. Wars, treaties, court intrigues, or the intrigues of assemblies, actions of statesmen, are combinations which never resemble one another; they can, therefore, only be recounted; and, rightly or wrongly, they appear to follow no definite law. It can be said with certainty that, in any case, if these laws exist they are the most difficult to discover. On the other hand, institutions during their evolution preserve their essential characteristics throughout long periods of time, and even on occasion through all the series of a continuous collective existence; for they express the more constitutional elements in every social organisation. From another standpoint, once stripped of this covering of particular facts which conceals the internal structure, it could be asserted of them that this structure, while varying more or less from one country to another, presented striking similarities in different societies. *Rapprochements* thus became possible, and comparative history had its birth. The Germanists and the German Romanists, Maurer, Wilda, etc., established resemblances between the laws of the various Germanic peoples, and between those of the Germans and Romans. By comparison of the classical texts relating to the organisation of Greek and Roman cities, Fustel de Coulanges managed to portray in its essential particulars the abstract type of the city. With Sumner Maine, the field of comparison, still further widened, embraced besides Greece, Italy, India, Ireland, the Slav nations; and unsuspected resemblances were revealed among nations which up to that time were supposed to have no features in common.

Nothing better witnesses the importance of the scientific transformations which have just been referred to than the evolution which political economy underwent during the 19th century. Under the influence of different ideas, otherwise ill-defined, but which it is, however, possible to refer to two principal types, it has in Germany lost some of the characters which made it possible for Comte to contrast it with sociology as the type of the "ideologic" method of construction. To establish the

legitimacy of Protection, and more generally of the economic action of the State, List reacted against both the individualism and the cosmopolitanism of the Liberal school. The "National System of Political Economy" maintains the principle that intermediate between humanity and the individual is the nation, with its language, literature, institutions, manners and past. The classical economist fashioned an economic world having no existence—the *Guterwelt*, an isolated world uniform throughout—in which the conflict of purely individual forces acted according to inflexible economic laws. As a matter of fact, individuals make their efforts to grow rich in collectivities widely different from one another; and the nature of these efforts changes, and their success varies, with the characteristics of the collectivity in which they are displayed. The practical consequence of this principle is that the State acts on the economic conduct of individuals by means of the reforms which it introduces, and by its external policy. The theoretical consequence is that economic laws vary from one nation to another, and that consequently a "National Economy" based on observation, should take the place of the abstract, *a priori* economics. True, the conception of a "nation" is a mystical, obscure idea; and the very definition of national economy excludes the possibility of truly scientific laws, since it conceives its object as unique, and excludes comparison. List made, nevertheless, an important step in advance by introducing into economic speculation the idea that a given society has a real existence, and that the economic and other manifestations of its own life are in reciprocal relations.

"Socialism of the chair," attempting also to found theoretically its political conception of the rule of the State, adapted and perfected List's idea. It is not enough to say that economic activity of individuals is dependent on social phenomena; we must add that only by abstraction can we speak of individual economic activity. What *is* real is the *Volkswirtschaft*, the economic activity of society having as its peculiar object economic, ethical and juridical phenomena. This *Volkswirtschaft* is the immediate object of economic science; it is occupied essentially with social concerns, and, by way of consequence only, with individual interests. Here, political economy, though

preserving a normative more than speculative character, is at least clearly conceived as a social science with truly social phenomena for its object, of the same nature as other social institutions.

Another phase of progress, akin to the foregoing, was accomplished at the same time. The historical spirit applies itself to all the particular characteristics which distinguish societies and epochs from one another. "National Economy" had therefore to find in history its argument against the universalist theories of the classical school. From the moment of its origin, List is invoking the historical method; and Roscher, the founder of the historical school, does not separate the study of economic facts from that of juridical facts in particular, and from social facts in general. Language, religion, art, science, law, the state, and industry—all are different aspects of one complete whole, which is national life. This school has had a special influence in the development of political economy. It has assumed an attitude here definitely speculative, and without having at any time entirely lost sight of historical research as a means of judging the value of a given political action in given circumstances; it has occupied itself with matters without much reference to their practical aspect, and has insisted on studying them with a view to their comprehension alone. It has introduced to some slight extent the comparative method in economic history, and, among its most recent exponents, Schmoller has clearly formulated the idea that economic laws are inductive. Another—Bücher—has sketched a classification of economic *régimes*, thus constructing abstract types to which by their economic organisations all nations, whether present or past, belong. Both, and particularly the latter, are no longer content with studying historic societies. They already demand some information from ethnography as to the economic condition of lower races.

What, however, far more than this reconstruction of history and economics, constitutes the great movement of the century, is the appearance of a whole array of new disciplines which, by the very nature of the questions with which they deal, are led from the first to establish principles and practise methods hitherto ignored.

First, we have two allied sciences—Anthropology or Ethnography on the one hand, the Science or History of Civilisations on the other. With the commencement of the century, Humboldt, relying on already ascertained facts, was able to assert the unity of the human mind as a fundamental axiom—as that which implied the possibility of comparison between the various historical phenomena of human activity. Once this postulate was granted, science was naturally led to study and classify them, just as races and languages are studied, in order to establish the unity of the diverse human civilisations. Such was the work of Klemm in Germany, in his *Kulturgeschichte*, of Prichard in England, in his *History of Man*. The founding of prehistoric archæology, by affording striking proofs that the human race in very ancient times must have everywhere passed through a state similar to that in which savages remain who can actually be observed to-day, went yet further in extending the field of these investigations and fortifying their methods. Not only the unity of the human minds, but the relative identity of human evolution, was thus demonstrated. The impulse once given, ethnographic discoveries rapidly followed one another, calling attention to remarkable similarities between the most different nations. This it was which the partial encyclopædias of Schoolcraft and Bancroft already revealed, but it was most clearly put in evidence by the great work of Waitz Gerland, in which is found synthetised the ethnographic and anthropological work of a whole epoch.

These syntheses, nevertheless, were almost exclusively descriptive. In connection with juridical phenomena was the first attempt at an explanatory systematisation made. Discoveries relative to the history of the family contributed largely to the result. Disputable as the theories of Bachhofen, Morgan, MacLennan, etc., were in many respects, they proved by evidence the existence of forms of the “family,” very different from those known up to that time, and also their *generality*. The remarkable identity of the nomenclature of parentage in Australia, and among the Redskins of North America, was not a fact to be neglected. The similarities between the Iroquois tribes and the Romance nations, if exaggerated by Morgan, were not purely fictitious. Resemblances of the same kind were proved in the

case of criminal law and the law of property, and thus a school of comparative law was founded, whose object it was to bring out these agreements, to classify them systematically, and endeavour to explain them. This is the school of ethnographic jurisprudence, or juridical ethnology, of which Herman Post may be regarded as founder, and with which are bound up the names of Kohler, Bernhoeft, and even Steinmetz.

The studies of religions underwent an almost identical evolution. With the help of comparative grammar, Max Müller founded comparative mythology; but this comparative study remained for a long while confined simply to the historical religions of the Aryan nations. Under the influence of ethnography and of anthropology (or ethnology as the English call it) the field of comparison was widened. Numerous scholars—Mannhardt in Germany; Tylor, Lang, Robertson Smith, Frazer, Sidney Hartland in England; Wilken in Holland—collected a considerable number of facts which tended to prove the uniformity of religious beliefs and observances throughout the whole human race. Armed with the “survival” theory, the same authors annexed at one stroke to the comparative science of religions, the whole mass of facts which the Folklore or Volkskunde of the Germans—observed, registered and brought together from the commencement of the century—contained; and they received by that incorporation a new significance. The customs of our own peasants, magical practices, ideas concerning death, tales and legends, all appeared now as the *débris* of ancient civilisation and ancient beliefs. Thus the religions of the most advanced societies and the most backward tribes were mutually bound together and served to explain one another.

The result of these investigations went to show that social phenomena were no longer to be considered the product of chance combinations, of arbitrary wills, of local and fortuitous circumstances. Their generality witnesses their essential dependence on general causes which, whenever present, produce their effects; always the same with a necessity equal to that of other natural causes. Ethnological jurisprudence, says Post, “has discovered in the juridical life of every nation widespread parallelisms which cannot be referred to purely accidental conditions, but must be con-

sidered as emanations from human nature as such. This discovery confirms one of the most fundamental propositions of modern ethnology, *i.e.*, that it is not we who think, but that the world thinks in us."* Further, historical analysis itself, becoming more acute, finally recognised the impersonal character of the forces which govern history. Underlying the action of princes, statesmen, legislators, individual geniuses of all kinds, which was formerly thought to be the preponderating influence, is discovered the decisive influence of the mass. It is realised that legislation is only the codification of popular manners and customs; that it can only exist by driving its roots into the mind of nations; and that on the other hand the manners, customs, mind of nations are not things created at will, but are the work of the nations themselves. Students of social science have even gone so far as to assign an important part to collectivities, in a region which might be considered, not unreasonably, as more particularly reserved to the individual, *i.e.*, in art and literature. Literary monuments, such as the Bible, Homeric poems, and other great national epics, have been ascribed to an obscure and indeterminate assembly of anonymous co-workers. If nations, however, have a peculiar method of thinking and feeling, this mental life can become the object of science as much as that of individuals. A new science therefore took its birth in Germany, with a view to studying the products of this particular psychological activity: that is, the *Völkerpsychologie* or folk-psychology, of which Lazarus and Steinthal are the founders. However meagre we may judge the results obtained by these investigators to have been, their attempt did not fail, at least, to have an ample significance.

Finally, a science which made its first appearance only at the time when the *Cours de Philosophie Positive* was written, but which has undergone considerable developments during these last thirty years, added an important contribution to these ideas. This was statistics. Statistics, in fact, proves by measurement the existence of these general and impersonal forces. From the day when it was established that every nation has a birth-rate, marriage-rate, its own criminal statistics, etc.—which can be numerically

* Grundriss der Ethnologischen Jurisprudenz, i., p. 4.

evaluated, which remains constant so long as the circumstances are the same, but which may vary from one nation to another—it became evident that these various categories of action, births, marriages, crimes, suicides, etc., depend not on the capricious wills of individuals, but express social conditions permanent and definite whose intensity can be measured.

The raw material of social life thus took a consistence and fixity even in that part which appeared most fluid, and invited, quite naturally, scientific investigation. Where for a long time had been seen nothing but isolated advances without connecting links between them, were found the evidences of a system of definite laws. It was this that the very title of Quetelet's book expressed, in which he developed the fundamental principles of moral statistics, *Du Système Social et des lois qui le régissent*.

IV.

Rapid and incomplete as this sketch is, there flows from it the fact that henceforth the sociological idea is no longer entirely the monopoly of sociologists alone. Clearly the various scientific enterprises with which we have just been dealing gravitate more and more towards the same idea. For, implicitly or explicitly, they are all founded on the principle that social phenomena obey laws, and these laws can be determined.

The specialisation needed therefore by sociology, in order to become a truly positive science, does not constitute a sort of great work without historical precedent; it is on the contrary the natural result of a whole movement. It is not a matter of inventing and creating in every direction all kinds of new disciplines at present unknown; for the most part, it is sufficient to develop a certain number of the existing sciences in the direction in which they spontaneously tend. Real as this spontaneous evolution is, much remains to be done. The necessary work is prepared, not accomplished. Because the specialists are closely in touch with the facts, they have a more lively apprehension of the diversity and complexity of things, and in consequence are less inclined to rest satisfied with simple formulas and easy explanations. But, as against this, since they

have not taken in advance a general view of the regions to be explored, they proceed somewhat hap-hazard, without setting before themselves an idea of the end to be attained, nor of the close solidarity which unites them and makes them co-workers in the same field. Consequently, they fail in many respects to make their science a conception truly worthy of its subject-matter.

To begin with: since these various disciplines are carried on apart from one another and almost without knowledge of one another, the way in which they have divided up the social world is not always in harmony with the nature of things. For example, till recent times geography and demology (or science of population) remained strangers to one another, and now only begin to intermingle. Nevertheless, both investigate the same subject, *i.e.*, the material substratum of society; for what is it which constitutes essentially the body of society if not the social area with the population which fills this area? There are here two facts inextricably bound up with one another: the density of a community varies with the extent of territory which it occupies, with the shape of this territory, the number and direction of the water courses, the situation of mountain chains, etc. On the other hand, the exterior forms of social groups vary in time, and it is the historian, generally, who studies these variations. For example, the origin and development of rural and urban population is a problem usually relegated to the province of history. Yet to really understand the nature and actual part played by these groups—questions with which demology is concerned—it is indispensable to know their origin and the circumstances of their origin. There is therefore a whole array of historical studies which are inseparable from demology and also, in consequence, from social geography. Now, it is not merely for the better ordering of science that there is interest in drawing these fragmentary researches from their isolated position, but with their *rapprochement* new problems appear which otherwise would remain unsuspected. This was well shown by Ratzel's attempt which was characterised precisely by the use of the sociological method. Because this geographer was at once an ethnographer and historian, he was enabled to perceive, for example, that the different forms through which the frontiers of nations have passed

could be classified under a certain number of distinct types whose conditions he attempted then to determine. There is therefore a reason for uniting in one and the same science all the various researches which refer to the material substratum of society ; we have proposed elsewhere to give this science the name of Social Morphology. Inversely, it would be easy to show that other disciplines maintaining only indirect relations with one another are confounded together so as to form an amalgam destitute of any unity. Who could say with precision in what consisted the "*Kulturgeschichte*" of the Germans, or their "*Volkerpsychologie*," or their "*Volkskunde*"? How could such composite researches, formed of elements so little related, practise a method of any definiteness? For the nature of a method, having always direct relation to the nature of its object, cannot be more determinate than the object is.

But this condition of dispersion has another and perhaps more widespread consequence : it hinders the various sciences from being "social" other than in name. In fact, unless this word be applied to them as a meaningless epithet, their fundamental principle must be that all the phenomena with which they deal are social—that is, are manifestations of one and the same reality—society. Those only which present this character should be retained by the observer, and explanation should consist in letting it be seen how they partake of the nature of societies, and the particular way in which they express it.

But so long as specialists are solely concerned with their respective specialisms, it is impossible for them to be partakers together in this leading idea ; for as each investigates only a portion of the whole, which he himself takes for the whole, the adequate idea of the whole—society—escapes them. They say that the phenomena with which they are concerned are social, because they are clearly produced amongst human associations. But society is very seldom considered as the determining cause of the action of which it is the scene. For example, we have mentioned what progress the science of religions has made, but it is still quite exceptional to find religious systems connected with definite social systems as the conditions of their existence. Religious beliefs and practices are always presented to us as the

outcome of feelings which are born and nurtured in the individual conscience, and whose mode of expression alone, because it is external, is clothed in social forms. Such impressions as are left on the mind by the sight of the play of great world forces, by the experiences of sleep and death, would have formed the raw material of religion. Juridical anthropology, on its part, while declaring that law is a social attribute, is chiefly occupied in referring to certain attributes of human nature in general. In the similarities which juridical institutions present in various communities, students of this school have found the proof that a juridical conscience of humanity exists, and this primeval and fundamental conscience they have undertaken to retrace. Post, for example, expressly presents to us "the laws of the various nations of the earth as the form taken by the universal juridical conscience of humanity reflected in each particular national conscience." This admits a natural law *a posteriori*, prior to the formation of societies, and by implication, at least logically, in the moral conscience of the human individual. Social considerations can from this standpoint be invoked only to show how this primitive and universal heritage is differentiated in detail according to the various national individualities. As for political economy, we know how its general propositions, to which it gave the name of laws, were for a very long time deemed independent of all conditions of space and time, consequently also of all associative conditions. It is true that recently, owing to Bücher and Schmoller, economic science has been oriented in a new direction, thanks to the formation of economic types. These attempts, however, remain isolated, and the method, moreover, is as yet very uncertain. In the case of Schmoller especially, in an eclecticism somewhat confused, we meet with methods and inspirations of very various origin.

Even the principle of the interdependence of social facts, though readily enough admitted theoretically, is far from being effectively put into practice. The moralist still studies moral phenomena as if they were separable from juridical phenomena, of which, however, they are only a variety. The jurists, on their part, are very rarely met with who recognise that law is unintelligible if severed from religion, from which it received its principal

distinctive marks, and of which it is only, in part, a derivation. Inversely, historians of religion do not usually appreciate the necessity for setting the religious beliefs and observances of nations in connection with their political organisation. Or, yet again, when a specialist does happen to realise that the facts with which he deals have solidarity with other associative manifestations, if he wishes to discover in what their solidarity exists, he is obliged to reconsider his point of view and to integrate in his research all those special sciences whose help is necessary to him.

Schmoller has done this in his "*Grundriss der Allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre*." It is altogether a sociology from the economist's standpoint. It can readily be imagined how fragile such a synthesis is, made up of such heterogeneous investigations, which demand an equal heterogeneity of special aptitudes. A spontaneous co-operation of all those particular sciences can alone give to each of them the idea of the relations in which they stand to one another.

Thus, though they tend more and more to orient themselves in a sociological direction, this orientation still remains, in many respects, indecisive and unrecognised. To work to give it precision and accentuate it, and to render it more conscious, is, in our opinion, the urgent problem of sociology. We must implant the sociological idea more deeply in these various techniques, which doubtless are spontaneously raising themselves towards it, but only slowly, in doubt and darkness of mind. Then, indeed, the Comtist conception will cease to be a vision of the mind, and will become a reality. For the unity of the social kingdom cannot find adequate expression in a few general and philosophical formulæ far removed from facts and the detail of investigation. Such a conception can only have as its organ a body of distinct and unified sciences, all animated with a feeling of their solidarity.

Moreover, one can foresee that these sciences, once organised, will restore to philosophy, with interest, what they have borrowed from it. For, from the relations established among them, common doctrines will emerge, which will prove the soul of the organism thus constituted, and will become the subject-matter of a renewed and rejuvenated social philosophy that is positive and progressive, like those very sciences whose crown it will be.

APPENDIX

THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

President: The Rt. Hon. JAMES BRYCE, M.P., D.C.L., F.R.S., &c.

COUNCIL.

Chairman: Mr. E. W. BRABROOK, C.B.

Ex-President, Economic Section, British Association; Ex-President, Folklore Society;
Vice-President, Anthropological Institute: Vice-President, Royal Statistical Society.

Dr. J. H. BRIDGES	...	M.B.; Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians; late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford.
Sir JOHN A. COCKBURN	...	M.D., K.C.M.G.; late Premier and Minister of Education, South Australia.
Miss C. E. COLLET	...	M.A.; Hon. Sec., London Economic Club; Author of "Educated Working Women," &c.
Dr. C. M. DOUGLAS	...	M.P., D.Sc.; formerly Lecturer in Moral Philosophy, Edin. Univ.
Professor GEDDES...	...	President, Edinburgh School of Sociology.
Mr. G. P. GOOCH	...	M.A.; Author of "Annals of Politics and Culture."
Mr. G. L. GOMME	...	Ex-President, Folklore Society; Author of "The Village Community," &c.
Dr. A. C. HADDON	...	F.R.S., D.Sc.; Lecturer in Ethnology, Cambridge; Fellow of Christ's College; Ex-President, Anthropological Institute.
Mr. J. A. HOBSON	...	B.A.; Author of "Economics of Distribution," "The Evolution of Modern Capitalism," &c.
Mr. L. T. HOBHOUSE	...	M.A.; late Fellow and Assistant Tutor, Corpus Christi College, Oxford.
Mr. J. C. HUDSON	...	Hon. Sec., The British Child Study Association.
Mr. BENJAMIN KIDD	...	Author of "Social Evolution," "Principles of Western Civilisation," &c.
Rev. A. L. LILLEY	...	B.A.; Rector of St. Mary's, Paddington.
Professor C. S. LOCH	...	M.A.; Professor of Political Economy, King's College, University of London; Secretary, Charity Organisation Society.
Mr. DAVID MAIR	...	B.A.; Civil Service Commission.
Sir JOHN MACDONNELL	...	Master of the Supreme Court; Vice-President, Statistical Society; Professor of Comparative Law, University College, London.
Mr. H. J. MACKINDER...	...	M.A.; Director, School of Economics and Political Science (University of London); Reader in Geography, Oxford.
Mr. H. OSMAN NEWLAND	...	F.R.Hist.S.; Author of "A Short History of Citizenship."
Dr. F. W. MOTT	...	M.D., F.R.S.; Pathologist to the London County Asylums.
Mr. J. M. ROBERTSON	...	Author of "Buckle and his Critics," &c.
Hon. ROLLO RUSSELL...	...	M.A.; F.R. Met. Society; Author of "Epidemics," &c.
Dr. C. W. SALEEBY	...	M.D.; Author of "The Cycle of Life according to Modern Science."
Mr. S. H. SWINNY	...	M.A.; President, London Positivist Society.
Mr. JOHN STRUTHERS	...	C.B.; Scottish Board of Education.
Mr. E. J. URWICK	...	M.A.; Tutor, School of Sociology and Social Economics.
Mr. GRAHAM WALLAS...	...	M.A.; Teacher of Political Science, The University, London.
Mr. H. G. WELLS	...	Author of "Mankind in the Making," &c.
Dr. E. WESTERMARCK	...	Ph.D.; Author of "History of Human Marriage," &c.
Mr. J. MARTIN WHITE	...	Vice-President, Scottish Association for the Promotion of Technical Education.

Secretary: VICTOR V. BRANFORD, M.A., 5, Old Queen Street, Westminster, S.W.

Bankers: THE CLYDESDALE BANK, Lombard Street, E.C.

ORIGIN OF THE SOCIETY.

A conference was held in London, in June, 1903, to consider whether the opportunity was suitable for the formation of a Society to promote sociological studies. The conference was attended by about 56 representatives of various departments of social investigation—economic, anthropological, historical, psychological, ethical, &c.—of philosophy, of education, and of practical social interests. It was unanimously resolved to proceed with the formation of a Sociological Society, and a large General Committee was appointed to carry out the necessary preliminary requirements. At a General Meeting in November, 1903, the Society was duly constituted and the present Council elected, with Mr. Bryce as first President of the Society. Four Meetings of the Society were held in the Spring and Summer Terms of 1904, for papers and discussions—these being included in the first volume of "SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS" (Macmillan, 1905).

SCOPE AND AIMS OF THE SOCIETY.

The aims of the Sociological Society are scientific, educational, and practical. It seeks to promote investigation, and to advance education in the social sciences in their various aspects and applications.

Its field covers the whole phenomena of society. The origin and development, the decay and extinction of societies, their structure and classification, their internal functions and interaction have to be observed and compared; and all this with increasing precision and completeness. The many standpoints from which social phenomena may be considered have thus all to be utilised. In this way the Society affords the common ground on which workers from all fields and schools may profitably meet—geographer and naturalist, anthropologist and archæologist, historian and philologist, psychologist and moralist, all contributing their results towards a fuller Social Philosophy, including the natural and civil history of man, his achievements and his ideals.

This conception of social evolution involves a clearer valuation of the conditions and forces which respectively hinder or help development, which make towards degeneration or towards progress. The physician and the alienist, the criminologist and the jurist, have here again their common meeting-ground with hygienist and educationist, with philanthropist, social reformer and politician, with journalist and cleric.

Such mutual understanding among different workers must obviously tend to promote a clearer delimitation of respective fields, and a mutual suggestiveness towards methods of cultivation also—in other words, an extending division of labour, an increasing co-operation. But these fields are the aspects or subdivisions of sociology, both pure and applied; these methods, with their corresponding nomenclature and notations, have to be compared and unified, to furnish the methods of sociology.

The place of sociology among the sciences thus comes more clearly into view ; and the growing body of organised social knowledge may thus claim its place ; not only in the scheme of the logician and the synthesis of the philosopher, but in the education of the liberal professions and in the councils of the practical world.

PROGRAMME OF THE SOCIETY.

The Society prosecutes its work by means customary to a learned society—Meetings for Papers and Discussions, the collection of relevant periodical and book Literature, and by Publications.

It has been suggested that an endeavour should be made to hold meetings for papers and discussion in joint conference with those societies which deal with special aspects of social phenomena.

LIBRARY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The great output of specifically sociological literature which has characterised the past two or three decades—more particularly on the Continent and in America—is not adequately represented even in the largest libraries in this country. There does not seem to be any institution in this country where a student of sociology can at present consult a complete file of the leading journals of sociology. To collect and maintain for reference an adequate library of sociological books and periodicals is one of the pressing duties before the Society.

PROMOTION OF SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES.

While many foreign Universities have established Chairs and Lectureships in Sociology, the subject as such had, previous to the formation of the Society, been unrepresented in the Universities of this country. One of its founders (Mr. J. Martin White) placed at the disposal of London University a fund for the initiation of sociological teaching in the University. Under this scheme, research work is being carried on, and courses of lectures have been given—by Professor Geddes (“Civics”), Dr. Westermarck (“Social Institutions”), and Dr. Haddon (“Anthropology”). Mr. L. T. Hobhouse has also given in the University of London a course of lectures (“Comparative Ethics”), to which all members of the Society resident in the metropolitan district were invited to attend free of charge.

Various attempts have been made to apply systematically to the development of sociology those organised instruments of research (Observatory, Laboratory, Museum, etc.) which have so effectively aided the progress of the physical and natural sciences. It is one of the objects of the Sociological

Society to investigate such initiatives as those of the Musée Social in Paris, the Institut de Sociologie in Brussels, the Outlook Tower in Edinburgh, and the Laboratory of Sociology in Palermo. The Society proposes to examine into the effectiveness of such apparatus and institutions for Research, and, if advisable, advocate and encourage the development of these and the promotion of similar initiatives elsewhere.

LIBRARY AND PUBLISHING FUND.

The efficient working of the Society depends in large measure upon its general ability to raise considerable funds in addition to the ordinary subscription of members. In order to raise the money urgently required for the purchase of books and periodicals, and for the issue of a Journal, an appeal is made for special subscriptions, donations and gifts.

This country is alone amongst the leading nations in having no scientific journal devoted exclusively to sociological studies. Such journals, however, can hardly be expected to be self-supporting, and the issue of such a periodical at first involves a considerable, though it is to be hoped, diminishing outlay.

Should funds permit, the Society will also undertake other publications. There are, for instance, not a few foreign sociological works of the first importance urgently demanding translation.

While the Society aims at being self-supporting, its necessarily heavy initial capital outlays, its low subscription, and yet, in all likelihood, its limited membership, compel an appeal to the generosity of individual members to supplement their subscription by an initial donation, or by an addition to their annual subscription. Leaving ordinary expenditure to be met by the annual subscriptions, there is still required a capital sum, estimated at about £5,000, for the efficient establishment of the Society, including the collection of a Reference Library. Towards this capital fund the Society has already received numerous donations in cash and books.

CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP.

Membership of the Society is open to all who are interested in the promotion of the scientific study of social phenomena.

The rate of subscription has been fixed at £1 1s. (26 francs, \$5, 21 marks) per annum.

The payment for life membership is £10, 10s. (260 francs, \$50, 210 marks). Libraries and other Corporate Bodies are admissible as members.

PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE MOVEMENT

PROFESSOR FLINT, in his recent book "PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM; AND A HISTORY OF CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE SCIENCES." (pp. 336-8), says:—

In America, and all the chief countries of Europe, sociology has now attracted to itself a wide, vivid, and growingly increasing interest. Perhaps its importance has been most adequately realised in the United States, where it has been taught in almost all their universities, and in a generally independent and practical way. Britain must be admitted to have lagged behind, but has now seemingly awakened up to its duty and interests in the matter. The newly formed Sociological Society starts on right lines, and promises to be worthy of what it should be. It is to be hoped that it may have, as so many other countries already have, an appropriate literary organ for such a science as sociology is. The great variety of classifications of the contents of sociology to be found in books and pamphlets at the present time should not be regarded as in any way disproving or discrediting the validity and worth of sociology. It shows merely that sociology as the general social science is an extremely comprehensive science when compared or contrasted with the special social sciences which are occupied with the composition, elements, and internal organisation of social groups within comparatively limited spheres. There are many approaches, as Prof. Geddes says, to sociology. There are likewise many sections, and also subsections, each of which has its own special characteristics, and depends on distinctive phenomena (statistical, physical, organic, psychical, anthropological, ethnological, or theological), yet which none the less belong to sociology itself.

PROFESSOR TÖNNIES, in *SCHMOLLER'S JAHRBUCH* (1904):

The death of Herbert Spencer (Dec. 8th, 1903) was almost coincident in time with the formation of a scientific society which is intimately connected with a part of his life-work; with that part, too, which left in his mind the liveliest conviction that the necessary foundations for the wide generalisations of a synthetic philosophy were not yet sufficiently firmly established. I gather from a newspaper cutting which has come into my hands that Spencer has made provisions in his will for a considerable portion of his money, and of the prospective incomings from the sale of his works to be devoted to the execution of the work which he left in torso, *i.e.*—a

descriptive sociology—a compilation of ethnological, historical, and statistical data in tabulated form, to be extended gradually to all peoples in the world. There is not the slightest doubt that, had the Sociological Society which was founded on November 20th, 1903, come into being a few years earlier, it would have received not only his strongest sympathy, but also his most energetic support. The value he would have attributed to it—at least if it had been established on lines he approved—may be inferred from the fact that he has remembered in his will no fewer than twelve scientific societies and institutions of which, it is true, only the Geographical Society and the British Association can be said to have any distinct relation to sociological studies. . . .

The work of a learned society is determined by the work of the science which it aims at promoting. Is "sociology" the name of a science or of a plurality of sciences? I believe that if we only look deep enough we shall find that the name of every science—with the exception of the formal sciences—includes both meanings. The general part in which the principles are developed is itself a specific subject-matter, and is indeed the subject-matter of the science, whose name must also comprehend all its particular parts. Hence arise the confusions which are conspicuous throughout the old field of scientific problems. They are most frequent when we are tempted to enter on those untrodden and unexplored regions in which there are no signposts.

With regard to sociology, we may emphasise either its own distinctive subject-matter or its general and synthetic character. For a sociological society, the former would *theoretically* be the only correct, because definite and certain, way in which the powers which are to be concentrated can be directed. *Practically*, however, the other way will prove to be more efficacious, perhaps even necessary, when it is a case of enlisting new forces.

Fortunately, the services to be rendered by the society depend not so much on its programme as on the men who carry it out, and on the pecuniary means to be placed at their disposal. We have every reason to believe that neither men nor means will be to seek in Great Britain. The founding of the society is in any case an important event. For the British Empire affords opportunities and conditions equalled by hardly any other nation for a systematic and increasingly searching inquiry into the social conditions, customs, and morals of the so-called "uncivilised races." Think too of the significance for the whole science of culture of the predominance of the English tongue on this planet! of the English administration of India, the English influence in Japan and China. Then, again, for the highly developed and intricate conditions of a modern industrial nation, London must always be the central observatory. To make use of all the data thus acquired in the historical and conceptual understanding of human culture and its developments—this is the task of sociology; or, to be more precise, of applied sociology, in contradistinction to its pure or philosophical side. Whether widely or narrowly conceived, however, sociology must ever be mindful of its indebtedness to such men as Herbert Spencer, E. B. Tylor, Sir John Lubbock, Sir Henry Maine, Sir Alfred E. Lyall, and Mr. McLennan, with whom we may associate the best historians, statisticians, and descriptive economists.

To labour in their spirit, to organise and concentrate efforts, is a task worthy of the English Sociological Society. The learned world need have no scruple in extending a warm welcome to the new society.

DR. C. W. SALEEBY (in the *ACADEMY*), Nov. 1, 1904 :

From Hobbes to Galton this country has a distinguished list of those who have contributed to the study of society and its laws. In the production of original ideas our countrymen have been second to none. This is an assertion which has been systematically tested and established by Dr. Merz, of Newcastle, the erudite and impartial student who is now engaged upon the third volume of his invaluable history of nineteenth-century thought. But abuse and neglect are the portion which we usually mete out to our pioneers, whilst their ideas are developed in other lands. Thus it comes about that only within the last few months has there been established in this country a sociological society. Thus also it happens that whilst there are six official teachers of sociology in such a place as Chicago, the forthcoming session of the University of London is to see, for the first time, a systematic series of lectures on sociology—a subject which has no chair or lectureship in any university in the British Isles. The London University lectures are made possible by the recent benefaction of Mr. Martin White, one of the founders of the Sociological Society; and his generosity and enterprise have also induced the University authorities to include sociology as an honours subject for its science degree in economics. It was indeed high time that the science to which all others are ancillary, the science to which many of the greatest thinkers of past time have endeavoured to contribute, should at last find a home in the metropolis.

But the Sociological Society needs public support. It asks for the support of all who believe or suspect that there are laws of society. It has no other aim than to further our knowledge of those laws. It recognises no tests of creed or party, numbering members whose opinions vary within limits as wide as those of the Metaphysical Society, of which Manning and Huxley were members.

THE WESTMINSTER GAZETTE, April 19, 1904 :

While sociology has won a distinct and important place among the academic studies of France, Germany, and the United States, and the practical utility of this organised study of society is gaining ever wider recognition among thoughtful politicians, officials, moral teachers, and social reformers, Great Britain has lagged behind. Though Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Social Statics" were published in 1850, the resistance offered by the specialising tendencies of the age to the work of unification of social studies, of which Comte and Spencer were the pioneers, was successful in retarding for half a century the progress of the new science. Like political economy and psychology, two of its contributory studies, it has had everywhere to run the gauntlet of the vested intellectual interests unwilling to admit the claims of a newcomer whose large dimensions threatened many acts of trespass. Even now none of our universities contains any department of sociology, or has any professed teacher of that subject on its staff. Much work of a genuinely sociological character has, of course, been done by single students, especially in the collection and classification of social phenomena; and Governmental officers and commissions are continually engaged on what are, in effect, important branches of sociological research. But the waste of energy, from want of scientific method and of correlation of effort, is enormous. This lack of scientific

and practical economy is the chief justification for the existence of the Sociological Society, which aims at building slowly, on a sound assured foundation of ascertained facts, the unified structure of a science and an art of social growth. "The origin and development, the decay and extinction of societies, their structure and classification, their internal functions and interactions, have to be observed and compared." Such a study is essential to rescue, not only politics, but the whole field of social reform from the dominion of charlatans, sciolists, or short-range opportunists. The science of society must always remain the least exact of the sciences, but it is not on that account the least important. Even those who do not believe that society can be treated as an organism, and who look askance at the phraseology of social evolution, must be alive to the utility of co-operation among the workers in the several social sciences.

All such persons must recognise the claim of the Sociological Society to "afford the common ground on which workers from all fields and schools may profitably meet."

THE SPEAKER, April 16, 1904:

That the death of Mr. Herbert Spencer should have been synchronous with the birth of a sociological society in Great Britain, whose size and character afford promise of solid scientific work, is a significant coincidence. It is full eighty years since the encyclopædic Frenchman Auguste Comte invented the useful though barbarous name "sociology," and fifty years since Mr. Spencer began to publish his monumental labours on this portion of his synthetic philosophy. His more popular volume, "The Study of Sociology," made a powerful impression on the minds of the thinking minority, and, taken in conjunction with the liberal interpretation given to "politics" by such men as Mr. Buckle, Mr. Bagehot, and Professor Sheldon Amos, gave promise of considerable influence for the latest of the "sciences." But the times were not yet ripe for what seemed to more conservative scientists the intrusion of a pretentious charlatan into the preserve of the accredited sciences. An attempt of the devotees of the new study to assert their serious purpose through a social science association holding congresses drew considerable popular attention in the eighties; but, frowned upon by academic potentates and weakened by internal differences regarding the political and economic application of social principles, the movement flickered and died out. During the last ten years a remarkable advance of sociology in other countries—especially in France and the United States, where it has now won a solid, admitted position in many of the best organised universities, drawing into its pursuit many of the best-equipped intellects of these nations—has altogether altered the situation. So much advance has been made in special departments of the study of man in society, particularly in history, in economics, and in anthropology; the natural sciences, especially physiography and biology, have generated so many social implications, while the notable advance of psychology has formed such a substantial and frequented bridge between the sciences of "nature" and of mind, that the demand for a formal recognition of this focussing of many lights upon the nature of human society can no longer be denied. The new Sociological Society, whose constitution has been just completed, is a response to this demand.

To gather, compare, sort, and utilise for the deduction of social principles, well-attested facts gathered from the various sources here indicated is a work whose importance can hardly be overstated, not only in the interests of science or organised curiosity, but of practice. For we are glad to see it definitely recognised in the programme of the Sociological Society that its aims are not only scientific, but educational and practical. Both Comte and Spencer forcibly realised that it was the business of a science of society to furnish the principles for a social art, and that it was nowise derogatory to the disinterested character of the science that it should be required to prove its capacity of service to man by yielding sound principles of practice. Believing, as we now do, that social evolution in industry, politics, and other spheres of conduct is largely modifiable by human reason and the general will, it is supremely important to inform and clarify that reason for the guidance of that will. Those who peruse the remarkably representative list of names which form the provisional committee of the new society need entertain no suspicions or fears of dilettantism on the one hand, or of premature and rash propagandism on the other. The two hundred and more members of this committee comprise most of the well-known teachers and writers upon economics, philosophy, and anthropology; besides many specialists in law, criminology, and kindred subjects; a large sprinkling of members of Parliament and administrative officials; the principals of settlements; and other educationists and workers in definite paths of social reform.

THE DAILY CHRONICLE, April 19, 1904:

The society represents men holding very diverse views on economic, social and other subjects, and has been established to fill a blank of educational work in England. France, Germany and other Continental countries, as well as the United States, have institutions for the systematic study of the sciences and arts relating to human society, and the co-ordination of these efforts by the recognition of their unity under sociology. While they have been making great advances, no serious attempt has been made in England to carry on the work to which Herbert Spencer gave so powerful an impulse.

While able investigators, not a few, have been labouring in various fields of social study, elaborating theories or collecting and grouping social phenomena, there has been no intellectual organisation of their work, so as to secure economy and progress. There is no chair of sociology in any of our universities; and though, owing to the enthusiasm of Professor Geddes and a few other students, one or two small schools of sociology have recently been formed in Edinburgh, London, and elsewhere, this proper study of mankind, the latest of the sciences, has received less welcome in Great Britain than in any other civilised country.

The objects of the new society which is now formed are scientific, educational, and practical. It aims at "affording a common ground on which workers in various fields of social study may profitably meet."

From such co-operation, it claims that not merely will economy and mutual aid proceed, but an organised stream of ordered knowledge will flow to feed the practical arts of politics and social conduct.

The present time is particularly favourable for this effort. The

break-up of older ideas and the abandonment of older ideals in so many departments of thought has generated a barren and a most injurious sort of "opportunism" in the conduct of public life. A return to principles is admitted in many quarters to be essential to progress, and those principles, in conformity with the scientific spirit of our time, must be based upon carefully collected and ordered facts. The work done in special fields by such men as Messrs. Booth and Rowntree, Mr. and Mrs. Webb (to name one or two recent instances), as well as by Governmental inquiries into many industrial and other social problems, requires, in order to yield its full fruits, the existence of such a hierarchy of students as is implied in an organised study of sociology. The academic theorist, the fact-grubber, the politician, the moral teacher or clergyman, the social reformer in every sort requires the solid intellectual support which such a sociology alone can give,

